

FURTHER REPORT

ON THE

INTERVIEW AT ALI MUSJID

BETWEEN

BRITISH AND AFGHAN OFFICERS

On 21st September 1878.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1879.

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 30 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Fort William, the 31st January 1879.
MY LORD,
IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 116, Secret, dated the 31st of October 1878, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Major Cavagnari offering remarks in respect to a report of the discussion in the House of Commons on the actual circumstances of the interview between himself, accompanied by Colonel Jenkins, and Faiz Mahomed Khan, which took place at Ali Musjid on the 21st of September 1878.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.

Dated Jellalabad, 17th January 1879.

From Major N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer, Jellalabad, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE just perused in the *Standard* of the 7th December a report of the discussion in the House of Commons regarding the interview which took place at Ali Musjid on the 21st September last. I deem it advisable to make the following remarks.

2. At the time of submitting our written reports to His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, neither Colonel Jenkins or myself deemed it necessary to enter into too minute detail regarding the hostile appearances of things around us. Whatever danger there may have been of actual collision, we had returned without any such collision, and had effected the object for which we had been deputed, namely, to ascertain whether the British Mission would be allowed to proceed past Ali Musjid or not. We, therefore, from motives perfectly intelligible to all British officers, dwelt lightly on what had happened, and confined ourselves to giving a brief narrative of the interview, and deemed it only important to report with preciseness the actual reply given by Faiz Mahomed Khan, which was unmistakeably, "*that if the Mission advanced it would be opposed by force.*"

3. Our reports were, I think, sufficiently complete to show that the hostile preparations—notwithstanding that I had taken the precaution to send and apprise the Afghan officials of the approach of our small party for the purposes of a parley—fully justified Faiz Mahomed Khan in claiming credit for the friendly disposition he personally entertained, when he stated that it was only on that account *that he had restrained his men from firing on us*. I repeat what I stated in my report that Faiz Mahomed Khan behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed Colonel Jenkins and myself, but he never flinched from the reply he was instructed to give. The Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly interpreted my meaning that Faiz Mahomed Khan had a very disagreeable duty to perform, and did it in a courtly and gentlemanly manner.

4. I may mention one more fact to show that it would be somewhat difficult to over-colour the hostile intention of the Afghan officials, as observed by those who took part in the proceedings. Turabaz Khan, a Duffadar in the Guide Cavalry, noticing the state of affairs, instinctively got ready a cartridge for immediate action. He is an Afridi, noted for cool courage and determination, and has been granted the "Order of Merit" for gallantry in the Sapri Expedition. He may perhaps be regarded as better able to form an opinion as to what was contemplated by the Afghans and Afridis who surrounded our small party than either Colonel Jenkins or myself, though we both fully appreciated the nature of the situation, and although personally grateful to Faiz Mahomed Khan for his courteous behaviour, we felt that, notwithstanding that his friendly disposition had averted a collision, there was, judging from the hostile preparations made, but slight difference as regards the indignity offered to the friendly British Mission, whether words or bullets conveyed the insult intended by the Afghan Government.

I FULLY concur in what has been written above by Major Cavagnari.

(Signed)

F. H. JENKINS,

Brigadier-General,

Commanding 3rd Brigade.

AFGHANISTAN, No. 6.

DESPATCH

FROM THE

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

No. 136 of 1879,

FORWARDING

TREATY OF PEACE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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1879.

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DESPATCH.

No 136 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 2nd June 1879.

WE have the honour to inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a Treaty of Peace between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies. This Treaty was concluded at Gandamak, in Afghanistan, on the 26th May last, and was ratified at Simla by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General on the 30th May. Copy of telegrams that passed between the Viceroy and the Amir, upon the signature by His Highness of the Treaty, is also inclosed.

2. We propose to address your Lordship at an early date upon the subject of the recent military operations in Afghanistan, and generally upon the course of political events and transactions which have led to the settlement, by this Treaty, of definite relations with His Highness the Amir.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
" F. P. HAINES.
" A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
" A. CLARKE.
" JOHN STRACHEY.
" E. B. JOHNSON.
" W. STOKES.
" A. R. THOMPSON.

TREATY between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and HIS HIGHNESS MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer on Special Duty, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Right Honourable Edward Robert Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The following Articles of a Treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies :—

ARTICLE 1.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness' dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandize carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

ARTICLE 8.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar

and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed,* shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawur and Jellalabad Districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1296, A.H.

(Sd.) AMIR MUHAMMAD
YAKUB KHAN.



(Sd.) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major,*
Polit. Officer on Special Duty.

(Sd.) LYTTON.



This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla, on Friday, this 30th day of May 1879.

(Sd.) A. C. LYALL,
Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th May 1879.

FROM MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, TO VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA.

Now that the Treaty of Peace has been concluded, it only remains for me to express to Your Excellency, as the Representative of Her Imperial Majesty, my sincere hope that the friendly relations now established between the two States may day by day increase.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th May 1879.

FROM VICEROY OF INDIA, SIMLA, TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

I HAVE received with sincere pleasure the news of the conclusion of peace between our two Governments, and Your Highness' friendly telegram. I feel confident that the Treaty now signed will conduce to the mutual advantage of the two States, and to the consolidation of Your Highness' authority; and I shall always earnestly co-operate towards the fulfilment of the good wishes expressed by Your Highness, which I cordially reciprocate.

* NOTE.—Omitted for the present.

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1879.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, LAHORE, dated 20th November, 1878.

Lahore, 10 p.m.

No reply having been received from Ameer, orders have been issued to-night for advance at all points to-morrow morning in accordance with our proposals of 19th October and your telegram 7th November.

No. 1a.

REPLY from SECRETARY OF STATE, 21st November 1878.

Your telegram of 20th. Proposed advance approved.

No. 2.

No. 154 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp, Lahore, 12th December 1878.

I HAVE the honour to enclose the translation made of the reply sent by the Amír Sher Ali Khan to my letter of the 29th October last to His Highness. The substance of this reply was telegraphed to your Lordship on the 5th December; and on the 7th, the full text was telegraphed.

2. The Amír's letter is dated 19th November, and was delivered at the head-quarters of the British Camp at Dakka on the 30th November. It has been ascertained that a messenger, bearing this or some other similar letter from the Amír, reached Basawal on the 22nd November, but that he returned with the letter to Kabul on hearing of the fall of Ali Masjid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure in No. 2.

TRANSLATION of LETTER from HIS HIGHNESS the AMÍR of KABUL, to His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 19th November 1878.

BE it known to your Excellency that I have received, and read from beginning to end, the friendly letter which your Excellency has sent in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawáb Ghulám Hassan Khan. With regard to the expressions used by your Excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the friendly character of the Mission and the good-will of the British Government, I leave it to your Excellency, whose wisdom and justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance can be placed upon good-will, if it be evidenced by words only. But if, on the other hand, good-will really consists of deeds and actions, then, it has not been manifested by the various wishes that have been expressed, and the proposals that have been made by British Officials during the last few years to Officials of this God-granted Government,—proposals which, from their nature, it was impossible for them to comply with.

One of these proposals referred to my undutiful son, the ill-starred wretch Muhammad Yákúb Khan, and was contained in a letter addressed by the Officials of

the British Government to the British Agent then residing in Kabul. It was written in that letter that if the said Yákúb Khan be released and set at liberty, our friendship with the Afghán Government will be firmly cemented; but that otherwise it will not.

There are several other grounds of complaint of a similar nature which contain no evidence of good will, but which, on the contrary, were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of this God-granted Government.

With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission, your Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British Government.

I assure your Excellency that, on the contrary, the Officials of this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered; but they were afraid that the independence of this Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two Governments for several years might be annihilated.

A paragraph in your Excellency's letter corroborates the statement which they have made to this Government. The feelings of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of Afghánistán by the mere announcement of the intention of the British Government to send a Mission to Kabul, before the Mission itself had actually started or arrived at Pesháwar, have subsequently been fully justified by the statement in your Excellency's letter that I should be held responsible for any injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the Mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation to them for any loss they might have suffered; and that, if at any time those tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the British Government would at once take steps to protect them. Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object of the Mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of violence used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage, as such Missions are customary and of frequent occurrence between allied States. I am now sincerely stating my own feelings when I say that this Government has maintained, and always will maintain, the former friendship which existed between the two Governments, and cherishes no feelings of hostility and opposition towards the British Government.

It is also incumbent upon the Officials of the British Government, that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and eminence of their own Government, they should not consent to inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of their sincere friends; but, on the contrary, they should exert themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which have hitherto existed towards this God-granted Government, in order that the relations between the two Governments may remain on the same footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied States, the British Government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small escort not exceeding 20 or 30 men, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission, this Servant of God will not oppose its progress.

No. 3.

No. 161 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department. (Extract.)

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, the 27th December 1878.

* * * * *

2. In October last, His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab reported that the Chief of the States, named in the margin, were anxious that their troops might be associated with any military movements that might take place on the frontier. Mr. Egerton expressed his belief that the offers which he communicated to the Government were spontaneous and genuine indications of the

Patála, Baháwulpur, Nábha, Jhind, Kapurthalla,
Sirmur (Nahan), Malair Kotla, Faridkot.

loyalty of those who made them. To accept such offers, and to encourage such indications, was for several reasons politic and opportune; the feeling and spirit of the people generally in the Punjab were undoubtedly in favour of active reprisals against the Amir for his behaviour toward the Government of India, and the Chiefs were the natural and influential representatives of this feeling; while the Rajahs of Nábha, Jhind, and Patiála had been conspicuous in 1857 for their prompt and effective adherence to the British Government.

3. The Government of India, accordingly, cordially acknowledged and accepted the offers of the Punjab Chiefs; and His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor undertook the measures requisite for assembling the various contingents, and for slightly improving and assimilating their general organization. The troops furnished by the Nawab of Baháwulpur were detached to Multan, which is close to their own country, and where they could be at once useful on garrison duty; the other selected bodies of cavalry, infantry, and artillery were brought together at Lahore early in December, where they were placed under the command of Brigadier-General Watson. At Lahore the Viceroy, accompanied on the ground by the Maharaja of Kashmir and by the Chiefs whose men were paraded, reviewed the whole force, whose conduct and condition were very satisfactory. At the close of the review His Excellency addressed the officers, congratulating them and the Chiefs on the appearance of their men, and expressing his pleasure at this public demonstration of the readiness of the States' troops to join the Imperial Army. The entire corps is now on the march toward Peshawur.

4. We have received from very many other Chiefs in India, and from the Ministers of Hyderabad and Baroda, letters offering to send troops to serve with our army in the war which is now being prosecuted against the Amir Sher Ali Khan. Many of the Chiefs have placed all the resources of their States at our disposal, and some of them have expressed a desire to take a personal share in the campaign; Sir Salar Jung and his colleague have each asked permission to send a near relative to join the staff of the Generals commanding in Afghanistan, and arrangements are being made accordingly. We have been exceedingly gratified by such a wide manifestation of the loyal spirit which animates our feudatories, and by these proofs of their unhesitating adherence, in the present state of affairs, to the active policy of the Government. All these offers have been suitably acknowledged; although there are many obvious reasons why the great majority of them cannot, for the present at least, be accepted. We have indeed no intention, as matters now stand, of calling out any troops of the States besides those which, as this letter reports, have already been mobilized.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
A. R. THOMPSON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th December 1878.

FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Ally Bughan through Jumrood, to VICEROY, Viceroy's Camp.

December 19th.—Authentic intelligence of flight of the Ameer from Cabul for Turkistan accompanied by the remaining officers of Russian Mission. Yakoob Khan released and left at Cabul. Full particulars will be communicated after interview with Resaldar-Major Nukhshdund Khan, pensioner, who will reach Jellalabad to-morrow. Ameer appears to have nearly lost all authority at Cabul, but* his departure, and his soldiers deserted in large numbers. Country between Jellalabad and Cabul in state of anarchy. Sirdar Khalu Khan has succeeded in preserving order at Jellalabad and in parts of Lughman. In order to restrain Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, the Ameer has sent the Sirdar's family to Turkistan. I am sending off at once a special messenger to Cabul to ascertain the sentiments of Yakoob Khan. Sir S. Browne and troops will reach Jellalabad to-morrow.

No. 5.

TRANSLATION of a FIRMAN issued by AMIR SHER ALI KHAN, dated 22nd December 1878, communicated by the Meshed Agent.

LET the high in rank, &c., Sirdar Muhammad Omer Khan, the Governor of Herat, Tolmshir Sahib and Hasan Ali Khan, the Sipah Sala-i-Aazim, be honoured by this Royal Firman and know—

That, having previously announced the result of the fights of our victorious troops to-day, also that by the Grace of God a series of victories have been won by the lion-devouring warriors, we have deemed it necessary to announce the details of the same to you, so that you may be made fully aware of the facts.

The state of affairs and of hostilities on the Khyber frontier line are as follows :—At the outset there were only five regiments stationed at Ali Masjid as a permanent garrison when the British troops advanced to attack them. The said five regiments gave battle to fourteen of the infidel white regiments, and for about eight hours the roaring of the cannon and musketry, together with the clashing of the swords, were incessant; till, in accordance with the words of the holy verse, "There is no victory except that which comes from God," the goodness and strength of the Almighty aided the lion-catching warriors, and they totally defeated the English Army, when a considerable number being killed and wounded on both sides a stop was put to further fighting and each side retired to his own camp.

Six days after, two other engagements took place at Peiwar, where the victorious troops, again in their zeal to push back the infidel army, brought on a day like that of the Day of Judgment, and rushing on like a torrent compelled the infidels to fall back.

Since then to the present moment the English troops have not dared to show fight, nor to make any advance. In fact, on account of the severity of the winter and especially by the action of Ooloosat people and the Afridi tribes, who are anxious for the infliction of loss on their (the English) lives and property, it is quite certain that they will not make any forward advance.

As perfect harmony exists in all the affairs of this mighty Government, most of the Nobles and Chiefs of this country have made certain representations to us in person with the view of putting a stop to this mischief which may affect the peace of this Government. The opinion of our ministers and military officers being also in conformity with our royal views, we have decided that to put a stop to the present trouble there is no alternative but to have recourse to friendly negotiations as opposed to hostility and warfare; for instance, although our enemy should give up his hostile attitude and the idea of interference in Afghanistan, yet having taken up arms against us he ought to be bound down by diplomatic action.

It now being winter and his advance difficult, and, as in the spring this evil will be sure to break out afresh, there is no better opportunity than the present, when the enemy has not the power of moving in consequence of the severity of the winter, that our royal self should proceed to the capital of Russia, and open an official correspondence with the British Government. We have accordingly, in conformity of the approval of our ministers and a number of our well-wishers, decided on proceeding to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Russian Emperor, and have appointed our elder and beloved son, Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan, to act in our absence, leaving the whole of our Sardars, *viz.*, Sar Ghatamshir Bahadur Khan, Daud Shah Khan, Hyder Khan, Ghatamshir Bahadur, Muhammad Karim Khan, Ghatamshir Bahadur, the Mighty Regiments, Mirza Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Naib Muhammad Rahim Khan, the Royal Archives, the Treasury, and the special Chamberlains, under his immediate orders. We also, under an auspicious fortune, and putting our trust in Almighty God, left Kabul on the 13th December, accompanied by our illustrious brother (*sic*) Sardar Sher Ali Khan, Shah Muhammad Khan, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mirza Habibullah, the Mustaufi-ul-Momalek, Kazi Abdul Kadar Khan, a few servants, and one "Namadek Kadek Uptur," the Russian envoys who also took part in the council we held respecting this journey together with the High Princes, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and Sardar Muhammad Taki Khan.

We received letters from the Governor-General, General Stolietoff, at the station named Sir Cheshmeh; Stolietoff, who was with the Emperor at Livadia having written to us as follows :—

"The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you also, who are on the other side of the water,* must display the same sense of friendship and brotherhood.

* *i.e.*, Oxus. The English Government is anxious to come to terms with you through the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take his advice and counsel; but the

Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country, and, like last year, you are to treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold season passes away, then the Almighty's will will be made manifest to you, that is to say, the (Russian) Government having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will come to your assistance. In short, you are to rest assured that affairs will end well. If God permits, we will convene a Government meeting at St. Petersburg, that is to say, a congress which means an assembly of powers. We will then open an official discussion with the English Government, and either by force of words and diplomatic action we will entirely cut off all English communication and interference with Afghanistan for ever, or else events will end in a mighty and important war. By the help of God, by spring not a symptom or vestige of trouble and dissatisfaction will remain in Afghanistan."

It therefore behoves our well-wishing servants to conduct the affairs entrusted to them in a praiseworthy and resolute manner better than before, and having placed their hopes in God, rest confident that the welfare and affairs of this glorious Government will continue on a firm footing as before, and the mischief and disaffection which seem to have arisen in the country will disappear.

Let it be known to the high in rank, Tolmshir Bahadur and Hafizulla Khan, Secretary to the Sipah Salar-i-Aazim, that, thanks to God, the trouble we have been taking for a series of years in instructing and improving the officers of our victorious regiments has not been lost, and in fighting the English troops they have displayed the same bravery as the force of the civilized nations. Not one of the victorious troops went to Heaven until he had himself slain three of the enemy. In short, they fought in such a way, and made such a stand, that both high and low praised them. We are fully confident that our victorious troops wherever they may fight will defeat the enemy.

The Herat Army is also noted for its bravery and discipline, a result of your devoted services. You will convey our royal satisfaction to all the troops and inhabitants of Herat, high and low, and tell them that our hope is that God and his Prophet may be as satisfied with them as we are.

No. 6.

No. 5 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 3rd January 1878.

ON the 28th of December 1878, his Excellency the Viceroy had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship the full text of a letter addressed by the Amir Shere Ali Khan to the officers of the British Government in which His Highness wrote that he was leaving his kingdom and was proceeding to St. Petersburg, in order to lay his affairs before the Powers of Europe. We have now the honour to forward printed copies of the letter in question.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
N. B. CHAMBERLAIN.

LETTER from the AMIR SHERE ALI KHAN to the OFFICERS of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT, dated 13th December 1878.

BE it known to the Officers of the British Government that this supplicant before God never supposed nor wished that the matters (in dispute) between you and myself should come to this issue (literally "should come out from the curtain"), or that the veil of friendship and amity which has for many years been upheld between two neighbours and adjoining States should without any cause be thus drawn aside.

And since you have begun the quarrel and hostilities, and have advanced on Afghan territory, this supplicant before God, with the unanimous consent and advice of all the nobles, grandees, and of the army in Afghanistan, having abandoned his troops, his

realm, and all the possessions of his crown, has departed with expedition, accompanied by a few attendants, to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Czar of Russia, where before a Congress* the whole history of the transactions between myself and yourselves will be submitted to all the Powers (of Europe). If you have anything in dispute with me regarding State Affairs in Afghanistan, you should institute and establish your case at St. Petersburg, and state and explain what you desire; so that the questions in dispute between us may be made known and clear to all the powers. And surely the side of right will not be overlooked. If your intentions are otherwise, and you entertain hostile and vindictive feelings toward the people of Afghanistan, God alone is their protector and real preserver. Upon the course of action here above stated, this supplicant before God has resolved and decided.

No. 7.

TELEGRAM from LT -GENERAL STEWART to SECRETARY OF STATE, received 11th January 1879.

CAMAN Kushab, 8th.—Shortly after marching yesterday morning I received news that Governor of Kandahar with most of Kabul officials fled the previous night towards Herat; garrison with him are disbanded. Deputy Governor has sent offering submission. Troops will march through city of Kandahar to-day. Population everywhere friendly.

No. 8.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the HERAT CORRESPONDENT, dated 12th January 1879, communicated by the Meshed Agent.

A SERVANT of the Sepah Salar, who had been sent from here to Kabul, returned to-day. He brought several letters of the Amir Sher Ali Khan written from Bamian, to the Herat authorities, informing them that he (the Amir) having been repeatedly invited to St. Petersburg to attend a European Congress respecting his affairs, and the concluding of an alliance with Russia, and the Russian Envoy having also been instructed to urge his departure, he had accordingly left Kabul for St. Petersburg, taking Sardar Sher Ali Khan, Mirza Habibullah Khan, Mustaufi, the son of Sardar Muhammad Shercef Khan, and several others, as well as two Ressalas of horse with him.

He had also written that one or more engagements had taken place between the British and Afghan troops in the Khyber Pass, in which the former had been beaten back, and that the news of the capture of Jalalabad and Kandahar is quite false. That the (Herat) authorities were not to be alarmed in the least, but were to keep the country in perfect order and guard the frontiers until he should be able to arrange his affairs and return from Russia, and that he had entrusted the affairs of Kabul to Sardar Muhammad Yakub Khan.

It is also said that the British authorities instigated the Khyberis to fight with the Amir's troops, urging them to defeat them with great loss.

The Amir has removed all his family to Turkistan.

The horsemen ordered to Kandahar have not yet left here. I think the authorities are afraid to denude the city of cavalry.

No. 9.

No. 70 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp Lahore, the 27th March 1879.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers which relate to the overtures which have recently been made by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces at Jelalabad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a Letter dated Thursday, 20th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

PREVIOUS to this I received from you a kind letter couched in friendly and sympathizing terms.

As the substance of that letter was friendship and kindness, and as it contained no clear and obvious expression which might form a basis for the settlement of the trivial dispute and the removal of the temporary hostility which have occurred, I also, in my reply, confined myself to the expression of friendship and fidelity, in the hope that I should speedily receive a second letter from you which might allude to friendship and for the removal of the temporary hostility, and which I would certainly have replied to in a becoming and proper manner.

Up to the present you have shown delay and hesitation, and, as you made no effort in sending it, (the "second letter") I did not know what advantage it was which you had in view, or what result it was which you desired.

Therefore, considering that delay in the attainment of what is desired tends to the extreme loss and injury of both parties, and with a view merely to the welfare of both sides, and the advantage of both States, I have not thought it proper to delay any longer.

It were better if the dispute were adjusted and the hostility removed from both sides.

For that reason I write in a friendly way to say that I wish to use every exertion in this matter, so that through the favour of God, and human endeavour, I may adjust the accidental quarrel, and remove the trivial hostility which has arisen between the two States, and may also obtain for myself very great credit on account of the benefit accruing to both parties. But I know not whether this accidental hostility and this petty dispute are capable of removal and adjustment, or not.

As I have a constant and firm trust in the officers of the illustrious British Government, and as they have the power in this good work, of getting me a good name, I hope and desire that, as is proper and becoming, they will exert themselves in the adjustment of this matter, and not prefer hostility and quarrelling to harmony and friendship.

It is clear that in enmity and strife there will be very great loss and injury to both parties; and no other result will be obtained.

Should this matter be susceptible of arrangement and adjustment, I hope you will kindly inform me, so that I may, in a similar manner, bring every human effort to bear on my exalted father in the hope that, perhaps, the friendship of this God-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remain constant and firm.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th February 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta. (Extract).

Letter from Yakub Khan, dated 26th February, just received by special messenger. Contents as follows:—

Since despatch of my last letter, news reached Kabul on the 26th February of the death of my father on the 21st February. As my father was an old friend of the British Government, I send this information out of friendship. Letter ends. Bearer of the letter is Shahghasi Shah Sarwar Khan, nephew of Shahghasi Sherdil Khan. Sirdars Ahmed Ali Jan and Ibrahim Khan have fled from this. Letter affords favorable opportunity for opening negotiations with Yakub Khan. The special messenger was urged to convey the letter as speedily as possible, and was only two days on the road. I suggest sending a friendly letter of condolence.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER dated 26th February 1879, from SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

PREVIOUS to this I sent you a letter dated the 29th of the month of Safar (21st February 1879), designed for the establishment of relations of friendship and the settlement of the quarrel which has broken out between the British and Afghan States, and stating

that if the matter were capable of adjustment, I would undertake to step in and use my endeavours to that end. That letter you, no doubt, have received.

I now write a second time, in accordance with former friendship to inform you that to-day, Wednesday, the 4th Rabi-ul-awal (the 26th February 1879), a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon Friday, 29th Safar (the 21st February 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the Divine mercy. Since every living thing must relinquish the robe of life, and must drink the draught of death, I remain resigned and patient under this heavy calamity and misfortune.

As my exalted father was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Government I have, out of friendship, sent you this intimation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, No. 795A.P., dated 3rd March 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad.

Your telegram, 28th February, to Viceroy. Send Yakub Khan suitable letter of condolence as you suggest.

Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., to SARDAR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, dated the 5th March 1879.

AFTER the expressions of sympathy and sorrow, which is the customary mode of racers of the straight path of this transient world, I beg to inform you that at this unfortunate moment I have received your mournful letter, intimating an event, in recording which the pen sheds the tears of sorrow and the paper utters the sounds of pain, *viz.*, the departure of His Highness the Amir Sahib Bahadur from this transient world, (to which every one must bid adieu), to the everlasting one, which is the real abode of all (human) beings. This sad news has caused an indescribable sorrow and pain to sincere friends.

Since "every being on the face of the earth must respond to the call of death," and quit this fleeting world, it behoves all survivors and the lonely travellers of this world to recline against the cushion of patience and submission to the will of Providence, since no good can result from the opposite course, as Urfi has said—"Were a meeting with a beloved one to be procured by weeping, one might weep for a number* of years in the hope of obtaining the desired meeting."

* Literally a hundred years.

I can suggest no other course than to have patience. May the most High and Glorious God, through His mercy and grace, assign the deceased Amir an abode in the highest heaven, and bestow on his heirs patience and comfort.

Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, No. 829P., dated 6th March 1879, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad.

Your telegram to Viceroy, 26th February. Following reply should be sent to Yakub Khan. Letter begins:—

I have received the letter, dated 20th February, which your Highness has sent me; and it has been laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

His Excellency has instructed me to reply to your Highness that it has always been the desire of the British Government to maintain peace and friendship with the Government, the Sirdars, and the people of Afghanistan. The events which caused the rupture of friendly relations between the two Governments, and which compelled the British Government to declare war against the late Amir Shere Ali Khan, have been publicly proclaimed, and are well known to your Highness.

His Excellency the Viceroy has now received with satisfaction the expression of your Highness' anxiety for the renewal of friendship between the two Governments, and the assurance of your desire to make every exertion for that purpose. I am consequently authorized to communicate to you the preliminary conditions upon which, if they are

agreed to, the Viceroy is prepared to entertain negotiations for the conclusion of peace and for the restoration of a friendly alliance between the two Governments.

In the first place, the following arrangements respecting the territories now in possession of the British forces, are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquility of the North-west frontier of India :—

1. The Amir of Kabul must renounce all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes leading from Jellalabad into the Peshawur district, and over the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these passes.

2. The district of Kuram, from Thull to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi, will remain under the protection and control of the British Government.

In the next place, the foreign relations of the Kabul Government must be henceforth conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government ; and European British Officers accredited to the Kabul Government, must be permitted to reside, with suitable personal guards, at such places in Affghanistan as may hereafter be determined upon.

It is necessary for the conclusion of any friendly settlement of affairs between the two countries, that the Government at Kabul shall agree to these preliminary conditions : the Viceroy will thereupon be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace and a cordial alliance on a basis conducive to the common advantage of the two countries, and to the stability and prosperity of the Kabul ruler. Letter ends.

Bukhtiyar Khan can take this reply to Yakub, with any subsidiary instructions. Acknowledge receipt of this message.

Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

TELEGRAM, dated 6th March 1879.

FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

YOUR clear the line message of this day received and instructions understood.

Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER, dated Wednesday, 12th March 1879.

FROM SIRDAR MAHOMED YAKOUB KHAN, to MAJOR N. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.

AFTER compliments. Your friendly letter, dated the 7th March, in reply to my letter, has been received by the hands of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan ; and the whole of the contents have been fully understood. You state that you had submitted to his Excellency the Viceroy my former letter, which was simply designed for the renewal of friendship and the removal of the accidental enmity, and that his Excellency had instructed you to reply to it. You then state the object and desire of the British Government in three sentences, in detail, which I have fully comprehended.

In reply, I beg to say that I wrote to you before expressing my earnest desire, in the event of your agreeing to use every effort to restore friendship and remove enmity between the two contending parties, thereby gaining for myself a good name : and I also expressed a hope that the British Government, as it had the power, would, in this matter, get a good name for me.

I expressed that wish before the death of my father. When my father died, and the Government and Amirship of Afghanistan by the decision of the whole of the people of Afghanistan (all the chiefs and nobles and people having come and sworn allegiance) devolved upon me, I considered that it would be well for the welfare of both States if by any means strife and enmity could be changed into harmony and friendship, and the former amity restored. But I only meant so if it were compatible with my ability and capacity—to that extent I was ready to use every endeavour.

I now reply to your propositions.

1st. As this is beyond the strength and capacity of the officers of this God-granted Government, and is opposed to magnanimity and friendship, you should, out of magnanimity and friendship, depart from this condition, and, relinquishing the territories of the Afghan State which you have taken possession of recently, you should positively not interfere with them.

2nd. As this is a good and proper proposal and in conformity with friendship, there is no room for discussion or refusal. Certainly it will not be allowable for this Government, which intends friendship with the British Government, to enter into any friendship or relation with other foreign powers without the advice and consent of the officers of the British Government.

3rd. In the event of strong and firm friendship and harmony always existing between the Government of Afghanistan and the British Government, the Afghan Government out of friendship, agrees that, in accordance with the desire of the British Government several officers (*sahibs*) of rank with a proper escort, should reside on the part of the British Government in the capital only, which is Cabul, but they must not interfere in any of the affairs of Afghanistan. This to last until such time as the British Government obtains complete confidence in the constancy and faithful friendship of the Afghan Government. After that, they have the right either to withdraw the officers, or appoint them permanently, whichever they choose.

If the British Government from foresight and prudence approve and accept what has been written above, it will strengthen the friendship and tend to the welfare of both parties, and will, moreover, be in accordance with the practice of the great towards their neighbours. If, on the other hand, the British Government has other views and intentions, they are their own masters; no doubt that will come to pass which the Deity has willed.

No. 10.

No. 88 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Camp Lahore, 10th April 1879.

IN continuation of my despatch, No. 70, dated 27th March 1879, I have the

* From Major Cavagnari, dated 23rd March 1879.

From Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan dated 29th March 1879. at Jellalabad.

honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of further correspondence*, between Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan of Kabul and Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces

2. After receipt and consideration of the two letters from the Sirdar which were sent to your Lordship with my despatch above cited, I instructed Major Cavagnari to send a courteous reply, and to ascertain through his messenger, whether the Sirdar desired to discuss personally with a British Officer the obstacles to a peaceful settlement. The

† Dated 7th April 1879.

letter† which Major Cavagnari accordingly wrote is inclosed. Sirdar Yakub Khan in his answer shows himself greatly averse to yielding on the question of relinquishing territory; but he appears to consider that an interview with the British Officer may be advantageous, and he offers to receive an Envoy.

3. I have accordingly directed Major Cavagnari to make the necessary preliminary arrangements for proceeding to Kabul. He will take with him a letter‡ from myself acknowledging Sirdar Yakub Khan's letter to me announcing his father's death. And he will be empowered to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a general Treaty, if the essential point in the conditions already tendered, which is now at issue, can be satisfactorily adjusted.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., TO AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN of Kabul, dated Jellalabad, 23rd March 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your Highness' friendly letter dated 12th March 1879, in reply to my letter of the 7th idem, together with a letter addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, have been received by me and forwarded to His Excellency the Viceroy.

Meanwhile, I deem it proper to point out to your Highness certain matters of importance.

I am very glad to notice that your Highness has accepted two out of the three demands mentioned in my letter of the 7th instant, but I regret that your Highness has replied to the third demand in an uncertain manner ("mujmal"), and has, moreover, made a proposal that the British Government should absolutely withdraw from all interference in Afghanistan, and entirely evacuate the territory it has conquered.

I beg in a friendly manner to inform your Highness that this is a proposal which it is quite impossible for the British Government to accede to.

The point which your Highness has been asked to agree to is looked upon as most essential to the permanent security of the Indian frontiers, and has been adopted after much consideration with reference to the condition of Afghanistan.

I therefore entertain great hope that when your Highness has fully reflected upon the matter, you will not find this condition so difficult of acceptance, nor sufficient to prove an impediment to the development of friendly relations with the British Government which your Highness has expressed yourself desirous of effecting.

With this view I send your Highness this friendly letter by the hand of Munshi Bukhtiar Khan, and I indulge in a strong hope that, after reading it and reflecting upon the matter, your highness will send a suitable and satisfactory answer with due regard to your own personal advantage and with the view to cementing friendly relations between the British Government and Afghanistan.

I hope your Highness will always consider me as your friend and well-wisher.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 29th March 1879.

A. C.—I have received your kind letter dated the 23rd March by the hand of Munshi Baktiar Khan, and have given the fullest possible consideration and reflection to what you have written, pressing me to accept the third condition; and that you consider such acceptance as conducive to the permanent concord and alliance of the two Governments. In the permanent friendship and loyal affection to the British Government which it is my strong wish and desire to obtain, it is fitting that the British Government, having in view its own greatness and eminence, should have conferred on me numerous benefits and constant recurring advantages, and should have from beginning to end kept my advancement and independence in Afghanistan. In my acceptance of the two conditions which I have declared, and which I firmly and sincerely resolved to carry out, if you will carefully reflect, you will see that very important interests and matters are contained; so that there is no further room for introducing or mentioning the third condition. I ask for justice in this matter from the British Government. When I have accepted a British Resident in my capital, permanent or temporary as the British Government may choose, and, turning away my eyes from all aid or friendship from other States, have put the hand of hope and dependence firmly on the wide skirt of the British Government, what would be becoming in the strong and grand British Government; to take away a small part of my kingdom, or to extend it a little? As I have sincerely, truly, and decidedly chosen the permanent friendship of the British Government, I hope and expect from that great and magnanimous Government that my request on this point may be accepted, and that the foundation of friendship and alliance may be very speedily and firmly laid; and that by making happy your faithful friend with appropriate kindnesses, you may render your Government famous in the world and among all nations by your kindness and favor to me. Please God, the advantage of such kindness will appear sooner than that which the British Government anticipates from its third condition.

For the sake of giving confidence in these statements, and of strengthening the foundation of friendship, if the British Government propose to appoint a Mission* of rank, such as yourself, to come to Kabul and see me, the real concord on both sides will be declared and proved face to face. I will certainly not oppose this proposal. In any case, I desire and expect good and advantage in every way from the British Government, and I look upon the friendship of that Government as entirely an advantage and the source of much good.

Jellalabad, 2nd April 1879.

(Signed) W. JENKYNs,
On special duty.

* In the original the English word is used, and is apparently understood by the Afghans as meaning an Envoy.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Political Officer, to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, of Kabul, dated Jellalabad, 7th April 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I have received your Highness' friendly letter of the 29th March 1879, by the hand of Munshi Bukhtiar Khan.

It is a matter of gratification to learn that your Highness earnestly desires the renewal of friendship between the two States, and that you recognise the advantage that will accrue to Afghanistan from an alliance with the British Government.

I observe that in the concluding portion of your Highness' letter you state that, if the British Government thinks proper to depute a Mission of rank to Kabul for the purpose of verbally discussing with your Highness the matters now under consideration, your Highness also will acquiesce in such an arrangement.

As it is probable that this may be productive of good, and may tend to remove whatever misunderstandings exist, I am directed to inform your Highness that the British Government will appoint a Mission of rank to proceed to Kabul, with a suitable escort on receipt of information from your Highness that the necessary arrangements for its journey and reception have been made.

I trust that your Highness continues in the enjoyment of good health, and that you will consider me your friend and well-wisher.

Jellalabad, 7th April 1879.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI,
Political Officer.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

Dated Camp Lahore, 11th April 1879.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA, to His Highness AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Wali of Kabul and its dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

I HAVE received Your Highness' friendly letter of the 13th March 1879, informing me of the death of your father His Highness the late Amir Sher Ali Khan. This news has caused me deep regret, and I desire to express my sympathy with Your Highness in the affliction with which you have been visited. But since every human being must taste the cup of death, and life and death are in the hands of the Almighty God, it is fitting for these reasons to have patience and to show submission to His will.

2. Your Highness furthermore informs me that the nobility and people of Afghanistan have unanimously acknowledged you as Amir, and have tendered their allegiance. This information undoubtedly increases my expectation that the wishes expressed in Your Highness' letter for the establishment of a basis of friendship, will be fulfilled.

3. The friendly letter, dated 29th March 1879, written by Your Highness to Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., has been seen by me. In that letter it is said that if, for the sake of strengthening the foundation of friendship, the British Government propose to appoint an Envoy of rank, such as Major Cavagnari, to come to Kabul and see Your Highness, you will certainly not oppose this proposal.

I have accordingly deputed Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul, and this letter will be delivered by him in person to Your Highness. Major Cavagnari possesses my full confidence; he is authorised to communicate unreservedly with Your Highness upon the questions at issue between the two States, and he is to be considered as the representative of the Government of India.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself as Your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 11.

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th April 1879.

PLEASE telegraph views of Cabinet on following substance of Treaty to be negotiated with Yakoob: 1st, two Articles, formal; 3rd, amnesty for assistance to us during the war; 4th, Ameer agrees to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with advice and wish of British Government, will enter into no engagements or war with foreign State without concurrence of British Government; 5th, qualified recognition of heir; 6th, permanent British Resident at Kabul, and right to depute Agents to Herat, and other frontier places; 7th, their safety and honourable treatment guaranteed by Ameer; 8th and

9th, commercial facilities, protection of traffic, adjustment of duties, selection of open routes ; 10th, telegraph line ; 11th, restoration of Kabul territory now in our possession, except Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi, Ameer renounces authority over Khyber and Michnee tribes and passes ; 12th, secures payment by Ameer of customary allowances to certain specified Sirdars ; 13th, subsidy to Ameer, amount not yet settled.

No. 12.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO VICEROY, 8th April 1879.

YOURS ON Treaty. All the Articles approved.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE, 9th April 1879.

My telegram 6th and yours of 8th. If in return for 4th Article, which places his foreign relations entirely in our hands, Yakoob asks protection from foreign aggression, a distinct answer will be required.

Please telegraph your views fully on this point.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO VICEROY, 13th April 1879.

IF YAKOOB faithfully conducts his foreign policy under our direction, we shall be prepared to support him against any foreign aggression which may result from such conduct with money, arms, and troops, to be employed at our discretion, when and where we think fit.

No. 15.

No. 104 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 1st May 1879.

IN continuation of the Despatch of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Lahore, the 10th April 1879, No. 88, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of two letters, dated 20th April 1879, addressed by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the British Forces at Jellalabad.

2. We also inclose, for facility of reference, copy of the telegram which we sent to Your Lordship on the 26th April, containing the substance of Major Cavagnari's reply.

3. A complete copy of Major Cavagnari's letter has not yet reached us.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani (20th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan having waited upon me delivered your friendly letter to me, which I have perused. I am exceedingly gratified with its contents, which allude to the cultivation of friendship, concord, and amity between the two great States. From its beginning to the end, your letter expresses perfect unity and identity (of wishes). It is hoped that from this sapling of friendship the functionaries of the two great Governments will cull the fruit of their wish, and that from this goblet of affection the Officers of that powerful Government and the Governors of this God-granted State will pour out a draught of their desire. Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar has been given leave to return, and is proceeding towards you. I have made oral statements to him. He will, please God, communicate them to you one by one, and you will be pleased to rely upon them as true.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 27th Rabi-us-Sani (20th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—As Munshi Mahomed Bakhtiar Khan is now going to return to that direction, I take the opportunity of writing this short friendly letter to you to say that I have, on my own part, resolved to remove all doubts regarding friendship as well as to strengthen the friendly relations between the two States. God willing, I will leave for that direction and have the pleasure of seeing my friends. I hope you will reply to this epistle speedily, so that the terms (for the renewal) of friendship and concord between the two Governments may become known and manifest.

Further, all well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 26th April 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

Following from Cavagnari, 25th. Begins:—

FOLLOWING letter addressed to Yakub Khan made over to Bakhtiar with instructions to use every effort to procure early and favourable reply. Letter begins:—

After compliments and acknowledgment of his letter. "I gather from it that Your Highness wishes to arrange a friendly interview with the British Authorities, and desires to come in person for this purpose. This intention is indeed a true sign of that earnest desire for the establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments which Your Highness, in your recent letters, has frequently expressed, and which the British Government fully appreciate and reciprocate.

"I am consequently directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to reply that on receipt of intimation of the date of Your Highness' expected arrival at the British Camp, every effort will be made by the Officers of this Government to secure for Your Highness the most honourable treatment befitting your exalted rank during the period Your Highness, with whatever escort and retinue you may think proper to accompany you, shall remain as the guest of the British Government." Finis.

No. 16.

From VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 5th May 1879.

YAKOUB reached Butkhak 3rd May, on road towards British camp. Azimuthula Khan, Chief of Ghilzais has joined Cavagnari and tendered services to British Government.

No. 17.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th May 1879.

FOLLOWING from Cavagnari, 8th:—Amcer arrived at camp at half-past nine. His Highness appeared to be much impressed with his reception.

No. 18.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 8th May 1879.

FOLLOWING telegram just received from Yakoob at Gundamuk. Message begins:— I beg to announce my arrival at the British camp. I trust your Lordship is in the enjoyment of perfect health. I sincerely hope that the result of my visit may be productive of sincere and lasting friendship between the two Governments. Message ends. I have sent friendly reply.

No. 19.

No. 119 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 8th May 1879.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 104, dated 1st May 1879, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a translation of the reply sent by Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari's letter to him of the 25th April. We also enclose translation of a letter from Munshi Bakhtiar Khan to Major Cavagnari, dated 1st May 1879.

2. Your Lordship has been informed by telegram of Yakub Khan's departure from Kabul on 2nd May and of the several stages of his journey towards the British Camp, where he is expected to arrive this day.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 7th Jamadi-ul-Awal.—(30th April 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I beg to write this friendly letter to inform you that your very friendly communication dated the 25th April 1879, sent by the hands of the worthy and intelligent Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, reached me at a very fortunate moment. Its gratifying contents, which notify the marks of noble friendship and give the glad tidings of the tokens of great affection between the two sublime States, have afforded me unbounded joy. The Munshi above-mentioned has strung one by one on the thread of description the pearls of your friendly hints and verbal messages with which you, actuated by the motives of most sincere friendship, entrusted him, and thereby he has opened the door of happiness and joy to the face of my heart. Inasmuch as the grasp of the desire of having an interview with the (British) Officers of high rank and holding a happy conference with them has taken hold of the skirt of my heart, I will, please God, set out from the capital (Kabul) for my destination on Monday the 10th Jamudi-ul-awal (3rd May 1879). Further, what can I write beyond expressions of friendship?

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MUNSHI BAKHTIAR KHAN, TO MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I.,
Kabul, 1st May 1879.

AT 10 a.m. to-day I waited upon His Highness the Amir and inquired as to the stages by which he proposed to march. He stated that he intended to march by the following stages:—

2. About 9 or 10 o'clock to-morrow (2nd May) morning His Highness will leave the Bala Hissar and will march to Begrami.

3. The rest of the marches will be as follows:—

Saturday	3rd May	-	-	Butkhak.
Sunday	4th	„	-	Samuch-i-Mulla Umr.
Monday	5th	„	-	Sih baba.
Tuesday	6th	„	-	Jagdalak.
Wednesday	7th	„	-	Surkhpul.
Thursday	8th	„	-	Gandamak.

4. To-morrow (2nd May) evening His Highness the Amir will despatch an express sowar with a letter to you announcing the fact of his departure from Kabul.

5. His Highness the Amir observed to me that as the British officials were in light marching order, with a view to war, he would not trouble them to supply him with tents, but would bring with him tent equipage for himself and suit.

I told Bakhtiar Khan to apologize for any shortcomings on our part, but I shall nevertheless be able to prepare a respectable camp.—(Sd.) N. C.

6. As at present arranged the Amir's suite and following will amount to about 400 persons, which number may be increased or diminished on the road.

7. The Amir will have the following animals with him, viz.:—

450 horses.
50 camels.
2 elephants.

These will require only bhoosa and barley; but for the elephants green wheat as far as procurable will be requisite; if not procurable, bhoosa and flour may be given.

8. The British authorities will, of course, make any arrangements for supplies which they approve of: the Amir, being their guest, will not mention any wishes of his own.

A list of the quantities consumed will be afterwards sent. His Highness the Amir and his suite will bring their own cook.

I purpose pitching a camp for the Amir opposite the British Camp at Hashim Khel. I shall leave it to His Highness to decide whether he will protect his own camp, or wish us to do it. So that there may be no appearance of his being under any restraint.—(Sd.) N.C.

9. The site for the Amir's camp at Gandamak will be selected by the Political Officer near the British Camp in such place as may be approved of by him.

10. His Highness the Amir said that he hoped to be informed on his arrival at the Surkhpul of the time fixed for his entry into Gandamak and the arrangements for his reception.

The Surkhpul, from the tenor of Bakhtiar Khan's letter, seems to be regarded as doubtful whether we claim to be in possession of it or not. As it will please the Amir and be more convenient to us, I shall allow him to make his own arrangements for supplies there and only consider him our guest from the time he reaches Gandamak.—(Sd.) N.C.

He should be received at the Gandamak end of the Surkhpul. It has been arranged that he would collect his own supplies up to the Surkhpul.

11. The notables accompanying His Highness will be as follows:—

1. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan.
2. „ „ Tahir Khan.
3. „ „ Asaf Khan (son of S. Yahya Khan).
4. Sirdar Futteh Muhammad Khan (son of S. Zakariya Khan).
5. Sirdar Nek Muhammad Khan (commanding the body-guard).
6. Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik.
7. General Daud Shah.
8. Mirza Muhammad Nabi Khan (murasala nawis).

The Mustaufi and Daud Shah only will be taken into Council, the chief place being given to the Mustaufi.

12. The Amir also said that only three regiments would continue in Sial Sang till to-morrow for the salute on departure: the other troops that were in Sial Sang have to-day retired into the Bala Hissar and Sherpur.

No. 20.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 23rd May 1879.

WE propose to approve immediate conclusion of following articles of the treaty with Ameer. Articles begin,—

1st. Perpetual peace and friendship.

2nd. Amnesty.

3rd. Ameer of Kabul agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. Ameer will enter into no engagements with foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Ameer against foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. British troops entering Afghanistan to repel foreign aggression will return as soon as object has been accomplished.

4th. Permanent British Resident at Kabul, with right to depute agents to Afghan frontier whenever necessary. Ameer may depute agents to India.

5th. Ameer guarantees safety and honourable treatment of British Agents.

6th. Agencies, and

7th. Commercial facilities to be settled for one year.

8th. Construction of telegraph line to Kabul.

9th. The British Government restores to Ameer of Kabul the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British army, except the districts of Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi. Ameer of Kabul agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram, Pisheen, and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under protection and administration of British Government, that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deduction of civil charges, shall be paid to the Kabul Government. The British Government will retain in its own hands the complete control of the Khyber and Michnee passes, lying between the Peshawur and Kaaba districts, and of our relations with the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly connected with these passes.

10th. Subsidy.

End of treaty.

Mixed Commission will demarcate boundaries of assigned districts. Early reply solicited.

No. 21.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 23rd May 1879.

Yours to day. Articles approved by Cabinet.

No. 22.

FROM Major CAVAGNARI to SECRETARY OF STATE, 26th May 1879.

TREATY of peace with Ameer of Kabul signed to-day, 26th May.

No. 23.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 7th June 1879.

FOLLOWING from Cavignari, 6th, begins,—Ratified treaty presented to Ameer this morning in Durbur, His Highness, after receiving it, expressed his earnest hope that he and his subjects of every grade would do all in their power to preserve and increase the friendship now established. In saying farewell to the General and other officers, the Ameer expressed the hope that when he visits India he may renew his acquaintance with them. Ends.

No. 24.

No. 153 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 23rd June 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a letter from His Highness Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan to the Viceroy, dated 30th May 1879, and copy of His Excellency's reply, dated 4th June 1879.

2. We inclose, also, a translation of a letter, dated 11th June, addressed to Major Cavagnari by the Amir, in which His Highness expresses much pleasure and satisfaction at the receipt of the Viceroy's letter.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to the address of His Excellency the VICEROY, dated 8th Jamadi-us-Sani 1296, Al Hijri (30th May 1879).

BE it known to the friendly heart of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India (who is exalted and mighty, the bearer of high titles, the dispenser of glory and greatness, and the centre of goodwill and friendship, may his prosperity increase), that since the day of my arrival at the British camp at Gandamak I have been very happy, and that I am exceedingly pleased with, and thankful for, the reception and treatment accorded to me by the British officers, which will (doubtless) tend to produce good results and bear the fruits of friendship, unity, and concord.

Although I had resolved to come to Simla and give myself the unbounded pleasure of a joyful interview with Your Excellency for the purpose of strengthening friendly relations, the combination of three several circumstances prevented me from carrying my intention into effect. These were, in the first place, the intense heat of the weather, which renders travelling extremely difficult; secondly, the existence of cholera, which, in obedience to the divine decree, has made its appearance in those quarters; and, thirdly, the anarchy existing in the interior of Afghanistan, to attend to which is the most important of all matters.

After completing a tour through the country, during which I shall inspect the frontiers and provinces, and introduce good government therein, I intend, God willing, towards the close of next cold season, to set out for my destination, and have a joyful meeting with Your Excellency, for the purpose of making firmer the basis of friendship, and drawing closer the bonds of affection and amity in a most suitable and appropriate manner.

Further, what can I write beyond professions of friendship and good will.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

From His Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies.

MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

Dated Simla, 4th June 1879.

MAY the prosperity of Your Highness, the well-wisher and cherisher of your friends, be increased, and may the causes of happiness and pleasure ever brighten the face of Your Highness's days.

Be it known to Your Highness's friendly heart that Your Highness's letter, dated 30th May 1879, has been received by me.

It gives me special pleasure to learn that Your Highness is well satisfied with the arrangements which were made by the British authorities for the accommodation of Your Highness and your suite at Gandamak. My desire was that everything possible should be done for the hospitable reception and entertainment of so honoured a guest.

I should have been greatly pleased if it had been possible for Your Highness to fulfil your kind intention of visiting me at Simla, as I am convinced that a meeting would have been most advantageous toward drawing closer the bonds of personal friendship and confirming the fortunate alliance which has now been concluded between the two States. But the impediments mentioned by Your Highness make it manifest that for several reasons the journey cannot at present be undertaken. Nevertheless, in accordance with the intimation which Your Highness's kind letter conveys, I anticipate confidently the pleasure of meeting Your Highness before long, at a more convenient season, in India.

May Your Highness's days be happy and prosperous to the fullest extent of your desires.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself Your Highness's sincere friend.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated Gandamak, 20th Jamadi-us-Sani 1296 A.H. (corresponding to 11th June 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your friendly letter, dated Jellalabad, 9th June, enclosing a telegram to your address from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated the 6th June, in which congratulations are expressed for the victory of my troops over the Turkomans on the Herat frontier, and also His Excellency's letter to my address, was received and read by me on the evening of the 19th of the current Mahomedan month.

I was much pleased to hear of your health and welfare; and the frank and cordial expressions of friendship and kindness in the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy gave me the highest pleasure and satisfaction. I strongly hope that, in accordance with the rules of friendship, day by day and hour by hour every effort will be made by both sides to strengthen the alliance between the two Governments, not only at the time of the interview with His Excellency the Viceroy, which is alluded to in His Excellency's letter of the 8th Jamadi-us-Sani, but also before and after the interview.

You may continue perfectly assured with respect to me, and I hope you will write informing me of your welfare, until a meeting takes place, as this will afford me much pleasure.

No. 25.

No. 152 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 23rd June 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a proclamation lately issued by the Amir of Afghanistan, which grants a general amnesty to all Afghan subjects who have held intercourse with the

British forces during the war, and secures them from all punishment or molestation on this account.

2. The proclamation is issued in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty concluded between the British and Afghan Governments.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 25.

TRANSLATION of the Proclamation issued by the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

PROCLAMATION issued by the Government of Afghanistan, dated Gandamak, Jamadi-us-Sani A.H. 1296=(June 1879).

WHEREAS perpetual friendship and peace have been established between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, all disputes and differences between those two Governments have been entirely removed.

It is hereby publicly proclaimed that a general amnesty has been granted to those subjects of the Afghan Government who have held intercourse with the British forces during the war. And the Afghan Government declares in writing that all its subjects shall be exempt from punishment or molestation, covert or overt, on account of such intercourse.

No. 26.

No. 160 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 7th July 1879.

IN our despatch of the 2nd of June we transmitted to Her Majesty's Government a copy of the treaty concluded in May last with the Amir of Afghanistan; and we have now the honour to lay before Your Lordship a full report of our proceedings in connection with recent Afghan affairs.

2. Your Lordship's despatch of the 18th of November 1878 briefly recapitulated the leading features of the policy of the British Government toward Afghanistan, and reviewed the course of events and transactions which terminated with the reception of a Russian mission at Kabul, the deputation of Sir Neville Chamberlain as British envoy to the Amir, and the repulse of his embassy at Ali Musjid. Immediately upon that repulse being known, a demand for apology and reparation was addressed to the Amir; and, when no answer was received within the period prescribed, His Highness was declared an enemy of the British Government, and the British forces entered his kingdom on the 21st of November.

3. The plan of operations to be followed by the British army in Afghanistan had received our most careful consideration; and, in its scope and aim, it was strictly limited to the attainment of certain definite objects. We deem it now due, both to ourselves, and to Her Majesty's Government, by whom they were approved, to state and explain those objects before describing the measures adopted for the attainment of them.

4. For some time previous to the immediate occasion of the late Afghan War, the warning course of events beyond the north-west frontier of India had forced upon the anxious attention of this Government certain features in the character of that frontier which could not but be regarded as defective if judged by the well known axiom of modern military science,—that the strategic value of any natural obstacle, such as a river or a mountain range, is mainly dependent on the command of the points of issue

on both sides, and the consequent power of operating at will on either side of it. Before the war just ended in Afghanistan the north-west frontier of India was drawn along the eastern base of a vast and widely extended system of mountains. With the exception of the southern defiles (recently secured by the Khelat treaty of 1876), all the passes through that portion of the range which, sloping towards Afghanistan, rises immediately above the plains of India, were in the hands of wild, independent, and more or less hostile, tribes; and the army of India, if attacked upon this frontier by a skilful and powerful enemy, would have had no alternative between forcing the passes, under conditions of much difficulty and danger, in order to meet its adversary in a hostile country, far from its base, and without any friendly support within reach, or else, with a great and often almost impassable river at its back, awaiting his arrival behind a frontier line of one thousand miles in length, pierced by passes open to the enemy at points too numerous to be all effectually guarded. It is needless to dwell upon the serious character of the danger to which India would be exposed in any such eventuality.

5. On the other hand, apart from this serious strategic defect, our late land frontier had much to recommend it from an administrative point of view; and we consider that, when that frontier was first accepted, the adoption of it was justified by a reasonable regard to the political circumstances and general convenience of the moment. It was not deliberately selected, on strategic grounds, with a view to contingencies at that time remote; and, even then, there were not wanting eminent advocates for the adoption of the Indus River as a better strategic border than the mountain chain beyond it. But this mountain chain approximately represented the limits of the Sikh power, and of the territories which the Punjab campaigns had transferred to the British Government; and, conquest having been carried thus far, we think it was a wise decision not to carry it beyond the point at which military operations would have become more difficult and their results less satisfactory. Rich plains, although easily overrun, are easily held, and they remunerate the benefits conferred on them by improved administration. Wild mountain tracts are not only difficult to traverse and difficult to subdue, but, when subdued, the administration of them is unprofitable. The foot of the mountains offered to India a well-defined boundary; and, although the adoption of this line left our north-west border peculiarly exposed to injury and insult from the hill tribes around it, yet, on the whole, the inconvenience of remaining within it was less than the inconvenience of advancing beyond it. Between this line and the nearest outposts of the Russian power in Central Asia intervened nearly one thousand miles of difficult country, inhabited by warlike populations existing in various degrees of feudal relation to the Amirs of Kabul and the Khans of Khelat. So long as the land frontier of India was unexposed to the pressure of any political or military influences more formidable than those of the marauding tribes around it and the weak governments of barbarous states beyond them, its strategic defects might be contemplated without anxiety by the Government of India.

6. But the possibility of danger was not overlooked; and it is, we conceive, with a view to the prevention of it that the British Government, both in India and in England, has at all times attached supreme importance to the exclusion of foreign influence from Afghan and Biluch territory. Guided by this consideration, the invariable aim of its policy has been to secure the friendship, the confidence, and, in case of need, the co-operation of the Sovereigns of Kabul and Khelat. Unfortunately, however, causes, which we need not now examine, rendered fruitless the measures adopted for that purpose; and in 1875 our relations with these two sovereigns had become almost intolerable. The subsidy given to the Khan of Khelat had been withdrawn. The subsidy offered to the Amir of Kabul had been rejected. The whole of Biluchistan was in that condition of complete anarchy which so frequently precedes the loss of independence; and for the restoration of his authority the Khan was looking, not to his British, but to his Afghan and Persian, neighbours. For some time previous to this, the attitude assumed by the Amir of Kabul towards the Government of India had been growing more and more unfriendly and mistrustful; whilst the communications between His Highness and the Governor of Russian Turkestan had simultaneously increased in frequency and apparent confidence. In the meanwhile, the distance between the Indian and Russian Empires had been reduced from 1,000 to 400 miles, by advances exclusively on the part of the Russian military power.

7. In these circumstances, the Government of India could no longer afford to contemplate with indifference the strategic defects of its northwest frontier. We felt that strenuous endeavours should be made, without further loss of time, to find in the stability, friendship, and alliance of the trans-frontier states those sources of security from external danger which were not furnished by the condition of the frontier itself.

In Khelat our endeavours were not unsuccessful ; and the treaty signed with that state in 1876 virtually placed in our hands the command of the southern passes, thus giving to India a strong frontier from the neighbourhood of Multan to the sea, a distance of 500 miles. This arrangement, moreover, by restoring order and reviving trade and agriculture throughout Biluchistan, has been eminently beneficial to the Khan and his subjects, in whom the Government of India found loyal and useful allies during the late Afghan war. All endeavours, however, to ameliorate our relations with the Amir of Kabul were completely abortive ; and the unfriendliness of His Highness was apparently increased by the increasingly critical condition of relations between the British and Russian Governments, until at last it culminated in the open repulse of a British, after the open reception of a Russian, mission to his capital. From the foregoing summary of the circumstances and events immediately preceding the rupture of our relations with the Amir of Kabul it will be seen what cause we then had to view with grave anxiety the defective features of our Afghan frontier. It was not compatible with the policy and principles of this Government to have recourse to the sword for the remedy of those defects, but it was our paramount duty to India not to leave them unrepaired if we were successful in a war which we had made every effort to avert.

8. When, therefore, military operations against the late Amir of Kabul had been necessitated by circumstances already reported, we determined to direct them, not only to the punishment of an unprovoked affront, but also to the prompt and complete attainment of the following objects :—Firstly, the exclusion of all foreign influence from Afghanistan ; and, Secondly, such a rectification of our Afghan frontier as would suffice to render impossible for the future the exclusion of British influence from that state. These, at least, are the results it was our object to secure ; those which it was equally our object to avoid were more numerous ; and since they materially affected our plan of operations, we must here indicate the nature of them.

9. When forced to declare hostilities against the Amir Sher Ali we were warned by several high authorities that a short or a small Afghan war would prove to be impossible ; that we should be opposed in overwhelming numbers by the independent tribes whom the Amir (to quote his own words) had threatened to “roll against us like blasts of fire ;” that, after forcing passes thus fiercely contested, we should be confronted by a united Afghan nation ; that, having once crossed the frontier, we could not safely arrest our progress till we had completed the entire conquest of Afghanistan ; that such a conquest could not be abandoned without the risk of renewing, and, perhaps, aggravating, our political dangers, nor yet maintained without heavily augmenting our financial and administrative burdens ; and that, in either case, our utmost military success would bequeath to the Afghan people, whether as neighbours or as subjects, memories and sentiments of inextinguishable animosity ; leaving to ourselves no practical alternative between the helpless contemplation of the confusion and anarchy created by our own action and the wholesale annexation of a barren country and a turbulent people.

10. The Government of India would have been inexcusable had it disregarded warnings so numerous and so authoritative. The dangers thus indicated were not underrated by us ; but we had long and fully considered them from every point of view, in direct reference to carefully verified facts, and we were satisfied, by our knowledge of the actual condition of Afghanistan at the time when hostilities were declared, that no such dangers need be incurred if adequate precautions were taken to avoid them.

11. In the first place, for the rectification of our frontier as defined in paragraph 8 of this despatch, no great extension of territory was required. All we needed was the permanent command,—not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which, piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our Empire from beyond its northern and western confines. The main defiles of the Mohmand and Afridi hills, converging towards Peshawur, are peopled by independent tribes, and have never belonged to the Amirs of Kabul. For the command of these passes it would probably suffice, after clearing them of the Amir's troops, to resume to ourselves the payment and control of the pass tribes. The valley of the Kuram, rising westward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal, terminates at the Shutur-Gardan, a high ridge of the Safed Koh Range ; and an army holding that position would command, on the one side Kabul and Ghazni, on the other easy access into India. Our southern frontier, as before observed, had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Khelat, which gave us a strong position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Pishin, which, bounded by the Kojak-Amran range, constitutes the great

natural granary of Quetta. Holding Pishin, and commanding the issues of the Kojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our own plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues. For these reasons we regarded the permanent military command of the Kuram and Pishin districts as essential to the complete rectification of our frontier. But all such objects could certainly be attained without wholesale annexation, and possibly even without any actual acquisition of territory.

12. In the next place, many of the independent pass tribes were not indifferent, either to the Amir's withdrawal of the allowances they had formerly received from His Highness, or to the possible renewal of those they had at one time received from the British Government; and we had been careful to secure the neutrality of these tribes, so far as neutrality could be expected from robber hordes certain, in the event of any conflict between British and Afghan troops, to side with the victorious and fall upon the vanquished combatant. In the third place, an all-important change had been silently effected during the reign of Sher Ali in the social and administrative character of Afghanistan. This change was peculiarly favourable to our whole plan of operations, which had, indeed, been mainly determined by the knowledge of it.

13. During the reign of the Amir Dost Mahomed the fighting power of Afghanistan was mainly of a tribal and feudal character. From the time of his accession to the throne, however, it had been the aim of the Amir Sher Ali to break up this tribal organisation, and replace it by a mercenary army. The system of internal government thus introduced by His Highness had undermined the national foundations of his power. His standing army was regarded by the local chiefs as a menace to their independence. The compulsory enlistment of troops, for whose maintenance the nation was severely taxed, had extended the unpopularity of Sher Ali's rule to all parts of his dominions and all classes of his subjects. The administration, as well as the army, had become denationalised. The chief civil and military offices of the state, to which the custom of the country had given a somewhat family character, were, under the new system, necessarily entrusted to men with no power or influence independent of the Sovereign's favour. By thus centralising his authority the Amir had isolated himself from his sirdars; and an administration destructive of popular privileges was naturally unsupported by popular sympathies. Partly by the aid and countenance of the British Government, Sher Ali had gradually brought under his personal sway all the dominions formerly claimed by his dynasty; but for the government of them he was driven more and more, by increasing mistrust of his sirdars, his subjects, and his neighbours, to expedients which only increased a disaffection they were intended to suppress. The Afghans, in short, had grown weary of Sher Ali's domestic administration, whilst all their national sentiments and prejudices were opposed to that fatal intimacy with Russia which was the final error of his foreign policy.

14. Such being the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan when war was declared by the British Government against the Amir of Kabul, it was no impossible task to maintain, between the Afghan people and their ruler, that practical distinction proclaimed by the Viceroy in the manifesto which accompanied the declaration of hostilities. We were persuaded that the sirdars and people of Afghanistan (if considerately treated by the military and political officers charged with the execution of our orders, which, on this point, were most explicit) would not make common cause with the Amir, or support him in resisting the chastisement he had so recklessly provoked. We were also persuaded that the resources of his country would fail the Amir, no less effectually than the disposition of his subjects, in any attempt to prolong such resistance after the fighting power of his army had been thoroughly broken. By far the most serious embarrassment we had to anticipate was, neither the hostility of the Afghan people nor the strength of the Afghan army, but the complete disintegration of the Afghan state which might not improbably result from the swift and total destruction of Sher Ali's personal power. With this contingency, which had engaged our lengthened and anxious consideration, we felt we must be prepared to deal in case of necessity. It was constantly before our eyes and in our thoughts during the period which elapsed between the declaration of hostilities and the signature of peace. As, however, it has not arisen, we need not now say more about it than that it was a contingency which we were at all times anxious to avert.

15. We have recorded and explained at some length the importance attached by the Government of India to the prevention, as well as to the promotion, of certain political results during the conduct of the war and the negotiation of the peace with Kabul because our entire plan of military operations was directly dictated, and all its strategic

combinations constantly restricted by these important political considerations. From first to last, throughout the recent campaign in Afghanistan, military action has been strictly subordinated to political purpose, and this acknowledgment is due to those able military officers whose discreet exercise of the political powers entrusted to them has greatly enhanced the practical value of their successful achievements in the field. It was necessary to inflict signal and public punishment on the late Amir Sher Ali Khan and to destroy his fighting power as speedily and completely as possible. These objects would have been most swiftly and simply accomplished by the immediate capture and temporary occupation of Kabul. But we had serious cause to apprehend that, by thus precipitating the downfall of Sher Ali, we might irretrievably shake to pieces all the independent materials of government in Afghanistan—bequeathing to Sher Ali's successor no stable basis of authority, and placing ourselves in a position from which we could not afterwards retire without surrendering to anarchy and civil conflict a state which it was our object to strengthen and consolidate in the manner most conducive to peaceable and friendly relations with it. For this reason, although the capture and occupation of Kabul involved no military difficulty and offered several military conveniences to the British columns which routed the Amir's army on the Peiwar and expelled his garrisons from the Khyber Pass, that measure was deliberately excluded from our plan of military operations for the opening of a war which we hoped to finish in a single campaign. The only advanced movements not originally included in this plan were the occupation of Jellalabad and Gandamak. But these measures were dictated by considerations partly of a sanitary, partly of a political character, and were undertaken with the certainty that they would not be opposed by any military force. The occupation of those points was intentionally temporary, but even in the selection of temporary outposts we were determined that the British troops should not occupy any position which they could not permanently hold in case of need without risk to their communications and supplies or from which they could not be withdrawn at any moment without detriment to our political interests and military reputation. We deem it due no less to the cause of historical truth than to the character of our Government and the right understanding of a policy which has been much misrepresented to place thus distinctly on record these decisions and the grounds of them. It remains to explain the further considerations which dictated the more important details of our military action and guided our constant endeavour to minimise the unavoidable expenditure of blood and treasure in the effectual attainment of its objects.

16. We have already stated the reasons which induced us to regard the Amir's standing army as the only fighting power we should have to deal with in Afghanistan. The known strength of that army was about 60,000 men. Its artillery we believed to be good, and this impression was confirmed by subsequent experience, but, with the exception of the breach loaders formerly given to His Highness by the Government of India, the musketry of the Amir's army was of course much inferior to that of our own. With this army the Amir, according to our anticipations, would have to garrison all his outlying provinces, protect his Persian flank, defend his capital and central districts, and at the same time resist our advance. It was, therefore, not difficult to calculate approximately the maximum force he could oppose to us at any given point. We consequently determined to attack him simultaneously on three different lines, thus obliging him to distribute his force or else to leave one or other of these lines undisputed.

17. The three lines thus selected were those of the Kojak, the Khyber, and the Kuram. These three lines were not only the most suitable for the immediate purposes of our attack, they also included all the advanced positions we had, for the reasons stated in paragraph 11 of our present despatch, determined to hold permanently. The line to which the Viceroy attached special importance was that of the Kuram. His Excellency believed that if the Amir allowed a British force advancing on this line to reach the Shutur-Gardan in full strength, both Kabul and Ghazni would remain completely at its mercy. He, therefore, anticipated strong resistance to our advance at some point in the Upper Kuram Valley, where the Amir's troops would command positions of great strength, easy to hold, and very difficult to attack. He calculated, however, that if Sher Ali's army were thoroughly beaten here, its defeat would immediately be felt in the very heart of the Amir's power, which must be more severely shaken by the loss of a battle in the Kuram than by a similar disaster in any other part of his dominions. Our object, therefore, in despatching a force to the Kuram, was to defeat and disperse any Afghan army which might be found there, and to seize with the utmost rapidity a position directly menacing Kabul and Ghazni, but without advancing beyond the Shutur-Gardan. This force was entrusted to the command of General Roberts.

18. The force operating on the Khyber line was commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne, whose instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the Amir's garrisons from the Khyber, and occupy Lundi Kotal, Dakka, or such other point as might be found most convenient at the head of the Pass, thus threatening Jellalabad, but not advancing further.

19. Our longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar; and it was, therefore, necessary that the force operating on this line should be proportionally stronger; as, whilst its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign than that of the Khyber and Kuram columns. In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amir, it was deemed desirable to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan; and for this purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a more far-reaching character. In the event of a complete disintegration of the Kabul Power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any chief or state whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and, in the event of re-established relations with the ruler of a united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar, however, has never formed part of our political programme; and no endeavour has been spared during the war to render our temporary occupation of it as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants. The command of the Kandahar force was entrusted to General Stewart; and his instructions were to carry out a reconnaissance in force as far as the Helmand and Khelat-i-Ghilzai; ascertaining the features and resources of the country in that direction, and attacking any enemy he might find within striking distance, but not establishing himself at any point beyond Kandahar.

20. The generals commanding the forces employed on the above-mentioned lines of advance were invested with the chief political authority beyond the frontier. Their instructions were to intercept the collection of the Amir's revenues, and preserve order throughout the country occupied by their troops. They were required to conciliate its inhabitants, and protect them from all avoidable injury. They were also to use their best endeavours to effect a friendly understanding with the tribes in their vicinity; but they were to avoid all unnecessary interference or collision with those tribes. When, in the development of operations opened on the Khyber line, the British troops had advanced to Jellalabad, Major Cavagnari was intrusted with the conduct of relations between the Government of India and the Afghan sirdars and tribes with whom that movement brought us into contact.

21. We calculated that all the operations thus ordered could be completed before the commencement of the winter, when the passes would be closed by snow, and a suspension of hostilities imposed on both belligerents by the rigour of the season. It was our hope that the previous success of our military operations would then set free at Kabul various political forces and interests specially favourable to negotiations for peace. In any case, the situation might advantageously be left to develop itself during the period of inaction which must necessarily elapse before the passes were again practicable for the passage of troops. We naturally desired to be spared the necessity for further operations, but we felt that, if forced to re-open the campaign in the spring of the following year, we should then be in a position to do so with every possible advantage on our side. Our advanced bases would have been firmly established, their communications thoroughly secured, the organisation of transport and supply completed for more extended lines of advance, and our political influence pushed far beyond the range of our military posts, upon the three main approaches into the interior of the enemy's country. In short, we considered that the precautions thus taken to minimize both the magnitude and cost of the military operations, and the number of political risks and responsibilities involved in them, were also best suited to facilitate further military action, should such action be unfortunately rendered necessary by the course of events between the close of 1878 and the spring of 1879.

22. Such was the general plan of the campaign opened by the Government of India in Afghanistan on the 21st of November 1878. On that date General Sir Samuel Browne entered the Khyber, and attacked the fort of Ali Musjid. The fire of the fort was well sustained and directed, and the defence made by the garrison of Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its spirit. But the position, having been turned during the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy with the loss of all his guns, stores, and camp equipage. Several of the fugitives were captured by our troops,

and the remainder were plundered and dispersed by the Afridis. Sir Samuel Browne met with no further resistance on his march to Dakka, which he held unmolested for some weeks; but this position being found inconvenient for the lengthened occupation of so large a force, the General was, in the month of December, authorised to advance beyond it, and occupy Jellalabad; which he did without resistance, receiving there the unconditional submission of the local officials, and their request for British protection. No attempt was made by the Amir's army, at any subsequent period, to resist the advance of the British troops on this line of operations.

23. On the same day, General Roberts entered the Lower Kuram Valley; and he subsequently occupied, without opposition, the head-quarters of the district, replacing the Amir's officials by his own. He found the people of this district willing to submit to his authority, and furnish provisions for the supply of his troops. Continuing his advance into the Upper Kuram Valley, General Roberts there encountered a large Afghan force, established in a position of great strength, strongly armed with well posted artillery, on the ridge of the Peiwar Kotal; which commands the valley on one side of it, and the road, on the other, towards the Shutur-Gardan. This force he at once attacked. The attack resulted in the sharpest, and most important, engagement that has occurred during the whole campaign. The strategic strength of the enemy's position was very great, but it was quickly turned by our troops who, under the skilful command of General Roberts, completely defeated and routed those of the Amir. The broken Afghan regiments fled across the Shutur-Gardan, leaving all their guns behind them; and the limit assigned to the advance of our Kuram force was thus speedily reached and secured without further resistance. General Roberts had been instructed to push his reconnaissances, as opportunity might offer, into the adjoining valley of Khost, with a view to prevent the Amir from drawing either supplies or revenue from that district; and this instruction he successfully carried out in the month of January.

24. General Biddulph, entering Pishin on the 26th of November, found it already evacuated by the Amir's troops. The small, but important, district of Sibi, lying upon our line of communications close to the Biluch border, had, in the meanwhile, been occupied by a British detachment on the 23rd of the same month. Much political inconvenience had been caused by the interposition of this small Afghan district in the midst of Biluch territory, with which it is almost entirely surrounded; and we had, therefore, determined upon its permanent withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Kabul authority. In December General Stewart reached Pishin, and, assuming command of the Kandahar Expeditionary Force, crossed the Kojak Range with considerable difficulty owing to the want of roads. On the 9th of January, after a skirmish with the Amir's outposts, in which the Afghan cavalry showed itself completely unable to make any stand against our own, he entered Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On the 21st of January his cavalry had pushed as far as Khelat-i-Ghilzai, while Girishk, on the Helmand, was occupied by a force under General Biddulph. On the 26th of February General Biddulph's cavalry distinguished itself in the repulse of an attack upon his rear guard when returning to Kandahar. With the exception of these engagements the occupation of Kandahar and the reconnaissance of the Helmand were effected without resistance, or any serious manifestation of national resentment at the presence of British troops.

25. Thus, within two days after the declaration of hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission at Ali Musjid was appropriately avenged on the spot where it had been offered. Within two weeks after the same date the passes of the Kyber and the Kuram were completely in our hands, and the Amir's troops swept clean beyond the range of our operations. Not long afterwards Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied without resistance; and before the end of January (that is to say, in less than three months from the commencement of the campaign) the greater part of Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmand to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British Government. The rapid success of our military operations completely confirmed the calculations on which they had been based. The Amir's standing army was defeated and dispersed beyond all possibility of recovery; yet his Sirdirs had not risen to the rescue of his power. His towns opened their gates without remonstrance to our summons; their authorities readily responded to our requirements; and their inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence of our troops. Nor was the neutrality of the independent tribes less satisfactory than the indifference of the Afghan people. From these tribes our convoys and outposts, especially along the Kyber Pass, were exposed to occasional annoyance; but, generally speaking, all the long lines of communication between our advanced positions and their bases in British India were far more facilitated by the friendly co-operation, than impeded by the occasional thefts and assaults, of the tribes along the tracts they

traversed. Three years ago no European British subject could approach the Kyber Pass without serious personal danger. But during the greater part of the recent campaign telegraphic communication from Peshawur to Jellalabad was maintained along the entire length of this Pass.

26. In the meanwhile, our anticipations as to the probable political effects of successful military operations on the Kuram line had been justified with startling rapidity and completeness. General Roberts routed the Afghan army at Peiwar Kotal on the 2nd of December. Following, as it did, so shortly after the capture of Ali Musjid and the expulsion of the Afghan garrisons from the Kyber Pass, this event completed the destruction of Sher Ali's power, which had already been much weakened by previous reverses. The detailed news of their total defeat was carried to Kabul, with all the rapidity of panic, by the Amir's beaten and demoralised troops. Their discomfiture was contagious; it infected the garrisons of the capital, and the columns on which the Amir was reckoning for the reinforcement of a position already irretrievably lost. Instantaneous and wholesale desertions attested the moral effect of General Roberts' decisive victory. The standing army of Afghanistan had ceased to exist, and with it disappeared an authority which had no other support. On the 19th of December we received from Major Cavagnari, by telegraph, authentic intelligence that the Amir Sher Ali Khan had fled from Kabul, accompanied in his flight by the remaining officers of the Russian Mission; and that, in the last moment of his hurried departure, he had released from prison, and invested with the regency, his long incarcerated son Yakub Khan. The Amir announced his departure by a letter addressed to the British authorities. In this letter His Highness informed us that he had abandoned his dominions with the intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg for the purpose of there laying his case before the European Powers.

27. In these circumstances we authorised Major Cavagnari to address to Yakub Khan a letter which, though couched in general terms, was friendly in its tone, and such as to afford His Highness an opportunity of separating himself, were he so minded, from the policy which had proved so disastrous to his father. We at the same time instructed our authorities upon the frontier to explain to the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan that the cessation or continuance of hostilities now mainly depended on the manifestation of their feelings and wishes in regard thereto. Sher Ali, however, appears to have left Kabul in the hope of promptly obtaining from Russia all the means he required for the renewal of hostilities with the British Government. This, at least, was the hope attributed to His Highness by his son, his Sirdars, and his subjects. Until the reasonableness of such a hope had been practically tested the dread of the Amir's return to power, and possible reconciliation with the British Government, sufficed to repress any manifestation of the national sentiment. The Amir had left his capital but not his country. He halted on the Afghan side of the Oxus, where he was believed to be in communication with the local authorities of the Russian Government. Yakub Khan was not regarded either by himself or his fellow-subjects as a free agent. His reply to Major Cavagnari's letter expressed no desire, on his own behalf or that of his father the Amir, for a reconciliation with the British Government. But at Kabul, where apparently such a reconciliation was not regarded as impossible, there seemed to be a prevalent impression that, if it took place, Sher Ali would be restored to power; and that, in that case, his vengeance would fall, without scruple or restraint, upon all who had incurred his displeasure or suspicion during the war. It was obviously the interest, and indeed the necessity, of all concerned in the development of this ambiguous situation to wait upon events; and we had at least the satisfaction of feeling that, from the commanding position we had already secured, we could better afford to wait than either Sher Ali or Yakub Khan.

28. Towards the end of January it was reported about our frontier that the Amir Sher Ali had died at Mazar-i-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan. Early in February we received from Sirdar Yakub Khan a spontaneous communication, which contained distinct overtures for a reconciliation with the British Government, and an offer of his good offices, as an intermediary between ourselves and his father, the Amir, for the removal of differences which he regarded as susceptible of adjustment. A few days later we received from the Sirdar a letter, dated the 28th of February, informing us of the death of the Amir, and his own accession to the throne. These letters were addressed to Major Cavagnari, who was authorised to respond to the latter by a suitable expression of the Viceroy's condolences, and to the former by a plain statement of the terms on which His Excellency in Council was prepared to entertain negotiations for peace.

29. Those terms were in accordance with the essential objects of the war, as described in the preceding paragraphs of our present despatch; and they were subsequently

embodied, without modification in the treaty of peace concluded with the Amir of Afghanistan. They required that the foreign relations of His Highness should be placed under the acknowledged control of the British Government; and they provided for the effectual fulfilment of the mutual obligations involved in that condition; firstly, by securing to us the command of the principal passes between India and Afghanistan, together with the administration of the three districts since assigned to us by the treaty, and, secondly, by the admission of a permanent British resident at Kabul, with the right to depute British officers, as occasion may require, to any part of the Afghan frontiers. The further commercial and telegraphic clauses of the treaty are the result of subsequent negotiations opened at Gandamak.

30. The Amir Yakub Khan agreed, without hesitation, to place his foreign relations under British control; he also at once accepted in principle, as a necessary consequence of this arrangement, our condition respecting European British agencies in Afghanistan. To our territorial conditions, however, His Highness, as might have been expected, evinced considerable repugnance, and for the withdrawal of them he made to us a strong appeal.

31. These conditions could not be waived without sacrificing one of the essential objects of the war; an object dictated to us by a deep concern for the permanent security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. We were in a position to enforce them without further reference to the Amir; for we already held a much larger portion of Afghan territory than we had any desire to retain. It was, therefore, at all times open to us to proclaim the permanent extension of British jurisdiction to the districts of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi. A similar course had been found convenient by Lord Dalhousie in dealing with the Court of Ava at the close of the last Burmese war. But the circumstances and objects of the second Burmese war were very different from those of the second Afghan war; and, for obvious reasons, we contemplated with great reluctance the adoption of any such course on the present occasion. We conceive that the Government of a powerful civilized state is in no circumstances morally free, because it is practically able, to consult its own convenience without reference to the manner in which the legitimate welfare of its weaker neighbours may be affected by its action or inaction. But special force was given to this consideration by all the circumstances and conditions of the late Afghan war. The efficient, but humane, prosecution of that war involved duties, not only towards the people of India, but also towards the people of Afghanistan; whose country we had not willingly invaded, and whose legitimate interests we had assuredly no wish or cause to injure. We desire the friendship and prosperity of that people, the confidence and stability of their ruler, and a mutual recognition of those peaceful interests which are common to their Government and our own. The withdrawal of our troops from their advanced positions in Southern Afghanistan without reference to the effect of such a measure on the country concerned, would have probably consigned all parts of the Amir's dominions to a condition incompatible with orderly government or tolerable neighbourhood. We had already secured possession of the improved frontier we required; but this was not enough. We had still to secure the exclusion of all foreign influence from the whole of Afghanistan, as well as the goodwill and confidence of the Afghan people and their ruler. To the attainment of these objects our policy had been not less steadily directed; for the undisturbed tranquility of any frontier must necessarily depend, to some extent, upon the peaceable condition of the countries with which it is contiguous, and the satisfactory character of relations with the Governments of such countries. Although, therefore, we could afford, far better than the Amir, to await the result of negotiations for peace, we deemed it our duty to spare no effort, consistent with the dignity of the British Crown, and the just interests of its Indian dominions, for the early establishment of mutually satisfactory relations with the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan.

32. So many and such mischievous misrepresentations of our Afghan policy, more especially in reference to territorial questions, had been propagated after the rupture of our relations with Sher Ali, that the Amir's reluctance to entertain any territorial basis of negotiation appeared to us very probably attributable to exaggerated and erroneous apprehensions as to the real character of the arrangements we deemed essential to the future security of our frontier. We felt, however, that their moderation must be admitted if they were compared with the conditions of a similar character hitherto dictated, at the close of victorious wars, by conquering to conquered powers; and we believed that, if the object and scope of them were thoroughly understood by the Amir, the last obstacle would be removed from the conclusion of a mutually honourable and advantageous treaty of peace between His Highness and the British Government. For this, it was necessary that there should be between us a frank interchange of views and

wishes on the subject of our relative positions. Such interchange of views could not be satisfactorily carried on by formal correspondence or without personal intercourse, but long and varied experience had convinced us that the policy of a European Government cannot be adequately interpreted or represented by Asiatic agents, however loyal and intelligent they may be. Many of our minor troubles on the frontier have been caused by the employment of Asiatics as mediums of communication between the British authorities and the border tribes, and whatever improvements have been effected during the last three years in our relations with those tribes and the neighbouring tribal States, such as Biluchistan, are due to the personal influence of British officers. Warned by this knowledge, we felt that to entrust the detailed explanation and discussion of our views to any Native agent would insure misconception and resistance on the part of the Amir. On the other hand, we reposed complete confidence in the discretion and ability of Major Cavagnari, and for all these reasons we were anxious to bring about, if possible, early and unreserved personal intercourse between him and the Amir of Kabul. Having regard to the Amir's position at that time, we did not feel justified in proposing that His Highness should leave his capital for this purpose, and having regard to our own position, we were fully conscious that our motives in proposing to Yakub Khan a personal conference with Major Cavagnari at Kabul, would probably be misconstrued by the public, and possibly misrepresented to the Amir. We considered, however, that we ought not to be deterred by this consideration from taking the course which we had good reason to regard as most conducive to the early re-establishment of peaceful relations with His Highness upon a thoroughly sound and honourable footing. We, therefore, authorised Major Cavagnari to address to the Amir proposals for a personal conference at Kabul on the subject of our territorial conditions. These proposals having been accepted, the native bearer of them was instructed to arrange with Yakub Khan for the proper reception of Major Cavagnari at the court of his Highness.

33. In the meanwhile, the suspended activity of our troops upon the Khyber line, had begun to exercise a very prejudicial influence upon our political, as well as our military position in Afghanistan. Although, for political reasons, the capture and occupation of Kabul had been excluded from our plan of military operations, it was obviously most inexpedient to proclaim or avow that decision. The continued inactivity of our forces, however, in positions so closely threatening the Afghan capital, and the comments made upon it by our own press, had gradually encouraged the people of Kabul and the intervening tribes, to attribute their freedom from molestation on our part to our concealed inability to advance any further. We had reason to believe that these impressions were strengthened by questions asked and opinions expressed in Parliament, of which the reports rapidly circulated beyond our frontier, were such as to suggest a conclusion that rather than incur the cost and inconvenience of further military operations, the British Government was ready to make peace with the Amir of Afghanistan on terms dictated, not by itself, but by His Highness. The result was an apparent disposition on the part of the Amir to assume towards us a more reserved and ambiguous attitude, and a recrudescence of petty, but vexatious and harassing attacks from the surrounding tribes, acting on the instigation of fanatical Mollahs from Kabul. These attacks gave rise to two actions, in which severe loss was inflicted on the Shinwari tribe by Brigadier-General Tytler at Doh Sarrak, and on the Khugianis by Brigadier-General Gough at Futtehabad. The tribes thus defeated are among the most restless and warlike of those with whom our troops were brought into contact during the recent campaign, and we cannot doubt that their complete discomfiture on the occasions above mentioned, contributed to the encouragement of pacific influences in the councils of the Amir. At the same time, the increasing heat of the weather and the defective sanitary conditions of Jellalabad, had begun to tell injuriously on the health of the large force concentrated in that locality, and due regard to the well-being of our troops necessitated an immediate change of quarters to some higher and healthier ground.

34. We consequently authorised General Sir Samuel Browne to advance a portion of his force as far as Gandamak. This movement was primarily dictated by sanitary motives of an urgent character, but in authorising it, we were not indifferent to the important political advantages it offered as a significant corrective to the erroneous impressions referred to in the preceding paragraph.

35. Within a few days after the occupation of Gandamak, a letter from the Amir announced his intention of proceeding to that place for the purpose of there entering into personal conference with Major Cavagnari. This was clearly a more satisfactory arrangement than the deputation of a British envoy to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was therefore instructed to arrange with General Sir Samuel Browne for the honourable

reception of His Highness, and was invested with full powers to represent this government in negotiations, respecting which he had previously been furnished with detailed instructions by the Viceroy at Lahore. The Amir reached Gandamak on the 8th of May, and was received there by the British authorities with all possible honour and hospitality. After the formal ceremonies of his reception, negotiations were opened by His Highness, and continued without interruption till the 26th of May, when the treaty of that date was signed in the British camp by the Amir on behalf of Afghanistan, and by Major Cavagnari on behalf of the British government.

36. The several Articles of this Treaty were framed in the belief that they fully secure all the objects of the war which have already been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our paramount position in Afghanistan and our adequate control over the Amir's external relations. Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign aggression is the legitimate consequence of this condition, and it is required of us not less imperatively for the security of India than for the independence of Afghanistan. But the British Government could not have undertaken such an obligation if the means of fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the residence at Kabul of a British representative, and for the right to depute British agents, as occasion may require, to all parts of the Afghan frontier. The Amir himself had requested that our permanent representative should reside at his capital, and from the opening of the negotiations, he has evinced no disinclination to the admission of British officers within his dominions. Such disinclination would, indeed, have been incompatible with any sincere desire for the advantages of British friendship and support, and the Amir's appreciation of these advantages has been manifested, not only by his conduct during the negotiations, but still more effectually by the alacrity and loyalty with which he is already carrying out his treaty obligations in reference to the amnesty clause, and other minor matters.

37. Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the treaty, His Highness engages to take measures for the protection and encouragement of commerce between India and Afghanistan. This engagement will receive practical development in a special commercial convention to be concluded within twelve months from the ratification of the treaty of Gandamak. Some such interval was required for the arrangement of details connected with the selection and improvement of roads, and for the examination of the nature and circumstances of the trade between the two countries, as well as for the reciprocal adjustment of duties. It is premature to forecast the ultimate results of arrangements now for the first time possible, in reference to the security and expansion of the overland commerce of India with other Asiatic countries. But on our western frontier access to and from India, although far from easy, is not impeded by such great natural barriers as elsewhere interpose almost insuperable obstacles to regular and frequent intercourse, by land, with the rest of Asia. On this part of our border the main hindrances to commerce have always been political, and of late years such hindrances were increased both by the chronic misrule and jealous isolation of the Afghan Government, and also by the inadequacy of internal restraints upon the marauding tribes who hold the passes. When these impediments disappear, we may look for a considerable expansion of the land-borne commerce of Northern India. Afghanistan itself is a country of no great productive resources, but it commands the routes which penetrate into Central and Western Asia; and the commercial classes, not only of that country, but also of those immediately beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is principally in Indian hands; and the Russian Governor at Tashkend recently promulgated a severe edict against the Hindu bankers of Turkestan, who are mostly emigrants from the western districts of India. The route by Herat and Kandahar runs through the more open and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the important towns of Herat and Kandahar. The treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Khelat towards the close of the year 1876 effected the pacification of Biluchistan, and re-opened the great trade route, through the Bolan Pass, which has not since been interrupted. By that arrangement the commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Kandahar, is placed in safe connection with the railway system of India and the rising seaport of Kurrachi. There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in the number of caravans now annually passing the Bolan; and the merchants of Sind have always been among the most industrious and enterprising of our foreign traders. With proper management, therefore, and under a judicious system of transit duties, considerable expansion may be reasonably expected in the external commerce of India upon this important line. All such considerations will receive our careful attention in the negotiation of the Commercial Convention which remains to be concluded with the Amir of Kabul.

38. It may be here mentioned that our political officers who accompanied the columns withdrawn from Kandahar in the spring of this year have explored much of the country, hitherto almost unknown, which lies on the direct lines between Pishin and the Indian frontier below Dera Ghazi Khan. They have ascertained that the routes through this country traverse elevated valleys and high plateaux, where the climate is at no season of the year very unfavourable, and where supplies and water are comparatively abundant. The tribes who inhabit this region are less unfriendly to strangers than the northern Pathans; and the construction and maintenance of good fair weather roads present no serious difficulties. There is little doubt that this was the direction taken by the earlier trade routes into India from Persia and Southern Afghanistan, and on commercial as well as on military grounds the possibility of restoring those channels of communication deserves further examination.

39. The treaty of Gandamak provides for the immediate commencement of telegraphic communication between Kabul and India. The advantages of such communication are obvious: and the establishment of it will both illustrate and confirm the character of the change now effected in our relations with Afghanistan.

40. The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber Pass has never formed part of those dominions; while the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram are retained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security of our frontier, and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly the towns of Kandahar and Jellalabad are restored by the treaty of Gandamak to the Amir of Kabul. The passes of the Kojak Mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Pishin country, like the upper districts of the Kuram Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require or have ever contemplated. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Pishin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence which the treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

41. Similar objections applied to the retention of Jellalabad. As a military position that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Lundi Kotal ridge. It can at any moment be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber, and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation as far as Gandamak of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and petty chiefships to the north-east of the frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilising those tribes and chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Kabul; and for the control or punishment of such action material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the treaty, which secures to us the permanent military command of Kabul from the crest of the Shutur-Gardan. In short, we have framed this treaty with an earnest desire to render all the conditions of it not only consistent with but also conducive to the maintenance of that friendly and mutually advantageous footing on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan; and from those relations we have laboured to eliminate every appreciable cause of irritation and disunion.

42. The engagements thus concluded at Gandamak with the Amir Yakub Khan represent and attest an important change in the whole condition of Central Asian affairs.

The magnitude of this change will be best appreciated when our present position and influence beyond the frontier are compared with what they were during the greater portion of the preceding period between the Umballa Conferences and the recent Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the part of Afghan Princes. The late Amir Sher Ali, throughout the whole period of his reign, was under a formal treaty obligation to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Government; but that engagement in no wise prevented his adoption of a course which led him into inevitable rupture and open hostility with this Government. We regard the present treaty rather as the commencement than as the confirmation of a new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan. It provides for and facilitates the attainment of results incalculably beneficial to the two countries concerned. The character of those results, however, will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadiness with which the British Government maintains, and the intelligence with which its local agents carry out, the policy that has dictated this treaty—a policy which has for its object to substitute co-operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mistrust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise from ourselves that the practical value of the treaty mainly depends upon the character and disposition of the Amir and his successors. Relations established with Afghanistan under the most favourable conditions and with the most promising prospects may, of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty of Afghan Princes or by the alienation of their unrequited confidence. In either case complications may arise, against which no present precautions on our part can completely guarantee our successors in the government of India. But, though anxious to deal considerately with the Amir's susceptibilities, and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable requirements and legitimate interests of his Government, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British interests and influence in Afghanistan, a position substantially independent of the personal caprices of any Afghan ruler; and for the effectual maintenance of that position the treaty provides strong material guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place the British power in permanent command of the main avenues from India to Kabul.

43. Your Lordship will, of course, understand that, in thus speaking of British interests and influence in Afghanistan, we mean the interests only of our alliance with that state in reference to external affairs, and the influence only which is necessary to maintain and direct a common policy on behalf of those interests. We in no wise contemplate any system of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; and the British Envoy at Kabul will be strictly required to abstain from such interference. The small subsidy which we grant to the Amir will, we hope, strengthen his hands in maintaining his authority.

44. Notwithstanding the conditions it imposes, the Treaty of Gandamak, so far as we can judge, is regarded with satisfaction by the Amir, to whose possession it restores important tracts of territory, which His Highness could not have recovered by the sword, and to the peaceful consolidation of whose authority it will, we trust, powerfully contribute. We desire to record our high appreciation of the signal ability with which Major Cavagnari conducted the negotiations to this successful conclusion; and it is, we think, difficult to over-estimate the value of his political services throughout the campaign. The political officers, generally, had difficult duties to perform, and they discharged them with great tact and efficiency.

45. We have also much pleasure in mentioning to your Lordship that, not only the justice of the war, and the humanity with which it has been waged by the British Government, but also the fair and generous terms on which we have concluded it, are now receiving unreserved recognition in numerous communications spontaneously addressed to the Viceroy by Her Majesty's feudatories and native subjects in all parts of India.

46. By the Khan of Khelat (with whom our relations four years ago had been very unsatisfactory) the cause of the British Government throughout this war has been well supported beyond the frontiers of India. It cannot be doubted that the conditions of the treaty signed with the Amir of Kabul at Gandamak in 1879 have been greatly facilitated by the results of the treaty signed with the Khan of Khelat at Jacobabad in 1876. Certain it is, that the military difficulties of the war, and the political impediments to the peace, now happily concluded, would have been seriously aggravated by hostile or untrustworthy conduct on the part of the Sovereign and sirdars of Khelat. For the fidelity with which the Khan has observed his treaty obligations, and for the uninterrupted

sympathy and goodwill of the Biluch tribes and sirdars we are largely indebted to the personal influence of Major Sandeman, and to the ability with which he has discharged his important duties as the Governor-General's agent in Khelat. We shall take an early opportunity of submitting to your Lordship the measures whereby we propose to mark our appreciation of the friendly and loyal attitude maintained by His Highness Khodadad Khan of Khelat throughout the progress and settlement of our disputes with the late Amir of Kabul.

47. It now only remains to notice those conditions of the treaty which have reference to the independent tribes of the Khyber and Michni Passes. We do not, of course, anticipate the immediate or habitual good behaviour of all these wild hillmen, whose tribal organisation is infinitely various, and whose management will doubtless require much skill and patience on the part of the political officers intrusted with that task. But it is a task which presents no difficulties insurmountable by the steady exercise of such qualities. At no time since the annexation of the Punjab has the mountain border of that province been wholly free from depredation and insult on the part of the surrounding tribes, nor can it be reasonably expected that what successive Governments of India have failed to accomplish in the course of thirty years will now be accomplished all at once. We must be prepared for occasional misconduct (especially during the first two or three years of the new arrangements), requiring from us recourse to punitive measures. But, apart from the indirect advantage of such increased respect as our authority has acquired from our military successes during the war, our practical power of controlling the border tribes has been greatly strengthened by the treaty. The Amir of Kabul has now neither the motive nor the means to incite these tribes to acts of hostility against us. The policy applied during the last three years to the pass tribes of Biluchistan has already effected the complete pacification of even their most turbulent sections, and the Bolan Pass, though unguarded by British troops, has been remarkably safe and quiet. These facts justify us in anticipating the most satisfactory results from the judicious and patient application of a similar system to the management of the Khyber and Michni Passes.

48. We cannot close this narrative of the second Afghan war without bringing prominently to your Lordship's notice the high character maintained by Her Majesty's troops, both English and Native, and their admirable conduct throughout the campaign. The enemy's positions in the Khyber and Kuram Passes were of great natural strength, but, though powerfully armed and vigorously defended, they were rapidly captured. His forces, dislodged from these positions with the loss of their guns and stores, were not merely defeated, but dispersed. In the advance to Kandahar, the superiority of the British cavalry was established as soon as tested, at the outset of the campaign. Against the valour and steadiness of the British soldier the fiercest assaults of the most warlike mountain tribes were as ineffectual as the organised resistance of the Amir's regular troops. Under conditions more trying than those of actual combat, the strictest discipline has been maintained throughout all ranks of the field forces, and the life and property of non-combatants effectually protected. It would be out of place in this report to specify particular services or particular regiments; but the Viceroy desires to record his high appreciation, in which we cordially concur, of the good service performed by the Native as well as the European regiments of the army of India in Afghanistan, where their discipline and courage were attested, not only by the uniform success of their arms, but also by the steadiness of their conduct under those trials and privations which are incidental to periods of inaction on the part of an invading army in a wild and inhospitable country.

49. We have also to acknowledge with sincere satisfaction the thoroughly creditable efficiency and patriotic spirit with which the contingents of the native states have sustained their honorable part in the labours of the late campaign.

We have, &c.

(Signed)	LYTTON.
„	F. P. HAINES.
„	A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
„	A. CLARKE.
„	J. STRACHEY.
„	E. B. JOHNSON.
„	W. STOKES.
„	A. R. THOMPSON.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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DESPATCH.

No. 27.

Secret,
No. 27.

India Office,
London, 7th August 1879.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA
in Council.

MY LORD,

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of letter from Your Excellency's Government, No. 136, dated the 2nd June last, transmitting, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the treaty of peace and friendship which you have concluded with the Ameer Yakoob Khan, and also of your subsequent letter, No. 160, dated the 7th July, received on the 2nd instant, explaining the considerations by which you were influenced in regulating the course of the recent campaign in Afghanistan and in the settlement of terms of peace.

2. My despatch of the 18th of November last reviewed the leading features of the policy followed by the British Government towards Afghanistan in such detail as to render unnecessary, on the present occasion, any further remarks on the subject. The refusal of the late Ameer, Shere Ali Khan, to admit within his territories an envoy from Your Excellency, after he had, in the summer of last year, welcomed a Russian mission to his capital, compelled Her Majesty's Government to demand reparation for the insult thus offered, and to intimate that his position would be regarded as that of a declared enemy unless the reparation required was afforded by a specified date. The Ameer had for some time previous adopted a course of conduct which tended to endanger both the security of the north-west frontier and the peace of the empire at large. This unfriendly attitude was met with forbearance, but the time at length arrived when it became necessary to abandon a policy which had apparently encouraged His Highness to undervalue the power, as he had already disregarded the wishes, of the British Government.

3. Her Majesty's Government were not without hope that the communication addressed to the Ameer would rouse him to a sense of his critical position, and that he would reply in such terms as might render hostilities unnecessary. This hope, however, was not fulfilled; the date specified passed without any reply from His Highness, and no alternative remained but prompt and decided action. The passage of the Afghan frontier by British troops was followed by the defeat of the forces which guarded it, and the rapid occupation of positions which placed the territories of the Ameer at the mercy of the British Government. Simultaneously with the advance of the troops, Your Excellency issued a proclamation, which clearly intimated to the Afghan sirdars and people that the invasion of their country was the consequence solely of the ill-advised conduct of their ruler; and that the British Government in no way desired to injure the people of Afghanistan, or to attach to them any share of responsibility for Shere Ali's proceedings. The considerations which led your Excellency in Council to anticipate important advantages from thus proclaiming a practical distinction between the Afghan people and their ruler, as set forth in the 13th paragraph of your letter of the 7th July, were weighty, and are proved by the result to have been based on an accurate estimate of public feeling in Afghanistan and of the extent to which the late Ameer, by his domestic and foreign policy, had alienated the feelings of his subjects.

4. There were grounds for believing that the rapid march of the British columns and the signal failure of the Afghan troops, although occupying formidable and well-selected positions, to offer any effective resistance, might satisfy Shere Ali of the rashness of his conduct and induce overtures from him of an acceptable character. The event, however, was different; within three weeks after the advance of Her Majesty's forces, the Ameer, having first released from prison his son Yakoob Khan, whom he at once appointed Governor of Cabul, quitted that city for Turkistan, accompanied by those members of the Russian mission who had remained at the capital after the departure of General Stoletoff.

5. The ultimate intentions of Shere Ali at this time are necessarily involved in some obscurity. Whatever they may have been, they were frustrated by his death on the 21st of February. Capricious at all times, and, in his later years, unfriendly as he had proved himself to be, Her Majesty's Government could not but receive with regret the intelligence of the decease of a prince with whom the Government of India had at one

period been on terms of cordiality, and who, moreover, had shown himself possessed of many of the qualities required in a ruler of Afghanistan. The event, followed as it was by the undisputed accession to power of the present Ameer, enabled your Excellency's Government to suspend further military operations, and unquestionably rendered less difficult the re-establishment of relations between the British and Afghan Governments on a satisfactory footing. Yakoob Khan had necessarily been free from responsibility for his father's policy; pacific overtures could, therefore, be made by him without humiliation, and he wisely took immediate steps to secure that alliance which his father had forfeited. His early communications addressed to your political officer at Gundamak indicated a desire for peace, and his eventual decision to leave his capital and proceed in person to the British camp afforded proof of his confidence in the moderation and justice of the British Government, and of his readiness to accept in principle the terms you were prepared to offer him, with the general nature of which he had been previously made acquainted.

6. This confidence was not misplaced, and to it, and to the correct appreciation shown by the Ameer of the true relative positions of the two Governments, must, in a great measure, be attributed the success of the negotiations which followed his arrival at Gundamak. I have already conveyed to you by telegraph the approval, by Her Majesty's Government, of the conditions of the treaty by which those negotiations were closed, and it is, therefore, only requisite for me now to make a few general remarks on some of its more important articles.

7. The second article, which guarantees an amnesty on the part of the Ameer in favour of those of his subjects who may have aided the British forces during recent operations, was essential to guard against the occurrence of reprisals such as followed the close of the last Afghan war. Her Majesty's Government learn with particular satisfaction that the Ameer has indicated in a practical way his desire to give effect to its stipulations, and they are confident that His Highness will take care that this desire is not contravened by any act or negligence on the part of subordinate officials. Her Majesty's Government attach special importance to this matter, which materially affects the honour of the British name.

8. The third article of the Treaty, which defines the future political relations of the two Governments, appears to Her Majesty's advisers to secure to each of the parties to it everything that is essential to their respective interests. On the one hand the Ameer undertakes to conduct his relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; on the other hand, he receives a guarantee against any consequences which may ensue to him from the due observance of this undertaking, and against unprovoked foreign aggression. At the same time, the concluding passage of the article indicates the strict adherence of the British Government to its oft declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which is again plainly affirmed in the fifth article. It being obvious that, so long as His Highness conforms strictly to his treaty obligations, foreign aggression must necessarily be unprovoked by any spontaneous act on his part, Her Majesty's Government see every reason to believe that the unambiguous stipulations which have now been recorded in a solemn instrument will be conducive to the material prosperity of Afghanistan, to the tranquillity of India, and to the peace of Central Asia.

9. The conditions embodied in the fourth article in regard to the establishment of British agencies in Afghanistan are likely to secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view. It is satisfactory that one of the first acts of the Ameer after opening negotiations should have been to express his desire to receive a permanent British resident at his capital. Although Her Majesty's Government always abstained from pressing this measure on the late Ameer in deference to his objections, they have never ceased to consider it in itself expedient; they believe that even the occasional presence at Cabul of an officer of sound judgment might have obviated many of the misunderstandings of recent years; they are satisfied that the objections expressed by Shere Ali will be shown to have been without substantial foundation; and they anticipate with confidence that the effect of the presence of a British officer at Cabul will be to consolidate that unity of policy between the Governments of India and Afghanistan which it is the first object of the treaty to establish. Her Majesty's Government are glad to observe that you have accorded to the Ameer the privilege of deputing his own agents similarly to India. They believe that many advantages will accrue to both Governments by the presence of an Afghan envoy of good sense and ability at Your Excellency's Court.

10. The right has properly been reserved to the British Government to send subordinate agents to the Afghan frontier, when such a measure may be considered necessary. With a competent resident at Cabul, the permanent location of English officers at Herat, Candahar, and other points on the frontier will, no doubt, be less essential than, up to the present time, Her Majesty's Government have considered it to be. It is clear, however, that the British Government cannot ensure the integrity of the Ameer's dominions against foreign aggression unless they have every reasonable facility for acquiring trustworthy information of events beyond the border through the channel of officers deputed from time to time to the frontier.

11. The territorial arrangements specified in Article IX. secure to the British Government that control over the western passes, and the tribes inhabiting them, which the course of events has rendered essential. The strategic defects of the Indian frontier in the direction of Afghanistan, as that frontier has existed since the acquisition of the Punjab, are very clearly stated in your letter of the 7th July. As is therein observed, it was not compatible with the policy and principles of the British Government to have recourse to the sword for the purpose of strengthening its position; but the successful conclusion of a war, which every effort was made to avert, has been legitimately used to remedy defects, of which the gravity could no longer be overlooked. Her Majesty's Government are gratified that it has been found possible to secure an object so important without actual annexation of Afghan territory, and, in particular, without a permanent occupation of the cities of Candahar and Jellalabad. They agree in the opinion of your Excellency in Council that the loss of those places, and especially of Candahar, would have been extremely detrimental to the strength and credit of the Afghan Government, while they see no reason to question the judgment of your competent professional advisers that it was not necessary, on strategic grounds, to incur so grave a political disadvantage.

12. Her Majesty's Government do not underrate the difficulties which may for some time be experienced in dealing with the tribes now first brought under the control of the Indian Government; but they are persuaded that the same energy and judgment which has been attended with such admirable results on the existing Punjab and Sindh frontiers will be equally successful in the new and more extended sphere in which those qualities will now be exercised.

13. The engagement in regard to the construction of a line of telegraph to Cabul through the Kurram valley, and the improvement of the present imperfect facilities for commercial intercourse between India and Afghanistan, which are embodied in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the treaty, are cordially approved by Her Majesty's Government. Although the promises made by Shere Ali to the late Lord Mayo on this subject were never fulfilled, he lived to see the benefit which accrued to his country by the measures agreed upon by your Excellency's Government and the Khan and sirdars of Khelat, affecting the lower trade routes between Afghanistan and Beluchistan. The Ameer Yakoob Khan has only to observe the improvement in those regions, in the way both of extended trade and of increased civilisation, to appreciate the solid advantages which commercial facilities and improved communications bring in their train.

14. The subsidy accorded to the Ameer, under Article X. of the Treaty, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be moderate in amount, and necessary to the support of His Highness's legitimate authority. Experience has shown that it is difficult for the ruler of so poor a country as Afghanistan to dispense with material aid of this kind; but its continuance has properly been made dependent on the efficient fulfilment by the Ameer of the engagements which he has now contracted.

15. Her Majesty's Government have observed with great pleasure the loyalty manifested by the Native Chiefs and Princes of India, both individually and collectively, in the recent crisis. Their anxiety to take an active part in the war, and the unreserved manner in which they placed their resources at the disposal of your Excellency's Government, are gratifying evidences of unity of interests and mutual good feeling and confidence between the British Government and the great feudatories of the Empire. Equally satisfactory has been the conduct of the Khan of Khelat, whose friendly and loyal attitude, no doubt, greatly facilitated the military operations in Southern Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to give the most favourable consideration to any measures which your Excellency in Council may propose for the purpose of marking their recognition of His Highness's services.

16. As I propose to address you separately in the Military Department on the purely military aspect of the operations now happily terminated, I confine myself at present to recording Her Majesty's complete satisfaction with the conduct of officers and men, European and Native, under circumstances trying to their endurance and discipline.

17. The various political officers attached to the columns and detachments in the field have had delicate and onerous duties to perform, and have discharged them in such a manner as to add materially to their reputations. The services of Major Cavagnari and Major Sandeman in particular have been of special importance to your Government. The value of Major Sandeman's personal influence over the Khan of Khelat and the Biluch sirdars can scarcely be over-rated; while Major Cavagnari's conduct of the various duties which fell to him during the campaign, and of the negotiations which have led to the restoration of peace with Afghanistan, was marked by tact and ability of a high order.

18. I have only, in conclusion, to express the deep interest with which Her Majesty's Government have perused the clear and able exposition of the policy of the Government of India in connection with recent Afghan affairs, which is contained in your letter, No. 160, of the 7th July, and their cordial approval of the proceedings of your Excellency in Council throughout the critical period which is now closed. In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and instructions, your Excellency and your colleagues have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and an accurate appreciation of the objects essential to be attained. Her Majesty's Government confidently believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of Gundamak, to which your Excellency personally has so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently, secure both British and Afghan interests, and promote the stability and peace of the Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CRANBROOK.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:
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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Telegram, dated 2nd July 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

AMIR well received at Kabul on his return. People reported generally satisfied with treaty. Selected officer will be deputed by Amir to Kandahar to arrange details of gradual evacuation of territory. All quiet at Kandahar and in assigned districts.

No. 2.

No. 163 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 14th July 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams containing news of current events at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 6th June 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Safed Sang, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR TAHIR KHAN, son of (Sirdar) Sharif Khan, has been appointed to the Governorship of Kelat-i-Ghilzai. He left Gandamak to day to take up his post.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 26th June 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FOLLOWING news received from Kabul :—All quiet in city, troops getting their annual leave. Certain Chiefs and Sirdars were much ashamed at being shown by Amir letters they had written to the British during the late war. Asnatula Khan, Ghilzai, who was accompanying Amir to Kabul, had fled on road and gone towards Kashmir. Troops had turned out to meet Amir. Mahomed Afzul's house is being prepared for British Envoy. Shabbaz Khan had been ordered to proceed with two regiments to Kushi to meet Major Cavagnari. Wali Mahomed Khan had asked permission from Amir to visit Kurram and look after his property, but was refused.

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(Signed) LYTTON.
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A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
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Telegram, dated 26th June 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FOLLOWING news received from Kabul :—All quiet in city, troops getting their annual leave. Certain Chiefs and Sirdars were much ashamed at being shown by Amir letters they had written to the British during the late war. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, who was accompanying Amir to Kabul, had fled on road and gone towards Kashmir. Troops had turned out to meet Amir. Mahomed Afzul's house is being prepared for British Envoy. Shahbaz Khan had been ordered to proceed with two regiments to Kushi to meet Major Cavagnari. Wali Mahomed Khan had asked permission from Amir to visit Kurram and look after his property, but was refused.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 30th June 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

News from Kabul as follows:—People generally pleased with peace. Sirdars and others who assisted or communicated with us during hostilities are frightened at treatment they may receive from Amir. Pakuk (Yakub) Khan visited Abdulla Jan's mother and reassured her. Rumoured that Ibrahim Khan and Ahmed Ali Jan will be sent to British territory. They reached Kabul on 25th June, and are in their own houses under surveillance.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 4th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai a week ago. Has sent no intimation of his arrival to General Stewart. Muhammad Aslam Khan, Tokhi, to whom the fort was made over by us, and to whom the Amir had written to come to Kabul, fled the day before Mahomed Tahir's arrival, certain assurances he required being withheld. He was unsuccessfully pursued by Mahomed Tahir's men, and two of his people made prisoners. These proceedings, though possibly justifiable, have for the present neutralised any effect produced here by Amir's Amnesty Proclamation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Telegram No. 1779 E.P., dated 5th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 4th July. We have ordered case of Aslam Khan, Tokhi, to be placed at once for orders before Amir at Kabul, and requested that Aslam Khan may be assured he has nothing to fear, and that he may go safely to Kabul where British Envoy will see to his treatment. Let these orders be known, and explain that no one under the amnesty need abscond.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 5th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Peiwar.

KINDLY send the following letter to Bakhtiar Khan. *Letter begins—*

You are informed that Muhammad Aslam Khan, Tokhi Ghilzai, had friendly intercourse with the British authorities during the late war and was left as Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, when the British forces left that place. It has now been reported from Kandahar that Mahomed Tahir Khan has been appointed Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and that Aslam Khan has fled for fear of molestation on account of his intercourse with the British authorities. You are to take an early opportunity of bringing the matter to the Amir's notice and to inform His Highness that the British Government expects that he will take measures for reassuring Muhammad Aslam Khan that he has nothing to fear from the Kabul Government on account of his intercourse with the British forces. It will be better that Muhammad Aslam should be summoned to Kabul, and you are authorised to write a letter to Aslam Khan assuring him that he has nothing to fear. This letter should be written after consultation with the Amir. I expect to reach Kurram about the 14th July. *Letter ends.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 8th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY of news for week ending 7th. Everything has been quiet during past week. No news from Herat. Mahomed Tahir, new Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, arrived there, ten days ago. Muhammad Aslam, Chief of Ghilzai, retired to the mountains. Before his arrival news of the appointment of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to be future Governor of Kandahar has been received with satisfaction; he was Governor for five years and was generally popular. Mir Afzal is still at Furrak, and is collecting revenue in district. Trade with India continues brisk. Heat slightly increasing. Health of troops good.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

Telegram, dated 11th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A CARAVAN arrived to-day from Herat with news to 21st June. All quiet there. News of peace had arrived and caused general rejoicing. Six infantry and one cavalry regiment said to be leaving Herat for Kabul.

No. 3.

No. 167 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams, containing news from Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

Simla, 21st July 1879.

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 16th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Bakhtiar Khan, dated 14th instant, reports death from cholera of brother of the Mustaufi, and also of Ataula Khan, Shahghassi. Heir-apparent has left for Lughman on account of cholera in Kabul. Arrangements are being made with the Shinwaris for protection of the road from Dakka to Haftchah.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 17th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRIVED this morning. Leave to-morrow for Karatiga where Afghan escort under Shahghassi Khushdil Khan meets us. On 19th proceed to Kasimkhel and expect to reach Kabul on 23rd. General Roberts has arranged for a small force of all arms to escort and show honour to Embassy to Karatiga. General also accompanies it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 15th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY for week ending 14th. City and country have been generally quiet during past week. Revenue in grain and cash continues to come in. A party of 80 travellers arrived on the 11th from Herat; they report everything quiet there and on the road. Six regiments of the garrison had been ordered to Kabul. News of peace excited general rejoicing.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Telegram, dated 16th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN has sent a servant on to prepare his house, and is expected to arrive in four or five days. He has no troops with him, but a regiment is accompanying his family some days behind him.

No. 4.

No. 169 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 28th July 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams containing news from Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 19th July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Kahamkhel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING could exceed the admirable arrangements made by the Afghan officials for the reception of the Embassy. Amir has insisted upon the Embassy and escort and camp-followers being his guests during the march to Kabul. At each stage tents have been pitched for our reception. General Roberts will telegraph further news. Good-bye.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 19th July 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

KARATIGA, Saturday, 19th July. Kabul Embassy arrived here yesterday, escorted from Ali Khel by two companies of 67th Foot, two companies 72nd and 92nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, four guns number 2 mountain battery, and one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry. Khushdil Khan and Badshah Khan are encamped at Kasim Khel, two miles from this, and about halfway to crest of Shuturgurdan; they will meet Major Cavagnari

this morning, and escort him to the camp pitched for him at Kasim Khel. To-morrow he will proceed to Kushi, reaching Kabul on 23rd instant. Country is perfectly quiet. Representatives of all neighbouring tribes are in our camp. I accompany Major Cavagnari to the Shuturgurdan and then return to Ali Khel.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 20th July 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel to VICEROY, Simla.

CAVAGNARI crossed the frontier yesterday morning.

Kushdil Khan came to our camp to receive him.

Everything was done by Afghan officials to show honour to British Embassy, and reception of myself and officers was most cordial. We rode to crest of Shuturgurdan escorted by Afghan troops, and, after taking luncheon with Khushdil Khan, said good-bye to Cavagnari and party. Mahomed Umar Khan, late Governor of Herat, has died of cholera at Kabul; Sirdar Gaza Khan has been appointed Governor of Kabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 20th July 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

Khushdil Khan came to our camp at Kaham Khel yesterday to meet Major Cavagnari, escorted by a regiment of cavalry and some irregular infantry. As Major Cavagnari left the British camp a salute of 15 guns was fired by our mountain battery. The Embassy then proceeded to Kasim Khel, where tents were comfortably arranged for their reception. After partaking of tea and refreshment we rode to crest of Shuturgurdan escorted by the Amir's troops. On our return we found lunch prepared for 50 officers. Shortly afterwards we took leave of Major Cavagnari, and his party, also of Khushdil Khan, who, however, insisted on accompanying us some distance. Everything was done by the Afghan officials to honour the British Embassy, and the reception of myself and officers was most cordial. Amir has insisted upon the Embassy, their escort and followers, being his guests during march to Kabul. At each stage, tents have been pitched for their use as Major Cavagnari has passed through, and Kurram is all quiet.

Enclosure 5 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 21st July 1879.

FROM MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Kushi, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Arrived here this morning. Descent of Shuturgurdan and ascent of Sheenaki Pass near Dobandi very tedious for camels; rear of baggage did not reach camp till 4 P.M., though we marched at 5 A.M. We are receiving most hospitable treatment.

Enclosure 6 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 21st July 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, KURRAM, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE satisfactory and cordial reception of Embassy by the Amir's officials on the Shuturgurdan has had a most beneficial effect all over Kurram. Some people doubted peace had been made, others thought it was only temporarily, and many believed that the meeting of our envoy with the Kabul authorities would be the signal for an outbreak. Some few of the local men I took with me up the Hazardarakht were so

convinced there would be a disturbance that they hesitated to go as far as Kharatiga when the time for the meeting arrived. All are satisfied now, and the large majority are I believe really glad that peace has been concluded.

Arrangements have been made for safety and despatch of letters and telegrams between Ali Khel and Kabul. Post now takes about 86 hours.

Zaman Khan, the newly-appointed Governor of Khost, passed through Kurram a few days ago.

Enclosure 7 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 22nd July 1879.

From MAJOR CAVAGNARI, Zarghun Shahr, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Zarghun Shahr, 21st July. Arrived this morning; easy march of seven miles over flat stony plateau. Regret to report death from cholera of Bakhtiar Khan. He will be a great loss to me. At present the only man I can suggest to replace him is Extra Assistant Commissioner Ghulam Ahmed, now at Peshawur. If appointed, he should be prepared to leave Lundikotal as soon as information is received that his escort through Jellalabad district has been arranged. But for his age, Nawab Ghulam Hussan Khan would be the best man. If he could join direct and rapidly, I would prefer him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 24th July 1879.

From SIR L. CAVAGNARI, Char Asiah, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHAR ASIAH, 23rd. Arrived this morning about four miles from Zahidabad. The valley closes in, and the road passes over low hills, but there is nothing to impede the march of troops. Shahghassi Mahomed Yusaf arrived in camp to communicate the Amir's arrangements for reception of Embassy. Certain of the principal Sirdars will come out to meet us with artillery, cavalry, and infantry. We hope to enter Kabul about 9 A.M. to-morrow.

Enclosure 9 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 22nd July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUMMARY for last week. Complete tranquillity in district and city. The new Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, arrives to-morrow, when that part of the province not under our direct administration will be made over to him. Travellers continue to arrive from Herat where everything (is) quiet. Six regiments of Infantry left some time since for Kabul.

Enclosure 10 in No. 4.

Telegram, dated 23rd July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN arrived this morning. He was met by General Stewart's Aide-de-Camp and an escort of cavalry under a European officer, and received at his house by a guard of honour of the 15th Sikhs under a European officer. A salute of 17 guns was fired from the cantonment. He will be visited by the Nawab and myself this afternoon, and will cail on the General to-morrow morning.

No. 5.

No. 173 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 4th August 1879.

WE HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of telegrams received from our officers in Afghanistan during the past week.

2. These telegrams describe the arrival and reception of Sir L. Cavagnari at Kabul. They also report the arrival at Kandahar of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the Afghan Governor of that province, and the arrangements under preliminary discussion, in view to the transfer of the administration to the Amir's authorities.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 24th July 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN, Governor of Kelat, has arrested Mullah Hasibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam Khan, although furnished with a safe conduct by me to go to Kabul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 25th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul viâ Ali Khel.

Following from St. John, Kandahar.

MAHOMED TAHIR KHAN, Governor of Kelat, has arrested Mullah Hasibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam Khan, although furnished with a safe conduct by me to go to Kabul.

Please inquire and obtain from Kabul Government early issue of necessary orders to respect our safe conduct.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 26th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 24th July. Embassy entered city this morning, and received a most brilliant reception. Four miles from city Sirdars Abdullah Khan, Herati, and Mullah Shah Mahomed, with some cavalry and two elephants, met us. We proceeded on the elephants with a large escort of cavalry. Outside the city two batteries of artillery, some cavalry, and nine regiments of infantry, were drawn up in column and saluted, their bands playing British National anthem. As we entered city the heavy battery fired a salute of 17 guns. Large crowd assembled, and was most orderly and respectful. Mustaufi and Daud Shah met us at our place of residence.

In Bala Hissar at 6 p.m. I paid formal visit to Amir, and delivered Viceroy's letter. Amir inquired after Viceroy's health, and also after that of the Queen and Royal family, and expressed regret on death of Prince Imperial. Amir's demeanour was most friendly.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

Telegram, No. 1966EP., dated 27th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, via Ali Khel.

Your telegram, 24th, received. Viceroy has received with great pleasure intelligence of the brilliant reception given at Kabul to your Embassy; it is regarded as most favourable inauguration of friendly intercourse and understanding between the two Governments. Your telegram was repeated to England.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 28th July 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Envoy, Kabul, post Ali Khel.

Following message from St. John, 27th :—

Syed Mir Hashem sent by me to Herat, where he arrived after declaration of peace, has been imprisoned by Ayub, although he has had passport from me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 28th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 26th July. Visited Amir this morning, and delivered presents. All continues satisfactory.

Enclosure 7 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. Kabul, 27th July. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 30th July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, July 28th. Samarkandi left yesterday. This morning, accompanied by my staff, I rode to Baber's tomb, and round the environs of Kabul. Returned through one of the city bazars. People very orderly, many saluted, Mullah Shah Mahomed and some Afghan cavalry accompanied me. Visited Amir this evening.

Enclosure 9 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 31st July 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. Kabul, 29th. All continues well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 1st August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 30th July. Visited Sial Sang this morning. Received your message of 28th. Will inquire from Amir about Syed Mir Hashem.

Enclosure 11 in No. 5.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

The principal event of the week has been the entry of the new Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, which took place on the morning of the 23rd. His Excellency was met by an Aide-de-Camp of the General with an escort of cavalry, and conducted to his house in the city. Great crowds assembled to see him arrive, but no particular enthusiasm was shown. The next day His Excellency called on General Stewart, who returned the visit on the 26th; arrangements are being made for the transfer to him of authority in the city and province. The country and city are tranquil. No news of importance from Western Afghanistan.

No. 6.

No. 177 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to inclose translations of three letters received by his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan from General Von Kauffmann, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan. These letters have been transmitted in original by His Highness the Amir, through Sir Louis Cavagnari, to the Government of India.

2. Of the two earlier letters, dated 25th February 1879,* and 27th March 1879,† one is addressed to the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan himself, the other to his son. The third letter, dated 25th April 1879,‡ was brought to Kabul by a special messenger, whose coming was announced beforehand by a letter§ from the Russian Governor at Katti Kurgan to the Amir's

deputy in Afghan Turkestan. This messenger was allowed to deliver his letter at Kabul; but His Highness the Amir has given orders that in future no agents of the Russian Government shall pass the Oxus without his express permission.

3. It has been explained to us that the two letters first received from General Von Kauffmann are in reply to friendly letters of ceremony which Gholam Hyder Khan, the Amir's deputy in North Afghanistan, sent to Tashkend under instructions from Yakub Khan. The Amir's hold upon his northern provinces was at the time precarious; and, as he apprehended some adverse movement from beyond the Oxus on the part of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, he was anxious to appear to be on good terms with the Russians. We attach little importance to the formal interchange of letters written and received under these circumstances.

4. But the third letter forwarded through Katti Kurgan has apparently been spontaneously addressed to the Amir by the Governor-General at Tashkend; it reached the Amir at a date subsequent to the ratification of our Treaty with Afghanistan, and

His Highness deferred answering it until after the arrival of our Envoy at Kabul. We have now received from Sir Louis Cavagnari a copy of the reply which has been despatched to General Von Kauffmann by His Highness; and we submit it,* translated into English, for Your Lordship's information.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Translation from the Russian.

To his Highness AMIR SAHIB MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN.

WISHING you complete happiness, the following are my words:—

With deep sorrow I heard the sad news of the demise of my friend, your all-beloved just Father, the Amir Sahib, and I sincerely lament the heavy loss sustained by you and by the country of Afghanistan.

Your Highness, being the lawful heir—and having been called upon to become the ruler of the country by your late father himself, at a time of dire visitation sent by God—have now ascended the throne.

I offer you my felicitations and my most sincere wishes of every good.

As a friend of your late amiable father, I hope that you will foster the same good disposition and the same confidence towards me, as did your father, the late Amír Sahib.

I wish Your Highness wisely and justly to rule the people, who will not abandon you in these hard times, and who will be always ready to stand up for, and defend, your throne.

The envoys of your late father, the Amír Sahib:—Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Wazír Shah Mahomed Khan, Kazi Abdul Kader, and the Kemnal-Dabir Mahomed Hassan, are returning to be at your service. I am convinced that these men who faithfully served your father, will as faithfully serve your Highness.

May God grant you wisdom, health, and the love of your people!

The Governor-General of Turkestan,
(Signed) ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
VON KAUFFMANN, 1st.

City of Tashkend.

The "25th" February* 1879=(The 16th Rabil-ul-awul 1296 H.)

*(New style:
9th March).
Tr

N.B.—The Russian note at foot of the vernacular page testifies the correctness of the translation. It is signed by "Collegien Rath Nerasimof" or "Norasimof," and is dated Tashkend, the 25th February*9.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

Translation from the Russian.

To the highly respected (:) The CROWN PRINCE of the Afghan Throne, SIRDAR MAHOMED MÚSA KHAN; to ULÁM AIDAR KHAN; to AMÍR MAHOMED; to NÚR MAHOMED; and to KHABIBULLA.

I WISH you all constantly to enjoy the favours and the good-will of the new ruler, the Amir Sahib!

After which the following are my words:—

I cannot but tell you candidly that the news of the demise of my friend the Amír Sahib, Shir Ali Khan, has profoundly grieved me. From your letter of the 26th Rabiyl

Avvela, I learnt that you, Sirdar Mahomed Músa Khan, as being the lawful heir, have been chosen by the Váaliat—which proves the good disposition and attachment of the Afghan people towards your family and your race. To me, an old friend of your late grandfather, this news has given unspeakable joy.

I wish you all good fortune in all your good undertakings, and likewise that you may prove powerful supporters of the fortunate Amír Sahib Mahomed Yakub Khan. God grant it!

The Governor-General of Turkestan,

(Signed)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

VON KAUFFMANN, 1st.

City of Tashkend. The "27th" March* 1879.

* (New style:
8th April.)
—Tr.

N.B.—The Russian note at foot of the vernacular page testifies the correctness of the translation, and is signed by "Collegien Rath Nerasimof" or "Norasimof." It is dated Tashkend, the 27th March 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from HAKIM WASNIHAVITCH, (?) Russian Governor of Katti Kurgan, to the Address of GENERAL GHULAM HYDER KHAN, Loe-náb, (Governor-General) of Chahar Velayet (four provinces or districts,) dated 29th* Aprii 1879=(—1296, Hijri).

* New Style, 11th May 1879.

(After Compliments.)

So long as the system of the universe continues in its working order through the instrumentality of Providence, so long may the Most Merciful and Gracious God continue you—who hold a high dignity and rank, and who do not stand in need of any praise or eulogy—on the path of prosperity, and maintain you on the "masnad" of authority, and make your days roll on agreeably to your wishes for the sake of the Chief of the Prophets and his holy posterity.

I beg to inform you that my servant, Nasir Khan, is, at this happy moment, leaving with a letter from the Governor of the province of Turkestan for his Highness the Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, whose assistance is highly valued. It is hoped that you, out of regard for friendship, will send the man on with your own servant and cause him to be presented to the Amir with the letter, and that you will kindly inform me of the delivery of the letter and the presentation of the man to the Amir, as well as of the state of His Highness' health. This will not, of course, be more than a friend will do for a friend. May God make you happy and prosperous both in this world and the next for the sake of His Prophet and his posterity.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

Extract from Translation of a Report from MUNSHI BAKHTIAR KHAN to the Address of MAJOR CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., dated 9th June 1879.

A LETTER was received by the Amir yesterday from General Ghulam Hyder Khan to the effect that he had stopped Mahomed Nasir Khan, a Russian Government Agent, whose arrival in Turkestan he had reported previously, from proceeding to Kabul until further orders. The Amir has written to the General to allow the Agent to proceed to Kabul to deliver the letter brought by him from the Governor-General of Tashkend, as previously ordered; but has given instructions that if any other person connected with the Russian Government should intimate his intention in future to visit Kabul, he (the General) must direct him to remain on the other side of the Amu pending receipt of orders from the Amir. Also, the General is to hold no communication with the Russians in future without the Amir's permission.

Enclosure 5. in No. 6.

Literal Translation of a Letter from GENERAL KAUFFMANN to AMIR MAHOMED YAKUB KHAN, dated 25th* April 1879=(16th Jamadi-ul-Awal, A. H. 1296.)

* New Style, 7th May 1879.

(Translation from the Persian.)

AFTER my wishes and prayers for your Highness' safety and prosperity, I take the opportunity to write that, having bidden (a temporary) farewell to the affairs of the State entrusted to my charge,* I intend to start for the metropolis of the Russian Empire on the 15th May, corresponding to the first week of Jamadi-us-Sani. I therefore beg to intimate this my intention to your Highness, and hope that your Highness, considering me your sincere friend and staunch well-wisher, will keep me informed of every occurrence that takes place in your Highness' dominions while I am away.

I have given orders here that any letters that may be received from the Great Amir (your Highness) during my absence should be forwarded with all possible despatch to St. Petersburg. May the Most High God prolong your Highness' life and grant your Highness a great victory.

Here the seal of the General.

Here his signature in Russian.

Enclosure 6. in No. 6.

Translation of a Letter from His Highness the AMIR of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to GENERAL KAUFFMANN, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, dated Kabul 26th July 1879.

YOUR friendly letter, dated the 25th of April 1879, reached me by the hands of Nasir Khan, and I fully understood all the friendly and neighbourly meanings contained in it.

The state of affairs here is that peace and friendship have been established between my Government and the British Government in a way which is conducive to the advantage of both. All cause of quarrel and misunderstanding has disappeared from between the two parties, and the officers of both Governments are now pleased and happy. As Nasir Khan has been dismissed, and is about to set out to his home, I have thought proper to answer your friendly letter, and to add that if, at any time, the officers of your Government, in accordance with the rules of friendship and neighbourhood, should require to communicate with my Government, either in writing or verbally, they will no doubt consider it advisable to do so through the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister in London, his Excellency the Viceroy of India, or the British Envoy at Kabul, in conformity with the treaty which has been concluded between my Government and the British Government.

No. 7.

No. 180 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a memorandum on the arrangements made for the reception of the British Embassy in Kabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 J. STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 7.

MEMORANDUM on the Arrangements made for the Reception of the British Embassy in Kabul.

ON Wednesday the 23rd July the Amir's master of the ceremonies, Shahgassi Mahomed Yusaf Khan, waited upon his Excellency, the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., at his camp at Char Asiah to inform him of the arrangements made by His Highness the Amir for the reception of the Embassy next day.

On Thursday the 24th July, the Envoy and staff, escorted by the 9th Regiment of the Amir's Cavalry, marched from Char Asiah, and were met three miles outside the capital by Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan (Sultan Jan) of Herat and Mullah Shah Mahomed, the Foreign Minister, with 100 men of the Amir's mounted body-guard. Two elephants were also brought and were mounted by the Envoy and the Secretary to the Embassy. Order of procession was as per margin. The body-guard saluted and fell in in front, leading the procession. Half a mile nearer the city, another troop of orderly cavalry fell in in front of the body-guard. Close to the eastern gate of the Bala Hissar the troops of the Kabul garrison were drawn up in line of columns on the left of the road. On the right was a mountain battery, then nine battalions of infantry, and a horse artillery battery. On the left was a regiment of cavalry.*

One Troop, Amir's Regular Cavalry.
100 Sabres, Body-Guard.
Elephant with Envoy and Sirdar Abdulla Khan.
Elephant with Mr. Jenkyns and Shah Mahomed Khan, Foreign Secretary.
25 Sabres, Guide Cavalry.
9th Regiment of Amir's Regular Cavalry.

* The troops saluted the Envoy presenting arms and playing "God save the Queen."

The Envoy and staff entered the Bala Hissar by the Shah Shabid Gate, and as they did so, a salute of 17 guns was fired by a heavy battery, 18-prs. Near the Amir's palace a guard of honour, consisting of a whole regiment, was drawn up and saluted the Envoy as he passed, by presenting arms.

Immediately on the arrival of his Excellency at the place of residence appointed for the Embassy, Mustaufi Habibulla (the Finance Minister) and Daud Shah (Commander-in-Chief) waited upon him to make formal inquiries after his health on the part of the Amir.

At 10 o'clock Mr. Jenkyns, accompanied by Lieutenant Hamilton, visited the Amir on the part of the Envoy, and thanked him for the honourable reception that had been given to the Embassy.

His Highness appointed 6 p.m. as a suitable hour for receiving the Envoy.

At quarter to 6 p.m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mullah Shah Mahomed) called at the British Embassy in order to escort the Envoy to the Amir's palace.

At 6 p.m. the Envoy, accompanied by the whole of his staff, paid a formal visit to His Highness the Amir. A guard of the Amir's Highlanders accompanied the Envoy from his residence to His Highness' palace, at the door of which a guard of honour of the same regiment was drawn up.

His Excellency introduced the members of his staff to the Amir, and, after the usual inquiries after his health, thanked His Highness for the very honourable reception, and the hospitable treatment which the British Embassy had experienced. The Envoy then delivered a letter to His Highness from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, and conveyed his Excellency the Viceroy's compliments to His Highness. The Amir expressed his pleasure at the honour, and said he indulged the hope of having a personal interview with his Excellency the Viceroy soon. His Highness also inquired after the health of Her Majesty the Queen, and the Royal Family, and of his Excellency the Viceroy. He also expressed his sorrow and condolence on the death of the Prince Imperial. After some further conversation the Envoy withdrew being escorted back by the Foreign Minister.

Sirdar Yahya Khan (Governor of Kabul) Mustaufi Habibulla (Finance Minister), and Daud Shah (Commander-in-Chief), were present at the Durbar and sat on the Amir's left. The Envoy and staff, with Sher Mahomed Khan, Kayani, (of the Kohat district) sat on His Highness' right.

(Signed) W. JENKYNs,
Secretary to Embassy.

Kabul, 24th July 1879.

No. 8.

No. 181 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 11th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translations of reports received from the Meshed Agent and from Herat.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from the Meshed Agent to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated
17th May 1879. (Extract.)

AFTER the starting of Ayub Khan's messenger for Teheran, I was told by some Heratis that the letters of which he was the bearer, although professing to be from Amir Yakub Khan, were, in reality, concocted by Ayub Khan.

The Kabul and Kandahar regiments of the Herat garrison are in a state of disaffection and disorder. The officers have no kind of authority over them; and all the Government employés at Herat are in expectation of news announcing the capture of Kabul, and the downfall of Yakub Khan, and so soon as the troops get this news, they intend robbing the peasantry and neighbourhood, and deserting for their homes.

The inhabitants of Herat have given up all industry and trade. No shops, with the exception of those of bakers, grocers, and butchers, are opened; and the natives bury all their goods because of the state of lawlessness of the place and the oppression of the authorities. From time to time, they produce such things as may be necessary, but then hide them again. The authorities also are so fearful of the stability of their tenure of office that they are mercilessly collecting a year's taxes.

All people trying to get away are stopped on the borders, and are not allowed to pass unless they know some one in authority, or are able to bribe and make presents. All the inhabitants of Herat, native and outsiders, are anxiously awaiting the advance of the English army.

Any traveller coming from Kabul is taken first before the authorities by men stationed at the gates for the purpose, where he is taught what he is to say according to the interests of those in power.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from Herat, to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated 4th May 1879.
(Extract.)

YESTERDAY two-and-a-half lakhs of Kabul rupees, that is to say, 50,000 tomans, arrived here from Turkestan. The expenses here' being great, and the revenues small, this sum has been paid into the treasury of Ayub Khan.

No doubt this has been done with the knowledge of Yakub Khan. The Sepeh Salar and Sultan Muhammad Khan are to start for Kabul to-morrow or the day after; they will be escorted by Yar Gul Khan, brother of General Fakir Ahmed Khan, and 200 horse. Some other Khans are to follow in five or six days. These have doubtless been summoned at the request of the British officials, who wish that Ayub Khan's supporters should be present at any deliberation respecting peace.

We hear from Kandahar that the English have got a firm footing there, and have been collecting supplies of all sorts. The inhabitants have much liberty, and are making a great deal of profit by their transactions. No customs dues are levied beyond one rupee for every ten Kandahar māns on each load, which is exacted without respect to the kind of goods.

We have no fresh news from Kabul, as the authorities only publish what is favourable to themselves, in the hopes of keeping the natives of the provinces together.

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from Herat, to Ronald F. Thomson, Esq., dated 16th May 1879.

THREE days ago, a Government courier came in from Kabul. Amir Yakub Khan had written to Sirdar Ayub Khan, telling him to send 20 batmans of manna, and also informed him that Sirdar Yahya Khan had been sent to bring the harems from Turkestan. This Sirdar is the Amir's father-in-law.

Twelve days ago, the Sepeh Salar was despatched with honour, but under the surveillance of 200 horsemen, to Kabul. He left without being in debt either to the Herat Treasury or any private individual. Sirdar Mahomed Umar Khan, the ex-Governor of Herat, was also sent to Kabul three days ago in a very ignominious manner. His private servants were all put under arrest; and it being found that he had spent a lakh of rupees out of the revenues, a bond was taken from him for the amount in Amir Yakub Khan's name and forwarded to Kabul, for the Amir either to recover the sum from him, or make him a present of it.

Two nights ago, Mustaufi Mirza Aziz, who has been the Mustaufi of Herat for the last four years, was arrested with two of his brothers, and his accounts were examined. A deficiency of 8,000 tomans was found, and the Sirdar has put him in prison until he makes good the money.

General Fakir Ahmed Khan is the absolute Minister of Sirdar Ayub Khan. Several Afghan Chiefs, like Mir Akhor Agha Jan Khan and others who accompanied the Sirdar from Meshed, have all been recently sent to Kabul by the advice of the said General.

Two Herati regiments which had deserted from Maimeneh were compelled to go back by the Herat authorities. On arriving there, the inhabitants would not allow them to enter the place, so they have gone and occupied Aul-i-Mar, a place three fursakhs distant off.

There are no signs of peace. The British authorities are paramount at Kandahar; and it is said their advance guard has come as far as Zamindawar.

To-day, a caravan consisting of about a thousand souls, Kandahari merchants, &c., left this for Kandahar. They had goods and ready cash to the amount of 10 or 12 lakhs of kraus.

No. 9.

No. 183 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 18th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a memorandum of a personal interview, which took place on the 25th

July 1879, between Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 9.

MEMORANDUM of a personal interview, which took place on the 25th of July 1879, between MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., and His Highness the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, &c.

AFTER some conversation on ordinary topics I informed His Highness that the Government of India had received the letter despatched by General Von Kauffmann by the hand of Nasir Ali Khan of Samarkand, and which His Highness had forwarded for the advice of the British Government as to the reply that should be given to the messenger. I informed the Amir that the Russian Government would be informed that such correspondence is opposed to the pledges of non-interference in the affairs of Afghanistan which the Russian Government has frequently made, and I added that the Amir should now dismiss the messenger with a letter acknowledging the communication received from the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, and stating that in future, if the Russian authorities had anything to communicate to the Afghan Government, they should do so through the medium of the British authorities. I further stated that it was advisable that His Highness should furnish me with a copy of the reply given to the Russian messenger.

The Amir without hesitation acquiesced in what I proposed, and said that he only awaited my arrival to dismiss the messenger.

I replied that it was a very good thing that the Russian messenger should have been an eye-witness of the honourable reception given to the British Embassy, and further that the arrival of the representative of the British Government should be the signal for the departure of the emissary from the Russian authorities. His Highness promised to forward through me a reply to his Excellency the Viceroy of India's letter which I presented yesterday, and to send at the same time a copy of his reply to the Russian letter above alluded to.

I next informed His Highness that Major St. John, now on political duty at Kandahar, has been appointed Consul-General at Astrabad, and that it would be a great convenience to that officer if, instead of having to travel through India and the Persian Gulf, it could be arranged that he should proceed viâ Herat and the northern frontier of Persia.

The Amir replied that, owing to the unsettled state of the country between Girishk and Herat, he could not be certain that satisfactory arrangements could be made until his troops were again stationed at Girishk, but that if it would be a convenience to Major St. John he would direct Sirdar Sher Ali Khan at Kandahar to make arrangements to escort him to the Afghan frontier in that direction. At my request the Amir promised to write to the Governor of Kandahar to communicate with Major St. John, and if he wished to proceed to the Persian frontier viâ Seistan to make the necessary arrangements for his journey. I informed His Highness of the news telegraphed from Kandahar as to the apparent anxiety of Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan on hearing that Afghan troops were about to march in the direction of Farrah. The Amir replied that he could not understand why the Sirdar should have any apprehensions, as his letters which were of frequent occurrence were submissive and friendly.

As regards Herat matters the Amir stated that he has the most thorough confidence in his brother the Governor of that place, and added that, in consequence of his lengthy residence at Meshed, it was possible that Sirdar Ayub Khan still maintained friendly correspondence with the Governor of Khorassan, but that he (the Amir) did not approve of any further correspondence and would order its discontinuance.

I next entered into some general conversation on matters relating to Merv. The Amir stated that he was aware that the Tekke Turkomans had grave apprehensions as to the aggressive designs of Russia, and that they would have to seek an alliance with Afghanistan or Persia. He added that the Turkomans would naturally prefer the Afghans to the Persians.

Before taking leave of His Highness I remarked that I hoped no restrictions would be placed upon Sirdars and others visiting the officers of the Embassy, as I assured him that he need never fear that we would do anything to lessen his authority and influence. The Amir replied that he has never forbidden any one to visit the British officers. I answered that the people of Afghanistan would act in accordance with what they believed would please their ruler, and that if they thought he would not like such visits being paid they would not make them even though no orders were given them.

At my request His Highness promised to arrange for the safe-conduct to the British frontier (Kurram) of the baggage animals and followers who accompanied the Embassy to Kabul.

No. 10.

No. 186 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 18th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward a copy of further telegrams on the subject of affairs at Kabul and Candahar.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 2nd August 1879.

FROM SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 31st July. The following movements of troops ordered from Kabul Garrison:—Three infantry regiments to Herat, three to Ghazni, six to Turkestan, and a cavalry regiment to Zurmat, to collect arrears of revenue. Cholera has increased during two last days. We ride about the environs every morning. Amir has not left his residence since cholera became epidemic.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 3rd August 1879.

SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 1st, Kabul. All well. Violent earthquake last night.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 5th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 3rd, Kabul. All well. Six regiments of infantry have arrived from Herat, others under orders to replace them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 7th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 5th.—Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani Chief, died of cholera yesterday.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 8th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 6th August.—Alarming reports personally reached me to-day from several sources of the mutinous behaviour of the Herat regiments lately arrived here, some of the men having been seen going about the city with drawn swords, and using inflammable language against Amir and his English visitors; and I was strongly advised not to go out for a day or two.

I sent for Foreign Minister, and as he was confident that the reports were exaggerated, we went out as usual.

I do not doubt that there is disaffection among troops on account of arrears of pay, and especially about compulsory service, but the Amir and his ministers are confident that they can manage them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 9th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 7th.—State of affairs reported yesterday continuing in milder degree. Amir professing complete confidence to maintain discipline.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 9th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 7th.—Some Ghilzais or Jajis have been plundering fruit merchants between Kharatiga and Shuturgardan, and yesterday they detained for some hours the Kabul mail bag. I represented this to the Amir, who has directed Foreign Minister to summon Padshah Khan and come to a proper understanding with him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 12th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 10th August.—Three regiments under Brigadier Zabardast Khan, Ghilzai, marched for Ghazni on 7th instant. Amir inspected them at Deh Mazang. Amir inspected to-day some of the regiments lately returned from Herat, and is about to give them some pay.

Enclosure 9 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 13th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.
KABUL, August 11th.—All well. Nothing important to report.

Enclosure 10 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 14th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.
VIRULENT cholera has broken out in the regiments recently returned from Herat. Many deserted in panic, and the rest have been given leave to their homes.

Enclosure 11 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 15th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 13th.—All well. Foreign Minister reported by order of Amir that a Turk, calling himself Said Husain Pasha, and stating he was captured by the Russians in late Turkish war, arrived here three days ago from Bokhara, having travelled *viâ* Orenburg and Tashkend. He is now on his way to Bombay *viâ* Kurram. Amir gave him some expenses for his journey.

Enclosure 12 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 5th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AUGUST 5th.—There has been no event of importance during the week. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has taken charge of the out-districts, but the town and neighbourhood are not yet made over to him. The Herat road is again infested by robbers, and no more caravans have arrived.

Enclosure 13 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 9th August 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRANGEMENTS made for making over city to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan on 10th under satisfactory conditions.

Enclosure 14 in No. 10.

Telegram, dated 12th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EVERYTHING quiet in city and neighbourhood. Charge of city was made over to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan on the evening of the 10th. Our police and sanitary arrangements

remain unchanged, and the gates are still held by our guards, but the town dues and taxes remitted by us were at once re-imposed. The sellers of shoes and caps have closed their shops in consequence. Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, re-appointed Governor of Pusht-i-Rud, and Zanindawar, arrived here from Kabul on the 7th. He visited General Stewart on the 10th, and the latter returned his visit on the 11th. He leaves for Girishk to-morrow.

No. 11.

No. 188 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers received from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Kabul and its Dependencies, regarding the reception of the British Embassy at Kasim Khel by His Highness the Amir's officials.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

No. 2, dated 19th July 1879.

Memo. from MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

HAS the honour to forward copy of a letter addressed to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Dated, Camp Kasim Khel, 19th July 1879.

FROM MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to His Highness the AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

(A. C.) I WRITE to inform your Highness that I arrived at Kasim Khel this morning.

Khushdil Khan Loinab* came to meet me at Karatiga with an escort of cavalry and infantry. General Roberts and several officers accompanied me to Kasim Khel, and rode to see the crest of the Shuturgurdan. After partaking of Khushdil Khan Loinab's hospitality, General Roberts and the other officers left Kasim Khel highly pleased at having seen the excellent arrangements your Highness' officials had made for the reception of the British Embassy. In short, nothing has been omitted by Khushdil Khan Loinab to indicate your Highness' sincere friendship to the British Government.

I hope to reach Kabul on the 24th July, when I shall have the honour of renewing with your Highness that friendly intercourse commenced at Gandamak.

The other officers of the Embassy join with me in expressing a hope that your Highness is in the enjoyment of good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

No. 4, dated Camp Zahidabad, 22nd July 1879.

Memo. from MAJOR L. CAVAGNARI, C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul Embassy, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dept.

IN continuation of No. 2 of the 19th instant, has the honour to forward a letter received this day from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR YAKUB KHAN to MAJOR SIR L. CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., dated Kabul, 21st July 1879.

(A. C.) BE it known to my kind friend Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., who has a heart warm in affection and marked with friendliness, that at a time when my heart longed to hear the happy news of his good health, his most friendly and cordial letter, dated Saturday, the 19th July, reached me from Kasim Khel. I cast an affectionate glance over it, and learnt from its contents the account of his arrival at that place, in company with General Roberts, his aides-de-camp, and a few other officers of high rank, as well as of the attention and consideration shown to him by Loinab Khushdil Khan.

It is a source of gratification and joy that my worthy friend has reached so near his destination in a state of sound health; and, God willing, on the appointed day, viz., the 24th July, the doors of fresh happiness and pleasure and unbounded joy and delight will be set open to my heart by having a joyous interview with him. But it is a matter of great sorrow and regret that at this time when my friend is approaching my capital, Kabul, the worthy Mir Munshi Muhammad Bakhtiar Khan, who was a trustworthy and true servant to his Sublime Government and a special well-wisher of my God-granted Government, having been ill with cholera for two or three days, bade adieu to this ephemeral world, and departed to that of happiness and repose on Sunday, the 29th Rajab (20th July).

Although his death has occasioned sorrow and pain to me, and will no doubt impose the burden of grief and regret upon your mind, yet there is no remedy against the decrees of God, and we are bound to submit to His will.

No. 12.

No. 192 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th August 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a further collection of telegrams relating to Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 16th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 14th.—All well. Padshah Khan, Ghilzai, personally deputed to make arrangements for protection of Shuturgurdan road.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 17th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 15th.—All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 18th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

DATED Kabul, 16th August.—All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 19th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 17th.—Amir of Bokhara contemplates moving some troops towards Badakshan frontier in consequence of depredations committed on the Kabul and Darwaz frontiers. Governor of Afghan Turkestan has begged Amir not to do this, promising to put pressure on the insurgents. Sara Beg, the ex-Mir of Kulab, is said to be the instigator of these acts by the Badakshan insurgents.

Some Russians are exploring along the right bank of the Oxus.

Enclosure 5 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 20th August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 18th August.—Amir has ordered troops to proceed to Badakshan to coerce the insurgents. Cholera here again on the increase. Herati regiments lost over a hundred men.

Enclosure 6 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 21st August 1879.

From SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

REGIMENTS for Turkestan have left Deh Mazang. It is believed that many will desert.

Enclosure 7 in No. 12.

Telegram, dated 20th August 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the past week. Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan has gone to Zamindawar, and Sirdar Sher Ali's elder son, with his brother and other Sirdars, have arrived from Herat.

No. 12A.

No. 194 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 1, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, No. 10, dated 29th July 1879, submitting his diary No. 1 for the week ending 26th July.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 J. STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 12A.

No. 10, dated 29th July 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

HAS the honour to submit diary for the week ending the 26th July 1879.

No 1. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul from the 19th to 26th July 1879.

July 19th. Under arrangements made by Major-General Roberts, C.B., V.C., Commanding in Kuram, the camp of the British Embassy left Ali Khel on the 18th of July escorted by the following troops:—four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery; one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry; 2 companies 67th Foot; 2 companies 72nd Highlanders; 2 companies 92nd Highlanders; and 4 companies 5th Goorkhas, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Massy. The camp halted at Kharatiga, the boundary between the Jaji and Ghilzi tribes, and which, by arrangement concluded with His Highness the Amir at Gandamak, is now the limit of the British administration in Kuram. About 8.30 a.m., on the 19th, Shahghassi Khushdil Khan, Barakzai, son of the late Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, arrived at the frontier with a regiment of regular cavalry commanded by Colonel Shahr Khan and some Ghilzi levies under Padshah Khan, the Chief of the Ahmedzai Ghilzis. Mr. Jenkyns, C.S., and Captain Conolly, Political Assistant to General Roberts, were deputed to meet Khushdil Khan and conduct him to the British camp.

At 9 o'clock a.m., the British Embassy left the camp at Kharatiga under a salute of 15 guns. A guard of honour from the 67th Foot presented arms as the Envoy left his tent.

The Afghan troops were drawn up a short distance from the frontier and saluted as the Embassy approached.

General Roberts and a number of officers of the Kuram force accompanied the Embassy.

At Kasim Khel the Afghan officials had tents prepared for the Embassy, and no trouble was spared to make everything as comfortable as possible.

After a visit to the crest of the Shutar Gardan Pass the officers returned to Kasim Khel, and there partook of the Shahghassi's hospitality. In the course of the afternoon they returned to Dre Khula.

Major Cavagnari wrote to the Amir announcing his arrival at Kasim Khel, and expressed his thanks for the arrangements that had been made for the reception of the British Embassy.

July 20th. Marched from Kasim Khel to Khusi.

July 21st. Marched from Khusi to Zarghun Shahr.

Received a letter from Kabul announcing the death from cholera of Mir Munshi Bakhtiar Khan.

July 22nd. Marched from Zarghun Shahr to Zahidabad. Major Cavagnari wrote to the Amir conveying the news received by telegram from Simla that he (Major Cavagnari) had been appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath. His Highness was also requested to appoint an official in the place of the late Mir Munshi to inform the Envoy of the arrangements made for the entry of the British Embassy into Kabul.

July 23rd. Marched from Zahidabad to Char Asiab. In the course of the forenoon, Shahghassi Muhammad Yusaf, brother of Shahghassi Khusdil Khan, arrived in camp, bringing a letter from His Highness the Amir, containing congratulations to the Envoy, and informing him that the bearer of the letter would personally explain what had been arranged for the reception of the Embassy.

July 24th. Marched from Char Asiab to Kabul.

Four miles from the city, Sirdar Abdullah Khan, son of Sultan Ahmed Khan (Sultan Jan), formerly Governor of Herat, and Mullah Shah Muhammad, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met the Embassy with a troop of cavalry and two of the Amir's State elephants. Major Cavagnari and Sirdar Abdullah Khan took their places on the leading elephant. Mr. Jenkyns and the Foreign Minister followed on the second one. Lieutenant Hamilton (Queen's Own Corps of Guides) and Dr. Kelly, surgeon to the Embassy, followed on horse-back. The Guide Cavalry Escort and the Afghan Cavalry completed the procession.

Close to the city the troops of the Kabul Garrison were drawn up in column and presented arms as the Envoy passed. There were two regiments of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and nine regiments of infantry on parade. The bands played the British National Anthem as the infantry presented arms. On an eminence south-east of the city a battery of 18-pounders was posted, and a salute of 17 guns was fired as the British Embassy entered the Shah Shahid gate of the Bala Hissar.

A guard of honour consisting of a regiment of infantry were drawn up on some open ground a short distance from the place appointed as the residency of the Embassy.

Immediately after the arrival of the Embassy, the Mastaufi (Minister of Finance) and General Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, waited on the Envoy and made inquiry after his health on the part of the Amir.

At 10 o'clock a.m., Mr. Jenkyns, C.S., and Lieutenant Hamilton visited the Amir, on the part of the Envoy.

At 6 o'clock p.m., the Envoy and Staff visited His Highness the Amir, and delivered a letter from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, informing the Amir of Major Cavagnari's appointment as Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.

July 25th. At 9 o'clock a.m., the Envoy had a private audience of the Amir.

In the afternoon Mullah Shah Muhammad and Mirza Nabbi, the Private Secretary, visited the Envoy, and presented a rough draft of the Amir's reply to the Viceroy, and also of one prepared as an answer to General Kauffmann's letter.

July 26th. At 10 o'clock a.m., the Envoy and Staff visited the Amir, and delivered some presents. In the afternoon the Foreign Minister and the Private Secretary visited the Envoy, and delivered the Amir's letter addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy, and also a copy of the reply sent to the Russian letter.

No. 13.

No. 195 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department. (Extract.)

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 1st September 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams on the subject of Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON,
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 24th August 1879.

FROM SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR has taken by force part of the money and ornaments amassed by the mother of Abdulla Jan.

There is friction between Amir and Daud Shah, and the latter appears to be strengthening his own faction, and if the Amir press him too severely, he will join the anti (?) Jacobins, who are gaining strength daily in consequence of Amir's want of conciliation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 25th August 1879.

FROM SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla

KABUL, 23rd August. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated Ali Khel, 26th August 1879.

FROM SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, August 24th. Fresh outbreak of Cholera. Embassy all well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 13.

Telegram, dated 26th August 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the past week except the death from cholera of Sirdars Ali Akbar and Ali Askar Khan, brothers of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan: they had recently arrived from Herat. The epidemic has almost, if not entirely, ceased in both city and cantonments. Weather still very warm. 1st Punjab Cavalry and Company Sappers here marched for Pishin.

No. 14.

No. 196 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 1, 1879.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of letters from the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, Nos. 16, 17, and 19, dated respectively the 5th, 13th, and 19th of August 1879, forwarding his diaries for the period between the 27th of July and the 16th of August 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 16, dated 15th August 1879.

FROM MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul for the week ending the 2nd of August 1879.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

No. 2. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from 27th July to 2nd August 1879.

27th July 1879.—At the request of the Envoy that some one amongst the Amir's officials should be appointed to attend at the British Embassy, the Amir told off Nazir Abdul Ghiyas for this duty.

28th July 1879.—The Envoy and staff accompanied by Mullah Shah Muhammad and Nazir Abdul Ghiyas, and escorted by a detachment of the regular cavalry under Colonel Sharo Khan (a relative of the late General Feramurz Khan, and of Kafir origin) visited the tomb of the Emperor Baber. In the afternoon the Envoy visited the Amir, and made over to him a translation of a telegram, dated the 25th July, from Major St. John, at Kandahar, reporting that Mahomed Tahir Khan, the Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, had arrested Mullah Habibullah, agent of Muhammad Aslam, Tokhi, though furnished with a safe-conduct from the Political Officer at Kandahar. The Amir stated that the matter would be inquired into.

29th July 1879.—Newsagents report that the general opinion in Kabul is that now that the British Envoy has arrived, the arrears of pay due to the troops will be paid; that compulsory enlistment will be discontinued; and that oppressive taxes on the peasantry and on the trading classes will be considerably reduced. It is stated that the Amir has kept the troops in good heart by promising them their arrears of pay after the arrival of the British Embassy.

30th July 1879.—Reported that Sirdar Yahya Khan has been trying to dissuade the Amir from visiting the frontiers of Afghanistan in company with the British Envoy, alleging that it would be derogatory to the Amir's position to do so. Daud Shah and the Mustaufi advise the Amir to adhere to his promise to visit Turkestan and Herat. It is thought probable that the Amir will, if the Envoy presses the subject, agree to depute some one to accompany any of the Embassy to visit the frontier.

Kazi Abdul Kadir, Peshawuri (Kazi Kadru) has been deported from Kabul. He was supposed to have advised the late Amir to get rid of Sirdar Yahya Khan who had accordingly to leave Afghanistan. On his return from Gandamak the Amir made the Kazi over to Sirdar Yahya Khan, and it was generally supposed that he had been secretly assassinated. It now appears that the Kazi was spared though the intercession of Kazi Mahmud Jan (another of the Peshawur Kazi Khel who fell into disgrace with the British authorities of Peshawur) who accompanied the Sirdar on his return from India, and who is now employed confidentially by Yahya Khan. This increases the suspicion that the latter is not well-disposed towards the British Government. Kazi Kadru has sent to Kabul for the females of his family. It is not certain whether he intends residing in Bonair, Swat, or Bajour, or whether he contemplates returning to Peshawur. If the latter turns out to be his course of action, it might be advisable to have him deported across the Indus, or placed under surveillance.

Munshi Anwar, for some time a news writer to the British authorities at Kandahar, arrived in Kabul a few days ago, and at an interview with the Amir, informed him that it was probable that he would be again appointed as news writer, but that he desired first to ascertain the Amir's wishes. The Amir told him that he might take the appointment. The inference is that the Munshi may try and serve two masters. It may therefore be advisable to apprise the Kandahar authorities of this matter. Three regiments of infantry have been ordered from Kabul to Herat. Three more to Ghazni, and six to Turkestan. A cavalry regiment is under orders for Zurnat to collect arrears of revenue. There will probably be some delay in the march of the above, owing to the difficulties of obtaining baggage animals.

31st July 1879.—Taj Muhammad Khan (brother of Naib Lal Muhammad Khan) recently created a general, was granted the contract of the Mint by the Mustaufi. In consequence of the large number of British rupees now in possession of the people of the country, and which eventually will be brought to the Mint to be converted into the

current coinage of Afghanistan, Ghulam Raza Khan (a former Kotwal of Kabul) offered more than double the original bid, and the Mustaufi accepted this and revoked the contract he had previously given. When Ghulam Raza's servants went to the Mint to take over charge, Taj Muhammad's retainers beat and insulted them. When this was reported to the Amir, Taj Muhammad Khan was sent for, and was disgraced and deprived of his generalship. Naib Lal Muhammad Khan is very vexed at the above treatment of his brother.

Syud Hassan, whose daughter is married to Mazullah Khan, Ghilzai, will probably be appointed Chief Kazi of Turkestan.

It is reported that a number of men have been specially told off by the Amir to watch who visit at the British Embassy, and with whom the Envoy has communication, or gives presents to.

Sirdar Yahya Khan visited the Envoy to-day.

1st August 1879.—It is reported that the Amir is pressing the sons of the late Sirdar Mahomed Umar Khan (lately died of cholera at Kabul, and formerly Governor of Herat) to pay two lacs of rupees alleged to be due by their father. The sons are quite unable to comply with this requisition.

Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan (son of Sirdar Sharif Khan) has been ordered to take three regiments and proceed to the Kohistan and Panjsher to collect arrears of revenue. The Sirdar considers the appointment beneath his rank and is consequently displeased.

The Amir desired Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan to send to Kabul the persons who accompanied him when he went into exile to Meshed. The Amir was annoyed at the Sirdar having made certain military appointments amongst the troops at Herat, and these were ordered to be cancelled, and the officers so appointed to be sent to Kabul. It is stated that the Sirdar is not inclined to send the companions of his exile to Kabul, but has directed the officers he promoted to proceed to the Amir.

The Amir's mother is said to be estranged from him on account of his forcibly depriving her of some money and ornaments she had amassed, and which she wished her other son, Sirdar Ayub Khan, to share in. She is reported to be going in a huff to Mamakhel in the Jellalabad district.

The Wakil-ud-daulet of Saighan, who has considerable influence among the tribes of that quarter, is distrustful of the Amir, and refuses to attend at Kabul.

The Mustaufi and Khudai Nazr Khan have had a dispute in connexion with the betrothal of a woman. The former is desirous of effecting a reconciliation. Khudai Nazr Khan has sent privately to know the Envoy's wishes. The Envoy informed the messenger that both parties are looked upon as friends of the British Government, and that, therefore, it would be better that they should have no differences among themselves.

2nd August 1879.—Yar Muhammad, Mohmand, with 20 sowars, arrived last night from Herat.

Thirty men of the Mangai tribe arrived here a few days ago. Object of their coming is not yet known.

In the afternoon the Amir sent Mullah Shah Muhammad and Mir Akhor Muhammad Akhtar Khan to the British Embassy with 11 horses and some trays of country produce as presents to the officers. Reported to the Foreign Secretary for orders as to the disposal of these presents.

Cholera has been slightly on the increase during the last few days. Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani, is reported dangerously ill of this disease.

The officers of the Embassy go out every day for a ride in the environs of Kabul. The Foreign Minister and the Nazir, and some Afghan cavalry always accompany them.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 17, dated 13th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 3rd to the 9th of August 1879.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

No. 3. Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul from the 3rd to the 9th August 1879.
(Extract.)

August 3rd, 1879.—The Envoy visited the Amir at 8 o'clock A.M. The interview was of a personal character and the conversation that took place was on general subjects. In the afternoon the Mustaufi visited the Envoy and presented a letter received from Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Kandahar, reporting, for the information of His Highness the Amir, his interview with General Stewart, Commanding at Kandahar.

News-reporter states that six regiments of infantry from Herat will probably reach Kabul in the course of the next two days. They are said to have been despatched from Herat with only three rupees per head for their road expenses, and that they have plundered and oppressed the villagers of the Hazara country during their march through it.

It is stated that Sirdar M. Ayub Khan has dismissed Mirza Aziz, the Mustaufi of Herat, and has demanded half a lac of rupees from him. Mirza Sadik has been appointed in his place.

It is supposed that the Amir contemplates a reduction in the allowances hitherto paid to the Muhammadzai (Barakzai) Sirdars, excepting the family of Sirdars Yahya Khan and Hashim Khan, and that those of the Ghilzai and Kohistan tribes will be reduced. Up to the present Padshah Khan, Ghilzai, is outwardly favourably treated by the Amir. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, still hesitates to obey the Amir's summons to Kabul.

4th August 1879.—Mir Akbar Khan, the Kohistani Chief, and rival of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, (who has always professed to be well-disposed towards the British Government) died of cholera to-day.

5th August 1879.—The Mustaufi went yesterday to the house of Khudai Nazr Khan in the Bala Hissar and made up the quarrel between them.

It is reported that the Amir contemplates giving the Khanship of the Jabbar Khel, Ghilzais, either to Rahmatullah Khan or to Bahram Khan. If this is done Asmatula Khan will create trouble. Some petty Maliks of the Ghilzai tribe are said to have been deprived of their Malikships in consequence of their having had intercourse with the British authorities. (I have not sufficient information as to the true facts of the cases to ask the Amir for explanation about them.—L. C.)

6th August 1879.—The regiments from Herat reached the Sherpur Cantonments yesterday. To-day a number of the soldiers were reported to be moving about the city in a most disorderly manner, and creating some excitement amongst the rabble of the place. The Envoy sent for the Foreign Minister, who assured him that the troops were not out of hand, and that if a few wild spirits had been making a noise in the city, it was not a matter for any apprehension. He further stated that in a day or two the troops would be paid their arrears and be given furlough for a few months.

7th August 1879.—Some of the Ahmedzai Ghilzais have been molesting travellers between Kasim Khel and Dobandi. The mail bag from Ali Khel was detained for a few hours. The intention of the Ghilzais is to attract notice in order that some dissatisfied parties may be granted allowances. Report of this was made to the Foreign Minister who promised to arrange matters with Padshah Khan.

A deputation from the Kharoti Povindahs has visited the Amir with the view to obtaining his intercession with the British Government for the release of the prisoners who were convicted of being concerned in the raids on the Tank (Dera Ismail Khan) frontier.

The Amir has sent a conciliatory message to Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, and has again summoned him to Kabul. The Chief fears that if he leaves his country he will not be permitted to return, and that during his absence his rivals will gain the upper hand of him.

8th August 1879.—Three regiments under the command of Brigadier Zabardast Khan, Ghilzai, left for Ghazni to-day. The Amir went to Deh Mazang to see them off and wish them God-speed.

Yesterday General Daud Shah visited the Herat regiments and attempted to conciliate them by offering them furlough, but it is stated that they were somewhat disrespectful to him, and said that they would not take leave until their arrears of pay were given them. They also demanded the release of Husain Ali Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, who is now under restraint in the Bala Hissar.

It is reported that six other regiments are coming from Herat under the command of Taj Muhammad Khan, a son of Arsala, Ghilzai.

The Envoy visited the Amir to-day.

9th August 1879.—The Mustaufi visited the Envoy this afternoon with reference to Kandahar matters. He also intimated that if the British Government were disposed to view with favour any representation on the part of the Amir in the case of the Kharotis, whom he added were subjects of the Afghan Government, His Highness would personally address the Envoy about it. He further stated that if the British Government saw no objection, Haji Ataulla would be again deputed to the Court of the Amir of Bokhara, and that copies of all correspondence between the two Courts would be submitted for the information of the British Government. The Envoy replied that after a reference to his Government the reply would be communicated to the Amir.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

Memo. No. 19, dated 19th August 1879.

FROM MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

HAS the honour to submit diary of the British Embassy at Kabul for the week ending 16th August 1879.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

No. 4.—Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 10th to the 16th of August 1879.

10th August 1879.—Report received that the road over the Shuturgurdan is still unsafe, and that fruit sellers from Logar were obliged to return. (This has again been brought to the notice of the Foreign Minister, who has promised that the matter shall receive immediate attention). 1,000 men of the Malla Khel (nomad Ghilzais) started from Ghazni, by instigation of the Governor, to attack the Hazaras of Besud. The Hazaras heard of the move and collected to the extent of 3,000. The Malla Khel were defeated with a loss of five or six men. Two causes are assigned for the conduct of the Governor of Ghazni. 1st, the Ghilzai nomads (Kuchis) go to Nawar to graze their flocks, and of late the Hazara tribe has plundered them. 2nd, Rajab Khan, a great friend of Mir Fateh Khan, one of the Hazara Chiefs, has a son in one of the cavalry regiments serving in Kurram, and during the campaign Rajab Khan contemplated visiting the British authorities, but the Governor of Ghazni having heard of this intention imprisoned him. Mir Fateh Khan in retaliation attacked the Ghilzai herds.

Yesterday the Amir sent for the officers of the Herat regiments and told them to bring up their men to receive pay.

11th August 1879.—Yesterday two of the Herat regiments were paid. Two companies were deprived of their ammunition. It is supposed that gradually all the ammunition of these regiments will be taken away.

It is said that General Daud Shah and the Mustaufi are displeased at the Amir's interference direct in military and finance matters.

12th August 1879.—It is reported that the Amir told his Attar-bashi yesterday that he intended going upon tour about the 20th of Ramzan. (I don't place much reliance upon this report, as the Mustaufi and Foreign Minister have frequently told me that the Amir cannot leave the capital until he has settled all matters connected with Kabul and its vicinity.—L. C.)

All the ammunition of the six regiments from Herat has now been taken from them. They have received their arrears of pay. Cholera has broken out among them in great severity. Large numbers have deserted, and the remainder have been granted furlough.

13th August 1879.—Foreign Minister reported to the Envoy that a Turk, calling himself Said Husain Pasha, and stating that he had been taken prisoner by the Russians in the late Turkish war, and had been conveyed to St. Petersburg and released at the

conclusion of peace, arrived three days ago from Bokhara, and is about to proceed *via* Kurram to Bombay. The Amir gave him some money for his journey, and desired the Foreign Minister to report the matter to the British Envoy.

The Amir is said to be preparing a handsome "khillut" for the Mustaufi.

The allowances and status of Khudai Nazr Khan, Wardak, have been confirmed as they were before. No "Sannad" to this effect has yet been given him.

14th August 1879.—The Khanship of Asmatula Khan has, at last, been given to his cousin, Bahram Khan, who was yesterday presented with a dress of honour.

Asmatula Khan has gone to Kulman and refuses to come to Kabul.

Yesterday a daughter of Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan, who was betrothed to the late heir apparent died of cholera.

Two of the Kabul regiments received their pay yesterday.

The Amir is angry with Sirdar Abdulla Khan (son of Sultan Jan of Herat) on account of his conduct in some private inheritance case.

General Ghulam Hyder Khan sent a cavalry regiment and three infantry regiments from Turkestan against the Shaikh Ali tribe. The troops were beaten back twice, but finally compelled the tribesmen to retire, without being able to disperse them thoroughly. A Sowar in the cavalry regiment writes to a friend in Kabul, that General Ghulam Hyder Khan suddenly summoned back the regiments to Turkestan in consequence of the rebellion of Mir Muhammad Khan at Siripul. An engagement is said to have taken place in which General Ghulam Hyder Khan was defeated, and Syud Hasain Elbegi (an Uzbek Chief in the Amir's service) was killed. Ghulam Muhi-ud-din, son of Khwaja Nur Khan of Kabul, was wounded. Mir Muhammad Khan has 2,000 Turkoman horse in his employ. The fight took place at Bel Chiragh. (The Foreign Minister states that the rebellion of the Mir of Siripul took place immediately after the death of the late Amir, but that order was restored before he (Mullah Shah Mahumud) left Turkestan for Kabul. He further states that the Shaikh Ali Tribe has submitted, but this is not confirmed by travellers from Bamian, who assert that the road is still unsafe.)

15th August 1879.—The representatives from the Mangal tribe are still at Kabul, waiting for the return of some of their number whom the Amir sent back to bring certain influential men who had not come to Kabul.

A large number of men from the troops recently sent to Ghazni deserted on the march leaving their arms which have been sent to Kabul.

Six infantry regiments intended to relieve those in Turkestan have moved out of the Sherpur cantonments to the Chaman east of the city.

There are now 12 infantry regiments at Herat, six are Kabul regiments, and six are Herati. There are two Herati regiments quartered at Maimeneh.

16th August 1879.—The Foreign Minister by order of his Highness the Amir, brought a letter received from the Governor of Turkestan which contained the following communication from Mulla Muhammad Umr, Governor of Khumab, on the banks of the Oxus:—"On Sunday the 14th of Shaban I reached the Kilif Ferry. A Kabul caravan had arrived at the ferry. Some of the Mir of Kilif's men had come over the river to take toll from the caravan, and two or three men of Akcha had gone over to the other side. I asked them about the Russians. They said that three Russian officers with three soldiers and an interpreter had come up the river in two boats. They passed one night at Charjui, and one night at Kilif. Early on the morning of the 14th they left for the ferries of Kara-Khwan and Sherabad. It is said that they will go as far as the frontiers of Kulab. They had no steamboat with them. They brought one large boat with six boatmen from Organj, and another smaller one which worked with a screw. (?) These boats were dragged up the river with ropes. It is reported that three or four other Russians with some soldiers in two boats have left Charjui, and will reach Karki in a day or two."

A letter subsequently written was received from the Superintendent at the Chuchka ferry:—"Thirty-three Russians accompanied by some Mahomedans are coming up the other bank of the Oxus from Khiva. From the Chuchka ferry to Patta (?) we kept up this (Afghan) side, and they on the other side. They travelled in two 'Kaima' (boats?). I have sent a letter to Muhammad Hassan Khan, Zirmisher of Tashkurgan, to watch his own ferries."

(Signed) L. CAVAGNARI, Major,

Kabul, 19th August 1879.

Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul.

No. 15.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

DURING night of 4th September information reached Ali Khel that, on morning of 3rd, British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three revolting Afghan regiments, joined later by six others. Embassy defended itself when messengers left Kabul. To-night, letters received at Ali Khel from Amir leave no hope as to fate of Embassy. General Massey ordered to move from Ali Khel on Shuturgardan to-morrow. General Roberts from Simla will reach Peiwar in five days and take command of rapid advance on Kabul. Colonel Baker will command one brigade. General Stewart ordered to hold Kandahar and threaten Ghazni, if necessary.

No. 16.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Two letters from Amir received at Ali Khel. First, dated 3rd, 8 morning, says troops assembled for pay at Bala Hissar, suddenly broke out, stoned their officers, then rushed to Residency and stoned it; received volleys in return. The confusion reached height beyond control; people from city and surrounding country poured into Bala Hissar, began destroying artillery park and magazine. All troops and people attacked Residency. I, Amir, sent Daud Shah to help Envoy. He was unhorsed at Residency by stones and spears: is dying.

Then I sent Yahya Khan and my own son with Koran, also Mullahs, to troops, but no use. Disturbance continues till now, evening; confusion is beyond conception. Letter ends. Second from Amir, dated 4th says, yesterday from morning till evening, thousands assembled to destroy Embassy; much life lost both sides; at evening they set fire to Residency. All yesterday up to now, I, with five attendants, have been besieged; have no certain news of Envoy whether he and his people have been killed in quarters or seized and brought out.

Letters end. Telegram unfinished. Line interrupted. Will follow.

No. 17.

Telegram from VICEROY, 6th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Following is remainder of Ameer's last letter:—

Troops, city, and surrounding country have thrown off yoke of allegiance. Daud Shah not expected to recover. All his attendants killed. Workshops and magazines totally gutted: in fact, my kingdom is ruined. After God I look to the Government for aid and advice; my true friendship and honesty of purpose will be clear as daylight. By this misfortune I have lost my friend the Envoy, and also my kingdom. Am terribly grieved and perplexed.

Here follows Amir's date seal. Both these letters are addressed to General Roberts.

No. 18.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 6th September 1879, to VICEROY.

DEEPLY grieved at news. Pray send further details immediately they are received.

No. 19.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 10th September 1879, to VICEROY.

THE early occupation of Kabul is a necessity, and the advance upon it should be immediate. We assume supplies and communications assured. You may rely upon support of Government for most vigorous action. In selection of officers fit for the work you will be thoroughly supported. Complete domination at Kabul the first point. Until then future arrangements cannot be settled. Let me know at once in detail the time within which Kabul may be in our hands, the amount of forces available for action, and supports on each line, health of troops, provision for transport and supplies.

No. 20.

Telegram from VICEROY, 12th September 1879 to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.—The force advancing on Kabul under General Roberts will consist of three batteries Artillery, one squadron British Cavalry, two and a half regiments Native Cavalry, three regiments British Infantry, four regiments Native Infantry, one company Sappers, in all about 6,500 men, divided into three brigades, one of Cavalry under General Massey, and two of Infantry under Generals Macpherson and Baker. This force takes the country from Shuturgurdan to Kabul.

The country from Shuturgurdan to Thull will be held by two batteries Artillery, two Native Cavalry, one British Infantry, five Native Infantry, or, in all, about 4,000 men, under command of General J. Gordon. General H. Gough will have charge of communications of this force.

Importance of Khyber line renders early organisation of force very urgent. It will consist of five batteries of Artillery, one and two-thirds British Cavalry, four Native Cavalry, two British Infantry, five Native Infantry, two companies Sappers, or, in all, 6,600 men, in addition to the Peshawur garrison and the troops now holding the Khyber up to Lundikotal. This force will protect road from Peshawur to Gandamak, garrison intermediate stations, and provide a movable column to hold Jagdalak and communicate with Kabul.

The reserve at Peshawur and Rawul Pindee will number about 5,000. Major General Bright will command this force; General C. Ross will command at Peshawur. General Doran thence to Basawal; General Arbuthnot thence to Jellalabad and Gandamak; and General C. Gough, the force onwards.

Above force will represent a division capable of meeting all opposition, with its headquarters at Kabul and army line to base at Peshawur. It will have a secondary line *viâ* the Shuturgurdan till this pass is closed, from which time General Roberts must look for maintenance to Kabul and Peshawur. Khyber column is in active organisation. Troops are now advancing to occupy Dakka, and Guides are pushing on there and onward to Basawal.

No. 21.

No. 202 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, September 15, 1879.

By the telegrams we have had the honour to despatch to you during the past week, your Lordship is already informed of the recent catastrophe at Kabul and the military measures which, in consequence of it, have been taken by this Government. We have now the honour to state in fuller detail, *firstly*, the sources of such information as has reached us up to date respecting the murderous attack upon the British Embassy at the capital of Afghanistan; and, *secondly*, the considerations which have guided us in the adoption of immediate measures for inflicting prompt retribution on the perpetrators of this national outrage, and re-establishing order at Kabul.

2. Early in the morning of Friday, the 5th instant, information reached this Government by telegraph from Captain Conolly, its Political Assistant Officer at Ali Khel, that, on the 3rd instant, the British Embassy at Kabul had been attacked by certain mutinous Afghan regiments, and that Sir Louis Cavagnari and the members of his Mission were still defending themselves against overwhelming numbers, when the messenger who brought this intelligence left Kabul at noon on that day.

3. Immediately on receipt of the above information Captain Conolly was instructed to inform the Amir by letter that the British Government would hold His Highness responsible for the personal safety of all the members of its Mission, and that the British troops would march to Kabul unless we were immediately assured of the complete safety of the Embassy. Captain Conolly was simultaneously ordered to let it be generally known upon the frontier that our troops were preparing to advance. General Stewart was at the same time instructed to stand fast at Kandahar, concentrating there all the troops previously under orders to return to India. Major St. John and party

who were about to proceed to Herat were also instructed to remain at Kandahar until further orders.

4. Late in the night of the 5th instant we received intelligence from Captain Conolly that letters had arrived at Ali Khel addressed by the Amir to General Roberts, and that the contents of these letters, as well as the statements of the messenger who brought them (an uncle of Padshah Khan, the great Ghilzai Chief) left no doubt as to the fate of the Embassy and escort. Captain Conolly's telegram added that particulars would follow immediately; and still later in the course of the same night, we received from him, by telegraph, the substance of a portion of the Amir's two above-mentioned letters. This telegram ended abruptly, with a note by the Station Officer at Kohat that the wire at Thull had broken down; and it was not till the afternoon of the following day, September the 6th, that we received the continuation of it. The Amir's letters dated respectively Wednesday, 3rd instant, 8 A.M., and Thursday, the 4th, have been since received, and translations are enclosed with this despatch. They appear to have been written in great grief and perplexity. The first letter relates hurriedly that the troops who had been assembled for pay at the Bala Hissar suddenly broke into mutiny, and assaulted the British Residency, after having stoned their officers; that they were received by the Residency with "a hail of bullets;" that the tumult was swelled by the troops from the outlying cantonments, and by the people of the city and the country around who destroyed the artillery park, magazine, and workshops; and that His Highness made three ineffectual attempts to restrain the assailants, sending first his Commander-in-Chief Daud Shah, who was beaten down by the mob and was supposed to be dying, then his son with Yahya Khan, the Governor of Kabul, and finally some Syuds and Mullahs.

5. The Amir's second letter states that the assault on the British Embassy was protracted with much loss of life on both sides from the morning till the evening of Wednesday, the 3rd instant, when the besiegers set fire to the Residency, and the Amir had been unable to discover whether the Envoy had perished or had been rescued. He goes on to declare that the catastrophe had been brought about by malcontent and seditious persons, for the disruption of his alliance with the British, and for the ruin of his Government; that he is shut up within his house with a few attendants, having totally lost authority and control over the troops and the people; and that he has used every effort in vain to suppress the disorder; that his kingdom has been brought to destruction by these events; but that after God his strong reliance is upon friendship and union with the British Government, from whom he solicits advice as to how he should act. He protests that he will maintain a firm hold on the friendship of the British Government, and that his sincerity and innocence will be made manifest. He concludes by deploring the loss of the Envoy, whereby his State is ruined.

6. On the 6th instant, Captain Conolly telegraphed that Sirkai Khan, the bearer of the Amir's first letter, had told him that Padshah Khan, who had visited the Embassy after the disaster, had seen there the dead bodies of the Envoy, staff, and escort, and added that of the latter some nine sowars were supposed to have escaped. He described the defence as very stubborn and the loss of the Kabulis as heavy. Sirkai Khan's statement (just received by post and herewith enclosed) says, however, that he and Padshah Khan did not see the bodies of the British Officers; also, that the nine sowars belonged to a party of eleven who were returning from grass-cutting, of whom two were killed.

7. Sirkai Khan states, further, that he with Padshah Khan and another were waiting at the Amir's quarters to take leave of him, being about to leave for the Shuturgurdan, when the mutiny broke out, and they heard the sound of firing. The Amir sent them to some troops in the "Chaman," whom they succeeded with some difficulty in pacifying; they then returned to the Amir's quarters, where they appear to have remained, without making any attempt to protect or rescue the Embassy, until the Residency had been taken and its defenders overpowered. Sirkai Khan says that the Amir placed sentries round his own palaces, but that the soldiery were intent only upon taking the Residency; and that the only troops who did not join the attack, and were ready to assist the Amir, were the artillery, who might have fired on the assailants had they received any orders.

8. The written statements of Jellal-ud-din Khan, who arrived at Ali Khel on the night of the 4th instant, with the first intelligence of the assault on the British Embassy at Kabul, and of Mirza Niyaz Tajik of Panjsher, his servant, have reached us by post and are herewith enclosed. According to these statements three of the Amir's regiments whose pay was in arrears, and whom the above-mentioned informants state to have been

encamped in the Bala Hissar, on being offered one month's pay refused it, demanded arrears, stoned their officers, pillaged the armoury, made a rush at the palace, and finding its gates closed, went off to attack the Residency.

Jellal-ud-din and his servant also declare that General Daud Shah did his best to control the mutineers and was wounded in the attempt. Furthermore that the people of the city did not join in the affray, and that in the course of the attack on the Embassy its assailants were joined by six other regiments, some of which were also quartered in the Bala Hissar.

9. It is not yet clear whether the troops who were being paid in the Bala Hissar had been admitted within the fort only for that purpose, or whether they were part of the fort's garrison. But according to all our information up to date, the regiments which led the attack upon the British Embassy were apparently those lately returned to Kabul from Herat. These regiments were known to be in a very mutinous condition. To quarter them permanently within the Bala Hissar would have been to render nugatory the strong security otherwise afforded by its position against revolutionary outbreaks; and it seems scarcely credible that the Amir should have disregarded so obvious a consideration. On the other hand, to admit mutinous troops within the enclosure of the Bala Hissar even for the purpose of paying them off, would *prima facie* appear to be an act of inexcusable rashness. But the information received from Sir Louis Cavagnari previous to the date of the outbreak renders such an act intelligible, as we gather from it that the Herati regiments in question had been previously deprived of their ammunition, and might therefore have been considered incapable of creating any serious disturbance.

10. The Amir's statement that "the city people of all classes" joined in the outrage is also apparently contradicted by the statements of Jellal-ud-din and his servant who say that "the city people did not join in the affray." We are not at present in a position to say which of these two statements is the more accurate.

11. On the 8th instant, Captain Conolly telegraphed that two or three regiments were reported to have marched from Kabul towards Gardez and Spega, places lying west of our Jaji border, for the purpose of inciting the Ghilzais and Mangals of those parts to rise against us, and that Padshah Khan's party were said to be greatly concerned and alarmed at what had taken place. Captain Conolly added that none of the messengers sent by him to obtain further information from Kabul had returned. And, in reply to inquiries from the Viceroy, he subsequently explained that the alarm and concern attributed in his above-mentioned telegram to Padshah Khan's party, were caused partly by horror at the atrocity of the massacre and partly by a fear that they might be involved in the punishment of it as persons whose influence might have been exerted to incite or prevent it; but that this apprehension had probably been removed by subsequent letters from him exhorting them to espouse our cause and promising rewards for service performed. On the 8th instant the Officer Commanding at Lundikotal also telegraphed reports that some of the tribes in that direction were stirring, but that these reports he had been unable to verify. Subsequent intelligence, not yet fully authenticated, mentions a movement of Kabul troops towards Jellalabad; and on 10th General Doran telegraphed from Lundikotal a report that the Amir was sending messengers to Tirah and the Shinwaris, presumably of a character hostile to our advance on the Khyber line.

12. On the 10th September Major St. John telegraphed from Kandahar that the Afghan Governor of that place had received a letter from the Amir giving an account of the attack on the Embassy and laying great stress on the energetic efforts made by him to effect its rescue. The Sirdar had also received a private letter from the Amir's Chief Munshi which concluded in these words: "In order that the Amir's letters may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases, such as are advisable at such a time."

13. On the same date Captain Conolly telegraphed the arrival at Ali Khel of a man named Eman Buksh, a native of Jullundur, formerly in the Hyderabad (Sindh) Police, and latterly in the employ of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who stated that he was in the Residency during the attack upon it, and had escaped by hiding himself till nightfall in a drain under one of the baths. This man's story, as briefly telegraphed to us, is to the effect that when the mutineers failed to storm the building they set fire to the wooden framework of the doorways below, under shelter of a verandah which runs round the house. They then surrounded it on all sides, and some of the defenders were killed, others perished in the burning building. He says that Sir Louis Cavagnari was first wounded by a sword-cut, and afterwards crushed by a portion of the building which fell in; that the British and Native Officers fought with the most determined gallantry, and

that the defence only slackened when Sir Louis fell, and ammunition began to run short. Emam Buksh says that two cannons fired some shots, but this statement is inconsistent with the evidence of Sirkai Khan, who is probably a better witness.

14. Two further telegrams subsequently received from Captain Conolly, but bearing the same date, namely, the 11th instant, contained the following information:—One of his spies just returned from Kabul stated that, so far as he could ascertain, the Amir, though he had not planned or foreseen the assault on the British Embassy, was so mistrustful of regaining the confidence of the British Government that he had now made up his mind to resist the advance of the British troops; that in this frame of mind he was actively invoking the support of his people, and had already despatched some cavalry and infantry to Zurmat and Spega; that from Gardez, a locality in the Zurmat district, news had been received of the arrival of three Afghan regiments with six guns from Ghazni, and that three more were expected to arrive shortly from Kabul; also arms for the people; and that preparations were being made there for an attack by the Spega route and in conjunction with the Machalgo Ghilzais, on the left flank of General Roberts' advance upon Kabul.

15. In the meanwhile a special messenger had arrived at Ali Khel with an unwritten message from the Amir asking our advice. To this message General Roberts has been instructed to address a written reply in conformity with the terms of our telegram to him of the 12th instant, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. The original letters addressed by the Amir to General Roberts on the 3rd and 4th September, only reached us on the 14th. The situation at Kabul must have altered materially since these letters were written; and the Amir may possibly now be disinclined, and very probably may be unable, to act in accordance with the sentiments which these letters express, in a tone which is certainly favourable to a belief in his sincerity. Nevertheless we have thought it right at once to instruct General Roberts to inform His Highness that if his assurances are sincere, and if his reliance on the friendship of our Government is genuine, he has nothing to fear personally from the advance of our troops, and that his authority will be supported and restored.

16. This is all the information received up to date by the Government of India respecting the assault on the British Embassy at Kabul and the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and all the members of his Mission and escort. Before proceeding to describe and explain to your Lordship the measures that we are taking to repair and avenge this disaster, we deem it desirable to advert briefly to such portions of the communications received from Sir Louis Cavagnari from the date of his arrival at Kabul to that of the last letters received from him, as have any bearing upon the circumstances to which we owe the irreparable loss of that invaluable officer and his heroic companions.

17. In July, Sir Louis Cavagnari had received confidential information from Bakhtiar Khan, his native agent, who died at Kabul before Sir Louis arrived there, that Sirdar Yahya Khan, the Amir's father-in-law, was using his considerable influence over His Highness in a manner injurious to the Amir's popularity, and decidedly adverse to the proper fulfilment of the Treaty engagements with the British Government. Sir L. Cavagnari, on reaching Kabul, confirmed these statements so far as they regarded the hostile and disaffected conduct of Sirdar Yahya Khan. But as regards the alleged ill-treatment of the so-called English party, he wrote that although these Sirdars were not being treated by the Amir in a liberal spirit he did not consider that there had been "any actual infringement of the Amnesty Clause." The general condition of the country and administration he described as disorganised and greatly in need of remedial measures; the soldiery being dissatisfied on account of arrears of pay and a continuation of the unpopular compulsory enlistment; the peasantry still depressed by the heavy taxes imposed by the late Amir and unable to obtain redress from the petty governors and revenue farmers; and the Sirdars discontented that no reversion had yet been made to the feudal system suppressed by Sher Ali; whilst he said that all these classes were disposed to look to the British Envoy for an immediate redress of grievances which could only be gradually removed by the Amir's judicious exercise of his own authority in proportion as it became consolidated. Sir Louis Cavagnari also mentioned that some regiments said to have left Herat in a somewhat disorganised manner were expected at Kabul next day. And he added that the Amir's "demeanour and apparent desire to make things comfortable for the Embassy left nothing to be desired;" that no restrictions were placed on the movements of the Envoy, who went about freely, and was on the most satisfactory terms with the Foreign Minister. On the 4th of August Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote that the Amir was well-intentioned, but too confident of his strength and without any good advisers, and that he was about to take an early opportunity of suggesting to His Highness the more important of the necessary reforms. On the 8th

of August, Sir Louis Cavagnari reported that three of the regiments returned to Kabul from Herat were in a very disorderly condition and clamorous for arrears of pay. On the 11th he reported that two of these regiments had been paid off and that they were gradually being deprived of all their ammunition. On the 12th he reported that the ammunition of all the six regiments from Herat had been taken from them; that they had received their arrears of pay; that large numbers had deserted, and that the remainder had been granted furlough.

18. On the 14th August he reported that two of the Kabul regiments had also received their arrears of pay; and on the 16th, 17th, and 19th he reported news of large desertions amongst the Amir's troops in various localities. In a letter, bearing the last above-mentioned date, he referred to a fracas in which some men of his escort had been slightly assaulted and to which he did not appear to attach any serious importance, his remonstrances having been promptly and satisfactorily attended to by the Amir. This letter concluded with an expression of confidence in the Amir's good disposition towards us, and in the satisfactory result of continuance in patient and friendly efforts for the general amelioration of the Afghan government and country. In reply to inquiries from the Viceroy whether the Amir was in immediate need of pecuniary assistance, the Envoy expressed his opinion that it would be undesirable to offer such assistance until His Highness became more fully alive to the necessity for those administrative reforms which he hoped His Highness would be induced to adopt. Sir Louis Cavagnari, in his subsequent letters, made frequent allusion to the friendly intercourse established between the men of his escort and those of the Amir's regiments in Kabul, with whom they had, on several occasions, joined in athletic exercises and sports. In none of his private letters, or official diaries, has Sir Louis Cavagnari at any time expressed the slightest apprehension for his personal safety or that of the members of his Mission. We received continual and increasingly satisfactory reports of the freedom with which the Envoy and his staff were in the habit of moving about the city and its environs; the demeanour of the people; and the friendly intercourse between the escort and the Afghan troops. The danger of what has actually occurred, namely, an overwhelming attack upon the Residency itself, seemed precluded by the location of the Residency within the fortifications of the Bala Hissar and close to the palace of the Amir; and here it should be remembered that the establishment of the British Residency at Kabul was determined, in the negotiations which preceded the Treaty, by the express stipulation of the Amir himself, who declared that nowhere else in Afghanistan could he answer for the Resident's safety. In his last private letter to the Viceroy, dated August 30th, Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote that the Amir showed no disposition to conciliate or treat with generosity those persons who have had communications with us during the war; that their liberal treatment would, no doubt, be greatly to the Amir's own interests; but that there could be no question as to his perfect right to withhold from them the allowances or lucrative appointments they were desirous of obtaining; that neither in person nor in property had they been subjected to molestation on account of their connexion with us; and that the Amir had "done nothing, and will do nothing opposed to the letter of the Treaty." Sir Louis added, "I have nothing whatever to complain of on the part of the Amir or his Ministers, though there are many matters I wish I could influence him about. There is no doubt that his authority is weak throughout the whole of Afghanistan. This is not to be wondered at after the years of misrule and oppression on Shere Ali Khan's part. But if he keeps straight with us he will pull through it. * * * His conduct of foreign relations is apparently all that could be desired * * * I have no doubt that when disaffected persons see that they get no encouragement from us, things will settle down; and, if Yakub Khan will only adopt a little more conciliation, and show his subjects that he is not going to use our safeguard as a means of grinding them down, all will go well." Sir Louis Cavagnari's above-mentioned confidential letter to the Viceroy concludes with the assurance that "notwithstanding all people say against him, I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." The latest communications received from Sir Louis Cavagnari were chiefly in reference to the Amir's expressed desire to visit the Viceroy at Calcutta if possible at the close of the present year; and his last telegram, dated 2nd instant, that is to say the day before the attack on the Embassy, gave no indication of any threatened danger, and concluded with the words "all well."

19. We have now laid before your Lordship a brief and impartial statement of all the information respecting the circumstances of the British Embassy at Kabul, received by us, confidentially as well as officially, by private as well as by public channels, previous and subsequent to, the date of its destruction on the 3rd instant. We are not at present

in a position to verify or analyse this information, and we deem it altogether premature to draw from it any positive conclusions as regards either the past, the present, or the future, except in reference to the plain duty now before us of doing all in our power to repair the unprovoked calamity which has occurred, and punish the perpetrators of the unprecedented national crime which has been committed. It remains to report to your Lordship the steps which have been taken, and are still being taken, by us in the recognition and performance of this imperative public duty.

20. The obligation to undertake and complete this duty with the utmost possible promptitude has been imposed upon us at a time when our frontier garrisons are weakened by the periodical sickness prevalent in those localities at this season of the year, when the greater number of the troops employed in Southern Afghanistan during the late campaign were under orders to return to India, and when the undisturbed tranquillity of our new frontier, and financial considerations dictated by the continued depreciation of our currency, justified every possible retrenchment of expenditure compatible with the efficient administration of the Empire. The first intelligence of the outrage at Kabul received by us on the morning of the 5th instant, left room to hope that Sir Louis Cavagnari and the members of his Mission had not yet perished, and that if the defence of the Residency could be maintained for a short while longer the lives of its inmates might still be saved. In the course of that day two alternative plans of action were prepared and organised in the minutest detail, one of them being based on the assumption that it might be still possible to save the lives of the Envoy and his companions. The intelligence received during the night of the 5th, although imperfect, annihilated the hope which had inspired this plan, and on the morning of the 6th instant measures were decided on in reluctant recognition of the fact that our object could no longer be confined to the rescue of the Embassy.

21. General Roberts, who, being a member of the Army Commission, was at Simla on the morning of the 6th, started in the afternoon of that day for Kurram, with orders to lose no time in advancing upon Kabul in command of a force of about 6,500 men.

22. General Massey had been already instructed to re-occupy the Shuturguridan at once and commence concentration at that point of carriage and supply for the above-mentioned force. This operation was successfully completed without opposition on the evening of Thursday last, the 11th instant.

23. As stated in paragraph 3 of this despatch General Stewart had been ordered early on the 5th instant to re-occupy Kandahar, and on the 6th instant he telegraphed that the town had been re-occupied, permission to reside within the citadel and under the protection of our troops being given to the Afghan Governor, to whom the administration of Kandahar had been previously made over, but who on receipt of the information communicated to him by General Stewart had expressed anxiety to be closely associated with the British authority.

24. On the same day a force of 6,500 men in addition to the Peshawur garrison and the troops already holding the Khyber Pass up to Lundikotal was detailed for operations along that line and placed under the command of Brigadier-General C. Gough, with orders to protect the road from Peshawur to Gandamak, and provide a moveable column for holding Jagdallak and establishing communications with Kabul. At the same time measures were taken for securing an efficient reserve of 5,000 men between Peshawur and Rawal Pindie. The Khyber and Kurram forces, as thus constituted, represent a division capable of dealing with the resistance likely to be opposed to it and having its head-quarters at Kabul with its army line base at Peshawur, and a secondary line across the Shuturguridan till that pass is closed by the first winter snowfall.

25. Many of the transport animals of the Kurram force had, during the previous months, suffered from sickness, and the remainder had to a great extent been dispersed to graze where they were not immediately available for employment beyond the Shuturguridan. To expedite the advance of the entire force under General Roberts, it was consequently necessary to collect at that point carriage and supply for 6,500 men; and this could only be done with a minimum of difficulty and delay by denuding the Peshawur Valley field force of all its available transport. The rapidity of the advance upon Kabul by the force under General Roberts will greatly depend on the assistance, or opposition, it may receive from the Ghilzai tribe, who, if willing, could largely contribute to the transport required for this force. Captain Conolly was consequently instructed to lose no time in securing the active co-operation of the two chief men of this important tribe—Padshah Khan, and his brother, Allal-ud-din Khan. On the 9th instant, he reported to us that he hoped this would be arranged; although Padshah Khan was still at Kabul and might possibly be detained there by the Amir if His

Highness were disposed to resist our advance. Every effort has been and will be made to complete within the shortest possible time the collection of transport requisite for the equipment of the entire force organised for operations along the Khyber line; and for this purpose all parts of the empire have been placed under requisition. The experience of the late campaign had convinced us of the urgent necessity of a thorough re-organisation of our Commissariat Department with special reference to the difficulties of transport and supply, and this was one of the important questions submitted by us to the Army Commission now sitting at Simla. Unfortunately, necessity has now arisen for immediate effort, on an almost unprecedented scale, in regard to the speedy collection of transport, before our receipt of the report anticipated from the Army Commission at the end of next month, and consequently before the possibility of any complete re-organisation of our Commissariat Department. In view, however, of our anticipated difficulties in collecting and organising transport for renewed and extended operations in Afghanistan, we have created a new office separated from the Military Department and placed in more immediate communication than was possible between the Commissariat branch of that department, between the Commander-in-Chief on the one hand and the head of the Civil Government on the other. This office we have placed under the direct management of Lieut.-General Sir Michael Kennedy, R.E., K.C.S.I., in whose administrative abilities we have great confidence, and who has been invested with special powers for the expeditious conduct of its business. This officer, as Comptroller General of the Commissariat, will be responsible for the supply of transport to the various columns detailed for field operations; but, on their receipt of the transport thus supplied, it will be treated as regimental equipment, for the supervision and organisation of which the responsibility will rest exclusively with the commanding officers concerned.

26. In consequence of the reports received by us on the evening of the 11th instant that Afghan troops and artillery were mustering in Zurmat to attack the left flank of General Roberts' advance upon Kabul, and that Herat regiments were advancing upon Jellalabad, whilst Dakka was being occupied by the Mohmand tribe with the support of some Afghan cavalry, we determined, on the morning of the 12th instant, to reinforce General Roberts by two squadrons of Bengal Cavalry, one regiment of British Infantry, one Mountain Battery, and three Native Infantry regiments. We also deemed it prudent, instead of pushing on the advance guard of our Khyber force with the rapidity previously considered desirable, to concentrate it at Lundikotal pending the completion of carriage for the whole force, so as to prevent all menace to our Khyber communications whilst preparations are still being made for a general advance upon that line at the earliest possible date. These decisions are now being carried out. We are not yet in a position to say whether the information on which they were promptly taken was absolutely accurate; but we have deemed it inexpedient to incur the smallest risk in our advance upon Kabul either by the Kurram or the Khyber line; and the commencement of that advance will not be delayed by the above-mentioned re-inforcement of it. We are unable to speak with any confidence as to the real disposition and desire of the Amir at the present moment. We do not as yet believe him to be guilty of any instigation or distinct foreknowledge of the murderous assault on the British Embassy; and indeed it is incredible that he should not have perceived the extreme jeopardy in which such an event must place his own interests. But it is clear that even at that time his authority was very weak, and we feel bound to assume that at the present moment he must be so powerless in the hands of the Afghan mutineers and rebels that little or nothing can be expected from his personal action or influence, whatever his disposition may be.

27. General Roberts reached Ali Khel yesterday evening, and we have reason to hope that his advanced guard under Brigadier General Baker will reach Kushi on Tuesday the 16th instant. Kushi is about 48 miles from Kabul, and the intervening country is perfectly open. A bumper harvest in the Logar valley and surrounding Ghilzai country promises abundant local supply for our troops beyond Shuturgurdan, from which the force under General Roberts will carry with it provision of its own for ten days' supply. The march from Shuturgurdan to Kabul, if opposed, may last ten days. If unopposed, it will doubtless be much more rapid; but, as General Roberts will take with him all his available carriage, exclusive reliance cannot be placed on his Kurram line of communications after he has crossed the Shuturgurdan, and it is possible that this line may be effectually closed by snow early in the month of November next. For this reason we fully realise the paramount importance of losing no time in the active development of the Khyber line, to which the base of the force now advancing on Kabul under General Roberts must be transferred six weeks hence. But the measures we are now taking for this purpose justify the anticipation that almost as soon as, and possibly before, General Roberts can

reach Kabul from the Shuturgurdan, General Bright will be in a position to establish communications with him from Gandamak.

28. In his latest telegram of the 13th, General Roberts reports that the troops placed at his disposal should be ample for the work before them, and that they are in excellent spirits. The tribes are working well with him from Thul as far as Ali Khel; the independent Ghilzais beyond are being tampered with by emissaries from Kabul; but General Roberts hopes to forestall any serious effects. We learnt yesterday, with great relief and satisfaction, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussan Khan, who had been sent from Kandahar to join Sir L. Cavagnari at Kabul, had arrived safely upon the Shuturgurdan.

29. Sir Robert Sandeman has telegraphed that the country round Quetta is quiet, that the good disposition of the Chiefs and people of those parts has been unaffected by the event at Kabul, and that His Highness the Khan of Khelat has offered to assist the British Government to the utmost of his power.

30. The Viceroy has already informed your Lordship by telegraph that our financial position and prospects at the present moment are fortunately such as to occasion no difficulty, and cause no anxiety, in providing for the cost of the unexpected military operations above described.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

STATEMENT regarding the disaster at KABUL on 3rd September 1879.

JELLAL-UL-DIN KHAN, just arrived from Kabul, says: "Yesterday about 9 a.m. sound of firing in Bala Hissar. I live in the (deceased) Mir Munshi's house in Bagh Nawab, far from the Residency. I sent three men to ascertain cause; (one has never returned), the other two, one of whom is known as Babajee (whose wife was wet-nurse to the Mir Munshi's daughter) returned to say that three regiments of infantry on duty in Kabul had, on being offered that morning one month's pay, refused it, demanded arrears, and on not getting it, attacked the Residency quarters, killing and wounding some of the escort and removing some horses (among them Sir Louis' own horse, a bay Wazeeri); after which two or three companies went to the 'Mistri Khana,' and seized some arms and ammunition (the remainder surrounding the Residency); and then a fresh attack was made on the Residency, guns being brought up to join in the attack, the Residency being defended by Sir Louis and staff and escort. The city people were ready to defend themselves and property. The attack continued and increased; and being unable to get to or afford the Residency any aid, after removing the Mir Munshi's family, I left Kabul with Babajee and galloped off towards Ali Khel and Kurram to give the news. I have travelled incessantly and without food: my knees are rubbed sore and eyes bloodshot.

(True—A. C.)

I heard before leaving that the regiments intended attacking the Amir. Six other regiments in quarters at Shahr Naw and Bala Hissar had come to the city to plunder, some returned with plunder, the rest to join the attack. I heard that Daud Shah tried to prevent the attack and was wounded. The fastening of sling of my sword is undone by the jolting at a gallop.

(True—A. C.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

MIRZA NIYAZ TAJIK of Panjsher, servant of Jellal-ud-din (whose wife used to suckle the deceased Munshi's children) states that he was present at the disbursement of pay to the three regiments (without arms), which are in camp at Chaman, at the Bala Hissar. Saif-ud-din Brigadier was present; Muhammad Karim's Regiment refused to take one month's pay, demanding arrears from two months before the "Nawroz" (21st

March). A mutineer and ringleader on throwing down his pay was thrashed by the Brigadier and Colonel, on which the men rose and stoned their Colonel and rushed off to the armoury and seized the arms and made a rush at the Amir's quarters, but the gates were shut to, on which they went off, after hurling stones and clods at the Amir's doors, to the Residency; the escort turned out and fired on them, killing and wounding some 10 or 12 men, and closed the gates; by this time some of the horses of the Guide Cavalry and of the Embassy were carried off. Brisk firing was now kept up by the soldiers from below on the Residency and returned by the officers of the Embassy and the escort from their upper-story: the crowd suffering heavily, whereas their fire seemed to have no effect. The regiment brought up a gun from the "Top-khana," but having no ammunition could not use it (nor did I hear the sound of artillery firing as I was leaving Kabul). I now ran off to tell Jellal-ud-din, and we decided on coming away (as we could give no aid) to inform the English. We got away by some excuse, and rode here as hard as we could. Daud Shah, Commander-in-Chief, did his best to control the mutineers, but was shot at and knocked over with stones. The officers did not join these men, but were powerless to prevent them. The only road to the "Top-khana" lies exposed to the fire of the Residency; the only other way in which they could get ammunition would be (if) it were let down to them from the fort walls by the Kabuli sentries. The city people had not joined in the affray, but were all ready to protect themselves and property. The three regiments were joined by three from the new cantonment of Shahr Naw and three from the Bala Hissar itself, making nine in all; also by the cavalry on foot and artillery (without guns). The portion of the Bala Hissar occupied by the Residency is surrounded on the north by a hill, east by a portion of Bala Hissar itself, south by open ground, west by part of Bala Hissar containing magazine. The Amir and the Embassy are completely surrounded. A man might escape at night by letting himself down into the open country from a balcony. There is no well in the Residency or Amir's quarters; the Amir probably has enough food for three or four weeks by him: the "Sahibs" for two or three days; the Amir cannot supply the Embassy now, as it is impossible for him to reach them.

(Taken by myself.)

(Signed) A. CONOLLY,
Captain, Political Officer.

Ali Khel, the 4th September 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, dated 15th Ramazan 1296 H. (3rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that in accordance with the divine decree which man cannot evade by his contrivance or precaution, at 8 o'clock (a.m.) to-day, Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan (September), the troops who had been collected in the Ark (citadel) of the capital to receive their pay, having all of a sudden and unexpectedly raised an uproar and tumult, first stoned their own officers and, afterwards, all in a body ran towards the quarters of the British Envoy Plenipotentiary. On one side stones were hurled, on the other side began a hail of bullets from within the Embassy (Sarai); and thus the fire of disturbance, rebellion, and mutiny blazed up; so it could be checked or remedied by no kind of means. Then immediately all the troops at Sherpur and Chaman, outside the citadel, and the city people in successive crowds having entered the citadel to plunder the factories, the artillery, and the arsenal; and then both the soldiery and the city people hastened towards the residence of the Envoy. Meanwhile I ordered Daud Shah Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, to this Minister's assistance. No sooner had he arrived at the door of the Minister's residence than he was felled by the soldiers with stones and spears and is now in a dying state. I then sent Sirdar Yahya Khan and my own son and heir-apparent, with the Koran, the book of God, in their hands towards the troops; but this also was of no avail. Then I deputed the Syuds and the priests, one after the other in their order; but this also produced no good. Up to this moment, viz., the "asr" (4 o'clock), the fight is going on. It now remains to be seen what the result of this will be, and what consequences will follow this alarming and lamentable occurrence. I have written this for your information.

Enclosure 4 in No. 21.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, of the 16th Ramazan 1296H. = (September 4, 1879).

AFTER compliments.—Be it known to you that yesterday, Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan (September 3rd) from eight in the morning until evening, thousands of people collected for a determined attack on the person of the (British) Envoy, and a fight and slaughter on both sides took place. At the “Asr” (1 o’clock) prayers they set fire to the residence of the Envoy, and I with a few (*lit.* five) of my attendants and adherents am besieged from yesterday until this day, Thursday, the 16th. I have no certain intelligence of the Envoy’s condition. I know not whether he with his attendants has been slain or some one has rescued him from destruction. Although this event has befallen in accordance with the divine decree, still a few (*lit.* five) evil-disposed and seditious persons, who disliked and opposed the alliance and friendship between the two Governments, are the authors of this dangerous commotion, and have stirred up the populace to bring about the ruin of this State, and (*i.e.*, by) the murder of the Envoy, and having thus shed blood have brought the matters to such a pitch that the Afghan Government has been destroyed and ruined: this is for me a day of the utmost distress, as I am confined within my house, and my few attendants and adherents remain prepared to defend me and my family. All the troops and the city people, and the people of the country adjacent, have united in open revolt from my authority. I am using every effort and expedient and device in my power to suppress this outbreak; but it is to be seen with what effect.

Daud Shah Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, whom I had sent yesterday to the assistance of the Envoy, is now lying wounded and bruised with stones, spears, and blows from the butt ends of guns, and is not expected to live. Those of his attendants who accompanied him have all been killed. The factories and the arsenal have been sacked, the soldiers and the people have plundered all at their pleasure. In short, my kingdom has by these events been destroyed, and after God my strong reliance is upon friendship and union with the British Government, which should communicate with and counsel me what it considers advisable and expedient, and what it thinks proper—in accordance with the requirements of the terms of perfect friendship and mutual understanding—for the extinguishing of this flame of tumult and crime, and for extricating me from this circle of fear and peril—so that I may act accordingly. Let this not remain hidden from the minds of those in charge of the British Government that so long as I live I will not let go my grasp of the skirt of friendship with, and attachment to the British Government. By God’s will the fact of my cordial friendship and my sincerity, and the innocence of my heart has been and will be clear and manifest as the dawn to the (British) Government. By this affair, in which I have lost my true friend the Envoy, and through which my State has been utterly damaged and broken up, I have become greatly distracted, and am in distress and confusion as to what I should do.

Enclosure 5 in No. 21.

Statement of SIRKAI KHAN, uncle of PADSHAH KHAN.

Padshah Khan, Allal-ud-din Khan, and I live in a quarter of Kabul known as the Bala-joi. Shortly after sunrise we all three went to pay our respects to the Amir; Padshah Khan wished to take leave before starting for the Shuturgurdan, which he had been told to look after. While we were waiting to be received, a Munshi, who had been disbursing pay to Muhammad Karim’s Regiment at the office about 150 yards off, hurried up and passed on to the Amir’s apartments, and we heard the sound of firing from the office. The Amir called Padshah Khan, and a Jabbârkhel Chief upstairs, and sent them out with the “Koran” to quiet the troops in the Chaman (or plain), of which one regiment had mutinied at the office. Padshah Khan and I and the heir-apparent and Sirdar Yahya Khan went accordingly to the Chaman; and though we were roughly handled, we succeeded in preventing these two Regiments from joining the rest. A messenger now arrived from the Amir to say the Residency was being attacked and Daud Shah had been sent by the Amir to quell the disturbance, but had been badly stoned and speared, and was with difficulty saved by a few men. After a while we returned to the Amir’s quarters, which were almost deserted, and waited in an outer courtyard till the afternoon: all this time the firing was going on. A messenger came to us to say the Residency had been set on fire, and we saw the smoke rising and in a short time the firing which had become tremendous, ceased. We went over to the

Residency, Padshah Khan and I. There was a great crowd of men jostling each other and gutting the place. We could not get close enough to recognise any one, nor did we see the bodies of the Sahibs, but the corpses of both sides were lying thick about the place. We returned to the courtyard, and then a letter arrived from the Amir which Padshah Khan desired me to take to Kurram. I left after night-fall and came away as quick as I could, bringing a footman with me from Surkhab (Abdool Rahman, servant of the Embassy Mehmandar, caught me up at Drekhula). As I was leaving Kabul, sowars of a Kabul regiment in camp on the Chaman told me that out of 11 men, ** Sic. in orig.* sowars and grass cutters, on return from getting grass, were met: * two killed and nine saved by the Ressaldar of the Regiment above-mentioned; they were alive when I came away: I was told they were Sikhs as well as Mahomedans. After Daud Shah was wounded the Amir placed sentries round the palace and did not show himself. The soldiery did not concern themselves about him but were intent on taking the Residency. The only troops who did not join in the affray and were ready to assist the Amir, were the Artillery who stood to their guns; had they had any officer to direct them they might have fired on the infantry and helped the Embassy. Numbers of the cavalry and infantry dispersed after the affair was over.

(Taken by myself.)

Camp Ali Khel,
The 6th September 1879.

(Signed)

A. CONOLLY, Capt.
Political Officer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 4th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, Simla.

A MAN, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari's service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns and being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Embassy and escort were defending themselves when he left Kabul about noon yesterday. I hope to receive further news.

Enclosure 7 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram to General Roberts giving news from Kabul of attack on Residency. Send immediately a letter to the Amir referring to report received, and conveying message from Viceroy that British Government holds His Highness strictly responsible for personal safety of Cavagnari and whole British Mission. Add that troops will march on Kabul if not immediately assured of complete safety of Mission, and give out publicly that troops are preparing to march at once.

Enclosure 8 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

A SERVANT and companion of Jellal-ud-din has come in from Rokian and confirms his statement in all matters except as regards the guns being used.

Enclosure 9 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Simla.

LETTERS from the Amir brought by Sirkhai Khan, uncle of Padshah Khan, as well as their own statements, leave no hope as to fate of Embassy and escort. Particulars follow immediately.

Enclosure 10 in No. 21. (Extract.)

Telegram, dated 6th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRKAI KHAN, bearer of Amir's first letter, confirms previous reports of disaster, and describes how Padshah Khan visited the spot and saw the dead bodies of Envoy, staff, and escort. Of the latter, some nine sowars are said to have been out getting grass that day and were not killed with the rest; defence was very stubborn and loss of Kabulis heavy, put down at 100, or more. Finding they could not storm the place, the mutineers set fire to the doorway below, and, when that gave way, swarmed in and up to the upper story, overwhelmed the defenders, and sacked the place.

The second letter was brought by another messenger, servant of the Embassy Mehmandar, whose story in all but a few unimportant details is the same as that first received.

I have detained the Kabul messengers pending receipt of instructions as to line of policy to follow, and what to communicate to Amir, or Padshah Khan. The former invokes our aid; the latter expresses himself, through his messenger, anxious to serve us. Once in Logar valley, where they have had a bumper harvest, we could live on the country.

I beg to cancel my application to be relieved.

Enclosure 11 in No. 21.

Telegram, No. 2376 E.P., dated 6th September 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram 6th. Reply to Amir at once from Viceroy that a strong British force under General Roberts will march speedily on Kabul to his relief from Shuturgurdan, and that he should use all his resources to co-operate with and facilitate the advance of the troops through his country. Roberts will send detailed instructions.

Enclosure 12 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

My letters to Amir and Padshah Khan run as follows (they have just been despatched by Sirkai Khan, who will make all haste to relieve and acquaint the Ghilzais of what is expected of them *en route*):

To the Amir—Viceroy informs you that a strong British force under General Roberts will move speedily on Shuturgurdan and Kabul. You should do all in your power to help with supplies, carriage, &c. It is (?) advisable that Padshah Khan should see to the Shuturgurdan, revive the *dāk*, and communicate daily with General Roberts through myself.

To Padshah Khan—After consulting with the Amir, you should at once go yourself, or depute your brother, Allal-ud-din Khan, along with Sirkai Khan, to the Shuturgurdan, and secure, through the Ghilzais, the safe passage of our convoys, &c., and security of roads from Karatiga to Kushi. For this you shall be paid down one year's subsidy as lately fixed by the Amir, and also receive the subsidy monthly from us for such time as you may render aid, or as shall be fixed by the British Government, together with any other honours or rewards which your services, on the approval of the British Government, may entitle you to. Use the *dāk* or special messengers daily to acquaint General Roberts, through me, with the true state of affairs.

Enclosure 13 in No. 21.

Telegram 2381 E.P., dated 7th September 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel.

YOUR telegram 7th. Your letter to Amir should state particularly that the force marches on Kabul to his assistance. Add that Viceroy requests His Highness to keep

him constantly informed regarding his own personal safety, and the circumstances of his position, and affairs at Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879. (Extract.)

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I BELIEVE the prompt action of Government will have the best possible effect on the tribes here. I have sent for representatives, Maliks of all Jaji sections, to exhort them to show their loyalty, by preserving order, by giving all necessary assistance, and by plainly telling their neighbours beyond our frontier of the inutility and hopelessness of any hostile demonstration.

Enclosure 15 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

HAVE written to the Amir in accordance with terms of your telegram of to-day.

Enclosure 16 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 8th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla,

Two or three Regiments are said to have marched from Kabul towards Gardez and Spega which lie west of our Jaji border to incite the Ghilzais and Mangals of those parts to rise. Accounts differ as to whether they are cavalry or infantry. Padshah Khan's party said to be greatly concerned and alarmed at what has taken place. None of my messengers back from Kabul yet.

Enclosure 17 in No 21.

Telegram, dated 9th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AN Afghan, who says he constantly visited the Envoy, confirms previous accounts, highly extols the stubbornness of defence and gallantry of the British Officers, upbraids the cruelty and cowardice of the Kabulis in murdering guests and strangers, says there were 12 regiments implicated, that first a gateway leading into the Residency courtyard was burst open, and there such a resolute stand made with rifle, sword, and bayonet, that the assailants were checked; but they set fire to the house, and the defenders charging out sword in hand were all slain and the place completely wrecked: loss of Kabulis including some city people stated at 210, may be read 410. A guard of Guide Cavalry out with grass-cutters escaped, not known where. Amir, terribly perplexed, and confused at the reproach to his name, is in privacy with a few faithful Sirdars, and is sure to come personally to apologise to the Government, as the regiments had got beyond his control. Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan expected on 7th instant. Amir intends making his excuses to him. Rumour that the sepoy were taken and are still alive. Will continue to give news, for I have friends with the Amir, though I dare not venture out myself.

Enclosure 18 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A KAHAR belonging to Embassy who was outside Residency when attack took place has escaped and arrived at Karatiga; says attack began morning, Residency fired noon, but fight continued till evening, guns taking part; believes no one escaped, hid himself and travelled by night; saw no troops on road.

Enclosure 19 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879. (Extract.)

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EMAM BUKSH, native of Jullundur, once in Hyderabad (Sind) Police, and lately in Sir Louis Cavagnari's secret employ, was present at mutiny of troops, and throughout fight in Residency. Two guns were used, but fired only some eight shots. Says the mutineers, under shelter of a balcony which ran round the building, set fire to it, and that the defenders were partly killed, partly smothered, and burnt alive. Sir Louis was rendered senseless by a cut from behind which clove his head, and was immediately afterwards crushed by a portion of wall and building roof which fell in. Jenkyns and Hamilton were shot, and scorched or burnt to death. Doctor Kelly, being shot, lived till next morning, when the mutineers returned, butchered him and all who were alive, stripping and mutilating their bodies in the most horrible way. The Sikh Jemadar defended the Envoy most gallantly, and struck off the head of his murderer with one blow. A Sikh Duffadar ran out and slew eight men with his own hand. All behaved well, but on Sir Louis being killed they lost heart, and the defence slackened. Ammunition, too, had begun to run out. Deponent hid himself in a drain under one of the baths, and at night crept out, and took refuge with a friendly Mullah. Remained two days, and came away. Three sepoy, who had also secreted themselves, were taken away alive to the Amir the same evening. During the attack which was from all sides, one side overlooking the Residency, the Amir and his Sirdars were looking on unconcerned, and did nothing to help beyond sending his son and Mullah a little way. Daud Shah made only a show of quelling the disturbance, but did not really exert himself. He was not wounded.

Enclosure 20 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AODIN, one of two men sent from Rokian on 5th instant, has returned from Kabul, where he has a relation in one of the regiments, to say that as far as he can ascertain, the Amir had not planned or foreseen the destruction of the Embassy; but now that matters have come to that pass, he despaired of ever appeasing or regaining the confidence of the English, and that he and all under him had made up their minds to fight. He had sent out letters, too, in all directions, calling on the people to support him, and despatched a small force of cavalry and infantry to stir up Zurmat and Spega.

Enclosure 21 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

NEWS from Gardez, in Zurmat, as follows:—Three regiments and six guns arrived from Ghazni, and three regiments expected from Kabul also. Arms arriving from Kabul for the people. Faiz Mahomed Khan, Ghilzai, who has seen much (?) service, and was commanding the cavalry in Zurmat, is appointed Governor of that province. The country is rallying round him, and an advance was intended by the Spega route in a few days, the intention being in conjunction with the Machalgo Ghilzais to threaten or attack our flank advancing on Shuturgardan. The bodies of two sons of Allayar, a leading chief of Zurmat, who were killed in the disturbance at Kabul, had been brought to Gardez and buried amidst great excitement, the people declaring they would avenge their death.

Enclosure 22 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 12th September 1879.

From CAPTAIN CONOLLY, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL news. Bulk of troops though in receipt (?) of pay demanded, and inflamed with desire to fight, are said to lack carriage and leaders.

Enclosure 23 in No. 21.

Telegram dated 14th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

SEND message to Amir that Viceroy has now received his original letters, dated 3rd, 4th September, and desires him to be assured in reply that, if he acts in accordance with his affirmation of innocence, sincerity, and strong reliance on friendship of British Government, he has nothing to fear personally, and that our troops will come to restore his authority and rescue him from his danger.

Enclosure 24 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From VICEROY, Simla, to GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING TROOPS, Kandahar.

ALL troops at present under orders to return to India to stand fast until further orders. Please telegraph present distribution of troops and what are at Kandahar, and also transport available at Kandahar and between this and Quetta, and what reserve of supplies you have. Major St. John and party to remain at Kandahar until you hear further.

Enclosure 25 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 5th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

NEWS received from Kabul that on 3rd September the British Embassy was attacked by revolted Afghan Regiments and overpowered. Letters leave no hope regarding fate of Mission. Your military orders go separately. Kandahar must be held and St. John retained.

Enclosure 26 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 6th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

TROOPS in movement towards Pishin recalled to Kandahar. Town re-occupied. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has asked permission to reside in citadel inside our lines in town. Sirdar has no information as yet from Kabul, but he seems anxious to be associated closely with us, and I encouraged him in this respect.

Enclosure 27 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 7th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI has been informed of events at Kabul, and expressed absolute devotion to British Government, and offers to raise contingent among Durani tribes to march to Kabul with British Force, should one go from here.

Enclosure 28 in No. 21.

Tel. dated 9th September 1879. (Extract.)

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

Your telegram 7th. Convey to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan the acknowledgments of the British Government for his friendly and honourable assurances, and add anything suitable regarding his offer of contingent.

Enclosure 29 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 9th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

EVERYTHING quiet here. Sirdar visited General yesterday evening, and renewed assurances of devotion to British Government. He is raising the usual local contingents of horse under tribal Chiefs to support collectors in collecting revenue; this also gives pay and employment.

Two Kandahar regiments on their road from Kabul to garrison Kandahar, on evacuation, have been halted outside city. One was disarmed before leaving Kabul. The Sirdar offered them leave to go to their homes, but they made protestations of fidelity and requested to be allowed to garrison any place remote from Kandahar. They have been ordered to the Tirin district under Sirdar's son, certain suspected officers being dismissed.

Arrangements making for supply of Commissariat from Government grain(?). This will mitigate rise in prices already commencing, and put money in Sirdar's Treasury, which (is) empty.

Zamindawar people have refused to pay revenue to Governor, Muhammad Yusaf, Amir's uncle, who is unpopular, and has no armed force. Sirdar has directed him to return to Girishk, and in conjunction with us, is inviting the Zamindawar Chiefs to Kandahar.

Enclosure 30 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 10th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR has received letter from Amir, written Thursday, giving account of events of preceding day. He says that with thousands of men he strove through the day to rescue the Envoy, and lays great stress on Daud Shah's wounds, adding that all the men with him were killed. He orders the Sirdar to follow advice of representatives of British Government.

Another letter from Amir's Munshi Bashi to Sirdar says that the troops have gone to their homes, or fled; that six regiments did not share in the attack, but have lost all discipline. He concludes thus:—"In order that the Amir's letters may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases, such as are advisable at such a time."

Enclosure 31 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PLEASE let us know as soon as possible intentions of Government with regard to retention of part or whole of force at Kandahar during the winter. The information is required with reference to arrangements for hutting and provisioning troops here and in Pishin. Early definite orders will save much trouble and expense. If it be decided to keep whole force above Passes, it is to be noted that supplies and forage are more readily procurable here than in Pishin.

Enclosure 32 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 11th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WITH reference to General Stewart's message of to-day, I think that forces might be with advantage retained here during the winter. Sirdar wishes it, and its presence under the circumstances, is not in any way distasteful to any part of population.

Enclosure 33 in No. 21.

Telegram, No. A.-94, dated 12th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

GOVERNMENT intend retention of whole force at Kandahar during winter.

Kurrachee will be your base, and the Bolan and Sind your line of communication. All supply and transport will be now transferred to the Bombay Government and authorities, to whom you must state your wants.

Enclosure 34 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 13th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR's bi-weekly post from Kabul arrived yesterday, having left 6th. He says that the only letter from Amir was a simple one of condolence on death of a relation, and I have no reason to disbelieve his statement. None of the private letters in bag contained, as far as I can ascertain, any notice of the occurrences of the 3rd, but this excites no surprise here.

Enclosure 35 in No. 21.

Telegram, dated 13th September 1879.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I ARRIVED Quetta this morning. Country perfectly tranquil; Kabul news has not had disturbing result. I had meeting of Achakzai and Kakazai Chiefs in Khojak Pass yesterday, and explained to them what had happened. One and all declared their determination to abide by previous agreement, and to, as heretofore, faithfully serve the Government. His Highness the Khan has telegraphed to me that his life, country, and all his possessions are at the disposal of Government. I consider there is no cause whatever for anxiety in this direction.

No. 22.

To His Excellency the Right Honorable THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA in Council.
No. 101 of 1879.

MY LORD, India Office, London, September 18, 1879.

1. HER Majesty's Government have received with profound grief and regret the intelligence conveyed by your Excellency's telegrams of the 6th inst., of the attack made on the British Embassy at Cabul by mutinous Afghan troops and the people of the city, which, as is unhappily but too certain, in spite of a desperate resistance on the part of the British Envoy, the members of his staff, and his native escort, terminated in the massacre of the entire Mission.

2. Her Majesty's Government feel that it would be premature at this moment to discuss either the immediate causes to which this deplorable event may be attributed, or the ultimate consequences which may result from it. They cannot, however, delay expressing their keen sense of the loss which the empire has sustained by the tragic and premature death of so able a public servant as Sir L. Cavagnari, and of his companions, to whom, in full confidence of the ability of the ruler of Cabul to protect them, had been entrusted the honourable but difficult duty of consolidating the friendly relations, so recently re-established, between the British and Afghan Governments. They desire also to place on record their recognition of the gallantry and devotion shown by the escort of the Corps of Guides in the almost hopeless task of the defence of the Embassy.

3. Her Majesty's Government need scarcely assure your Excellency in Council of their steady support in all measures which may be necessary to vindicate the honour of

Great Britain, and to exact redress for the murderous violence to which the members of the Mission have fallen victims.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CRANBROOK.

No. 23.

No. 203 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th September 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a communication from the late Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at Kabul, and of its enclosures, regarding the movements of certain Russian officers apparently engaged in making surveys on the Oxus.

No. 25, dated 27th August 1879.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
E. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

Memo. No. 25, dated 27th August 1879.

From MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Has the honour to forward translation of three letters received by the Governor of Afghan-Turkestan, reporting the movements of certain Russian officers engaged in making surveys on the Oxus.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter, Pattakaisar (?) ferry, dated 16th Shaban.

THIRTY-ONE Russians have come up the river in two boats. They have been 48 days on the road. Men of the country drag the boats up by ropes. They went ashore for a very short time to eat at Chuchka, on the north side of the river, and then proceeded to Shorab (?) and Pattakaisar (?)

The wooden boat is 30 yards long and 5 yards broad. The small boat is of iron and has a deck under which I don't know what there is. The chief Russian among them has a telescope through which he looks in front and behind, and writes down the account of the country and the river.

Nobody understands what he is doing. There are 14 boxes in the iron boat. The followers of these infidels are all armed. They seem to do nothing else beside noting down the state of the country and the river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter, dated 21st Shaban.

IN a letter dated the 14th of the present month I wrote to you that three Russian officers with three soldiers and one interpreter had come up the river in two boats, one a small one belonging to the Russians, and the other a large one which they had brought from Organj, and which was manned by six Organj boatmen, and had passed one night

in Charjui and one night in Kilif. They engaged a man in Kilif for 300 tangas whom they took with them, and questioned him about the countries on both sides of the river.

The people of the country pulled the boats up by ropes from boundary to boundary. They kept on the other side of the river, and never approached our side. The Mir of Kilif's men say that they are going to the source of the river.

I have repeated most of what I wrote in my last letter, lest you may not have received it, as you did not answer it. Yesterday, the 20th, 20 Russian sowars with eight loaded camels arrived at Ak-kum on the banks of the river and passed the night there.

It is reported that some other sowars are coming after them. I enclose a letter on the subject. I sent a man towards Sherabad, &c. When he returns he will bring a true account.

Enclosure 4 in No. 23.

Translation of Letter from a Turkoman of Kirki.

FOR some time I have been sick, but am now recovering, and hasten to inform you that 20 Russian sowars with eight loaded camels arrived on Saturday evening at Ak-kum. They passed the night there and moved on next day. I don't know where they will halt, nor what their errand is. Some other Russians, following them, have arrived in Kirki, with some object in view.

I have sent a man on with them who will find out what they are doing.

No. 23A.

No. 204 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 25th September 1879.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 196, dated 1st September 1879, we have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the late Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, No. 24, dated 27th August 1879, transmitting his Diary for the period between the 17th and the 23rd August 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23A.

Memo. No. 24, dated 27th August 1879.

FROM MAJOR SIR LOUIS CAVAGNARI, K.C.B., C.S.I., Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HAS the honour to submit Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, for the week ending 23rd August 1879.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23A.

No. 5.—Diary of the British Embassy at Kabul, from the 17th to the 23rd August 1879. 17th August 1879.—The daughter of Sirdar Yahya Khan married to the Amir has been attacked by cholera, but is now reported out of danger.

The deaths which have occurred from cholera amongst the Herat regiments are variously reported to be from 120 to 365.

The Amir has reduced the allowances of the majority of the Muhammadzai (Barakzai) Sirdars on the grounds that he will not require them to keep up so many followers as the late Amir directed them to maintain. This has caused dissatisfaction, but final orders in the matter have not yet been issued.

Certain military officers of high rank have fallen under the Amir's displeasure, and have been deprived of their commands. Among the number are General Ghulam Hyder Khan, Charkhi (who commanded the troops at Ali Masjid), and Brigadier-General Taj Muhammad Khan (in consequence of the fracas which took place about the lease of the Mint, *vide* Diary of 31st July 1879). General Saifudin Khan, commanding the artillery, is said to be about to be degraded, but as long as Daud Shah has influence over the Amir it is not likely to take place, as Saifudin Khan is a personal friend of the Commander-in-Chief.

Sirdar Yahya Khan has been given the command of 1,500 irregular cavalry ("Sowar-i-Kushada"). Kazi Sultan Ali, the chief priest of the Shiahs, has died of cholera.

18th August 1879.—The Amir has given Abdul Karim Khan, the Kohistani Chief, a letter to the headmen of Nijrow, summoning them to Kabul to arrange for the payment of their arrears of revenue. Abdul Karim has been promised the Governorship of Nijrow if he succeeds in securing the submission of the people of that valley to the Amir's authority. Asmatula Khan, Ghilzai, is reported to have increased the number of his personal retainers from 200 to 500, and is about to remove his family from Kach to Kulman.

The Amir has directed the Governor of Afghan Turkestan to move troops against the rebels in Badakshan as soon as the regiments in course of relief arrive from Kabul. It is thought that the troops are not sufficiently in hand for the task of restoring order in Badakshan.

19th August 1879.—Sirdar Hashim Khan has been appointed to the Governorship of the northern portion of the Hazarajat.

Six regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and 12 mountain guns, under orders for Turkestan, have left the cantonments. Two Kandahari regiments of infantry have left Kabul for Kandahar.

The three regiments lately despatched to Ghazni mutinied on the road and wounded Brigadier-General Zabardast Khan. The mutiny is said to have originated in consequence of one of the Colonels having flogged a soldier. The Colonel was violently assaulted and severely wounded. Numbers of men deserted, leaving their rifles which were sent into Kabul.

The Amir has of late become displeased with Daud Shah, and has demanded accounts from him; but owing to the exertions of the Mustaufi a reconciliation has taken place.

Part of Kazi Kadru's family and property left Kabul last night. He is reported to be somewhere in the Safed Koh. His Kabul wives have returned to their parents: his concubines have been sold.

20th August 1879.—Yesterday one month's pay was sent out to the troops under orders for Turkestan. The troops refused to take one month's pay and demanded their full arrears of four months. A compromise was effected by the Amir, having sent another month's pay which the troops accepted: but it is thought probable that many will desert when they get a few marches out of Kabul.

21st August 1879.—Haji Ataullah, former Envoy at the Court of the Amir of Bokhara, is said to be preparing to return to his appointment. (The Foreign Minister has assured the British Envoy that Haji Ataullah will not be deputed to Bokhara until the wishes of the British Government are made known to the Amir).

Muhammad Ali Beg, the Wakil-ud-dowlat of Sighan, arrived in Kabul yesterday with 100 sowars. It is rumoured that he will be detained indefinitely at Kabul, and will not be granted his former appointment.

Sayad Muhammad, son of the late Sayad Nur Muhammad Shah, has been appointed to a civil office at Kandahar under Sirdar Sher Ali Khan.

It is reported that the Amir is pressing Sirdar Hashim Khan to deliver up certain money and valuables the mother of the late heir-apparent is supposed to have deposited with him.

The amount of money reported to have been taken from the mother of the late Abdulla Jan, by order of the Amir, is as follows:—1,60,000 tillas Bukhari (1 tilla=9 rupees Kabuli) 12,000 ratiskas (Russian 5 rouble piece (gold)=12 rupees).

To-day the Amir went on a visit of condolence to the family of Mir Akbar Khan, Kohistani, at the gardens of Ali Mardan. After the visit His Highness went to see the cantonments at Sherpar.

His Highness the Amir sent his Foreign Minister to the British Envoy to say that, in consequence of the unruly behaviour of the soldiery at Herat, he did not think it prudent that Major St. John should go there, but Sirdar Sher Ali Khan would be instructed to arrange for that officer's journey via Anar Darra to Birjand. The above was communicated to Major St. John by telegraph.

23rd August 1879.—Report received that six Companies located at Ghori in Afghan Turkestan mutinied about their arrears of pay and arrested their commanding officer, and marched with him towards Mazar-i-Sharif with the view to demanding their pay from the Governor of the province. General Ghulam Hyder Khan, fearing that the arrival of these men would create a bad effect amongst the rest of the soldiery, sent out some pay, and thereby persuaded the mutineers to return to their post. The Turkestan soldiers, however, heard of what had been done, and are likely to follow the example set them.

The Mustaufi and Foreign Minister were informed that arrangements for laying the telegraph wire across the Shuturgurda are in progress, and that an escort would be required from the Amir to protect the camp of the telegraph officials. The Ministers replied that on intimation being received as to the date of the arrival of the telegraph officials at the Afghan frontier, all necessary arrangements would be made for their protection and for supplies.

No. 24.

No. 210 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
or India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 25th September 1879.

WE have the honour to enclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers containing all the material information that has reached us, since the despatch of our letter of the 15th September, regarding the circumstances of the attack upon the British Embassy at Kabul, and the course of events within Afghanistan. We propose also to report briefly the progress of the measures adopted to exact retribution at Kabul, and to restore order in the country.

2. In regard to the circumstances of the attack on the Embassy, several men of the escort, who had taken part in the defence, have managed to escape into British territory, and their depositions are enclosed with this letter. There are of course various discrepancies in the details of these statements, especially in regard to the manner in which the real attack, with fire-arms, began; but all accounts seem to agree that certain unarmed regiments were drawn up in the Bala Hissar to receive their pay, that they suddenly broke out into violent mutiny, and attacked the Residency; that they were at first kept off, but they went for arms, and on their return after a short interval surrounded and besieged the Residency; reaching the roof and setting fire to the house below, until the building became untenable and the defenders were gradually overpowered. The mutineers were joined by the city mob; and there is no evidence from the accounts given by these men, that any serious attempt was made by the Amir or his people to assist or rescue the British officers. Upon this important point it is still necessary to suspend judgment, until we are in possession of more ample and authentic evidence of the Amir's actual position and behaviour at the time, and until the Amir's own explanations shall have been received. From Kandahar we are informed that the Amir has written to his uncle, Muhammad Yusaf Khan, Governor of Zamindawar, giving an account of the events of the 3rd September, differing much from that sent to the Viceroy and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan. Only two regiments, both of the Body-Guard, are said to have mutinied, and attacked the Embassy and murdered the members of the Embassy. Nothing is mentioned of any attempt at rescue, or of participation by the people, and it is expressly stated that no other injury was done, and that by evening everything was quiet. We remark that Baha-ud-din Khan, a very intelligent native officer of our cavalry, who was in Kabul at the time, and Sirdar Gholam Nakshband Khan, who though not at Kabul when the attack took place, was connected with the Embassy, are both of opinion that the Amir might have assisted our officers.

3. In regard to the origin and causes of this sudden outbreak we are still without authentic information. Taimur, a Sowar of the Guides escort, who has escaped, mentions

that the troops and the city people at first welcomed the arrival of the Envoy, imagining that he would be able at once to improve their condition; but that the temper of the soldiery altered when they were disappointed about obtaining their pay. When, therefore, the full arrears were refused to the regiments in the Bala Hissar, they immediately turned on the Residency. Private letters received at Kandahar from Kabul corroborate this account, and say that the affair was unpremeditated; although no serious attempt was made to control the mutineers. On the other hand a letter from a Kazi of Kabul to Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan is said to hint that the affair was premeditated, and that Sir L. Cavagnari had some previous warning. At Kandahar Sirdar Sher Ali has freely declared his conviction that the Amir had been in the hands of dangerous traitors.

4. Several letters have been received, during the past ten days, by General Roberts at Ali Khel from the Amir. Of the first, dated 11th September, we enclose copy; it expresses the Amir's relief and pleasure at receiving a letter addressed to him, at the Viceroy's order, by Captain Conolly, his confidence in the friendship of the Viceroy, and his intention to punish the mutineers. Subsequent letters, dated 16th September, report the mutiny of troops at Herat, and the murder of the Governor there, with other news; while His Highness' latest letter, dated the 17th instant, answered and complied with General Roberts' suggestion that confidential representatives should be sent to him from the Amir, by announcing the deputation of Mustaufi Habibulla and Wazir Sher Muhammad Khan. These representatives reached the camp at Ali Khel on the 22nd, and have had interviews with General Roberts. They presented letters from the Amir acknowledging receipt, and expressing satisfaction at the contents of letters that had been addressed to His Highness by General Roberts, and declaring his fidelity to the British alliance. The deputies also assured General Roberts verbally of the Amir's friendly disposition, and his wish to be guided by the advice of our Government.

5. In regard to the general state of affairs at Kabul, and to the disposition of the principal tribes with whom we have to deal, it is as yet not possible to form any precise opinion. There can be no doubt that emissaries from Kabul are abroad in the tribal country, with the object of inciting the tribes to take arms, and to be prepared for giving trouble to the British forces. From Peshawur it has been reported that letters from the Amir were believed to have come to the Mohmands, Afridis, and Shinwaris, directing them to assemble. On the 17th September, General Roberts heard from the Ghilzais that the Amir had called upon them to stop all roads leading from Ali Khel toward Kabul; while on the other hand, Major St. John was told at Kandahar that the tribes had been instructed not to oppose our advance; and to reserve themselves for attack on our communications hereafter. We have not yet ascertained to what extent, and with what object, the Amir himself may be in correspondence with these tribes, or whether the messages are circulating under his direct authority. It was to be expected, however, that in his present situation the Amir would be anxious to secure, in any contingency, the adherence of the more powerful tribes; while it was certain that all persons at Kabul who have reason to dread our presence there would use their utmost influence with the tribes to embarrass our advance.

6. There has been an attack, near the Shuturgurdan, on a small party of our troops escorting stores; but generally the tribes with whom our officers are in communication on the Shuturgurdan and Khyber lines have not shown themselves hostile. The Commissioner of Peshawur reports satisfactory arrangements made with the Afridis of the Khyber; and from Ali Khel we learn that the headmen of many neighbouring tribes are coming into our camp. General Stewart's reconnaissance toward Ghazni will probably engross the attention of the Southern Ghilzais and will aid in maintaining tranquillity in that direction.

7. Kandahar and the adjacent country continue quiet. The Amir's Governor, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, is on very good terms with the British officers, and apparently desires to prove his attachment to the British Government in the existing crisis of Afghan affairs.

8. In the outlying provinces of Afghanistan the central authority of the Kabul Government appears to be weak. The Governor of Zamindawar, who is a younger brother of the late Amir, has shut himself up in his fort, and has sent into Kandahar for help. At Herat some troops mutinied on the 5th September, two days after the outbreak at Kabul, murdered Fakir Ahmed Khan, the Governor of the town, and plundered and burnt his house. Fakir Ahmed had been a devoted adherent of Yakub Khan, the present Amir; he had accompanied Sirdar Ayub Khan into Persia, returned with him, and was supposed to be his chief and most trusted officer at Herat. But a telegram from Major St. John mentions that private letters express an opinion that Ayub

himself planned the murder, apparently from jealousy of Fakir Ahmed's attachment to the Amir. The Amir has confirmed this news from Herat by letters to General Roberts, of which the last received states that the troops at Herat have been again disorderly, but have been quieted by payment. From Badakshan intelligence has been received, through Kashmir, of another local revolution, by which Mir Baba Khan has been overthrown.

9. Our military situation at the present moment may be briefly summed up as follows: in Southern Afghanistan, General Stewart concentrated the bulk of his force at Kandahar, and in addition to guarding his long line of communications had prepared a force of 2,000 men with transport and supplies, ready to move at a moment's notice. We have strengthened this force by the addition of two companies of Bombay Sappers for employment on the Bolan road, and have called up a Bombay brigade of three infantry regiments to guard the Sukkar-Multan line and frontier, and to meet the demands for escort and convoy duty. We directed a reconnaissance to be made to Kelat-i-Ghilzai; and a force of about 3,000 men under Brigadier General Hughes left yesterday morning for Kelat-i-Ghilzai. We have further under consideration the expediency of pushing this reconnaissance even up to Ghazni. On this line all operations are in full working order.

10. On the Kurram line, the supply of transport and the progress made up the valley by the reinforcing troops have now placed General Roberts in a position to advance. His line of communication is fairly well-guarded already, and is daily becoming more so. His field force is concentrated between Ali Khel and Shuturgurdan. An advance will be made to-day on Dobandi or Kushi by half the force; the remaining half following a day or two afterwards, when the Shuturgurdan will be held by four guns, the 3rd Sikhs, and 11th Native Infantry. The field force should therefore be fully concentrated by the 1st at Kushi, whence Kabul can be reached in four marches. Communication will be maintained with the Shuturgurdan until the pass is closed by snow, or the Khyber line is open.

11. On the Khyber line, Major-General Bright, who is now at Peshawur, has organised a strong advanced brigade which is destined to move on to Jellalabad and to push a reconnaissance beyond. A portion of the Lundikotal force will move immediately upon Dakka. The sickness in the Peshawur valley and Khyber Pass, which has been unusually great, has added to the difficulty of equipping two lines at once, but matters are mending in this direction; and as all transport has now been diverted to Peshawur, there is every hope that the road to Kabul will be open *via* the Khyber before the end of next month. A cart road already exists to Gandanak, and this will be improved and continued onwards with the utmost possible expedition.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

P.S.—A telegram dated 24th September has been received from General Roberts to the effect that, General Baker occupied Kushi without resistance at 3.20 p.m. o'clock, on the 24th instant. He reports that supplies are abundant. The strength of the force he has with him in Kushi is over 2,000 men.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1879, received 16th Sept.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A FOLLOWER of Cavagnari, Emam Buksh, and a Kahar have arrived here. They state three of the escort were alive when they left, and had been taken to Amir. Their fate unknown. Party of sowars were out with grass-cutter; their fate also unknown. Escort reported to have behaved most gallantly, especially Sikh Jemadar of Cavalry.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Following is précis of letter received yesterday from Amir, dated 11th September :—
Letter begins—

I HAVE received your letter of 7th instant, and was much pleased. I fully understood what was written. Complete confidence was restored and sense of relief felt in friendship shown by Viceroy, as my prosperity found favour in his (?) sight. I am dreadfully distressed and aggrieved at recent events; but there is no fighting against God's will. I hope to inflict such punishment on the evil-doers as will be known world-wide, and prove my sincerity. I have twice written on this subject, and third time by my confidential servant, Sher Muhammad Khan. I now write to say that, for these eight days, I have preserved self and family by the good offices of those who were friendly to me, partly by bribing, partly by hoaxing the rebels. Some of the cavalry I have dismissed; and night and day (I) am considering how to put matters straight. Please God, the mutineers will soon meet with the punishment they deserve, and my affairs be arranged to satisfaction of British Government. Certain persons of high position in these provinces have become rebellious; but I am watching carefully and closely every quarter. I have done all I could to ensure Nawab Gholam Hussan's safety. I trust to God for opportunity of showing my sincere friendship for British Government and recovering my good name before the world. *Letter ends.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan reached this yesterday. He arrived at Shah Kalander Kili, three marches from Kabul, before hearing of murder of Embassy. Troops at Ghazni seemed ready for mischief, Amir sent Allal-ud-din, Padshah Khan's brother, to take care of him. People of Wardak were inclined to molest him, but he managed to reach Shuturgurdan with Allal-ud-din without receiving injury. His property he had to leave with a friend in Wardak. Nawab's opinion is that Amir did not plan destruction of Embassy, but for some time there was estrangement between him and Envoy, and Amir had sent ammunition to Logar and orders to Ghazni to support any insurrectionary movement or opposition to English. Nawab thinks Amir will fly to Turkestan when we advance, and proposes that he should be invited to meet us as proof of his sincerity. Nawab says, massacre calls for retribution, and country should be occupied in strength.

Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I hope I made satisfactory arrangement yesterday with Allal-ud-din Khan for security of road from Karatiga to beyond Kushi, provision of transport animals, and supplies.

Ghilzais report that Amir has called upon (them) to stop all roads leading from this towards Kabul. I am trying to get one of the Amir's letters to this effect.

Enclosure 5 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Spy from Kabul reports 12 regiments, Highlanders (?), in Kabul; three had gone previously to Ghazni. Amir has authority and has his door guarded by faithful servant. He says open jihād is to be urged, and troops assembled. Whole city shared in plunder of Embassy, and that Kabulis are much concerned at the vengeance we may take. No troops between Kabul and this; country quiet. People of Logar, excepting the Afghans, favorable to us.

Amir had killed Brigadier Abdul Karim and Abdul Karim, Kohistani (?) for refusing to march off mutinous regiment to Kohistan, there dispersing and making away with them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879, received 19th.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KOTE DUFFADAR Futtah Muhaminad and Sowar Akbar Shah, of Guide Cavalry, arrived last night, with Sirkai Khan, uncle of Padshah Khan, Ghilzai Chief, (who) were out together with a Sikh Sowar, also saved, and twenty-five grass-cutters, twenty-two saved by Colonel Ibrahim Khan, pensioner of British Government and in Amir's employ,—state that some disturbance was anticipated ever since arrival of regiments from Herat, and that they had warned the Embassy. They were saved by their own tribesmen, Kuzalbash (?); do not consider revolt was instigated by Amir, who was still helpless. Some Embassy servants have escaped,—Envoy's bearer, chupprassis, Peshawuri, and Kuzalbash dhobi, and baker, also a sepoy, Ghilzai, who was on furlough in Kohistan. Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani Chief, said killed by Amir, because two of the three mutinous regiments were chiefly Kohistanis: this said to have caused revolt in Kohistan.

No preparations have yet been made either for opposing us in the capital, or on the road. The three sowars, including the Sikhs, were protected by Naibs (?) Mir Muhammad Khan and Rahim Khan, Kuzalbash Sirdars Taimur Saborai Shahzada. A Sowar in the Guides and one Gholam Nubbi, formerly in the Guides, Kuzalbash and Chupprassi to Envoy, saved.

Letter will follow.

Enclosure 7 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879, received 19th.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Letters from Amir, dated 16th September, and enclosures from Turkestan and Herat, report as follows:—Mutiny of troops and murder of Fakir Ahmed Khan, Civil Governor and Military Commandant under Ayub Khan at Herat; disaffection of three regiments ordered to march from Takhtapul and Mazar-i-Sharif to Ali Shaban in Turkestan; movements of Russian Officers under Czar's nephew, Nicholay Constantine Ozak, with one hundred and fifty men, apparently to have a look at country and meet Amir Bokhara.

Ayub's letter to Amir confirms report of disturbance in Turkestan, and begs leave to resign his position.

Amir states that he hopes very shortly to regain his power and intends expending the whole of his resources (?) and energy in maintaining his friendship with British.

The Russians gave out they intended fighting Turkomans at or near Merv.

Enclosure 8 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL BAKER, Shuturgurдан, through Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

Yesterday received letter from Head Malik of Kushi offering to come in; have summoned him here to-day. Yesterday letter arrived from Amir which has been sent to Roberts this morning. Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur, in Cavagnari's employ, since arrival of troops at Jellalabad in December last, reached this; he will doubtless be of great service as regards information when the time comes; he has been resident at Kabul for 10 years, and has property there and at Jellalabad; used to go to Residency every day: he says that if Amir had chosen he might have assisted Envoy. Arsenal was not looted. Doubts Amir. All here quiet and well. Very cold.

Enclosure 9 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Daud Shah has expressed wish to serve us and asked if he may. I have replied in the affirmative.

Hastings and Mahomed Amir have gone to join Baker on Shuturgurдан and open communication with people of Logar.

Arrangements being made for pushing on telegraph line towards Kushi.

Two hundred camels have just come to take our supplies to Shuturgurдан.

According to Nakshband Khan, Amir might have stopped attack on Resident when troops went to their lines to fetch their arms. As, however, Nakshband has come straight from Wali Mahomed's protection, his account must be received *cum grano*.

Enclosure 10 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 20th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER just received from (Amir), dated 17th instant, acknowledging receipt of my letter of 13th instant, suggesting deputation of trustworthy Agent to meet me, and intimating that, on 19th instant, Mustaufi Habibulla and Wazir Shah Muhammad would start for my camp.

Letter further contains assurances of trust in, and friendship toward, British Government.

Enclosure 11 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PRIVATE letters from Kabul state, three regiments only engaged in attack on Residency, that the affair was apparently unpremeditated, having arisen from disappointment of these three regiments at getting one month's pay only, and that no serious attempt at relief was made beyond preventing other troops taking part.

Enclosure 12 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A PRIVATE letter of 8th from Kabul confirms report that three regiments only mutinied and attacked Residency. One lately arrived from Herat, one Kabuli, and one of Amir's body guard. All three have received pay and been sent to Kohistan. Kabul is said to be in the greatest confusion and excitement.

Enclosure 13 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHIRINDIL KHAN, a nephew of Sirdar Sher Ali, who started for Kabul about a fortnight ago to make his submission to Amir, returned to-day, having met, between Mukur and Ghazni, a courier bearing letters from Amir to his Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

The courier told him of the massacre of the Envoy and escort, which was caused, he said, by quarrel about a woman taken into the Residency, and was carried out with the connivance of the Amir, who was now sending orders in all directions to assemble troops and tribes for a holy war.

Six regiments had been ordered to Kabul from Herat, and six from Turkestan.

The courier himself said that he was taking letters to Mahomed Tahir Khan, Governor of Kelat (-i-Ghilzai) to raise the Southern Ghilzais.

He had also orders from the Amir to the Governors of Ghazni and Kelat (i-Ghilzai) to seize Nawab Gholam and send him to Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR MUHAMMAD YUSAF KHAN, Governor of Zamindawar, being unable to enforce his authority and in fear of his life, has shut himself up in the fort of Sarhing, and sent to Sirdar Sher Ali for help; the latter is sending out to bring him in to Kandahar.

Enclosure 15 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Disposition of Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai uncertain. Sirdar suggested yesterday that Kelat-i-Ghilzai should be brought within circle of immediate influence of Kandahar, both for local and strategic reasons; and there would be no difficulty in occupying it as proposed.

Enclosure 16 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR has written to his uncle, Muhammad Yusaf Khan, (?) Governor of Zamindawar, giving account of event of 3rd, differing much from that sent to Viceroy and Sirdar. Only two regiments, both of body-guard, said to have mutinied, and attacked Legation, and murdered British. Nothing was mentioned of any attempt at rescue, or participation of people. Expressly states that no (?) other injury was done, and by evening everything was quiet.

Enclosure 17 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY., Simla.

FOLLOWING force ordered for advance to Kelat-i-Ghilzai under Brigadier-General Hughes:—Wing 59th Foot, Wing 3rd Goorkhas, Wing 2nd Biluchis, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, two guns, 8-4 Field Battery, and three guns, 11-11 Mountain Battery: a Company of Sappers, with two Companies Biluchis, will follow with reserve European stores. Major St. John might accompany force to report on disposition of tribes.

Attitude of Governor Mahomed Tahir Khan unknown, out approach of force communicated to him with request to provide supplies.

Enclosure 18 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

DAK from Kabul with dates to 11th September arrived yesterday evening. Letter from Amir to Sirdar contained only intimation that all was going on satisfactory at Kabul.

Enclosure 19 in No. 24.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Ayub Khan at Herat to Sirdar states that on the 5th September Kabuli regiments mutinied, attacked house of General Fakir Ahmed Khan, killed him, plundered and burnt his house.

Enclosure 20 in No. 24.

Translation of a letter from the AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, dated Thursday, the 16th Ramazan = 4th September.

ON the 15th Ramazan, the regiments which had come for their pay at 8 a.m. to the Ark suddenly rose in mutiny. First they stoned their own officers, and then with one accord ran to the residence of the Envoy. From their side stones were thrown, and from the other side a rain of shot was poured. The fire of mutiny and disturbance at once reached such a height that it became beyond remedy; and all the regiments from Shirpur and Chaman, (the cantonments) outside the Bala Hissar, and all the people of the city of every tribe invaded the Bala Hissar, and began to plunder the artillery park, the arsenal, and the factories; after which all the crowd, troops, and citizens, surrounded the Envoy's house. In the meantime I had sent Daud Shah Khan, Sipah-Salar, to the

Envoy's help. At the door of the Envoy's house he fell under the blows of stones and *sar-naizuh*,* so that he is now on the point of death. I then sent Yahya Khan and my son the Waliabd, the Koran in his hand, to the troops,

but it was of no avail. I then sent the Seyyids and Mullahs, but this equally useless. Till the time of evening prayer on Wednesday with thousands of men I defended the Envoy. On both sides there was much slaughter. At the time of evening prayer the door of the Residency was set on fire. Although it was the will of God that this should

happen, yet those *five*,† intriguers, whose profession is enmity, who were displeased at the friendship of the English and Afghan Governments, were the origin of this terrible and fearful agitation of the mob, and instigated them to the ruin of this Government and the murder of

the Envoy. The result has been that much blood has been shed, and that the kingdom of Afghanistan is ruined and destroyed. My own state is very grievous. With

five‡ servants and adherents, who with girded loins are guarding me and my family, I am sitting in my own *little house*.§ The troops, the townspeople, and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood with one accord have diverted the road of obedience from me, but by every means in my

power, I am trying to put an end to the business. Daud Shah Khan, whom I sent to help the Envoy, is so grievously wounded by stones, gunstocks, and bayonets, that there is no hope for him. The people who went with him are all killed. The arsenal and workshops are so completely ruined that of the latter not a brick remains in place, and everything of use to the soldiers and people has been taken away from the former. In short, my rule in consequence of this occurrence has gone to the winds; and I, after trust in the benevolence of God, have no hope but in the amity and concord of the British Government; and my opinion is this—that to extinguish this terrible conflagration

gration, and escape from this fearful and dangerous circle, the only way is to act according to the advice of the representatives of the British Government. I send you this for your information.

A letter from the Amir's Munshi-Bashi to the Sirdar adds that of the soldiers, some have gone to their homes, others have fled. The regiments in the Chaman outside the Bala Hissar, six in number, though not so guilty as the others, for they desisted from the attack on Cavagnari's house when they saw the Koran, have nevertheless spilt the water of discipline. In order that the Amir's letter may be fit to be shown, should you think it advisable to do so, I have inserted some words and phrases such as are advisable at such a time."

(Signed) O. B. ST. JOHN, Major, R.E.

Enclosure 21 in No. 24.

No. 1 dated Camp Ali Khel, 13th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, in original, the letter from the Amir brought by the special messenger mentioned in Captain Conolly's telegram to your address of the 10th instant, and to state that a reply has been sent to His Highness a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

Enclosure 22 in No. 24.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR of Kabul, to the address of GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., dated 8th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that I have sent a concise written account of the events of Wednesday and Thursday,* the 15th and 16th of the current month (Ramazan), for your information, and I was on the point of writing an account of the events which occurred on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, the 17th, 18th, and 19th† idem, when a friendly letter, dated the 18th‡ Rama-
 * Corresponding to 3rd and 4th September.
 † 5th, 6th, and 7th September.
 ‡ 6th September.
 § 8th September.

zan from Captain Conolly, arrived at 10 a.m., on Monday, the 20th§ idem. I have perused it and mastered its contents. Whereas it is necessary that the Officers of the illustrious British Government, who are in reality my kind and sympathising friends, should be thoroughly informed of the various and variable events of the present time, I have deputed my confidential Peshkidmat, Sher Muhammad Khan, to you that he may wait upon you and represent in detail the true state of affairs and lay before you a few words, which, for the welfare and friendship of the two Governments, I have entrusted to him, to the best of his ability.

Enclosure 23 in No. 24.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, to the AMIR, dated 13th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to your Highness that an order has reached me from his Excellency, the Governor-General (to the effect) that, according to the Treaty which was concluded in May of this year 1879, between the British Government and your Highness the Amir of Kabul, and which was entirely approved by your Highness, it was agreed that, conformably to your special request, an English officer should be appointed as an Envoy at the city of Kabul, and that "I (the Amir) will be responsible for his protection and honorable treatment." Whereas, in accordance with your Highness undertaking the responsibility, four British officers were sent to Kabul. After six weeks they were ruthlessly killed in the very Bala Hissar and within the Residency, and no effort was made by your Highness to protect them; but this was done by your Highness' own troops and subjects, and your helplessness and inability to carry out the treaty engagement became apparent. Moreover, it appears difficult for your Highness to establish your power even in your own capital; therefore, an English army is

advancing to Kabul for this purpose, (*viz.*) to inflict retribution upon the mutineers and murderers of the said officers, and that the terms of Treaty may be concluded (*sic*). The object of my Government in entering Afghanistan by the different routes is to strengthen and consolidate your Highness' Government on condition that your Highness loyally observe the friendship which has been concluded between the two Governments, and in no other way is it possible to strengthen your Highness' Government.

Your Highness' friendly letter of the 16th* Ramazan intimated that your friendship and sincerity are apparent, and will become apparent. But, in the meanwhile, my Government has heard that men have been sent from Kabul to stir up the people in the country. As this is contrary to the friendship above-mentioned, it appears therefore proper that your Highness should depute a confidential Agent to me, so that I should converse with him and become acquainted with your Highness' objects, as I am invested by Government with this power.

* 4th September.

Enclosure 24 in No. 24.

No. 2, dated Camp Ali Kehl, 15th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honor to forward (1), in original, a letter from His Highness the Amir to Captain Conolly received yesterday, précis of which was telegraphed to you yesterday evening; (2) copy of letter addressed to the Amir in accordance with the terms of your message of yesterday; (3) a narrative by Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan, K.C.S.I.

Enclosure 25 in No. 24.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to CAPTAIN CONOLLY, dated 23rd Ramazan,
H. 1296, (corresponding to 11th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that your friendly letter, dated the 19th Ramazan, reached me last night, Thursday, the 23rd idem. I was gratified to hear of your good health. I have fully understood the contents of your letter. My reliance upon the perfect kindness and good-will of his Excellency the Governor-General and the other officers of the illustrious British Government, who really desire the prosperity and advancement of my Government has become stronger.

Although I exceedingly regret and deplore the occurrence of the recent event, yet there is no remedy and help against the decrees of God. It is to be hoped that the fire of this tumult and uproar will be soon extinguished, and by the great vengeance which I intend to inflict, a result will become known to the world, which will perfectly console and satisfy both our hearts, and those of our friends.

I have written and sent you an account of the events that have occurred here twice in two letters, and the third time by the hand of my Peshkhidmat, Sher Muhammad Khan; and now I am writing to you that during the last eight days I have protected myself and my family by means of friends, relatives, and a body of my trusted adherents and servants, from the mutineers and rebels, having kept some of them at a distance from me by means of money, and dismissed others, such as troopers, from the service. Both day and night I am thinking how to repair the effects of this blow. God willing, the mutineers will soon be requited for their deeds, and order and tranquillity be restored to this God-granted Government, to the satisfaction and content of the hearts of the representatives of the illustrious (British) Government.

The governors and rulers of certain provinces have also commenced to revolt. I am attentively looking to every direction, that is to say, I am seriously thinking how, by the help of God, every place where disturbance prevails may be restored to peace and tranquillity.

Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan will give you an account of the disturbed state of the country which he has seen and ascertained on the road. As soon as the intelligence of the approach of the Nawab (to Kabul) reached me on the outbreak of this disturbance I despatched Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, and Muhammad Yusaf Khan, the guardian of my son and heir-apparent, to meet him, and after conveying my friendly sentiments

to him to relate to him verbally the present state of affairs, and to return after they had seen him pass these limits in safety.

My friend, I have this hope that, by the favor of God, as far as lies in my power and ability and strength and might, I may exhibit my perfect innocence and sincerity in my friendship and amity with the British Government, and establish my good name or friendship with the illustrious Government.

Further I will inform you of everything that takes place daily.

Enclosure 26 in No. 24.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to the AMIR, dated Ali Khel, the 15th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to your Highness that I have sent your Highness' two friendly letters of the 3rd and 4th September, conveying your Highness' cordial sentiments, in original to his Excellency the Governor-General; and I have received an answer thereto to the effect that they give evidence of your Highness' sincerity. I therefore write to inform your Highness and give you good news that if your Highness, as in the past, should continue to the end friendly and sincere, your Highness may rest perfectly assured and rely on the British Government that no harm or injury (lit. anxiety) will befall your Highness. The British force is coming specially to support your Highness, and will protect your Highness from all kinds of harm and danger, and strengthen your Highness' Government.

Enclosure 27 in No. 24.

Narrative of NAWAB SIR GHOLAM HUSSAN KHAN, K.C.S.I., dated Ali Khel, 14th September 1879.

(Received with letter from SIR F. ROBERTS, No. 2, dated Ali Khel, 15th Sept. 1879).

I LEFT Kandahar on the 18th August for Kabul with eight or ten Sowars and 16 or 18 footmen (including servants), of whom some 15 or so were armed men. We were escorted by one Habbo Khan Lukozai, Durani, told off by the Governor for the purpose. I believe all parties were sorry to lose me from Kandahar except the Barakzais.

I kept out of the way of a Kabul regiment marching down the road, and the troops at Ghazni appeared to me ready for mischief. According to advice received here, I left the high road to travel by Wardak, accompanied by one Mirza Ahmad Ali Khan. I got safely as far as Shah Kalander Kili, two marches from Kabul, and there heard of the disaster. Seeing that the Ghilzais of the place under one Muhammad Hossein Khan were hostile, I returned about a mile to Mustaufi Kila, where one Abdul Guffoor Akhoonzada, was kind to me, though a Mullah tried to raise the people against me; they stole some of my things, but those were recovered. Allal-ud-din Khan now joined me with a few sowars having been sent by the Amir. I left all my things (10 or 11 camel loads) and two horses in charge of one Haji Ata Muhammad Khan, Wardak, whom I had formerly befriended at Dera Ismail Khan on his way to Mecca, and who took them back to his own fort two stages back. I gave him a watch.

We now came away direct for the Shuturgurdan, escorted by Muhammad Afzal Khan and 60 or 70 Wardakis to the Logar border, and beyond that by Allal-ud-din Khan with a large following.

Two days after leaving Mustaufi Kila, Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan met me at Allal-ud-din Karez with some horse and foot, and gave me some information from the Amir, translation of which is attached.

Allal-ud-din Khan and myself then went on, the Wazir returning to Kabul, and reached British troops on Shuturgurdan, and were cordially received. Allal-ud-din Khan wanted to go back, but I persuaded him to come on and see what General Roberts required of him.

Enclosure 28 in No. 24.

Translation of the Proclamation issued by GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., in Command of the British Forces despatched to Afghanistan, dated Ali Khel, the 16th September 1879, corresponding to the 28th Ramazan 1296.

BE it known to all the Chiefs and the people of the country of Kabul and its Dependencies that, in accordance with the Treaty concluded in May 1879, corresponding to Jamdi-ul-Akhir 1296 Hijri, between the two great Governments, and to the terms of which His Highness the Amir expressed his assent, and agreed to the location of an Envoy of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, a British Envoy was, at the special request of His Highness the Amir, located at the Kabul Court, and the Amir guaranteed that he should be treated honorably and protected.

Within six weeks after the said Envoy was received at and entered (Kabul) the whole Embassy was besieged and massacred in the very citadel of His Highness the Amir, who could not save or protect them from the hands of the soldiers and the people. From this the lack of power of the Amir and the weakness of his authority in his capital itself is quite apparent and manifest. For this reason the British troops are advancing for the purpose of taking a public revenge on behalf of the deceased as well as of obtaining satisfaction (lit. consolidation) of the terms entered into in the Treaty concluded. The British troops are entering Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening the royal authority of His Highness the Amir on condition that His Highness loyally uses those powers for the maintenance of friendship and of amicable relations with the British Government. This is the only course by which the Amir's kingdom can remain intact, and (by which) also the friendly sentiments and sincerity expressed in his letter of the 4th September 1879 after the occurrence of the (said) event can be proved.

For the purpose of removing any doubt about the concord of the two Governments the Amir has been addressed to depute a confidential agent to my camp.

The British force will not punish or injure any one except the persons who have taken part or joined in the massacre of the Embassy unless they offer opposition. All the rest, the small and great, who are unconcerned (therein) may rest assured of this.

Carriage and supplies of every description should be brought into the British camp. Full price and hire shall be paid for everything that may be taken. Whereas mercy and humanity are the characteristics of this great Government, this proclamation is issued beforehand for the information of the people at large.

Enclosure 29 in No. 24.

Statement of RUSUL, Sepoy, 7th Company, Corps of Guides, of Mianrai, Yusufzai, taken 16th September 1879.

ABOUT 14 days before the attack on Residency, four sowars of the Guides were attacked in the bazaar of Kabul, but escaped. On the 14th day after this, in the early morning, some regiments, I don't know how many, were drawn up below the Bala Hissar, but inside the walls, to receive their pay. I do not know the names of the regiments, but they were unarmed. They suddenly broke into open mutiny with cries of "kill the kafirs." I was then in the Residency, in a building beside the house in which the European officers were. The troops came running up from the north, and entering our enclosure commenced to throw stones at us, and plundered our things which lay in the yard marked B. Mr. Hamilton came up and shut the gate leading from B into the road. We ascended the roofs of the houses in B. The troops attacked us with stones only, and were then unarmed. Sir L. Cavagnari ascended the roof of the Residency when a high officer of the Amir, whom I do not know, came from the parade ground and entered the arsenal, which is a good stone throw from B. The troops threw their stones away and entered the arsenal too. We had not fired upon the troops; they retired without our firing upon them; in fact Mr. Hamilton told us not to act on the offensive but keep quiet. The sowars also came inside B from C, leaving their horses in C. Then they began to fire upon us from the arsenal, and at the same time attacked their General. So I have heard, but did not see it. They fired four shots at us from the arsenal, when a shot was fired by Sir L. Cavagnari, who was on the south-western corner of the Residency, killing a man standing at the door of the arsenal. We were then on the roof

of the Sikhs' quarters, Mr. Hamilton with us. Then the firing became general from the arsenal upon us. There is a parapet on the roof of B, but none on A. The Afghans stood at and near the door of the arsenal: the arsenal stands on high ground, higher than the Residency, and commands the roofs of A and B, clearing C. Sir L. Cavagnari fired four shots lying on his face on the roof of A, when Mr. Hamilton, who was with us, said he had been wounded, but I don't know where Sir Louis was hit up to now: none of us had fired except Sir Louis. Then we got the order to fire, and we fired. Shortly after I and a few others descended and entered A in order to prevent the small door at D being forced. I and three other sepoys sat there, two Sikhs and two Mussulmans, when a Kabuli, who was a servant of the Mission, came up and said Sir Louis Cavagnari had sent him with a letter to the Amir. We let him out by the door at D, Metab Sing Jemadar giving the order. The door at E was always open. The Afghans then broke through the wall at F, and four men came in and entered the Residency though we fired, one was shot at the courtyard. Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded about 8 a.m. When we went to D Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Kelly also came into the Residency A. The roof of A to the north is one story higher than to the south. I don't know where Sir L. Cavagnari was. Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jenkyns, and Dr. Kelly were all in F with us. Mr. Jenkyns and some six or eight sepoys ascended the roof of F and fired from the north-western corner on the Afghans. The troops then placed ladders on the roof of a house to the north-eastern corner of F, and ascended the roof: this was about noon, and many were killed and wounded of us then. Mehtab Sing, Karak Sing Havildar, a Duffadar and others were dead. About this time the Afghans fetched up two guns and planted them to the north-west of B; they had also made holes in the thin courtyard wall from M to N. We, when the Afghans ascended the roof of F, descended into the building. Mr. Jenkyns sheltered himself in the rooms in the west corner of the building, while Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, with some sepoys, including myself, went from the east of F to the west in the building. The Afghans entered after us, and commenced to plunder and set fire to F from below, and the Afghans began to leave the building, ascending to the roof, and descending by the ladders. About 2 p.m. the fire began to make the building untenable, and we leapt from the roof of F into a narrow wall, and thence down to the roof of the Sikhs' quarters to the roof of B. The rest left this roof of F, but I remained behind, being driven back by the flames. I saw then at the east wall of F (the roof was about to fall) a Kabuli, Dost Muhammad, an acquaintance of mine, among some men who rushed up to kill me. Dost Muhammad called out loudly in Pushtu "don't kill him, he is my ustad," he caught me in his arms and dragged me off to one side, another Afghan snatching my rifle from me. He led me off to his house in the Bala Hissar; we were all in plain clothes, for no one had time to put on uniform. I told Dost Muhammad then to run and get me news of what was happening, his house is close, and he ran up sharp to see. He told they brought up the guns close to the door of B and killed some and carried off the rest of the Sowars' horses. They blew the door of B in and fired the building. He said that when the gate was blown open, about 3 p.m., Mr. Hamilton charged out of the gate at the Afghans, and was killed in the gateway, and Dr. Kelly and Mr. Jenkyns were killed there too, charging out at the head of the sepoys who remained alive. All were killed. Some have escaped, six sowars went out on grass-cutting guard; four have been killed, and two are said to have escaped, so I hear. I did not see any corpses of European officers, nor did I go to see for fear of my life. Dost Muhammad said to me, that next morning they put all the corpses in one place, below the wall of the Bala Hissar at a waste plot of ground at T, not far from the latrines; they dug a trench and buried Europeans, Sikhs, and Mahomedans there. Next day I left Kabul to go down to Peshawur. About four kos from Kabul I came into a village, of which I don't know the name, where there were troops of the Amir. They held me back and beat me for being a "kafir," and were about to cut my throat, calling out "let us kill this Cavagnari-ite;" ("Cavagnari"), but a soldier whom I told I was a Mussulman, begged me off to a village called Sarasia, where they again were about to kill me, when I fell at the feet of a Mian, who protected me, and I spent three days there with one Shamsudin. I left on the fourth day, but was again arrested at a village three kos this side of Sarasia. The people beat me, but let me go again. Some officer of the Afghan army heard that I had escaped, and again I was arrested by his men on the road and taken back; they stripped me, but let me go. Then I came along at night in the hills. I left Jellalabad exactly 48 hours ago, travelling chiefly by night. There was no force in Jellalabad nor in Dakka, nor are any coming, as far as I know or have heard. Everybody along the road is afraid, but they are not preparing for resistance. I have heard that some Mullahs are

talking of resistance. The regiments were on pay parade in the open ground inside the Bala Hissar when they broke.

I have heard that Daud Shah is wounded, Wali Muhammad Khan fled from "Nazarband" to Kurram; and that the Amir is in great distress at what has happened.

NOTE.—The above does not differ very materially from the story of Taimur, the guide who arrived yesterday, except in details regarding the commencement and the mode of the attack. Rusul is now being cross-examined, and his further statement will follow to-morrow. This man belongs to the infantry, and may have been away from the cavalry lines when the shots were fired by the Sikhs, or Taimur may not know who fired the first shots.

None of the regiments had ammunition, which had been taken away by the Amir, even those who had arms. The regiment that began the mutiny was also disarmed.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner.
Peshawur, the 17th September 1879.

Enclosure 30 in No. 24.

Statement of Sepoy MUHAMMAD DOST, G. Company (Q. O.) Corps of Guides, one of the survivors of the Cabul Embassy Escort, dated Murdan, 18th September 1879.

SEPOY MUHAMMAD DOST, Ghilzai, resident of Muhammad Khel, in Lughman District, Kabul, states as follows:—

I was employed to arrange for atta for the escort from the "Kuchis." Early on the morning of the 3rd September (day of attack) I went out of the Residency and brought back one load. I was told to go and get another, and when returning with it I found the Residency was surrounded by the Herati regiments, and fighting was going on. I returned to the Kuchi people. I was not in uniform. It was after 8 a.m. when I returned with atta the second time. When I first started for atta I saw the Herati regiments assembling to get pay. They had not got their rifles with them, but had side arms.

I heard that the Herati regiments were dissatisfied with only getting one month's pay instead of two, as other regiments had got the previous day. Daud Shah was sitting above watching the pay being given out. The soldiery began throwing stones at him, and he came down to where they were, when he was cut down with a tulwar and was bayoneted. He was not killed, but there was no hope for him.

The soldiers then made for the Amir's house, but were turned by his guard, and then they turned towards the Embassy and pelted the escort with stones. The Amir sent a message to Sir Louis Cavagnari to let no one get near his party. The escort fired upon the soldiers and killed nine men. Then the soldiers broke into the Amir's magazine and armed themselves with rifles.

I hid until evening in a house outside. I saw the Residency was burning. All was over about sunset.

When I first went out for atta that morning, Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly went out for a ride with some of our Sowars and some of the Amir's as escort. I heard a man say there were two Sahibs with the Amir's cavalry, and I was in hopes they might have been my Sahibs.

I stayed in a house about three miles from Kabul for three days. I heard that the grass-cutters and the guard with them were under the protection of Amir's cavalry. Two of the grass-cutters had been killed by some people.

When I started for Murdan, I went through Lughman, and remained there three days. Asmatula Khan came down upon Charbagh and looted the place, killing six of the Amir's people.

When I got to Jellalabad I heard that a Poorbeah grass-cutter who was dumb, or pretending to be dumb, had arrived there, and was being taken care of by the Hakim.

There was no force at Jellalabad, or at Gandamak, or at Butkak.

I stayed two days at Lalpura. The fort at Dakka was occupied by 150 men of Muhammad Sadik Khan of Lalpura.

I did not go through Lundikotal, but left it on my right and went by footpaths to Ali Musjid, where I stayed a night.

I was told the Herati regiments had upwards of 200 men killed.

(Signed) R. B. CAMPBELL, Major,
Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

REMARKS by COLONEL JENKINS, C.B.

I THINK this man gives a fair account of what he saw and heard. I made a mistake in saying in my telegram that he had come out by Michni. Taimur, the first man who got down to Lundikotal is here, but has got bad fever, otherwise he might be sent to Simla to be examined. The Government has his statement, however. It seems to me that neither the Amir nor Daud Shah knew that there would be an outbreak.

I have now two men in Kabul on leave, and a third that I sent to get news when I heard of the disaster.

Enclosure 31 in No. 24.

CAPT. J. B. HUTCHINSON, Officiating Departmental Commissioner, Lahore, to
COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR, dated 18th September 1879.

I WRITE to tell you that the man Khezi has arrived at Lahore. I had a long interview with him this morning, together with his brother, Sikunder. The following is the substance of his information, which for convenience sake I will give in his own words.

"I was formerly a sowar in the Guides. I took my discharge two years ago. My family lived at Kabul. I went there. I am an Armenian Christian. Dr. Kelly was the doctor of my regiment, and I knew him well. The Herati regiments were not at Kabul when the massacre took place. They had been disbanded, and had gone away. Only those whose homes were at Kabul remained there. Three Kabuli regiments were on duty at the magazine 100 yards from the house occupied by the Embassy in the Bala Hissar. I frequently noticed these soldiers taking together in knots of 10 to 20 men. They always were talking about the Embassy, and were saying that in a day or two they should all be killed. I told Dr. Kelly what they said. He answered 'Oh! you are afraid!' but I said, 'no, I am not afraid for myself, but I am for you.' I could not make Dr. Kelly understand that there was much fear. The general people like the English. They would be only too glad if the English ruled the country, but what they fear is that they will come and then go away again, and then any one who shows them any friendliness will be killed. Several men of high standing would have liked to visit the Embassy, but were not allowed. The strictest watch was kept not to let the English fraternise with men of position and influence. I left Kabul the Saturday before the massacre. I reached Jellalabad in five days, staid there two days, and then came into Peshawur in four days. I believe the three Kabuli regiments were guilty of the massacre, and I believe the Amir knew it must take place. The Amir was very cold and distant with the Envoy lately. He showed by his face that he did not want to meet him. He got rid of him as soon as he could when he called. I believe that the Amir understood that if he did not agree to the Embassy being massacred he would himself be put out of the way. I only spoke to Dr. Kelly. I was never able to get to Major Cavagnari to speak to him."

The above was evidently all that this man could tell me, but he seemed to be well acquainted with the general feeling at Kabul, and declared that the Bazaar people and private individuals were very well inclined towards the English, but not the soldiery and officials, and he did not believe the Amir was at all on our side in reality.

No. 25.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 27th September 1879, to VICEROY.

REUTER reports cholera amongst troops. Is it true? Telegraph reply immediately.

No. 26.

Telegram from VICEROY, 29th September 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

YOUR telegram 27th. Cholera prevails generally from Rawulpindee to Jumrood only; a few cases occurred at Ali Musjid, but that place and Lundi Kotal are quite free. As troops advance beyond Jumrood they lose cholera influence.

No. 27.

No. 215 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 2, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward to your Lordship, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers containing detailed descriptions of the outbreak of the troops in Kabul and the attack upon the Residency. The enclosures also carry down to the present date the narrative of events attending the advance of the British forces upon the Amir's capital.

2. The most important and apparently the most trustworthy accounts of what passed on the 3rd September, and on the days immediately preceding and succeeding, are those of Timos (Taimur), of the Corps of Guides, who formed one of the Residency Guard; and of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, a British pensioner, who was in Sir L. Cavagnari's employ at Kabul. These statements are now forwarded *in extenso* with this letter.

3. The postscript to our last despatch informed your Lordship that General Baker had advanced to Kushi and had encamped there with the troops under his command without any opposition. We now learn by a telegram that General Roberts arrived at the same place on the 28th ultimo with three regiments; and it is understood that his whole force, assembled yesterday at Kushi, moves forward to-day toward Kabul. The Cavalry Brigade, accompanied by General Roberts in person, advanced the day before yesterday as far as Zarghun Shahr, and was expected to reach Zahidabad, two marches from Kabul, to-day. General Roberts expresses his hope that the whole force will have arrived before the walls of the capital by Sunday, the 5th instant. Intelligence of the arrival of His Highness the Amir in General Baker's camp on the 27th September, has already been communicated to Your Lordship by telegraph. At 9 o'clock on the morning of that day General Baker received a letter from Daud Shah, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, asking whether General Baker would receive him and the Amir's heir-apparent in camp. General Baker replied in the affirmative. An hour afterwards some special servants of the Amir arrived, inquiring whether His Highness himself, attended by 300 sowars, would be received in camp. General Baker replied that he would meet him a mile from camp. The Amir appeared at Kushi on the evening of the same day attended by his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, a suite of 45 members, including many of the most important Chiefs, and an escort of about 200 men. Shortly before this, the Mustaufi and the Wazir Shah Muhammad, who had been allowed, after several interviews, to leave General Roberts' camp, had arrived at Kushi, where they have now joined the retinue of the Amir.

4. On receipt of this news by the Government of India, General Roberts was instructed by telegram not to delay his advance, and to issue a proclamation announcing his intention to occupy Kabul. On the following day the letter of general instructions, which is forwarded to your Lordship separately by this mail, was sent to General Roberts for the guidance of his proceedings as soon as he shall have occupied the city. It was reported that the gates were closed, and that the city was in some confusion immediately after the departure of the Amir, who appears to have left without giving any public notice of his intentions; and as soon as his withdrawal became known, the people, after some fruitless appeal had been made for assistance to three regiments in Kohistan, began removing their property. Kabul was reported to be quiet on the 27th September, but we now learn that four infantry regiments have returned thither from Turkestan, which may encourage the inhabitants to resistance. Besides the persons of rank and importance who accompanied the Amir, several others, including Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan and Abdulla Khan, awaited General Roberts' arrival at Zarghun Shahr, which is 7 miles distant from Kushi, and a satisfactory interview followed. The Amir has addressed the Ghilzais and his officials forbidding opposition to the advance of our troops, and has promised assistance, transport, and supplies, which, in obedience to his orders, have been sent in.

5. Hitherto, there has been little active molestation from the tribes along either the Kurram or Khyber line of advance. There have been rumours indeed of a general rising, and a warning to this effect was received from the Amir himself before he joined the camp at Kushi. A raid by marauders upon a convoy of telegraph material was mentioned in our last despatch; and on the 27th September, General Roberts, on his

march toward the Shuturgardun was attacked by a party of Mangals and Ghilzais, whom he beat off and dispersed with loss. In this affair five sepoy of a Sikh regiment were killed, and Deputy Surgeon-General Townsend was wounded. Along the Khyber route, where at first certain circumstances seemed to point to possible opposition, the people have shown no intention, as yet, of attempting to hinder General Bright's progress. The Khan of Lalpura was informed that the Dakka fort would be required for our troops, and he returned an amicable reply. The Amir had sent orders to him, and to the Afghan officials along the Jellalabad route, that they were not to resist, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the advance of the British troops. On the 29th September, a telegram arrived from Lundikotal stating that Dakka had been occupied by the Guides without opposition, and that the Khan of Lalpura, who is devoted to the Amir's interests, had retired to Lalpura. On the 30th the road was reported to be quiet, and supplies had begun to come in. A small collection of Mohmunds who had assembled near Dakka had dispersed.

6. From Kandahar the news received is of a satisfactory character. The brigade under General Hughes, which has been detached for a reconnaissance toward Ghazni and the country of the Southern Ghilzais, left Kandahar for Kelat-i-Ghilzai on the 23rd September. Major St. John, who accompanied the force, received on the 25th September a letter from the Afghan Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai in which he expressed pleasure at the approach of the troops, and promised assistance in obtaining supplies.

7. Among the enclosures to this despatch will be found letters received from the Amir prior to his entry into the British camp at Kushi.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1879.

FROM GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Ali Khel, to VICEROY, Simla.

GENERAL BAKER reports that guard escorting mails this morning between Shuturgardun and Karatiga were attacked by Ghilzais or Mangals, six men, 5th P. I., and about 20 muleteers and telegraph workmen killed, 74 mules carried off. Report received by General Baker of threatened attack on his camp. He is prepared. Allal-ud-din has sent men to Ghilzais, and hopes to keep road free from further attacks. General Baker will, however, be on the look out. 350 of 5th P. I. marched from this to-day for Karatiga escorting reserve ammunition. F-A and 12th B. C. go to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 23rd September 1879.

FROM GENERAL DORAN, Lundikotal, to QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, Simla.

HUSSEIN, Hamilton's syce, has arrived here from Kabul: he corroborates the stories of Taimur and Russul in all particulars; states that three men of the Guides, a Duffadar, and two Sowars, are safe in Chandaol and Muradkhana, suburbs of Kabul; also that the three mutinous regiments were sent to Istalif by the Amir a week after the massacre to bring three lakhs of treasure.

Simla, September 25, 1879.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 25th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

GUIDES should reach Dakka 28th. Please request Amir to order his officials and all his subjects on route from Khyber via Jellalabad to facilitate Bright's advance. Any kind of opposition must be strictly prohibited. We have made declaration that our troops come to assist Amir and to restore authority.

Enclosure 4 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 26th September 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL ROBERTS, Ali Khel.

FOLLOWING message from Lundikotal to Quartermaster-General received to-day :—
Begins.

Amir has written to his officials positively forbidding opposition to our advance. Small collection of Mohmunds, 12 miles from Lalpura, has dispersed. Ends.

Enclosure 5 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From GENERAL BAKER, Kushi, to VICEROY, Simla.

RECEIVED letter from Afghan Commander-in-Chief at 9 this morning, asking whether I would receive him and Amir's heir-apparent in camp. Answer sent him in affirmative. An hour afterwards Amir's special servants arrived asking whether I would receive Amir himself, attended by 300 sowars. I have sent him word to say that I will meet him a mile from camp. The Mustaufi and Wazir arrived here this morning from Ali Khel.

Enclosure 6 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Shuturgurda, to VICEROY, Simla.

The Amir, attended by his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, and suite of 45 members, with escort of about two hundred men, reached Kushi this evening. Kabul reported to be in state of disturbance, and the gates of city closed. I go to Kushi with 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 92nd Highlanders to-morrow.

Enclosure 7 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From MAJOR HASTINGS, Kushi, through Shuturgurda, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THERE are with the Amir, his son, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Daud Shah, Commander-in-Chief, Sirdar Ahmed Ali Jan, Haji Khanimulla Khan, Syud Ahmed, son of Fazul Mahomed of Kunar, Nesanided, (P) son of Sirdar Abdul Ghanni. Mulla Shah Mahomed and Mustaufi here in camp.

Enclosure 8 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Dobandi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, Habibula (P) Khan, son of the late Dost Muhammad, Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Muhammad Khan, once Governor of Herat, and Muhammad Hakim Khan are at Zarghun Shahr waiting for me. I am now on my way to Kushi.

Enclosure 9 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AMIR'S representatives in Kabul are Sirdar Wazir Muhammad Khan, General Abdul Kerj (?) Khan, Sirdar Nur Muhammad Khan and Mirza Syud Ahmed. Amir left city, without people knowing his intention. When people found he had fled, they sent messages to the three regiments in Kohistan asking if they would help regiments; replied they could not assist at Kabul; but promised to do so in Kohistan. People are carrying off their goods from the city, and no opposition expected. Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars left city without Amir's permission. Up to noon, Saturday, all was quiet in Kabul. Amir has written Ghilzais of Spega to desist from troubling us in the Hazar Darakht (?); he has also promised assistance, transport, supplies. I reached this to-day, and will see Amir to-morrow morning.

Enclosure 10 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR HASTINGS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR WALI MAHOMED, Hasan Khan, Mahomed Kasim (?) Khan, Habibula Khan, sons of late Dost Mahomed, Abdulla Khan, son of Sultan Mahomed Khan, once Governor of Herat, and Mahomed Hakim Khan, son of Mahomed Sharif Khan, are at Zarghun. Orders sent for them to remain there at present.

Enclosure 11 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 29th September 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturgurda, to VICEROY, Simla.

Reached this yesterday with 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 92nd Highlanders. Remainder of force will arrive on 1st October, and on following day I shall advance on Kabul. Amir with Sirdars who accompanied him is in camp. Wali Muhammad Khan and other Sirdars came to-day. Weather magnificent; troops healthy; all well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 30th September 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

YOUR telegram of 25th, reporting advance Khyber force. Amir says, he had previously addressed Hakim of Jellalabad and Khan of Lalpura, ordering every facility to be afforded. He has now urgently repeated the offer.

Enclosure 13 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 30th September, 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturgurda, to VICEROY, Simla.

Cavalry Brigade, with two guns Horse Artillery, and two companies 72nd Highlanders, march to-day for Zarghun Shahr, accompanied by 5th Punjab Infantry, to be joined to-morrow by 23rd Pioneers with treasure and reserve ammunition. Last of Kabul Field Force left Ali Khel yesterday, will be here to-morrow. Mangals and Ghilzais who attacked us on 27th, suffered considerable loss, and are reported to have dispersed. A small party of 92nd Highlanders under Colour-Sergeant Macdonald, and of 3rd Sikhs under Jemadar Suer (?) Mahomed, a native of Kabul, did excellent service coming to close quarters with the enemy. Dismounted men of 9th Lancers and 5th Punjab Cavalry aided materially with their carbines. The Amir, and indeed all Afghans, express great astonishment at horsed guns being driven over the Shuturgurda, an extremely difficult road, which had, however, been made so good by Sappers and Pioneers under General Baker's orders, that elephants were not required. Daud Shah Khan's wounds have been dressed by Dr. Duke, who considers, were caused by bayonet or stoning, and that unconsciousness would probably result from them.

Enclosure 14 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 1st October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Cavalry Brigade marched to Zarghun Shahr yesterday, and will be at Zahidabad to-morrow. I accompanied cavalry and met Wali Mahomed Khan and several other Sirdars, chiefly Barakzai. All professed great friendship for British Government. Supplies were forthcoming by order of Amir. Amir seems more at ease than when he first came to camp. Padshah Khan is, I think, with us; he is now with me in camp. Last of force will be here to-day, and on Sunday next the whole should be assembled in front of Kabul. Accounts are so conflicting, it is difficult to say whether there will be opposition. I am inclined to think not, but the four infantry regiments have returned from Turkestan which may induce the Kabul troops to fight.

Enclosure 15 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

LATEST news Kabul just given me by a servant of Sirdar Zulficar Khan, detenu in Lahore. He left Kabul day of the *Id*. Nakshband Khan had just reached his home at Kama in disguise. Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, killed by the soldiery. Cavagnari's body recovered from ruins day before *Id*, was placed in a coffin by the Amir when informant left. The mutineers were three orderly, and not Herati regiments, and they have now been sent to Kohistan under Sirdar Wali Muhammad to collect revenue.

Family of Kazi Abdul Kadir has reached Peshawur; he has gone to Bajour.

Enclosure 16 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 27th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

AM in constant communication with Sadik Khan of Lalpura, who has just replied verbally that he is friendly disposed, and is awaiting orders from Kabul. He read to my messenger three letters from Amir. The first informs him of attack on Embassy, and tells him to have his tribe in readiness; second informs him of Mustaufi having gone to Kurram; third, which arrived on 24th, told him peace was made, and ordered friendly attitude to British. Amir has also written to Governor of Jellalabad not to act against us. I have informed Lalpura and Jellalabad of the advance of our troops on 28th, Dakka, 1st, Basawal, and asked for supplies and carriage. 200 Kuchi camels arrived at Peshawur yesterday. Men sent for Sangu Khel and Tirah Hindus and Afridis are sending mules. No Mohmund gathering. Plowden thinks Khyber Afridis are communicating with, and desiring to meet the Orakzai.

Enclosure 17 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

WARBURTON telegraphs from Lundikotal. Khan Lalpura, in reply to letter regarding evacuation of Dakka fort and movement of troops from this side, asks for two or three days' delay. Khan has evidently received no order from Kabul, telling him to help us in this movement, but merely not to interfere. Khan is devoted to Amir's interests, and will not act in opposition to them. Guides halt here this day. Sadik asks for delay to enable him to disperse 3,000 men collected there. Our messenger said none and no news of any, but Sadik has sent to the Mohmunds to collect. Am sending one more letter to Khan Lalpura. Telegram ends. In reply, have said that further communication with Sadik appears unnecessary. Advance on Dakka may be delayed to 30th.

Enclosure 18 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 28th September 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

GOVERNOR, Jellalabad, replying to my letter of the 15th September by order of the Amir, expresses great gratitude for the favour and sympathy shown to the Amir by the British Government, and says it is necessary to postpone the advance of troops until his agents with General Roberts have disposed of some points affecting the interests of both Governments. The people will appreciate this kindness to the Amir. General Gough will still advance to Basawal about 2nd.

Enclosure 19 in No. 27.

Telegram, dated 29th September 1879.

From GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR SHER ALI has forwarded for perusal two letters, received 27th, from Kabul. The first from Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan who arrived at Kabul from Kandahar on the 5th September and interviewed the Amir, who stated to him that his Government had been ruined by certain wise men.

The second letter is from Roshun Dil Khan, a Kandahar Sirdar, written about 19th September. He mentions there are five persons belonging to the army who instigated the mutiny which was devised to avert an inquiry which Amir intended to make into reported thefts of large sums of money. The mutiny once commenced, the instigators were powerless to stop it.

Sirdar Sher Ali stated that the wise men and instigators of the mutiny herein referred to are Mustaufi Habibulla, Daud Shah Khan, and their adherents.

Enclosure 20 in No. 27.

No. 4, dated Camp Ali Khel, 18th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, in original and under registered cover, the letters and enclosures from the Amir, of which a précis was forwarded to you by telegram this morning.

Enclosure 21 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from YAKUB KHAN, to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 28th Ramazan 1296 A. H., corresponding with 16th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Yesterday, Monday the 27th current, a letter from Syud Jaffer Khan, an official of this Government, who was in Karshi and wrote it to the Governor of Turkestan, was received by me enclosed in one from the Naib-ul-Hukumat (Deputy Governor) of Turkestan. I have also sent the same to you, so that you may fully learn the matters contained therein.

Enclosure 22 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to the address of MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, dated 28th Ramazan 1296 Hijri=(16th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that the recent occurrence is this, that last night, Tuesday the 28th Ramazan=(16th September), couriers arrived from Herat with letters from my brother, Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, Governor of Herat. The purport of the letters is that the troops at Herat have mutinied, attacked the house of General Fakir Ahmed Khan, the Civil and Military Official of Herat, killed him, stripped, and dishonoured his family, and plundered his property. You will learn the detail of this frightful event from the three letters from Herat sent herewith

in original. But I only add that we had no trustworthy, confidential, faithful, and experienced servant like Fakir Ahmed Khan under our Government; and we had brought him up like a brother and a son. Although my brother, Muhammad Ayub Khan, was called the Governor, yet the civil and military administration of Herat was entrusted to him.*

* i.e. General Fakir Ahmed Khan.

At the hands of ignorant men matters have reached such a pitch that our sympathizing servant, nay in reality an obedient son, has been killed in such disgrace and dishonour. Although different and contradictory accounts of the excesses of the troops are received from Turkestan every day, yet the event of Kabul has made us forget the Turkestan disturbances, and the concurrence of Herat has served like salt that has been sprinkled on the wound of the affair at Kabul.

Yesterday, Monday, the 27th Ramazan=(15th September) a letter reached me from Turkestan which I have also sent to you with the Herat letters, so that you might thoroughly learn the true state of affairs in Herat and Turkestan.

Although the occurrence of these events has fallen hard upon me, yet in spite of all these troubles and blows, I have girded my loins with fortitude, endurance, and self-possession, and I hope that having soon through the mercy of God set right my deranged affairs and healed the wounds of my heart, I may use all my endeavours and exertions for the friendship of the illustrious Government. Please God I will fully inform you of anything that takes place hereafter. Consider me your sincere friend.

Enclosure 23 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to AMIR YAKUB KHAN without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—By the customary post which is leaving at this time I beg to write this short letter to inform you that on Thursday the 16th Ramazan (4th September) the Kabuli regiments having mutinied attacked General Fakir Ahmed's house, killed him, demolished his house, and dishonoured and stripped his family. I have sent you a detailed account of this occurrence by Gholam Muhammad Khan, my Peshkidmat. You will learn from (my) report the account of the event as well as of the misdemeanour of the Kandaks (troops?). Whatever orders you may think proper, please issue immediately.

Enclosure 24 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN, Governor of Herat, to AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Verily it is unlawful for me to remain alive after the killing in such a manner of our faithful old servant, General Fakir Ahmed. While I am still here his body has been dragged out of his house to the city wall and cast before me. Notwithstanding that I ordered the soldiers to desist from their misdeeds; they would not listen to me. Neither did they attend to their officers, who also forbade them. It would appear that this event has occurred through the worthlessness of myself and their officers. My reputation is injured for many years to come. We have indeed lost a faithful servant in General Fakir Ahmed who at the very moment of his death exclaimed—"tender my respects to the Amir and say—'thanks be to God! I have died as a faithful servant of the God-granted kingdom, and not as a traitor.'"

Under these circumstances I conjure you by God and the soul of the late Amir to let me retire from service, as in consequence of the injury my reputation has suffered, I can no longer live in Afghanistan in company with my peers. Therefore be pleased to appoint a Governor to superintend the affairs of Herat.

Enclosure 25 in No. 27.

Translation of a letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to the AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Whereas it is incumbent upon me to inform you of the events that have passed (here), I beg to state that during the early part (awal) of the holy month of Ramazan, General Fakir Ahmed Khan used to pass the nights with me, and during the days he attended to his duties and to the complaints of the people in the Durbar. On Wednesday, the 15th Ramazan,* Naib Hafizullah Khan came and stated that two sepoys of the first Ardal (?) regiment had disappeared; on a search and inquiry being made, it was found that one of them had been killed in Shewan, and I

* 3rd September 1879.

caused the murderer, who formerly belonged to the Herat Artillery and is not now in the service, to be put in prison. On this Thursday night, the 16th Ramazan,† General Fakir Ahmed Khan was with me till dawn, when he took leave and went home. After he left I went to sleep, and after an hour when I awoke, it was reported that the troops had mutinied before General Fakir Ahmed's house. I immediately rode off thither and saw that about 3 or 4,000 soldiers had mutinied and fallen on General Fakir Ahmed's house. Notwithstanding I ordered them to desist from their misdeeds, they would not listen, and every one of them said a different thing. Some said they wanted their six months' pay, and some said that General Fakir Ahmed had told the people in the country to kill the soldiers of the Kabuli regiments if they should commit any oppression or outrages in the villages; and some of them said that they had long been away from their homes, and that they misbehaved, so that they might be recalled to Kabul. In short, although the buglers sounded the assembly, they would not listen and stoned them. I called Naib Hafizullah Khan, General Taj Muhammad Khan, and the other officers, so that they should forbid them. They forbade them, but in vain. General Taj Muhammad Khan then told me that it was no use my standing in the sun, and that as they (soldiers) had demolished and plundered General Fakir Ahmed's house, and he himself had gone to Char Bagh, I had better go to the new Ark (fort) and sound the bugle of assembly, perhaps the soldiers might assemble. Accordingly I went to the new Ark and sounded the assembly, but not a single man made his appearance. When I came to the Hissar Fort, I found General Fakir Ahmed lying dead there. He had received many wounds, and his body was brought and thrown at the steps of the Hissar, and his house had been plundered and his family stripped. Naib Hafizullah Khan was going to shoot himself, and had once made up his mind to throw himself down from his balcony. General Taj Muhammad Khan was also going to kill himself, but was not let to do so. I was greatly grieved at the conduct of the troops, and returned to Char Bagh. On account of this occurrence I am unable to write. I have complained and written to you about the misdeeds of these troops, and asked you to recall them (to Kabul). You have not listened to my petition, and so it has led to this great disturbance. I again request you to recall them. Should you not do so soon, they will destroy the lives and property of the people of Herat, as they neither listened to me nor to their officers, especially the 1st and 2nd Ardal regiments. Further, you are at liberty to do as you like. Sirdar Abdulla Khan has written from Maimeneh, that the Herati troops have shown signs of mutiny (be-it-i-dali). I had sent Gholam Muhammed Khan, Peshkidmat, with letters to Maimeneh, in the hope that the people there might settle down, but this produced no effect. Gholam Muhammad Khan has returned with letters from Maimeneh, which I send in original. He will represent other matters verbally. I hope you will soon dismiss the bearer with a reply.

Enclosure 26 in No. 27.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B.,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, English copies of (I) the letter to the Amir from his Excellency the Viceroy, (II) the proclamation issued by me to the tribes, (III) a letter from me to the Logar Maliks; also Persian copies of the letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir, and my letter to the Logar Maliks.

2. Up to the present no reply has been received from the Amir to his Excellency the Viceroy's letter. Copies of the proclamation to the tribes and my letter to the Logar Maliks have been forwarded to the Amir, with the intention of keeping him acquainted with all that is being done. Copies in English (IV) and Persian of my letter to the Amir, forwarding copies of the proclamation to the tribes, and my letter to the Logar Maliks are also herewith forwarded.

Enclosure 27 in No. 27.

No. I.

Copy of Letter to His Highness the AMIR, dated 13th September 1879, corresponding to 25th Ramazán, in accordance with Telegraphic Communications from FOREIGN SECRETARY, dated 12th September 1879.

I AM directed by his Excellency to inform you that, according to the Treaty concluded in May this year between the British and Afghan Governments, with which you expressed yourself entirely satisfied, you agreed to receive a British Resident, who, at your special request was placed at Kabul, and to be personally, safely, and honourably treated, your Highness guaranteeing this. Within six weeks of the Envoy's reception at Kabul, the whole Embassy was surrounded and murdered in your Highness' own Fort, and your Highness has failed to protect the Envoy from your Highness' own soldiers and people; from this your Highness' present powerlessness to fulfil your engagements, and the loss of your Highness' authority in your own capital, are thus clearly proved. For this reason the British army is sent to superintend retribution for the murders, and to ensure the execution of engagements made. The army enters Afghanistan to support your Highness' authority, if your Highness is ready to use it loyally for maintenance of our alliance. This is the only thing that can now preserve the integrity of your Highness' kingdom, and prove the friendship and honesty of purpose declared in your Highness' letter of the 4th September 1879. We hear emissaries have been sent from Kabul to excite the tribes against us, which is of course incompatible with our alliance. Your Highness is requested to send without delay a confidential representative to meet me, as I have full power to communicate with your Highness on the part of the British Government.

Enclosure 28 in No. 27.

No. II.

Copy of Proclamation issued by MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.

BE it known to high and low, subjects and dependants of Kabul, and others, that by Treaty concluded in May 1879, with which Treaty His Highness the Amir expressed himself entirely satisfied, he agreed to receive a British Resident, who, at his own special request was placed at Kabul, and was to be personally safely and honourably treated. This was guaranteed by His Highness the Amir. Within six weeks of the Envoy's reception at Kabul, the whole Embassy was surrounded and murdered in the Amir's own Fort, and His Highness failed to protect the Envoy from his own soldiers and people.

His Highness the Amir's present powerlessness to fulfil his engagement and the loss of authority in his own capital are thus clearly proved. For this reason the British army is sent to exact retribution for the murders and to ensure the execution of the engagements made.

The army enters Afghanistan to support His Highness' authority, if His Highness is ready to use it loyally for the maintenance of the British alliance. This is the only way by which the integrity of His Highness' kingdom can now be preserved, and the friendship and honesty of purpose declared in His Highness' letter of 4th September. To clear up all doubt, His Highness has been requested to send without delay a confidential representative to my camp.

The army will not punish or oppress any but those concerned in the late massacre so long as no opposition is offered; all others should rest assured. Carriage and supplies of all kinds should be supplied wherever the British troops may be. Adequate payment and hire for everything received will be made. As mercy is the prerogative of sovereignty, notice is hereby given beforehand.

Enclosure 29 in No. 27.

No. III.

Copy of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to certain MALIKS of Logar Valley.

FROM the proclamation already issued by me, you will have learnt the reasons for the march of the British troops to Kabul. Her Majesty's Government, by the move-

ment of troops, intends to exact retribution for the massacre of Her Embassy and to aid His Highness the Amir in restoring order.

Let all those not concerned in the massacre rest assured, provided no opposition is shown.

His Highness the Amir, in communications received by me, expresses his friendship and wishes to continue friendly relations.

As the British troops under my command will shortly enter the Logar Valley, I write to assure you, and expect that you will inform all the residents of the valley not concerned in the late hateful massacre, the purport of the proclamation, and give every assistance in providing carriage and supplies required for the troops, for which adequate hire and payment will be made.

I hope that after the above assurance all the headmen will come to meet me in my camp, where I shall be glad to see them.

Enclosure 30 in No. 27.

No. IV.

Copy of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., to His Highness the AMIR, dated 18th September 1879.

AFTER the usual compliments. Your Highness' letter of the 28th Ramazán, with the enclosures from Herat and Turkestan, reached me last night. I have acquainted myself with the contents. I am glad to find your Highness is in good health, but sorry to hear of the unfortunate disturbances in your Highness' dominions. Your Highness' letter in original, has been sent with enclosures to his Excellency the Viceroy. I have already informed your Highness of the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, the reasons for the movements of the British troops, and requested your Highness to send a confidential representative to my camp. I am awaiting a reply to that letter and the arrival of your Highness' confidential representative.

In the meantime I have sent a proclamation to the tribes and letters to some of the Logar Maliks, your Highness' subjects, to assure those not concerned in the hateful massacre, and asking them for assistance in carriage and supplies on payment. As it appears to me proper I should inform your Highness of what I have done, I enclose copies of the proclamation to the tribes and of my letter to the Logar Maliks, and hope that your Highness may also issue necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans.

Rest assured of the Government support.

Enclosure 31 in No. 27.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR E. G. HASTINGS, Political Officer, Kurram Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN accordance with General Roberts' instructions I have the honour to forward:—

Statement of Ali Hasan, son of Naib Kasim, Kotwal of Kabul, Kazalbash of Chandawal, taken by Mr. Christie.

Enclosure 32 in No. 27. (Extract.)

Statement of ALI HASAN, son of Naib Kasim, Kotwal of Kabul, Kazalbash of Chandawal, dated 16th September 1879.

I was in Kabul when Sir Louis Cavagnari arrived. He was received by the Amir with every sign of respect. For three days the Envoy used to ride about the city and visit all objects of interest in the neighbourhood. He was everywhere treated with respect and invariably saluted by the Amir's troops. The Envoy used to be accompanied only by a few orderly sowars, and the Amir represented that it would be better if he confined his visits to the *chaman*, or open plain, where he would meet with fewer people and be in less danger. This warning of the Amir was known all over the city, and the Envoy listened to it. One day an Afridi orderly of the Envoy's (probably Amal Din, an old and trusted orderly of Sir L. Cavagnari) had a quarrel in the city

with two of the Amir's sepoys. The matter came to the ears of the Envoy, who rewarded his orderly, while the two sepoys were imprisoned by the Amir. This created feelings of anger in the minds of the people and the troops.

The Amir next ordered that his Sirdars and officers, with a few exceptions, were not to visit the Envoy. The exceptions were Mullah Shah Muhammad, Mustaufi Habibula, and General Daud Shah, who continued to visit the Envoy regularly.

On 3rd September (15th Ramazan), the three orderly regiments of the Amir were assembled without their arms in the Bala Hissar to receive their pay. Their chief officers were Brigadier Taj Muhammad Khan and Colonel Din Muhammad Khan. The Amir had given orders that they were to receive only one month's pay. They demanded more. Generals Daud Shah and Khariim Khan, who were distributing the pay, said, "If you want more pay go to your *shuezan* (i.e., your wife's lover) Cavagnari." On this some stones were thrown. Daud Shah ran away, and was slightly wounded with a spear. The Amir's pay office was then looted, his papers torn up, and his munshis maltreated; and the troops ran to the *chaman* or plain, where they were encamped, and, returning with their arms, proceeded direct to the Residency. They found the door of the compound—there was only one—firmly closed, and the residents employed in making loopholes. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on seeing the troops assembled, ordered all the Residency horses who were picketed outside to be shot, lest they should come into the hands of the mutineers. This was done. The mutineers then brought up a gun to fire on the door, while another was directed on the walls of the building. As soon as a breach was made, 300 sepoys of the Balkh regiments, who had been two days before recalled from leave, rushed in, and, according to some accounts, set fire to the building; others say that the residents themselves set it on fire.

Meantime, thousands of the city people had collected to share in the spoil, and more breaches had been made in the wall; the door, too, was forced open, and the crowd rushed in. The residents, harassed by the fire of troops above them, and by the fire and smoke of the burning building, took shelter all together in another place. Meantime the flames were spreading, and the roof under which the residents were sheltered fell in, and all who had escaped hitherto were buried in the ruins. This was about 2 o'clock, the affair having commenced about 8 a.m. Little or no spoil came into the hands of the attackers; all was completely burnt or ruined by the fire. The people then began to carry away their dead, of whom there were a great many, from the compound and the neighbourhood. I myself helped to carry away the body of a well-known Fakir Buzurg Shah, who had been for nearly two hours inciting the people to kill the infidels, and calling out that he was going to paradise.

When all was over at the Residency, the crowd rushed to the house of General Khisrao close by, where all the uniform for the Amir's troops was stored, and a number of swords and other weapons. These were all carried off. There was then a talk of looting the magazine in the Upper Bala Hissar where there were two other regiments. Daud Shah, who had taken refuge near here, called to these two regiments to allow no further looting. They replied that the troops and people were their brothers, and they would do nothing. The magazine, however, was not looted. The people abstained of their own accord. The people talked of attacking Yakub Khan, but the troops intervened, saying that he was their Amir and must not be touched.

After this for three days the shops remained closed, and the owners kept guard over their property. No further looting, however, occurred. Meantime, the doors of the palace were closed, and the Amir did not come outside. After three days, at the advice of his Sirdars, he took his seat in the balcony over the door, and sent his own son to the three regiments, who had first mutinied, to ask what their wishes were. They said that they only wanted three months' pay. The Amir sent their pay by the Mustaufi, and also sent two guns, saying that these three regiments might go and collect the revenue of Kohistan and take it themselves in addition to their pay. The regiments marched as far as the Chaman-i-rah-i-Khwaja Rawash, where they encamped, and, dismissing their officers, chose as their leaders men of their own tribe. They remained in camp for two days, when they returned to the city and applied for permission to return to their homes with their arms. No answer had been given when I left. After the third day the Amir called together his Sirdars, officers and chief men of the city, and said that, if they wished for a jihad, he was with them, and would do what they wished. He was obliged, for fear of his life, to say this. His wish throughout had been that the Envoy should, through fear, voluntarily leave the city, but he wished that the pressure should be put on him by the people or by independent tribes, and not by his troops.

Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, is in Kabul ; he is strongly advising the Amir to send his family to Kohistan. This he has consented to do, and all arrangements have been made. Camels have been sent for from Kohistan, but had not arrived when I left.

The residents of the Bala Hissar, where there are some 3,000 houses, have sent all their property to the city, and the city people are all busily engaged in burying their property. They are afraid to take it out of Kabul for fear of being looted.

The Amir has sent for the troops who had started for Balkh, and is recalling all soldiers from furlough.

Before this disturbance in Kabul, three regiments in Zurmat had mutinied for their pay, and expelled and wounded their commanding officer. I don't know how many regiments were concerned in the late disturbance, but there were as many people, soldiers, and others as could crowd together near the place. There was an idea that there was a vast amount of property stored in the Residency. When I left, there was a guard over the place, and the ruins were still smouldering and too hot to be disturbed. All the bodies, mutineers, and others, who have been found have been buried ; but there are still a great number under the ruins.

The Amir is endeavouring, by exciting people to a jihad, to regain his influence with the people ; but it is known that he has sent letters to the British authorities, and he is accordingly regarded with suspicion.

Note.—Informant appears to be speaking the truth ; his confession that he was himself on the spot strengthens the belief in his story. I have not arrested him, as, if he is only one of many thousands, his punishment would be of little use, and might create distrust in the minds of the people of Kabul generally, who were all, like himself, collected in hopes of sharing in the spoil.

Enclosure 33 in No. 27.

Dated, Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your perusal, (a) the depositions of two Guide sowars of the late Envoy's escort, who took refuge with their co-religionists, the Kazalbashes, given safe conduct from Kabul by Padshah Khan, and brought into this camp by his uncle Sirkai Khan ; (b) a letter in original, brought by Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, in whose house he had taken shelter when the late outbreak took place.

Enclosure 34 in No. 27.

Statement of AKBAR SHAH, Kazalbash of Murad Khana (Kabul), B. Troop, Guide Cavalry, escaped from Kabul disaster, dated Ali Khel, 17th September 1879.

ON the day of the mutiny, I and Duffadar Futteh Muhammad Khan and a Sikh trooper Narain Sing, with 25 grass-cutters, were out for grass. Lieutenant Hamilton had come a little way with us to look for good grass, and also Dr. Kelly. They turned back after coming about 1½ mile to the chaman, and returned to the Residency. Presently we heard sounds of firing from the Residency. We at once returned, and were met near the Embassy by a crowd who threatened and tried to capture us. We managed to get away and take refuge with Naibs Nur Muhammad and Rahim Khan, Kazalbashes, in the Murad Khana. The Sikh was secretly removed to a "dhum sala" in the city. As soon as the mutineers discovered our whereabouts, they surrounded the quarter, and demanded we should be given up ; but our fellow-tribesmen stood by us, and refused to surrender us ; on which the mutineers, seeing it was useless, desisted. We remained in Kabul for 10 days, and Sirdar Yahya Khan and Padshah Khan arranged with the Kazalbash Maliks above mentioned for our safe conduct. We were accordingly made over to Sirkai Khan, Padshah Khan's uncle, to whose house we were first removed, and then came away at night. At Dobandi, we were threatened by a Malik, who obliged us to leave the high road, and we then came round by Kundao to Rasim Khel by a difficult footpath over the mountains.

As regards the defence of the Residency, the Sahibs, finding the place untenable, at last set fire to it, and retreated to a "hammâm," from which Lieutenant Hamilton and a few men sallied out no less than three times, killing and wounding a number each time; at last he was shot near a gun he had tried to take. Mr. Jenkyns was killed in a doorway. The Envoy, being wounded on the forehead by a bullet when on the roof, was carried downstairs, and attended to. He dictated a letter to the Amir, which was taken by one Gholam Nabi, a Kabul chuprassie, brother of Muhammad Sharif of the Guides. The bearer got a reply promising help, but could not carry it back into the Residency, which was completely surrounded. Another (verbal) message was afterwards sent by one Taimûs, a Guide sowar (Saddozai), who, however, was thrown down over the wall, and became insensible. He was kept prisoner a day, and then released for extracting a bullet from one of the mutineers' shoulder.

I had the above account from Taimûs and Gholam Nabi.

I do not believe the Amir instigated the revolt. It was the soldiery who wanted their pay. They mutinied nearly all together, and the Amir was powerless to prevent. Yahya Khan, Barakzai, and father-in-law of the Amir's, also the heir-apparent, also the son of Shahghassi Muhammad Yusaf, were sent out with the Koran to quell the row, but could not. Had the Amir called us, Kazalbashes, out, we would have fought the mutineers and saved the Embassy. Abdul Karim Khan, General or Brigadier, of the three "ordul" regiments, incited the troops to go to the Envoy and demand redress. Another Abdul Karim, Kohistani, was killed by the Amir, because two out of the three mutinous regiments were mostly Kohistanis. This has raised the Kohistanis, who refuse to give up some of the Amir's camels out grazing with theirs, or to pay any revenue.

Twenty-two out of twenty-five grass-cutters were saved by one Ibrahim Khan, a Colonel Commanding an Afghan Cavalry Regiment, and a pensioner of the British Government, having been in service with one of the Bengal Cavalry regiments as Wurd-Major. The Cavalry did not join in the mutiny, but turned out ready to obey any orders sent. A few of the artillery served the guns, which helped to batter down the gateway of Residency.

Enclosure 35 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF FUTTEH MUHAMMAD, son of Muhammad Jan, Pharsiwan, resident of Kabul, Kote Duffadar, 2nd Troop (Q.O.) Guide Cavalry, dated 17th September 1879.

ON the day of the massacre, he, Akbar Shah (2nd Troop), and Narain Sing (4th Troop), were on duty with the grass-cutters of the escort. The grass-cutters had had only commenced going out to cut grass from the 1st. Up to that date, grass and bhussa had been provided by the Amir.

Lieutenant Hamilton wished the grass to be cut from the *chaman* (uncultivated grazing land) near Bini Hissar, and had ridden out with him in the morning to see if it was possible. It was feared that if grass was cut near the crops, they might be damaged by the grass-cutters. Lieutenant Hamilton, after seeing the uncultivated grazing land, agreed with him that it would be better to cut the grass near the *khets*, and gave orders that it was to be done.

There were 25 grass-cutters and 4 sowars of the Amir with him.

About an hour after Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, who had also ridden out with Lieutenant Hamilton, had left, he heard firing, and from its continuance, began to suspect there was a fight going on. (He was not surprised, as there was a very strong feeling against both the Amir and Sir Louis Cavagnari since the arrival of the six regiments from Herat, more than a month ago. They were angry with the Amir for having allowed the Embassy to come to Kabul, and expressed it openly. He mentioned about the feeling there was to Lieutenant Hamilton and Major Cavagnari; the latter said the Amir is our friend, it does not matter.) As soon as he had satisfied himself that there was a disturbance (*bulwa*) going on, and that it appeared to be against the Residency, the top of which was covered with people, (as a rule it was closed and never used because it overlooked other houses), he told the Amir's sowars to escort the grass-cutters to a cavalry regiment not far off, and started with the two Guide sowars and two grass-cutters (one a sowar and the other Dr. Kelly's) for the city. They failed to get to the Bala Hissar, as it was surrounded, but managed to reach Sirdar Yahya

Khan's fort just outside the city. Before they reached Yahya Khan's the Amir's sowars who had been with them on the grass-cutters' guard, came up, and wanted to kill Narain Sing, the Sikh sowar. They went so far as to take his sword; but on his and Akbar Shah showing that they would not permit him to be interfered with as far as in their power lay, he was allowed to come on and his tulwar returned. There were some Kazalbashes* at Yahya Khan's who offered to give them shelter, and be responsible for their safety; so they went with them to Murad Khana (a portion of the city occupied by Pharsiwans).

The night of the massacre they were joined by Gholam Nabi, an Embassy chupprassi entertained in Kabul by Sir Louis Cavagnari. He was formerly in the Guides, and is a brother of the present Wurdi-Major of the Guides, by name Muhammad Sharif Khan. He is also a Kazalbash. Akbar Shah, the other Guide sowar, is a Kazalbash Sayud. The next night they were joined by Taimūs, a Shazada of the Sadozai division, a sowar in the Guides, and one of the Envoy's escort. He had been kept a prisoner by one of the mutinous regiments, but was released for extracting a bullet from a Havildar's arm. All the grass-cutters (but two) out with him were saved. A Peshawuri chupprassi, Sir Louis' bearer, his washerman and a baker escaped from the Bala Hissar. He has heard that a sepoy of the Guides, one of the escort, who was on leave in Kohistan is also alive. The sepoy is a Ghilzai by tribe. Two carbines (snider), one sword, two pouches and belts belonging to himself and Narain Sing are with Afzal Khan, Kazalbash, a Khan. He has asked Yahya Khan to get them back. He does not think the Amir was implicated in the massacre, but he failed after the outbreak to save the Sahibs; he should have called out the Kazalbashes; they were ready to respond. The sooner the army reaches Kabul, the better. No preparations to oppose a force have been made, and the Amir himself is in a state of siege. Kazalbash sentries are on all the gates. The three first mutinous regiments (Kohistanis) were sent by the Amir to Kohistan. There are nine regiments in Kabul; there were four cavalry regiments, three have been disbanded, as the Amir had no money to pay them. There are plenty of guns in Kabul (50 or more), but there are no cattle to drag them.

Gholam Nabi, chupprassi, has the letter from the Amir in reply to the Envoy's request for help.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad was in his own house in the Bala Hissar during the attack. He was sent for by the Amir after the massacre, and has since been in communication with him.

They owe their safety to Colonel Ibrahim Khan, a son of Naib Sharif's. Colonel Ibrahim Khan is a pensioner of the British Government and in the Amir's employ.

When the Embassy first came, the people were pleased, as they expected reforms of all kinds.

Taken before me, 17th September 1879.

(Signed) E. G. HASTINGS, Major,
Political Officer.

Enclosure 36 in No. 27.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDARS WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN and IBRAHIM KHAN to the address of GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., without date.

BE it known to you that the state of affairs in these quarters is such that can neither be stated nor written. Piasce God when the worthy Sirdar obtains the honour of waiting upon you, he will represent the true state of affairs. Usual ending.

Enclosure 37 in No. 27.

No. 7, dated Camp Ali Khel, 21st September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, the following papers:—
Depositions of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur.

Translation of letter from Kazi Abdul Rahman to Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan,
K.C.S.I.
Information by Ressaldar Bahawul-din, 11th Bengal Cavalry.

Enclosure 38 in No. 27.

Deposition of RESSALDAR-MAJOR NAKSHBAND KHAN, SIRDAR BAHADUR, dated Ali Khel,
19th September 1879.

I LEFT Aoshahr, a place about one kos from the city of Kabul, at about 7.30 p.m. on the 17th day of the current month.

Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the Mission, six regiments of infantry arrived from Herat; they encamped for three days at Debori, about one kos distant from Kabul; on the morning of the fourth day after their arrival, they marched in order through the principal streets of the city headed by their officers and with bands playing. While marching along they shouted out, abusing the Envoy by name, asking, "Why has he come here?" &c. They also abused all the Kazalbashis, saying, that they were not men, and that they (the Herat soldiers) would show them how to act, that they would soon put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to their camp at Sherpur. The residents of the city said nothing to them; they appeared neither pleased at what was going on, or the reverse. I was present when this took place, and at once took the news of what was going on to the Envoy, who said, "Never fear, keep up your heart, dogs that bark don't bite." I said, "These dogs do bite, and there is real danger." The Envoy said, "They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our death will be avenged." I then went to Mr. Jenkyns and told him what I had heard and seen. He asked me whether I had been to the Envoy, and if so, what he had said about it. I told him what had passed, and Mr. Jenkyns said, "What the Envoy says is very true, the British Government will not suffer from losing the three or four of us here."

A day or two after this three Herat regiments were all paid up most of their arrears of pay, and were given forty (40) days' leave to visit their homes. At this time cholera was raging violently; about (150) one hundred and fifty men out of their number died in one day, and the men dispersed to their homes in a fright, placing their arms in the Balar Hissar; they did not even wait for their leave certificates. Up till date none of these troops have returned; in my opinion the greater part of them will not rejoin, though some of them may do so. The Commander-in-Chief (Sipah Salar) Daud Shah was present when the troops marched through the city as above mentioned, and was also abused by them. He did not reply at all. Some of my own countrymen (Jellalabad men) were serving in these regiments. On my asking them what the meaning of all this was, they answered, "Do you think soldiers would have acted thus without orders; we were ordered to act as we did by our officers, and to shout out as we marched along."

I called up a well-to-do Hindu, Hira by name; his son is a servant of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan (the elder brother of Yakub Khan). Hira knows the ins and outs of what goes on in the houses of the great men; he had been to see the Envoy twice before. I called him up and sent him to report to the Envoy; he went towards the Residency for that purpose; he came back to me, and told me that the Amir's sentry would not let him pass and stoned him. I reported this to the Envoy, who said, "It is untrue; the man lies." The next morning another man endeavoured to get speech of the Envoy: this man was also stopped by the sentry. I don't know who this man was, but I reported this also to the Envoy, and asked him, "What is the use of your being kept like a prisoner, and no one allowed to come near you!" He answered, "I will have that sentry removed." A day or two after this that sentry was removed by the Envoy's order. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent to order the sentry's removal, which was accordingly done. I heard that the Amir was very angry at the removal of that sentry. A day or two after this, the Amir asked me whether I knew what the Amir's intention was, "to travel with me to the frontier as he had engaged to do at Gandamak, or whether he intended not to go." When the Envoy asked me about the Amir's intentions as to his proposed journey with me round the frontier, I replied, "He will not go; he has made

“ no preparations for it at all. If you wish to make further inquiries, call the Mustaufi “ Habibulla Khan.” The Envoy ordered me to call him. I went to the Mustaufi who said, “ I am not well to-day. I will go to-morrow; give the Sahib my salaam.” I went to the Mustaufi the next day at 10 a.m. to call him as he had promised to be with the Envoy at 8 a.m. The Mustaufi went to the Amir, and stated that the Envoy had called him. The Amir gave him permission to go, but said, “ Don’t go alone, take “ Shah Muhammad the Wazir with you.” They both accompanied me to the presence of the Envoy, who made the three of us sit down, and entered into conversation. He then said to them that he had heard that the Amir was not treating well the Sirdars who had accompanied him (the Envoy), that he had stopped giving them the income they were entitled to, and which the Amir’s father had given them regularly, that they had nothing to live upon, and would suffer from the want of it. That the British Government would not let them be the losers, and would pay their allowances if the Amir refused to do so, and that the Amir would not be pleased at this. The Mustaufi said, “ He was unaware “ that this was the case, that he would mention it to the Amir, and say that if this was “ the case it was not proper.” The Envoy then asked the Mustaufi, “ Whether it was the Amir’s intention to travel with him as he had promised or not ? ” Both the Mustaufi and the Wazir said, “ He cannot go this year, because the country is unsettled, but he “ will go next year.” The Envoy said, “ Very well.” He then asked them, “ Whether “ the Amir intended to go to meet the Viceroy in India ? ” The Mustaufi said, “ Yes, “ he will go about December.” The Envoy said to them, “ Ask the Amir again about “ this.” They said, “ We will ask him.” The Envoy then dismissed them, and asked me my opinion as to whether the Amir intended to go to India or not. I answered, “ No ; “ he has thrown up the idea of going on this tour with you, and he does not intend going “ to the Durbar.” I heard shortly afterwards from a friend of mine, that he had heard from a friend of his, who was present at the time, that on the Mustaufi leaving the Envoy they went straight to the Amir and mentioned what had taken place at the interview. The Amir was very angry. The Mustaufi said “ Why are you angry ? “ If you do not give these men anything, and the British Government gives nothing “ to them either, they will suffer from actual want.” The Amir then asked Daud Shah what he thought of it. Daud Shah answered, “ I am a soldier. I don’t under- “ stand this sort of thing. I think that the promises made with the British Govern- “ ment at Gandamak ought to be carried out.” The Amir answered, “ This country is “ Afghanistan ; we cannot get on here without practising deceit.” On this, Naib Lall Muhammad (Farash Bashi) said, “ If this is true what you say that Afghanistan cannot “ be managed without practising deceit (fareb), then we may look upon Afghanistan as “ on the way to ruin ; it will go out of our hands.” The Amir made no reply. On hearing all this, I reported it to Cavagnari, who said, “ The Amir can do as he likes.” (This took place some 8 or 10 days before the 3rd of September.)

About three days after this, the Envoy said—“ I will go and call on the Amir to- “ morrow.” When I went to the Amir’s Durbar the next day, I saw the Envoy sitting alone with the Amir ; when he returned to the Residency, I came to speak to him. He told me that “ he had a private interview with the Amir which lasted two hours.” That the expression of the Amir’s face was a pleased one, that it was the same expression that he had seen him wearing at Gandamak. On the 2nd September the Envoy told me that he had asked Shah Muhammad to secure a house for Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan somewhere in the Bala Hissar but away from the Residency : this Shah Muhammad had refused to do so, the Envoy asked me to look out for one for him either in the city or Kazalbash quarter, or some other place than the Residency grounds. I had selected one, and was coming towards the Residency the next morning at 7 o’clock to report having done so. On arriving at the gate of the Bala Hissar, I heard a report that Daud Shah had been killed by some men of a regiment. I went on and saw three regiments and a few bazaar people going towards the Envoy’s quarters. I followed them with two of my own retainers. Some of the men of one of the regiments recognized me, and said, “ Kill him, he is Cavagnari’s father ; ” they were unarmed as a rule, some of them had side arms. Two men attacked me with sticks, one struck me on the shoulder, and another struck my horse, which reared and turned round. I found I could not go to the Envoy, so I went up a bye street to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan’s house, and leaving my horse in his stable I went inside the house, where I found Wali Muhammad who was taking his bath (Hamam). I called out to him to come out. He did so, and said, “ What is the matter ? ” I said, “ Men have gone up to kill Cavagnari.” He said, “ Don’t stay below, go upstairs.” I went upstairs, and from there, 200 yards off

through a window, I saw all these people go up to the Envoy's stables and begin stoning the syces and undoing the horses and plundering; some went on to where the Sowars' horses were and began to stone them and begin to plunder, and unfasten the horses; the Sowars armed immediately, and I then heard two or three shots evidently fired by the Sowars. I cannot tell whether any damage was done by these shots, but they all retired at once, and some two hundred of them went to the upper part of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms, and the rest of the soldiers going out by the Shah Shabie gate of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms from their Camp.

I heard that when the men had gone to fetch their arms, the Envoy wrote a letter to the Amir and sent it to him by a chaprassi. I heard that this letter reached the Amir, but did not hear whether he sent any reply or not. Had the Amir wished to assist the Envoy, why did he not send 100 men to guard each gate so as to prevent the return of these men with their arms?

In about half an hour's time, at 7.30 or 8 a.m., the soldiers returned with their arms and a regular fight began. Firing went on without intermission on both sides, the Afghan soldiers had capital cover and surrounded the Residency on all sides. The officers of the Afghans directed their men; they had looted the magazine of the Upper Bala Hissar and had plenty of ammunition with them. All the clothing, stores, treasury and other store-houses are near the Residency. The store-houses were looted; they attacked the treasure, but were stopped by the regiment or guard there. This regiment was I suppose about 500 strong, and remained at the treasury all day. The Amir's house is about 250 yards from that of the Envoy, Besides the regiment on duty at the treasury, I suppose there were some 2,000 followers of the Amir who had come into the Bala Hissar early that morning who were all round the Amir's house. They were all armed; none of them joined the attacking party in the morning, though some of them did so at about 2 p.m. I hear that the Amir several times said, "Some of you go to the Envoy's assistance," but whenever any did go towards where the fighting was going on, they only shouted out, "Kill, kill." This is only hearsay.

At about 9 a.m., while the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers charge out at the head of some 25 of the garrison; they drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. When charged the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head—Cavagnari was not with them this time,—with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkyns and Hamilton) leading; a fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jemadar bravely leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go up to the upper part of the house and fired from above. At about half-past 11 o'clock part of the building in which the Embassy was, was noticed to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders finding themselves so few fired part, so as to have a less space to defend. The firing went on continuously all day; perhaps it was hottest from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., after which it slackened, and the last shots were fired at about 8.30 p.m. or 9 p.m., after which all was quiet, and every one dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, what this was; she sent out her son to find out, he said, "They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency."

The whole of that day the dead bodies stripped remained in the Residency. On the next day I hear that the bodies of all Mahomedans, Hindus, and the two British officers, Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, were all thrown together into a place dug for the purpose. I hear that the body of Mr. Jenkyns was taken to the Amir. I know nothing more about it. Cavagnari's body was not found. I am of the opinion that it must have been burnt in the house. I heard that on the 4th, the soldiers found some money in the Residency. On hearing this the Amir posted sentries over the house, and on the 5th, caused the bodies to be buried, and from other money he found there, he paid each sepoy of the regiment that had guarded the treasury a present of seven rupees per man.

I asked Wali Muhammad Khan to send me to some safe place; he gave me three ponies. I dressed as a grass-cutter, and with one grass-cutter riding one pony in front and the second behind me with the other pony we got safely to Aoshahr, where I remained in hiding about nine days; when hearing that the British force was on the Shuturgardan I travelled by night and reached that place in safety and reported myself to the Brigadier-General Commanding there.

On or about the 13th or 14th September the man in whose house I was concealed came to his home and stated the following facts:—He said the Amir called up the Sirdars of every clan, the Ghilzais, Kohistanis, Kabulis, Kazalbashis, Tajiks, &c., and asked them whether they intended to join in the “Ghaza” or religious war to fight the British, and if so, he requested that he would send their families to Kohistan and Ghilzai country, or some other place out of the way; they answered; “We are not going to send away our families let the Ghilzais bring their families to Kabul, and we will then fight.”

The Amir at this reply was very angry and abused Zainulabundin, the man that had collected all the Sirdars together, and had said that they would agree to fight.

Abdul Karim Khan, Safi, the most powerful man in Kohistan, and a friend of the late Envoy's, was cut into small pieces by order of the Amir about ten days ago, the Amir fearing that he would probably seize him and make him over to the British in case he wished to fly to Balkh or Kohistan.

Malik Hamid, Ghilzai, Khan Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, Nyaz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, were all called by the Amir the day after Abdul Karim Khan had been killed, and said “Cavagnari made you all over to me, and I have done nothing to you; now you must swear on the Koran never to go again to the English, and you must join in a religious war against them.” They agreed to do as he ordered. When I left Kabul the troops consisted of—

One cavalry regiment “Sharuk Walla,” stationed at Kabul.

” ” ” Colonel Ghulam Hyder, stationed in Zurmat.

Seven infantry regiments, in Kabul.

Three infantry regiments, 14 guns, stationed in Ghazni.

Six infantry regiments, 24 guns, sent to Turkestan. I hear that they have been recalled, but do not know whether they have arrived.

There are a great number of guns in position in the Bala Hissar, but very few gunners.

The walls of the Bala Hissar are of no use for defence. There are some three or four places which men can scale easily.

Some 200 or 300 irregular troops, infantry, are in Kabul but no irregular cavalry.

On or about the 13th of this month three cavalry regiments asked for pay and were disbanded by the Amir after they had deposited their arms.

The Sirdars who are for the British and not for the Amir are—

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan.

” Ibrahim Khan.

” Ahmad Ali Jan.

” Muhammad Sarwar Khan.

” ” Sadik Khan.

” ” Hashim Khan.

” ” Karim Khan.

” Abdul Rusul Khan.

” Muhammad Hussan Khan, &c., &c., &c.

On my faith I believe that Yakub Khan stands alone, and that those Sirdars who are outwardly for him are so only through fear, and, when the British advance, will all come over to them.

I have omitted to mention one thing. Before the arrival of the six regiments from Herat (mentioned above) the Envoy, agreeably to a suggestion of mine, wished to pay Wali Muhammad Khan a visit to condole with him on the death of his mother. The Envoy said that he wished first of all to ask permission from the Amir before going. He did so, and the Amir answered “go.” The Envoy then told me what he had done, and said that he intended to visit Wali Muhammad Khan on the next day, ordering me to go and prepare Wali Muhammad Khan for the visit. I went to Wali Muhammad Khan's house and told him this, and the Sirdar made every preparation to receive him and informed all the other Sirdars of the expected visit. The next day, however, the Envoy told me he had asked Ghyas, the Mehinander, whether the Amir would really like his paying this visit, and that Ghyas had answered “No, the Amir will not like your going.” I then said, “I warned the Sirdar that you were coming and everyone expected that you would have paid this visit, and all the Sirdars hearing that you have put it off have begun to tremble in their hearts, saying, ‘We wonder what our fate will be if the Sahib is afraid of going, or is unable to visit our chief Sirdar.’”

Enclosure 39 in No. 27.

Letter from KAZI ABDUL RAHMAN of Kabul, written on 15th September, addressed to NAWAB SIR GHOLAM HUSSAN KHAN, K.C.S.I., and brought to him by RESSALDAR BAHAWUL-DIN KHAN, II. (Q.O.), Bengal Lancers on furlough in Kabul.

I HAD communicated the state of affairs in Kabul to Major Cavagnari several times through Ressaldar Baha-wul-din Khan, and especially two days before the outbreak which I told him would take place, and he should be on the alert, but my warning was disregarded. I again beg you to tell the Sahibs that no one is prepared to fight you. I declare they are all on your side and looking for your arrival. The revolt was pre-arranged.

The Ressaldar being cross-questioned as to what the Kazi could have heard to induce him to send the Envoy a warning of intended disturbances, says: "The Kazi judged by the fact of the Amir not having fulfilled one of his promises in connexion with the Treaty, that he had no intention of acting honestly, or being really friendly, but that, on the contrary, he would sooner or later break out into open hostility. The Kazi had not, however, heard of any specific intention or arrangement for mutiny or revolt on a given day or in a preconcerted manner."

(Signed) A. CONOLLY, Captain,
Political Officer.

Ali Khel,
20th September 1879.

Enclosure 40 in No. 27.

Information given by Ressaldar BAHAWUL-DIN KHAN, 11th Bengal Cavalry.

The "Neza bazi" practice by the Envoy was most distasteful to the Amir, because his own troops used to look on and sometimes join in the sport. The spot on which it was carried on, however, was concealed by willow trees, and not actually in sight of the palace.

There were other matters at which His Highness took offence, such as accompanying the Envoy in person on the proposed tour to the northern provinces; also the military rank of Sir Louis Cavagnari, for in the Afghan army a major is of no account.

As regards his attitude on the day of the mutiny, the first thing the Envoy did was to send him an urgent message verbally by one Muhammad Karim Khan, Subadar in the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and son of Muhammad Rahim Khan, who was killed with Captain Davidson at the Crag Picquet, Umbeyla campaign. (Muhammad Karim Khan, whose house is at Bariki Barik in Logar, had come to Kabul about a land case.) On his arrival with the message from the Envoy, he was told to wait, and help would be sent, but he was kept all day, and nothing was done. Later on one Ghulam Akhi, a Chaprassi with note from Mr. Jenkyns reached the Amir, but nothing was done beyond giving him a line to say help was coming, which never came. His son was certainly sent out apparently to stop the fighting, but he went to the Chaman or quarter which the three mutinous troops had left, and where there was no one left to coerce. Daud Shah when sent out was maltreated and wounded, and I dare say he did his duty honestly, for he had lately rather sided with the Envoy and estranged himself from the Amir accordingly. The Amir had a considerable number of personal attendants, from 100 to 150, and all the officers and leaders of the troops besides officials. Had he gone out in person even a short distance, it would most probably have had the effect of checking the revolt.

Besides he might, before they broke away and joined the attack, have kept back or made active use of three regiments quartered in the Bala Hissar close to his own residence.

Allao-din of Lalpura, a trusted adviser, urged him to help the Envoy, but he would do nothing.

Saif-ud-Din Khan Brigadier offered to bring up three regiments from Sherpur to beat off the assailants, but he was desired to be silent. He showed no concern as to the treatment of the bodies both of Embassy and escort (excluding the Envoy's which was not found); they had been tossed over the wall and left in a naked, dishonoured and horribly mutilated and hacked-about condition for a day and night, after which they were thrown into a hollow and covered with earth and rubbish.

As to the defence and setting fire to the Embassy this was done by the Embassy themselves in order to render untenable that portion of the place, the roof of which was in the enemy's possession, and from which they were pouring down a hot fire of bullets. They had scrambled on to this roof from a neighbouring building which stood on one side only of the Residency.

The defenders had retreated meanwhile to another part of the Residency, and eventually to a "pucca hamam" or bath which could not be set on fire, and which they defended to the last.

Ressaldar Bahaw-ul-din Khan's sources of information are Saifu-din Khan, Allao-din of Lalpura, Mirza Nishan (the Commander-in-Chief's Secretary).

He says Padshah Khan was being closely watched, but told him (the Ressaldar) that the moment he heard of our advancing from the Shuturguridan, he would slip away and get us unlimited supplies and carriage in Logar. Sirdar Wali Muhammad also sent a verbal message by him to say that for his own sake and that of the country he hoped the British would advance rapidly.

He believes Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan to be untrustworthy, but Mustaufi Habibulla and Daud Shah to be at heart favourable to our cause. The latter has reason to suspect the Amir for having sent him out alone to face the troops (that is exactly what Allal-ud-din Khan, Ghilzai Chief, has stated in one of his interviews with Sir F. Roberts). The coldness between him and the Amir arose from his having advised His Highness on certain points, as follows:—

- (1.) Eleven months' arrear of pay had been promised the troops, but not given them.
- (2.) His Highness had promised to go on tour, but would not make any arrangement for it.
- (3.) He was treating Abdulla Jan's mother very hardly and had forced her to give up 17 lacs.
- (4.) He would not befriend those who had come in to Cavagnari.
- (5.) He did nothing to gain the support and affection of the Chiefs and people.
- (6.) Or to listen to complaints of, or see to interest of, traders and travellers and people.

Enclosure 41 in No. 27.

Translation.

Statement of ALLAL-UD-DIN, brother of PADSHAH KHAN, GHILZAI, taken at Ali Khel on the 15th of September.

ON the morning of the 3rd, after the sun had risen, I and my brother started from our residence in the town of Kabul and proceeded to the Durbar of the Amir to ask His Highness' permission to return to our home. The Amir was in his private apartment at the time, and we stopped at the gateway downstairs. Our names having been announced to the Chief, he said he would send for us after he had washed his face and hands. As usual, General Daud Shah, Mullah Shah Muhammad, Yahya Khan, and Mustaufi Habibulla were with him at the time. At this time we observed two attendants of the Amir hurriedly running towards His Highness's apartment. Shortly after General Daud Shah came down, and we asked him if everything was all right. He said it was all right, and not all right, and in a hurry went away. His orderly told us that three Orderly Regiments quarrelled on the occasion of issue of their pay, and that, having mutinied, they had proceeded to the residence of the British Plenipotentiary, Sir Louis Cavagnari. A short while after a loud cry of "Dam-i-Charyar" was heard. It was said that the mutinous troops first went to the stables to seize the (Embassy) horses; that the Chhota Sahib, Mr. Jenkyns, ordered his men to fire upon them, and by this

means killed nine of the soldiers; that the Afghan troops, being then without arms, receded and went to fetch weapons; that they got hold of some arms from the magazine, known by the name of Qulah-i-Firangi, and took away some from the lines of the other three Afghan regiments stationed in the square of the Bala Hissar fort; that these regiments also joined the mutineers, and wounded Daud Shah by bayonets and stones; that the Amir desired to go out himself, but was prevented by Mulla Shah Muhammad and the Mustaufi, who expressed their apprehension that the troops would also kill him if he went out. The Amir then sent his heir-apparent and his tutor with a copy of the Koran and Yayha Khan to dissuade the three mutinous troops from acts of violence, and to tell them that he would send away the British Envoy from his territory if they did not like his stay at the capital. He also sent them a message to the effect that, if desired, he would wage a religious war, but that they should not raise a disturbance now. I and my brother and a number of other Khans were also sent with the deputation. When we reached near the troops we asked them to forbear, but they snatched the Koran from the hands of the heir-apparent's tutor, and beat him with the stocks of guns, and continued in attacking (the Residency). Guns (banduks) were being fired incessantly from both sides. The besieged inmates of the Residency showed a staunch resistance. I have heard that when the troops first attacked the Residency, Major Cavagnari wrote a letter to the Amir, telling him that no person treats his guest in the way (he was being treated). It is said that a servant of Major Cavagnari, the resident of Barki, managed to go out of the Residency with the letter, but as the place was subsequently more closely besieged, all communication with it was cut off. The fight continued to dusk, when the Residency was seen on fire. Some say that the inmates of the place set the building on fire themselves to burn away the mutineers who had reached the roof; while others remark that the building was set on fire by the mutineers, or it caught fire from the 10 or 12 charges of artillery which had been fired. That morning Major Cavagnari had gone out for an airing, and he had not yet ungirdled his loins when the disturbance broke out. When out riding, Major Cavagnari and the troopers of his escort used to cut apples while galloping near the lines of the Afghan troops, and the men of the Amir's army thought the British officer and his followers showed them that they were great swordsmen, and thereby taunted them. The Afghans took this to heart. Besides this, a few days ago some sepoy (of the Envoy's escort) were seen at the house of a saddler, with whose wife they were on terms of intimacy; they were even pursued that day by a number of people, and the circumstance enraged the populace. Major Cavagnari was not in the habit of receiving visits from any persons or hearing reports from them, and so he could not be aware of their feelings and ill designs. The Amir was not concerned in exciting the mutiny. But it is true that after the disturbance the Chief sent three months' pay to the mutinous troops to their lines to prevent them from doing any further harm. Three or four days previous to the mutiny a Russian Envoy was at Kabul; but I am not aware whether he was there on the particular day, or whether he is now in the town or not. From the hammam (bath-room) of the Residency house the mutineers brought out three women, two of whom were the daughters of a farrier of Kabul, and they were killed on the spot. The Amir cannot at present punish the mutineers for fear of his troops and the (excited) public. The soldiers do not obey the orders of their officers. They appoint their officers themselves. The people and the army are ready to wage war under the name of Jihád. As I have come here (to the British camp), the Amir will ruin me. I shall carry out as far as I can all the orders given to me. When leaving Kasim Khel yesterday I sent my nephew, Sherdil Khan, to Kabul to inform his father, Padshah Khan, that I had proceeded to the British camp, and to request him to manage to return home. If matters are settled with the British Government, I shall render them every service. The people will probably collect together to engage in Jihád.

Enclosure 42 in No. 27.

Statement of KAJIR KHAN, SON of PAYANDA KHAN, in Service of the Kabul Embassy, dated 10th September 1879.

I MET Major Sir L. Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., at Batti Kot during the late campaign and took service with him, bringing information as I was a Talib-ul-Ilm. I again came across Sir L. as he was proceeding to Kabul, and was asked to take service once more,

and consented, joining the Embassy six days before the massacre. There were four regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery in the Bala Hissar; the other troops were scattered about the place, owing to cholera. On the morning of the 3rd September a regiment, named Bahadur Khan's, turned out for parade with arms, then another; also a third without arms, to receive their pay. General Daud Shah rode up and was received with a salute; he then proceeded to pay regiment 3. A month's pay was handed to them, but the men demanded arrears for three; the General abused them, the soldiers replied with a volley of stones at him, and then at their officers; after this they proceeded towards the Embassy. At the commencement of the disturbance I was near the soldiers, and started at once to warn the Envoy of what had occurred, and Sir Louis ordered every preparation to be made for defence. The rioters fired shots and threw stones at the Embassy house, and were received with a volley; the cry of Ghaza was raised: all the regiments (with the exception of the officers) and the city rabble joined in. Up to one p.m. no impression was made on the Residency. The rioters then set fire to the buildings, and brought two guns to bear also. As the fire burnt the supports (wooden) of the houses, our men were now and then precipitated down and either shot or cut down. The smoke hindered the garrison greatly. It was about this time that I attempted to escape, and being secured by men of Bahadur Khan's regiment, would have been slain had I not thrown my arms round the legs of a man who was directing them, and he saved my life, keeping me a prisoner in one of the rooms. It was not till sunset that resistance ceased and all was over. At intervals men came in to report how the fight went on. In this way I heard that Amir Yakub Khan had sent his son with the Koran, and begged the soldiers to desist from attacking men who were their guests, and every claim of theirs would be satisfied, but they would not listen to the lad. After sunset the man who had saved my life told me to slip away. I did so, and took shelter in a village three kos from Kabul; the next day and night (4th September) I spent on the road; 5th, with a Ghilzai chief, who gave me shelter; 6th, Tezeen; 7th, with Azmatulla Khan at Charbagh; 8th, Girdeh; 9th, Safed dheri; 10th, Peshawur. During the six days that I was at Kabul, I mixed constantly with the people in the city, and am under the impression that the presence of the English officers was not distasteful to the residents, and that this rising was not premeditated or planned by any one.

Note.

Bahadur Khan's regiment is said to have come from Herat, and the regiment No. 3 also came from that quarter. Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan substantiates the first, and Wali Muhammad Khan, Zakka Khel, the second. Information received through Gholam Moyauddin Khan at Lundikotal from Jellalabad, says that the Herati soldiery had commenced the disturbance. Kajir Khan knows the regiment, entered here No. 3, as the "Ardal." He gives further details of the men at the Residency taking shelter in the garden, and throwing themselves into the water when on fire with their clothes burning, which shows that he was an eye-witness of the events he has related, though these details have been omitted here from his account.

At first this man expressed absolute ignorance of any Herati regiment having anything to say to this outbreak, and maintained that the regiment which began the attack was the Ardal, or orderly regiment, composed of selected men taken from all the regiments and formed into household troops.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Col.,
Commissioner.

September 14, 1879.

Enclosure 43 in No. 27.

MEMORANDUM on Information received from Kabul regarding the recent Massacre of the of the Embassy, the Attitude of the AMIR and that of some of the Tribes.

IN forwarding the information which I have selected as the most interesting, and to some extent most trustworthy of all that I have received regarding events in Kabul, and the present aspect of affairs, I would draw particular attention to the statement of Abdulla Nur, Chief of the Kuki Khel Afridis.

His history is well known to Government, and I need not repeat it; our most strenuous opponent throughout the late Kabul war, he declined positively to attend our

summons until he had received orders or permission from the Amir of Kabul. What those orders were he has briefly stated. Abdulla Nur is now in Peshawur with the Khyber deputation, and in receiving him in the presence of the whole of the Afridi tribes assembled, I told him that I remembered his services to me ten years ago, that we respected him for his adherence to the cause of the patron whose favours he had received, and that I now expected as hearty service from him as he had given to the Amir. He at once, in few words, replied that he had come in to do that service, and I, myself, believe that he will not be found faithless. Throughout my dealings with the Khyber tribes he has shown great strength; he has supported my views which have, no doubt, to some extent coincided with his own, but he has also had much to say in smoothing away difficulties and quieting the heart-burnings which naturally enough existed among the opposite faction.

I suspect that the little effect which the recent news of the disaster in Kabul has had upon the Afridis generally is greatly due to the calm attitude of Abdulla Nur.

I have said so much regarding this man because, being by far the most powerful and most respected among the Khyber Chiefs, and at the present moment working, to all appearances, heartily and honestly with us, I would obtain for his opinion as much weight as I think is due.

I believe it will be found that Amir Yakub Khan was as much taken by surprise as the Embassy, and that he was nearly in as great danger from his own mutinous troops as the Envoy, and became practically a prisoner in his own palace. No doubt he may have shown little force of character, and but little personal courage, yet he probably was deterred from running similar risks, by the treatment which General Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, and his attendants, as also the Amir's own son, had received at the hands of the soldiery.

With reference to the final paragraph of the statement of Abdulla Nur I may add here that three or four men, whose opinions ought to be the most valuable, have volunteered their conviction, almost in the same words, that Sirdar Ayub Khan was the secret instigator of this revolt. I should not say so much.

We have always heard that Ayub Khan, in writing to his brother Yakub Khan protested against the alliance with the British Government. These feelings were shared by the regiments lately arrived fresh on the scene from Herat, and they are also said to have openly expostulated with the Amir through their officers. To the soldiers and to Ayub Khan the Amir is reputed to have given a firm reply, that he had been powerless to resist us, and that we had treated him with consideration and kindness.

Ayub Khan and his regiments were but indifferently informed of the progress of events which led to the execution of the Treaty between the Amir and the Government. Could they have been in personal communication, Ayub Khan would probably have arrived at the same conclusions as the Amir. There is no necessity for suspecting Russian intrigue in Herat; Ayub Khan need only have been prompted by the same national feeling which influenced more or less all Afghans, and which was only modified by personal interests.

The troops lately from Herat had been for many years away from Kabul. They are not composed of residents of Herat territory, but of a miscellaneous collection of all classes and tribes from which the Army is usually recruited. I believe it was the intention of the Amir to have sent them in relief to Turkestan. On arrival in Kabul they were mutinous about their arrears of pay, and the Amir attempted at first unsuccessfully to disarm them. Then cholera broke out among them, 250 are said to have died in one day, and some three regiments received part of their arrears of pay, gave up their arms, and were dismissed to their homes.

The remaining regiments from Herat who were in the relief for Turkestan were probably detained in Kabul to accompany the Amir and the Envoy in that direction.

So far as I am able to judge at present the outbreak was entirely due to a quarrel about pay; the "Ardal" Regiment stationed in the Bala Hissar having demanded more than the one month's pay offered to them, then maltreating and wounding Daud Shah the General, and threatening the Amir and afterwards the Embassy. I should say that although there may have been disaffection and mutinous language, yet that the outbreak and its results were unpremeditated and unforeseen.

Assad Khan, Subadar of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, at this moment sitting with me, assures me that the Afridis are one and all ready to do the Government service, and adds that his news from Kabul is that the Amir is heartbroken and refuses food. When asked the origin of this disaffection and mutiny he immediately replies that the Sirdars Ayub Khan and Abdul Rahman Khan are at the bottom of it; the same story that I have before alluded to.

Why the Amir withheld so much pay from the troops I have never heard satisfactorily explained. He is supposed to have had the money, having recovered 18 lakhs from the mother of the late heir-apparent. It may have been to prevent desertion. Food was at famine prices, and the troops are universally said to have been starving and to have plundered right and left on their way to Kabul.

It is, of course, to be expected that the people of Kabul itself will dread the advance of British troops and fear indiscriminating retaliation. So also will the army, or at all events those regiments most concerned in the late outrage. But I do not as yet anticipate that our columns will meet with opposition. If any of the Herati regiments have left Kabul unbroken, and have marched in any direction, they are thinking of their own safety. They know that they will not find this in their homes; their nominal rolls exist, and it will I believe be found that they are endeavouring to escape into quasi-independent territory. Any advancing towards Jellalabad are probably making for Kafiristan, or more probably Kunar and Bajour.

I believe that the Afridis and the Khyber arrangements are absolutely in hand. I have as yet no fear of the Mohmunds or of any opposition on this road. I disbelieve the reports of the Amir having circulated letters calling for assistance from the tribes. He has probably told them what has happened and of our certain advance, and has asked them to await any summons. The rest of the message has probably been supplied by disaffected fanatical Mullahs, by those who have gained nothing personally from the British alliance, and by the alarmists within our territory who would raise difficulties in the hopes of our appreciating their offers of service.

Nevertheless I may say that the almost universal opinion expressed by natives in and about Peshawur is that Amir Yakub Khan has, 1st., been guilty of treachery, and has deliberately planned this massacre; 2ndly, is so alarmed at the results that he has thrown himself into the arms of his soldiers, and now looks to them to defend him.

I do not believe in either theory; the property of the Amir and the persons of his servants appear to have been no more respected than the Embassy.

People who served us before along the Jellalabad road, are again offering help, but no doubt all are waiting to see what the Governor of Jellalabad and the Khan of Lalpura will do. The latter is said to be prepared for flight. If this is the case, it is because the Amir when communicating with them was doubtful of the intentions of the British Government towards himself.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 14th September 1879. Commissioner of Peshawur.

Enclosure 44 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF ABDULLA NUR, Kuki Khel, dated 13th September 1879.

I REACHED Kabul the day before the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari, saw the Amir in Durbar, and was entrusted to the care of Shah Muhammad, who was directed to entertain me. I had one long and private interview with Amir Yakub Khan with no other persons present in the room, before I was permitted to return this way. He assured me that he had made definite arrangements with the English, and fully intended carrying them out; that for the future their friends were his friends, and their enemies his enemies. He then turned to me and said: "You, Abdulla Nur, are a true Pathan, and have clung to me, in spite of the advances of others, I now ask you to be friends with the English, serve them as you have served me. Go to them and they will treat you well I am certain, but even if they do not act as I have imagined, restrain your tribe from all hostilities with them, and I will then see what I can do for you from my own purse." I was presented with a thousand rupees and then dismissed. I believe the Amir to be friendly to the English, the reports of his having sent messengers and letters to stir up the tribes are all false. The soldiers of the Amir—some of them were opposed to the Envoy's coming to Kabul, as they considered that their "pardah" was gone. The Herati regiments have been in Herat for years, and their officers with Ayub Khan have been greatly open to Russian influences.

Enclosure 45 in No. 27.

STATEMENT OF SAYAD AZGHAM, SON OF SAYAD IMAM R. ACHINI BALA KHALIL PIRBUBAS.

WENT about one and half months ago to Kabul (without being called by the Amir) to solicit that a grant should be given him and his family, as the mowajibs enjoyed by him in Kunar and the Khalil tappah of Peshawur had been taken away from them; it had been given to them as khairat. Syud Amir is a cousin of mine, and his mother was a Mohmund woman, married to Sayad Ahmad Ali (his father), and related to the mother of Amir Yakub Khan; through her he obtained an interview with the Amir at the "tabela*" in the Bala Hissar. Yakub Khan, hearing his request, promised to give him a grant and advised him to bring his family to Kabul. I remained about 22 days in the Bala Hissar, a house being given me for my use. There were no regiments actually stationed there, but the fort had always a guard of 800 men or thereabouts. I had no interview with Sir L. Cavagnari, or any of the officers. During my stay the Amir was summoning men to his capital who were friends of the English like Gholam Nakshband Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, whom he desired to send towards Balkh with the Envoy, as he could not go himself. These men would only attend when the seals of the Amir and Sir Louis were on the paper, and as they interviewed the Amir they disappeared. Syud Muhammad, Badshah of Kunar, Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai, Jabbar Khel, and Khalo Khan, Barakzai, would not attend the Amir's summons. Sir Louis asked what had become of the men summoned (name of the person unknown from whom asked), the reply he received was that the Amir had made away with them, he then became aware that the Amir's intention was evil, and would not permit any one to get near him. Twelve or 13 regiments were summoned from Herat before I reached Kabul. They were to be replaced in Herat by others. In the bazaar the people said these regiments had been summoned to fight the English. Rumours were about that any day a disturbance would take place and Cavagnari had been informed of the same. Two of the Herati regiments about a couple of days before the massacre went to the Amir and demanded four months' pay. They were sent to Daud Shah. He said, I can give you a month's pay. If you want more, go to Cavagnari. They did not go that day, but went on Wednesday, the very morning I started for Butkhak on my way to Peshawur. I left about 5 a.m., and had reached Butkhak about sunrise. When at Pishin the same day the news came of what had occurred in Kabul. I was also apprised of letters having been sent in all directions to rouse the border tribes against us. I heard the firing of guns towards Kabul. I went the next day to Tezin, then by the Karkatcha pass to Burji Sultan, then Kajja, afterwards Sultanpur, and the next day Jellalabad. I stopped there in a masjid, and was informed that the Governor had sent letters to summon the Khan of Lalpura and the Shinwaris against Asmatulla Khan who had become rebellious. On my reaching Ali Boghan I met a Mullah Wali Muhammad, who said that he had seen the body of Gholam Nakshband Khan being carried to Kama; he had been killed in the Kabul affair. I knew Wali Muhammad Mullah; he belongs to Taikal Bala. I then proceeded to Chardeh, and arrived the next day at Lalpura. I came across two Mullahs with "talibs" (students) who had letters for the Mohmunds, Bajouris, Swatis, and Bunerwals. That for the Mohmunds was delivered to Muhammad Sadik Khan in my presence, and the Mullahs having been provided with horses went on their way. Sadik Khan was ordered to collect 6,000 Mohmunds, and a similar force would be sent from Kabul. I saw no collection of men. The Lalpura families were ready to fly away to the hills. The people were glad of a religious war with us, because they had heard of Mowajibs having been taken away in Peshawur, and promises made to others to be broken afterwards. In Kabul I heard that the Amir had made peace with us because he had been forced to do so contrary to his wishes, and that he meant us no good for the future. Muhammad Hashim Khan, son of Muhammad Sherif Khan (in Balkh), Ahmed Ali Jan, and Abdulla Jan's mother are against the Amir.

THE above is a fair specimen of the sort of news circulating in Peshawur. The informant is an elderly highly respectable Sayad. He was brought to me by Arbab Tatab Khan, Khalil, who assured me that his information was thoroughly trustworthy; and I had heard of his arrival the day before from Arbab Jumma Khan, Mohmund, who professed to believe all that the informant stated.

Most of the report is untrue and invented. The informant himself was evidently embittered against the Government, which had done nothing to better his circumstances.
 (Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
 Peshawur, 14th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 46 in No. 27.

Statement of AHMEDJI, MULLAH, Resident of Alladand, Swat, who had gone to Kabul three months ago to collect money due to a shrine in Swat, to which informant belongs. Taken 13th September 1879.

INFORMANT left Kabul a week ago and walked to Jellalabad whence he came down the river on a raft staying over night at Lalpura on the 11th and arrived at Michni on the 12th, in Peshawur to-day, 13th. Before the attack on the Residency took place the people in Kabul had expressed sentiments hostile to the presence of a British Envoy at Kabul, and no doubt the fact that British officers were in the Bala Hissar was unpopular in the city. A short time before the attack an affray between two Kabul soldiers and a sepoy of the Guides took place in which the Kabulis were wounded. They belonged to the Bala Hissar garrison which was much exasperated by the Amir arresting the Kabulis and by the chaff of the townspeople who taunted them with having first their comrades wounded and then put in jail. Informant was not an eye-witness of the attack, but hears that the Bala Hissar garrison broke out early that morning on parade, and after firing on Daud Shah who was wounded in the side, made for the Residency. Sir L. Cavagnari was shot through the head about 9 or 10 A.M., and the Residency was set on fire and taken about 2 or 3 P.M., or later. The Bala Hissar was open during the day and troops and townspeople kept streaming in. The first regiment to break was the "Orderly Paltan." The Amir was in his own house the whole day with strong guards; he was in fear of his life. He lives about 400 paces distant from the Residency. Informant saw the flames of the burning houses that evening. Most of the bodies of the defenders were burnt in the Residency, the rest buried next day. Four men of the Guides escaped. (These were spared out of a few sepoys who took refuge in a "hammam" or bath contiguous to the Residency.) Three (of whom two are unknown and one wounded, and one being Ali Asghar of Koh Daman) are with the Amir; and one is making his way down to Peshawur. Informant saw him at Butkhak. He belongs to Gujrat or Bakshahi, a village in Yusufzai. Next day the troops told the Amir that they did not wish to kill him, but were determined to have a religious war. The second day after the attack the Amir paid the troops three months' pay; armed the city and recalled the six regiments sent some time ago to Herat. When informant passed through Jellalabad, everything was quiet. Did not hear of any troops coming. No one alarmed. The Governor there, but no troops. At Lalpura the Khan was prepared for flight if the British advanced, and had written to his tribe, the Mohmunds, to prepare for a religious war. There were no troops there or at Dakka. Much excitement in Kabul, but no plundering of the city. The Amir is powerless to control troops. No chiefs were killed by the Amir. Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan is a prisoner in his house.

THE above has been generally confirmed by the Guide who has escaped from Kabul, and the last news from Lundikotal is that there are no troops at Dakka or Jellalabad, and that none are on their way there. The attitude of the people is one of expectation, and the Mohmunds are merely holding themselves in readiness.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
 Peshawur, 15th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 47 in No. 27.

GHOLAM MOHAYUDIN, on 11th September 1879.

A MAN by name Orakzai who had been sent to Jellalabad has returned. He states that many men have come to Jellalabad from Kabul and report that all the British officers of the Embassy and those who accompanied them have been killed and the Embassy house has been burnt. Though the principal part in the massacre has been

taken by Herati regiments, still almost all the people of the city joined, and other troops also connived. The mutiny is not yet over. Orakzai was searched near Jellalabad by the servants of Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor, with a view to intercepting papers to the address of the British authorities if any could be found on his person. He was again searched with the same object by the servants of Muhammad Sadik Khan at Dakka. The road this side of Jellalabad is safe, but on the other side of Jellalabad it is unsafe for traffic (on account of Asmatulla Khan, Ghilzai). Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor of Jellalabad (who probably had been away against Asmatulla, this is conjecture), received information of the mutiny from Muhammad Sadik Khan and directed the latter to establish posts. Muhammad Sadik Khan went towards Pesh-Bolak and has appointed guards in several posts and returned to Haftchah. He has sent his agents to Mohmunds to keep themselves in readiness and to come up as soon as invited. He intends to send for some Mohmund levies and post them in the fort of Dakka. He will probably locate some troops in this fort. His brother, Muhammad Ali Khan, is at Lalpura.

Nur Muhammad who has been sent by Sikandar Shah from Lalpura states that Muhammad Sadik Khan returned to Lalpura last evening. (Sikandar Shah is a resident of Karyanah-Daudzai, but has long been in the service of Nauroz Khan, father of Muhammad Sadik Khan. He may be sending news on his own account, but it seems most probable that Sadik Khan should know what he is sending.) Akbar Khan, son of Ajun Khan (the refugee who killed the Tehsildar of Hushtnuggur years ago) came last night into the fort of Dakka with 120 sowars and foot. Muhammad Sadik Khan has received orders to recruit 500 troops for the Dakka Fort and to collect his levies, so that British troops may not advance. Mullah Khalil, resident of Fahm-Killi in Khwaizai territory, has received letters from the Amir to collect men for a religious war, and His Highness has promised to pay expenses of the war.

The Amir has summoned to Kabul Muhammad Shah Khan and Abdul Aziz Khan, sons of Sultan Muhammad Khan, and Akbar Khan, son of Nauroz Khan, and they will leave to-day or to-morrow. (This would be to clear away the opposition faction and strengthen Muhammad Sadik Khan.) Akbar Khan, son of Ajun Khan, states that the six infantry regiments who killed the Embassy are on their way to Jellalabad.

WITH reference to the above, there are only 50 men in the Dakka fort. Akbar Khan has long been in service in Lalpura. The Amir had summoned Muhammad Shah Khan and others to Kabul before the outbreak. Muhammad Shah Khan is protected by his aunt, the Amir's mother. If any Herati regiments came this way, it is in order to escape to Kafiristan.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 15th September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 48 in No. 27.

Statement of TIMOSS (Taimur), B. Troop, Corps of Guides, Queen's Own.

Our arrival at Kabul was at first welcomed by the Amir's troops and the city people; the former were under the impression that the arrival of Sir L. Cavagnari would make a great change for the better in their affairs; they expected to receive their pay regularly and be permitted to take their discharge when it pleased them; but their views altered when they found that our Envoy could not interfere in their affairs; the respectable residents of the city on the contrary remained friendly to the end. During our stay there, regiments were coming in from Herat and Turkestan, were paid and sent off. I am a Saddozai, well acquainted with Kabul, and have many friends there. I am under the impression that the presence of the Embassy was not distasteful to the majority of the people. Matters remained thus till the 3rd September; there were two regiments inside the Bala Hissar who had been brought down from Turkestan, and had created a disturbance there; other regiments were encamped outside. The "Ardal" regiment with General Karim Khan went to the Munshi in the Bala Hissar, and asked for their pay; they demanded two months, but were informed that they were to receive only one. Karim Khan told them to appeal to Daud Shah; they went and were informed that orders had been given for them to receive merely a month's pay. The men then broke out, and another regiment joined in with them; the last went to secure their arms whilst the "Ardal" regiment started for the Embassy. On the way they stoned the

horses of the Guide escort and killed one of the syccs; the Sikhs to protect their own lives fired on the mutineers. They then went away to get their arms, whilst our men collected at the Embassy, and Sir L. made every preparation for defending it. The Amir's troops secured a "morcha" in a place named "Kulla-Fi-arangi," about 80 yards from our position and commanding it completely, and opened fire; it was then about 8 a.m. The fight continued till near mid-day, when Sir L. was wounded in the forehead with a bullet; he descended the stairs without assistance and asked for the doctor. Jemadars Jewand and Mehtab Sing were also wounded about the same time. Mr. Jenkyns then asked me to write a letter to the Amir demanding assistance, which I did, and it was carried by Gholam Nabbi, brother of Ressaldar Muhammad Sherif Khan; he delivered it, but was unable to bring back an answer. A second letter was then sent by the hands of a Hindu; he was killed at once. By this time an entrance had been made into the Embassy, and in spite of our utmost efforts their men would get in and commenced firing the building. I addressed them under the orders of Mr. Jenkyns, but could not induce them to desist. A paper was then given me to hand over to their general regarding their pay. As I appeared amongst the mutineers they plundered me of everything, and after beating me soundly took me before Karim Khan; he said I am unable to stop the disturbance, and gave orders for my detention. I was placed in a room, and shortly after a wounded havildar was brought in, and on his request I extracted a bullet from his back. In the evening this man gave me some old uniform of his regiment and permitted me to depart in return for what I had done for him. The Amir was surrounded in his residence and unable either to come out or render any assistance to the Envoy's party. He sent General Daud Shah with 20 or 30 men from other regiments. The mutineers wounded Daud Shah and he had to run away, his companions were killed. Sirdar Yahya Khan and the Mustaufi Habibulla were then sent; they were forced to fly also. The troops plundered everything belonging to the Amir they could lay hands upon, and released all the prisoners in the gaol. I went and hid myself in the house of Shahzada Sharyar, who is a relation of mine, and the next morning went secretly to see what had occurred at the Embassy, disguising myself as well as I could. I found Mr. Hamilton's body lying close to a gun about 70 paces from the Embassy; the soldiers round about were discoursing that the defenders had charged out about 5 p.m. Mr. Hamilton had shot three men with his revolver and cut down two others with his sword before he fell. Mr. Jenkyns was lying 20 paces nearer to the building, and Dr. Kelly by the stairs. I did not see the Envoy's body. I went back to the city and remained hid for four or five days. Heard that the bodies of the murdered officers had been buried about 100 paces to the west of the Embassy. I went then and saw their graves. The Amir's authority was completely gone, the soldiers plundered and did as they liked. One night they were on the point of putting him to death, and took away property valued at seven lakhs from him. All the shops in the city were closed for four days; the Khans used to send their followers to protect the Amir's life and person from his soldiery. I left Kabul on the sixth day and came by Butkhak and Lughman. There I heard that Gholam Nakshband Khan had been killed, but I could not learn by whom. I came by Lalpura and Jellalabad and reached Lundikotal at 8 p.m. on 14th September, and saw no men collected on the way to resist an advance. I know that the 20 or 30 men who came with General Daud Shah were killed by the mutineers. I heard this from others, and saw the bodies lying on the ground when I went to see the Embassy, and could distinguish them to be those men in whom Daud Shah placed considerable trust and confidence; their clothing was different to that worn by the regiments that had revolted. I went first to Shahzada Sharyar's house, remained two nights with him, and then removed to Sultan Khan Peshawuri's. There I heard of many events that had taken place. It was said that Futteh Muhammad Khan, Duffadar, Akbar Shah, and Narain Sing had been sent out with the grass cutters. Hearing the disturbance these men fled to Sirdar Muhammad Sarwar Khan's place in the Morad Khani, Akbar Shah's father being in his service, and the grass cutters were entrusted to the Amir's cavalry, and sent for by Sirdar Yahya Khan where I saw three of them. I also saw Futteh Muhammad Khan, Akbar Shah and Narain Sing at the house of the Turkestan Naib, whose name I do not know. Sirdar Muhammad Sarwar Khan sent them to Sirdar Yahya Khan, and he forwarded them to the Naib, as they belonged to his religious sect (Shia). Mr. Jenkyns' horse was purchased by General Tanas Khan of Jellalabad. The fire of the Sikh troopers (at the commencement) knocked over about six of the mutineers. I only know of one gunshot striking the door of the Embassy; the gun was fired several times during the day. When I appeared with Mr. Jenkyns' letter, the soldiers, under the impression that they could at all times lay hands on me, did not attempt to kill me, but led me to General Karim

Khan who commanded the two regiments and others that were encamped outside. The idea in Kabul was that this man had a hand in the revolt, and has been turned out of his command; his men were chiefly from Logar, Wardak, and Kohistan. I started from Sultan Khan's house with the messenger of Sirdar Asuf Kahn going to Lughman. I have not heard of Shahghassi Yusuf having come towards Peshbolak.

(True Translation.)

Peshawur,
16th September 1879.

(Signed) R. WARBURTON.

Enclosure 49 in No. 27.

Statement of TAIMUR (Timoss), Sowar B. Troop, Corps of Guides, on 15th September 1879.

I WAS in the Bala Hissar, Kabul, on the 3rd instant: Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and the other British officers were in the bungalow. At about 8 a.m. the Turkestani "Ardal" regiment, which was in the Bala Hissar, was paraded to receive its pay. Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, gave them one month's pay. They claimed two and broke.

They were paraded quite close to the Residency, and another regiment was also quartered with them.

One of soldiery shouted out "Let us destroy the Envoy first of all and after that the Amir." They rushed into the court-yard in front of the Residency and stoned some of the syces who were sitting there.

We then opened fire on them, without orders from any European. All the British officers were inside.

The Amir's men then went for their weapons and returned with them in a quarter of an hour. If in that time the British officers had so desired, they might have escaped. They then commenced to besiege the Residency, and from commanding positions made the roof of the Residency untenable. We then made shelter trenches on it and fired from the windows.

The city people came to help the soldiers at about 10 a.m. Major Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded in the forehead about 1 p.m.; he was in a shelter trench. A man from the roof of a house shot at him and the bullet striking a brick, it, together with a piece of brick, struck Sir Louis. But he was not killed. Mr. Jenkyns came up and sent for a Munshi to write to the Amir, but the scribe was unable to write through fear.

I then wrote briefly to the Amir that we were besieged and he was to help us, and sent it by Gholam Nabbi, a Kabuli, an old Guide sowar who was in the Residency. No answer came. Gholam Nabbi afterwards told me that the Amir wrote on the letter, "If God will, I am just making arrangements."

Major Cavagnari was helped into the Residency and tended to by Dr. Kelly. Mr. Jenkyns then ordered me to send a second letter to the Amir, stating that Major Cavagnari was wounded and to hasten on assistance. This letter was sent by a Hindu whose name I don't know. He was cut to pieces in front of the Residency. I was at about 3 p.m. sent with a letter by Mr. Hamilton promising six months' pay. By that time they had managed to get on to the roof of the Residency. I went armed into the midst of the crowd, and was immediately stripped of my arms, but my life was saved by an officer. I then said I had a promise to give them six months' pay. They threw me from the roof of the Residency on to the roof of the neighbouring house. I lost my senses, was stripped of everything I had, and was taken to General Karim Khan who commanded the brigade which had mutinied. He was sitting on a bed surrounded by 50 or 60 men. I did not see him give any orders, but when I told him I had come to give six months' pay to the troops, and that he must stop their fighting, he said he was helpless in the matter and ordered me to be confined.

I know nothing of what happened after this, but I visited the place next morning.

I recollect they had begun to set fire to the Residency just as I was leaving.

A wounded havildar of the Amir's, who was brought to the house where I was imprisoned, let me escape for extracting a bullet from his back. It was then morning. Daybreak I went to the Residency, and saw first the corpse of Lieutenant Hamilton lying over a mountain gun which had been brought up. The troops who were there told me Mr. Hamilton had shot about three men with his pistol, and had cut down two more before he was shot.

He was stripped and cut into pieces but not dishonoured. About 25 feet off was the

body of Mr. Jenkyns in a similar state. I did not go into the Residency, but was told Dr. Kelly was lying killed in the Residency. Sir Louis Cavagnari was in the Residency when it fell in flames. He was in the room where the wounded were, and his body had not been discovered when I left the city. All bodies found in the Residency were so burned that they could not be recognized.

The bodies of Messrs. Hamilton, Jenkyns, and Kelly were buried about 100 yards below where they fell, and in a garden. Besides myself no other of the defenders escaped, so far as I know. Gholam Nabbi, the ex-sowar, brother of Ressaldar Muhammad Sharif Khan of the Guides, who was entrusted with the letter, is alive and in Kabul. He still has the letter with the Amir's answer on it.

The Guide sowars who were out cutting grass are now in Kabul in the Mured Khana Mahalla, but prevented from leaving the city. The grass-cutters are with Sirdar Yahya Khan in safety.

There are no troops on the road from Kabul, nor are there any in Jellalabad nor Dakka. As far as I know none are coming.

Daud Shah did his best to stop the mutiny, being sent by the Amir, but he was pulled off his horse, stoned, and wounded with a bayonet. Daud Shah was alive when I left, but his life was in danger.

In the afternoon Sirdar Yahya Khan came accompanied by Mustaufi Habibulla, but were fired on and had to retire.

NOTE.—The above taken at Lundi Kotal differs slightly from that taken at Peshawar, and contains a few additional particulars.—W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner.—19/9/79.

Enclosure 50 in No. 27.

Memorandum by W. MERK, Esq., Political Officer at Lundi Kotal, dated 16th September 1879.

Taimur, sowar of the Guides, whose first statement is forwarded, arrived here on the night of the 14th, and before his statement was taken gave a different account (during the night), viz., that he and some other sowars, including Fatteh Muhammad Daffadar, escaped on the morning of the attack from some out-houses not actually included in the Residency building, which had been appropriated to sowars; he being a Peshawuri found refuge in the house of Sultan Khan (a son of the late Nazir Tarverdy Khan of Peshawur), who had accompanied Sirdar Yahya Khan to Kabul. Next morning he visited the scene of the attack and recognized the bodies of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jenkyns, and Dr. Kelly; all the sepoy, and in fact everybody in the Residency building, were killed. If it is true that he made this statement, and there seems reason to believe he may have done so, he is not an eye-witness, though his story is probably fairly correct and derived from eye-witnesses.

Report says that the Amir, though he could not have been averse to such a demonstration against the Residency as might have afforded him an excuse for demanding its withdrawal on a plea of being unable to protect the members of the Mission, yet neither he, nor anyone else in power, at all expected, or was prepared for what did happen. Other rumours connect Abdulla Jan's mother and her party with the occurrence.

NOTE.—I agree with Mr. Merk that there are doubts about Taimur, Guide Cavalry, having witnessed all he describes. He probably heard much from others.—W. G. WATERFIELD, Commissioner.—19/9/79.

No. 28.

No. 216 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 2, 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter which we have caused to be addressed to General Sir Frederick

Roberts, and which contains instructions for his guidance in carrying out the several objects of the expedition to Kabul.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 ,, F. P. HAINES.
 ,, A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 ,, A. CLARKE.
 ,, JOHN STRACHEY.
 ,, E. B. JOHNSON.
 ,, W. STOKES.
 ,, A. R. THOMPSON.

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranbrook,
 Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Enclosure in No. 28.

No. A.-505, dated Simla, 29th September 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kurram Field Force.

On the 5th September you received from the Viceroy in person at Simla instructions to return with all possible speed to your command at Ali Khel, and to move upon Kabul by the Shuturguridan Pass with the forces placed at your disposal for this purpose by the Government of India. You were invested with the chief political authority within the range of your military operations, and you were charged with the duty of signally and promptly punishing the barbarous murder of the British Envoy at the Afghan capital, and of subduing the confusion and disorganisation which have ensued in Afghanistan.

2. It would be useless, in the opinion of his Excellency, the Governor-General in Council, to endeavour to furnish you beforehand with detailed orders as to the manner in which these instructions are to be executed. Your proceedings will necessarily depend upon the state of affairs at Kabul and elsewhere, the acts and attitude of the Amir and his people, and upon various other conditions impossible at present to foresee. The Government of India desire, however, that in taking the measures necessary for the full and effective accomplishment of the objects of your expedition, you will be guided by the following general injunctions.

3. It is assumed that on your arrival at Kabul you will at once place your forces in a strong and secure position, such as will give you complete command over the Amir's capital, and reduce it entirely under your control. In order to assure your authority, and to prevent disorder, you will proceed at once to enforce the surrender of any fortified post and the disarmament of any Afghan troops remaining at Kabul, and of the whole city population. You will take early steps for the collection of the supplies which may be required for the maintenance of your force at Kabul, in the contingency of any temporary interruption of your communications with Ali Khel and Kurram, before your base of operations shall have been transferred to Peshawur, and your communications opened by Jellalabad. It is possible that the operations involved by this change of base may not be completed until some weeks after your arrival at Kabul. It is hardly necessary to remark, in reference to the provisioning of your troops, upon the expediency of looking carefully to the considerate treatment of that portion of the people of the country upon which you may be to some extent dependent for supplies.

4. With regard to the Amir Yakub Khan, your instructions are to secure his personal safety, retaining adequate control over His Highness' movements and actions. You are, moreover, to prevent the withdrawal beyond the range of your authority of any person or persons as to whom you may have reason to believe that their behaviour in connexion with the attack upon the British Residency may become a subject for future inquiry.

5. As soon as you shall have established yourself at Kabul you will institute a close and comprehensive investigation into all the causes and circumstances of the outrage which has compelled the British Government to occupy the capital of His Highness the Amir. Upon the question of the punishment, which, after due inquiry, it will be your duty to inflict as speedily as possible upon those who have abetted or participated in the perpetration of this outrage, his Excellency the Governor-General in Council desires me to commend to your careful attention the following observations.

6. I am to point out, in the first place, that for an offence of this character the Afghan nation must be held to be collectively responsible. It was a totally unprovoked and most barbarous attack by the Amir's soldiery and by the people of his capital upon the representative of an allied State, who was residing under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, in very close proximity to the Amir himself, and whose personal safety and honorable treatment had been solemnly guaranteed by the ruler of Afghanistan. In the second place, I am to observe that the nature and magnitude of the outrage leave no room for doubt that it had its leaders and its instigators—that certain persons must have taken a prominent part in the attack upon the Residency, and in the murder of its inmates; while there is a strong presumption that such an outbreak must have been fomented and encouraged by persons of rank and influence. Towards this latter conclusion all our present information points, and it is corroborated by expressions used in the letters written by the Amir himself after the occurrence of the catastrophe.

7. The retribution to be exacted must accordingly be adapted to the twofold character of the offence. It must be imposed upon the Afghan nation in proportion as the offence was national and as the responsibility falls upon any particular community; while it must also involve condign punishment of those individuals who may be found guilty of any participation in the crime. In regard to the penalties to be borne by the State, by the city, or by the people generally, it would be premature in the present stage of your operations to issue to you any specific directions. The imposition of a fine upon the city of Kabul would be in accordance with justice and precedent. The military precautions required for the security of your position may necessitate the demolition of fortifications, and possibly the removal of buildings which may lie within the range of your defences, or may interfere with your control over the city. In forming your plans for works of this kind, required by military exigencies, you will have the opportunity of considering whether they can be combined with any measures compatible with justice and humanity, or leaving a memorial of the retribution exacted from the city in some manner and by some mark that will not be easily obliterated.

8. In regard to the punishment of individuals, it should be swift, stern, and impressive, without being indiscriminate or immoderate. Its infliction must not be delegated to subordinate officers of minor responsibility acting independently of your instructions or supervision; and you cannot too vigilantly maintain the discipline of the troops under your orders, or superintend their treatment of the unarmed population, so long as your orders are obeyed, and your authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in the majority of cases with persons whose share in the murder of any one belonging to the British Embassy shall have been proved by your investigations; but while the execution of justice should be as public and striking as possible, it should be completed with all practicable expedition; since the indefinite prolongation of your proceedings might spread abroad unfounded alarm.

9. I am here to observe that it will probably be essential, not only for the protection of your own camp from annoyance, but also for the security of the well-affected population, and for the general maintenance of order, that you should assume and exercise supreme authority in Kabul, since events have unfortunately proved that the Amir has lost that authority, or that he has conspicuously failed to make use of it. Moreover, the conduct of the Amir himself in reference to the murder of the British Envoy is a matter regarding which very conflicting and ambiguous reports have reached this Government, and it will necessarily form one of the primary points to which your investigation will be directed. But, whatever may be the result of your inquiry, no action (beyond the limits already indicated in the 4th paragraph of this letter) should be taken in regard to the Amir Yakub Khan without special reference for orders to the Government of India. There may be other cases where the conduct of personages of high position at Kabul may come under examination, upon which it may be undesirable to pass any final decision without special deliberation or extended inquiry. It will be for you to judge what cases falling under this category should be reserved for the consideration of the Government of India.

10. The military and political exigencies of the situation with which you will have to deal require all possible precautions against future violence among a population of which a large section is fanatical, treacherous, and vindictive. While, however, it must be your aim to leave on the minds of all classes of the people the strongest conviction that atrocities such as those which have lately been committed will inevitably be visited by the British Government with the sternest retribution, you will spare no efforts to convince the people of Afghanistan that our desire is to treat them with justice and benevolence, to respect their religious belief, their feelings, and their customs. It cannot be doubted that a very large proportion of the agricultural and commercial classes in

Afghanistan will appreciate, as well as the people of other countries, the advantages of good government and of protection to life and property.

11. Although nothing can now be said in regard to the future internal administration of Afghanistan, the Government of India cannot ignore the possibility of being forced to exercise over that administration a closer and more direct control than has hitherto been contemplated or desired. It is, therefore, especially important that during the period of difficulty and disorganisation which must, it is feared, be passed before a better and more settled system of administration can be established, the people should learn, from the strict discipline of our army, and from the wise and upright proceedings of our military and political officers, to look to the strength and the justice of the British Government as their best guarantee for the future tranquillity of their country.

No. 29.

No. 217 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 9th October 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. General Roberts met the Amir at Kushi on the 29th September. He telegraphed on the 2nd October that His Highness was much alarmed for the safety of his family in the Bala Hissar, fearing that the Afghan troops might attack and plunder the Bala Hissar upon the near approach of the British troops. The Amir stated that there was but one regiment at Kabul upon which he could depend; and he and his advisers strenuously endeavoured to induce General Roberts to delay his advance. It appeared obvious that the promptitude of the movement upon the capital, and the ease with which our artillery had crossed the Shuturguridan, had taken the Amir, and indeed the Afghans generally, by surprise. General Roberts replied to the Amir that any delay was out of the question, but that all the women and children would be given time to leave the city. The Amir had apparently proceeded in some haste from Kabul to the British camp on hearing that Sirdar Wali Muhammad and other influential personages were about to join General Roberts. His Highness has accompanied the march of General Roberts' column upon Kabul.

3. On the 2nd October a telegram from Ali Khel reported that the British position on the Shuturguridan had been unsuccessfully attacked by the neighbouring tribes. Communications between Ali Khel and the Shuturguridan were interrupted during that day; but on the 3rd October news came from General Roberts giving the true version of the affair. The independent Ghilzais, who had been watching very closely the movements of the British troops, had assembled in great force on the ridge above the Shuturguridan crest. Colonel Money, who was in command there, wisely took the offensive, and attacking the Ghilzais in their position, he drove them off with a loss of 30 killed, and captured one of their standards. The number of the wounded is not known. On our side one officer and four men were wounded. This successful action is likely to have a salutary effect throughout that part of the country. On the 30th September, Lieutenant Kinloch was unfortunately murdered on the road a short distance beyond Thull, while proceeding with a single trooper to join his regiment. The circumstances of this murder and the measures which we are taking against the offenders are being reported separately.

4. General Roberts arranged to evacuate Kushi until he should be firmly in possession of the Bala Hissar, when a military postal service will be established between Kabul and the Shuturguridan Pass. He telegraphed that until this had been effected all communications between himself and the Pass, which would be held by a strongly entrenched force might be suspended for a few days, unless it were found possible to maintain a postal service or to keep up a correspondence by means of heliographic signalling. General Roberts took this course in order to avoid leaving small parties along the road while it was still insecure and because he was desirous of reaching Kabul with as strong a force as possible. The whole column reached Zarghun Shahr on the 2nd of October, and marched on to Zahidabad the following day. Here the insufficiency of transport, which General Roberts had previously reported to be the great obstacle to his progress, compelled the column to halt for one day, as it was necessary to send back

the animals to bring up the reserve ammunition and stores. On the 5th the advance was to be continued to Charasiah, which is only a short march from Kabul. The walled hill above the capital could be plainly seen from Zahidabad.

5. From the Khyber column it was reported on the 1st of the month that supplies were coming in, and that the troops beyond the Khyber Pass were healthy. General Gough with his detachment reached Basawul the next day. The country was quiet, and the Governor of Jellalabad had promised assistance. His agent had enjoined the tribes to refrain from acts of hostility. On the 4th October the Governor of Jellalabad himself came into General Gough's camp accompanied by the Khan of Lalpura, the chief of the Mohmands. They visited the General, and have been sending in supplies, with the aid of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes. A foraging party of the Guides is at Peshbolak.

6. On the 3rd October Major St. John telegraphed that General Hughes' brigade of reconnaissance, which he was accompanying, had arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and would halt there for two days. The arrangements which had been made by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, the Governor of Kandahar for supplies along the road, and for the maintenance of the post, were excellent. Letters were received from Kandahar, a distance of about 89 miles, in 36 hours. Sirdar Mahomed Tahir Khan, the Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, met the British commander outside the fort. He had collected some supplies. Grain was abundant, but fuel and forage were scarce. The country was apparently quiet, and caravans were arriving unmolested from Kabul. From Kelat-i-Ghilzai the troops advanced to Naorak, and thence pushed on to Ab-i-Tazi, the third march along the road and about 29 miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, as supplies were found to be insufficient at Naorak. The Amir had made no communication to the southern Ghilzais who inhabit this country except that he remained on terms of alliance with the English.

7. Several additional papers and reports received from General Roberts are also enclosed. They relate principally to the attitude of the tribes, and to the interviews held between the General and the Amir's agents, the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, before the Amir entered the British camp. It will be seen that the main objects of this deputation were to declare the Amir's desire to maintain friendly and faithful relations with the British Government, and to persuade General Roberts to stay his advance on the capital. The deputies represented that the presence of the British troops at Kabul might cause confusion and disorganisation throughout the country; and they pleaded that they were anxious to obtain for the Amir some chance of restoring his own authority. Nevertheless, they agreed that since the British army would not delay its march, it should come in such force as to overawe or overpower all attempts at resistance. Some further letters which passed between the General in command and His Highness the Amir are also enclosed.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
E. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

P.S.—We have just received and transmitted to your Lordship the following telegram from General Roberts:—

“Charasiah, 6th October.—Reconnoitring parties sent out on all roads to Kabul at daybreak this morning, reported enemy were advancing in great force from direction of city. The parties had to retire, and soon afterwards the high range of hills intervening between Charasiah and Kabul were crowded with troops and city people, while parties of Ghilzais appeared on the hills running along both flanks of camp, and reports were received that the road to Zahidabad was threatened, along which General Macpherson was advancing with large convoy of stores and reserve ammunition. Warning was sent to Macpherson, and some assistance in cavalry. It was absolutely necessary to carry the heights in front before evening. General Baker was entrusted with this very difficult duty, which he completed in the most admirable manner. He sent a party under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, consisting of a wing of that regiment, three guns, G-3 R. A., 100 of 23rd Pioneers, and two squadrons 5th P. C., to advance by the right of the gorge. After an obstinate resistance, Major White succeeded in driving the enemy off the main hill, and later in the day captured 12 guns. Our loss here, three Highlanders killed, six wounded, and a man, 5th Punjab Cavalry,

killed, two wounded, and one 9th Lancer wounded. General Baker, with 72nd Highlanders, Wing 5th Goorkhas, 100 5th P. I., and remainder of 23rd Pioneers, four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, and two Gatlings, made a turning movement to the left, and was soon hotly engaged. He reports that the advance of the troops was made to his entire satisfaction, height after height being carried in gallant style. Our loss, Captain Young, 5th Punjab Infantry, and Doctor Duncan, 23rd, Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd, wounded; and about 70 men killed and wounded. Enemy's loss unknown, but it must have been considerable; they fled in great confusion and lost two standards. We have strong pickets posted, as large numbers of Ghilzais are still in neighbourhood; but I hope to-morrow to be able to march to within a short distance of Kabul. Amir states Bala Hissar is no longer in possession of people he can trust; his family have moved into the city. The headmen of Chardeh, a suburb of Kabul, have asked if they may pay their respects to me. Others will probably follow their example, and I am sanguine that the country will quiet down now that the people see opposition is useless, but at present there is very great excitement in the city and country generally. I received greatest assistance throughout the day from army signalling under direction of Captain Straton, 22nd regiment."

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 2nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Amir is much alarmed for safety of his family in Bala Hissar, and begged me to interview him yesterday on subject of our advance. He and his advisers strongly urge delay. I said it was impossible, but that time would be given for all women and children to clear out of city. Amir fears his own troops may attack and sack Bala Hissar on hearing of our approach. He has only one regiment he can depend upon, and it is quite evident from having made no arrangements for their families that the Afghans never contemplated a British force would reach Kabul this season. Indeed, the Sirdars admit this, and don't conceal their surprise at the rapidity of our movements.

Amir hurried to our camp on hearing that Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars intended doing so; he wished to be beforehand. Amir accompanies me on line of march to-day.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 2nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kushi, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

67th Foot and G.-3 reached this yesterday. The two Infantry Brigades join Cavalry Brigade at Zarghun Shahr to-day, when Kushi will be for the time abandoned. Except as regards postal service, which I hope will be maintained regularly, and possibly heliograph signalling from some hill near Kabul, we shall have no communication with the Shuturguridan for some days. As soon as I have possession of Bala Hissar, General Gough will establish military post between Kabul and Shuturguridan, but I am averse to leaving so small parties on the road at present; besides, it is desirable to reach Kabul as strong as possible. Meanwhile 3rd Sikhs, 21st Native Infantry, and 4 guns Mounted Battery are strongly entrenched on Shuturguridan, and will be provided with food and ammunition. Holding the Shuturguridan gives me great support. One fatal case of cholera in Mountain Battery yesterday.

Enclosure 3 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 3rd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Zarghun Shahr, through Shuturguridan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Column arrived here yesterday, and marches to-day to Zahidabad; great difficulties about transport. No certain information of attitude of troops in and about Kabul, apparently want of leaders renders them powerless. The Ghilzais watched our move-

ments very closely, and yesterday morning assembled in great force on ridge above Shuturgurdau. Colonel Money wisely attacked them, and drove them off with loss of 30 killed, number of wounded unknown. Our loss, Major Griffiths, 3rd Sikhs, and a sergeant of 67th, belonging to signalling party, both slightly wounded; also three men, 3rd Sikhs: this will have good effect all over the country.

Enclosure 4 in No. 29.

PROCLAMATION (by GENERAL ROBERTS) to all people of Kabul, dated Camp Zarghun Shahr, 3rd October 1879.

BE it known to all that the British army is advancing on Kabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force; therefore, all well-disposed persons, who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Envoy, or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army, and the authority of His Highness, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming to the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them; and as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feeling, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders; every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty, but it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition.

After receipt of this proclamation, therefore, all persons armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British Government, and, further, it must be distinctly understood that, if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to the persons or property, even of well-disposed people, who may have neglected this warning.

Enclosure 5 in No. 29.

Translation of a Proclamation issued by His Highness the AMIR to all people of Kabul, without date.

It is hereby notified that the British troops are advancing to take possession of the city of Kabul, that is to say, to restore order there. If the above-mentioned troops be allowed to do so peacefully and without resistance, well and good, namely, the people will be protected and their lives and property saved, and injury will be caused to no one; if not, it will be seized by force. Therefore, all well-disposed persons, the Chiefs, the soldiers, and the followers of His Highness the Amir, who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Envoy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned that, in case they are unable to prevent resistance being offered by the ignorant and rebellious people to the British army and to the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should remove themselves and their families from among those ignorant and wicked people, and make arrangements for their safety, either by coming to the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them; and as the British Government does not think it lawful to make war on women and children, warning is given that, in case a band of the ignorant and vicious people should take up arms and offer resistance to the British Government, the well-wishers and the followers of His Highness the Amir, whether soldiers or others, should remove their wives and children from the city to some safe place. The British Government desires to treat all classes of people with justice and equity, to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, at the same time it will inflict severe punishment on the offenders and mutineers. Great care will be taken that the innocent do not suffer with the guilty, but it is necessary that the people of Kabul should take utmost precaution against opposition and not enter into open hostility to the British Government. After receipt of this proclamation, therefore, all persons inside and outside the town should not carry arms, as their carrying them would make the British Government suspicious of their hostile attitude, and all persons armed will be treated as enemies of the British Government; and if the entry of the British force is resisted by the inhabitants of Kabul, the British Government cannot hold itself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to the persons and property even of well-disposed people.

Enclosure 6 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 5th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Zahidabad, through Shuturgurdan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Reached this yesterday; obliged to halt to-day to send back transport for reserve ammunition and stores. March to-morrow to Charasiab, leaving all impediments in store here. Walled hill above Kabul visible from camp. Hope to open communication by heliograph with Shuturgurdan. A standard was captured from the enemy on the Shuturgurdan on Thursday by a native officer of 3rd Sikhs. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

From DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, Thull, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

ARRIVED yesterday evening. Ascertained following additional particulars regarding Kinloch's death. Dr. Bellew and other officers left Thull shortly before him. He marched along with his baggage and servants accompanied by a sowar. Other party safely reached Munderie halting ground. Kinloch was wearing Peshawur loongee, and was not distinguishable from a cavalry sowar. Scene of offence, a ravine running down to river Kurram from interior of Zaimusht country, some 11 miles from Thull, and in portion of road for which Wattizais are responsible. One of the Zaimushts said to have been shot in leg by deceased. Offenders were Khoedad Khel from furthest settlements, one of same sections as committed both raids near Gandior. Wattizai chowkidars in nearest road towers arrested, and in custody. Road kept open in consultation with General Gordon by Khatak levies.

Enclosure 8 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 3rd October 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

GENERAL GOUGH reaches Basawul. Agent of Governor of Jellalabad in camp assisting with supplies. The Governor himself will wait on the General to-morrow. Afridis, Shinwaris all working well. Amir's Sirdars to assist have reached Lalpura.

Enclosure 9 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Simla.

KHAN of Lalpura and Governor of Jellalabad have both come in, and are helping with supplies.

Enclosure 10 in No. 29.

Telegram from Kandahar, dated 3rd October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kclat-i-Ghilzai, 20th September, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ARRIVED this morning with General Hughes' column, which halts here for two days. Arrangements made by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan for supplies on road and for post excellent. Letter coming from Kandahar in 36 hours. Sirdar Mahomed Tabir Khan met me outside the fort; has collected certain amount supplies; grain abundant, but fuel and forage scarce. He has about 500 Khasadars, mostly Wardaks; about 300 are in fort, which is left in his hands. The country apparently quiet. Caravans arriving unmolested from Kabul. Thermometer falling below freezing point at night; early and severe winter predicted.

Enclosure 11 in No. 29.

Telegram, dated 4th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

As supplies are insufficient at Naorak, General Hughes' brigade has been permitted to go to Ab-i-Tazi, the third march from Kelat.

Amir has made no communication to the Southern Ghilzais, except that he remains on terms of alliance with English.

Enclosure 12 in No. 29.

Camp Ali Khel, 19th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding the Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of letters of this date addressed by me to Padshah Khan and Asmatulla Khan, leading Chieftains of the Ahmedzai and Jabbarkhel Ghilzais, with the object (a) of establishing friendly relations and gaining over to our side the influence and assistance of those powerful Chiefs, which will be invaluable to both the Shuturgurdan and Khyber Columns; (b) of making their personal acquaintance as soon as opportunity may offer.

The former I hope to see shortly, the latter after my arrival in Kabul, and after he has been of use, as I trust he may, to the Jellalabad Force.

Enclosure 13 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to PADSHAH KHAN, Ghilzai, dated 19th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your brother Allal-ud-din, with his son Bahram Khan, has arrived in Camp. I am aware of your attachment and that of your family (to the British Government). Therefore they have been treated, and will be treated with honour and respect.

Whereas we intend to proceed shortly to Kabul, *via* Logar, with a view to render friendly assistance and support to His Highness the Amir, and take revenge on the mutineers who massacred the Embassy, I hope that you, out of your devotion of long standing (to the British Government), will give me the pleasure of seeing you at Kushi at the time of the arrival of the British Camp there, and will accompany me to your own limits. By this you will do service to both Governments, and will be handsomely rewarded.

Rest assured in every respect; but do not fail to join the camp at Kushi.

Enclosure 14 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to ASMATULLA KHAN, Jabbarkhel, dated 19th September 1879.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Whereas I am well aware of your attachment to the British Government, and also know that you expressed the same to the late Major Cavagnari at Jellalabad, I consider you my friend. I am also aware that you have not waited upon the Kabul Durbar for certain reasons.

Whereas I intend proceeding shortly to Kabul, at the head of the Imperial troops, *via* Logar, I write to ask you to come and see me at Kabul as soon as you hear of my arrival there. I shall receive you honourably, and be pleased to see you. This will conduce to your welfare. I hope that you will not delay your visit after I arrive there.

Rest assured in every way, and be not afraid.

Herewith I enclose a copy of the proclamation, from which the object of the present expedition will become known to you. It is hoped that you will, out of friendship,

circulate and make known the said proclamation to the people at large, so that the tribes and the people who have not taken part in the base massacre of the Embassy may rest quite assured, and may not be afraid, as the revenge will be inflicted only on the participators in the crime.

Enclosure 15 in No. 29.

No. 9, dated Ali Khel, 24th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward in original, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the enclosed letter to my address, from Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, together with covering letter from an Armenian Christian in Kabul.

18th September 1879.

AFTER many compliments, if God please, I will come myself to see and explain you all the news after some days. Believe me, Sir, Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan is the only well-wisher of the British in this country. The well-wisher of the Christian faith, Luka or Sur-ood-din, an Armenian Christian, and a student of Revd. T. P. Hughes.

(Signed) C. M. S., Peshawur.

Enclosure 16 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR AHMAD ALI KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—The death of Sir Louis Cavagnari has caused me great sorrow, but as there is no remedy against the divine decree, nothing can be done.

May the Almighty now protect you with all the well-wishes of Her Imperial Majesty's Government from all harm. I and all my friends and relatives, the well-wishers of the everlasting Government, are looking forward to the time when we can do service to that Government with devotion and zeal.

Further rest assured in every respect, and please always gratify me with the good news of the well-being of the Imperial Government as well as of your own good health.

Enclosure 17 in No. 29.

No. 12, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 9 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, a copy of my reply to Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan.

2. I have also the honour to forward, in original, a letter received yesterday from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, together with copy of my reply. (See ante.)

Enclosure 18 in No. 29.

Dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to SIRDAR AHMAD ALI KHAN.

I HAVE received your letter, expressing your sorrow at the late occurrences in Kabul, and your readiness to serve the British Government. I am glad to have news of you and to know your feelings in this matter. It will give me pleasure to be informed from time to time of your welfare.

Enclosure 19 in No. 29.

Dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRED. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN.

YOUR letter has reached me safely at this place. I was glad to receive news of your welfare, and I send this reply to let you know that I shall be happy to hear from time to time that you are in good health.

Enclosure 20 in No. 29.

No. 8, dated Ali Khel, 23rd September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

(1.) From His Highness the Amir of Kabul to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 18th September 1879.

(2.) From His Highness the Amir of Kabul, to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 19th September 1879.

(3.) From Sirdar Ayub Khan to His Highness the Amir.

(4.) From His Highness the Amir to Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan, dated 19th September 1879.

(5.) From Captain Karazin to the Governor of Afghan-Turkestan.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted.

Enclosure 21 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from AMIR YAKUB KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 1st Shawal 1296 H.=(18th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that your friendly letter dated the 27th Ramazan (15th September) reached me yesterday, Thursday the 29th idem (17th September). From its contents I have derived a series of fresh favour and innumerable kindnesses on the part of the noble British Government towards me, as well as their wishes for the advancement and continuance of my Government which has greatly pleased and gratified me and increased the degree of my sincere friendship and love for that powerful Government.

My Peshkhidmat Sher Muhammad Khan arrived here after I had read your friendly letter. Although he has brought no letter from you, he has made a verbal statement of the favour and kindness of the British Government towards me, and thereby opened the doors of joy and happiness to the face of my sincere heart.

As I have deputed Mirza Habibulla Khan, the Mustaufi, and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan to you, and they, please God, will represent all the particulars and the minutiae of the event as well as my friendly sentiments towards the illustrious British Government, I think it sufficient to write the above. It is sincerely hoped that the above-mentioned officials will return with speed and happiness.

Enclosure 22 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., dated 2nd Shawal 1296 H.=(19th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that I have received and perused this day, Saturday the 2nd Shawal, your friendly letter dated the 29th Ramazan (17th September 1879) accompanied with two copies of proclamation to the address of the people of Kabul and Logar. From the contents of the (said) writings, viz., the friendly letter and the proclamations, I have fully understood the sentiments of friendship, kindness, sympathy and anity on the part of the officers of the illustrious British Government in regard to myself. I have deputed my most confidential agents to you. They will, please God, represent and state before you all the particulars of the case. I would,

therefore, not trouble you by writing more than this, that all that I most sincerely and cordially wish and desire is the friendship and amity of the illustrious British Government; by God's help the truth of these assertions has been and will be manifest and apparent every day.

I have informed the Mustaufi of certain internal and external matters. He will communicate them to you.

Enclosure 23 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR AYUB KHAN to the AMIR YAKUB KHAN, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Previous to this I sent you a detailed account of the murder of the late General Fakir Ahmed Khan both by post of Wednesday the (16th Ramazan)* and by the hands of my Peshkhidmat Gholam Muhammad Khan. God willing, you will receive and peruse it.

And as the customary post is now leaving for that direction, and you may perhaps wish to know what the state of affairs is, I beg to inform you that since the death of General Fakir Ahmed no untoward circumstance has happened. Let us see what will happen hereafter.

I hope you will take my petitions into your favourable consideration. As it is my duty I have represented the above.

P.S.—To-day the Kabuli Kandaks (Regiments?) laid plans for raising a revolt and committing another mischief, under the pretext of their pay being in arrears. But Hafiz Khan has commenced to pay them and has given one regiment their two months' pay. Consequently they are quiet at present, but what will happen hereafter remains to be seen. It being my duty, I have represented the above.

Enclosure 24 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to the MUSTAUFU and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD, dated 2nd Shawal 1296 H.=(19th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Thanks be to God that all is well here. I have just received a letter from Ghulam Hyder Khan, the Deputy Governor of Turkestan, dated Thursday the 23rd* Ramazan, enclosing a letter to his address from a Russian Captain. I send the same herewith in original for the information of General Roberts, so that he may know that both I and my servants acknowledge as friends no one but the illustrious British Government, and that we have and will have no hesitation or doubt in imprisoning strangers and expelling them from our country. The said Deputy Governor also reports that four Kandaks (regiments?) have left for the capital, and that they arrived at

Tashkurghan on Thursday the 23rd* Ramazan.

Enclosure 25 in No. 29.

Literal Translation from the Russian.

Kelif, August 25th.

[New Style: September 6th.]

Worthy and Respected Ruler of Mazar-i-Sharif.

ALONG the downward course of the Amu Darya, from Termez, there is [now] being floated down a Kayuk, occupied by four Russian travellers, with whom are four Cossacks and [some] servants.

Yesterday, the 25th* instant, this Kayuk was driven against [or, close to] the left Afghan bank of the river; and when three Cossacks and four Bokhariot Kayuk-men disembarked to tow the Kayuk [walking on shore], some Afghan people attacked them, and carried them off. This happened near the ferry of Chushka Gázár.

* [This must either be the 24th August-5th September; or the letter should have been dated the 26th August-7th September.]—Tr.

By the grace of God, Russia and Bokhara are at present at peace with Afghanistan, and not at war; hence I hope that this seizure of our people has not been effected by order of the Afghan authorities.

Informing you, the Worthy and Respected Ruler of Mazar-i-Sharif, of this, I request of you to pass an order to have these three captured Russian Cossacks and four Bokhariots sent to Kelif, without doing them any harm or violence.

I hope you will comply with this, my lawful and respectful, request.

(Signed) CAPTAIN NICOLAI KARAZIN.

SIMULTANEOUSLY I am also informing his Excellency Major-General Ivanof, Governor of the Samarkand Province, of all that has taken place.

Enclosure 26 in No. 29.

No. 10, dated Ali Khel, 24th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, notes of an interview which I had yesterday with the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan.

Enclosure No. 27 in No. 29.

Notes of an Interview between GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS and the Amir's Agents, MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD KHAN, Ali Khel, 23rd September 1879.

AFTER compliments General Roberts intimated to the Agents that at their desire he had granted them a second interview. He now requested them to be good enough to speak freely all that they wished him to know.

The Mustaufi then spoke in the following sense:—The interests of England and Afghanistan are the same, and the Amir and his officials are deeply grieved at the late occurrences in Kabul. Moreover, the Amir is anxious to do whatever the British Government wishes, and most desirous that the dignity of the British Government should be maintained by any means which may seem proper to the Viceroy. But His Highness cannot conceal from himself that the mutinous troops and the people in general, ryots as well as soldiers, are in fear of an indiscriminate revenge which will fall alike upon innocent and guilty. He hopes, therefore, that measures will be taken to guard against the possibility of a general rising consequent on fear.

The Mustaufi was here reminded of the tenor of General Roberts' proclamation of 15th September. He answered that the people were too ignorant to be acted upon by a proclamation; and then went on as follows:—

Of course it is possible that no such combination may take place. The Afghans are selfish and divided against themselves. Still, lest he should be blamed if it should occur, the Amir thinks it right to express his opinion and give the British Government all the information in his power. On the whole his advice, as an earnest friend, is that the advance of a British force on Kabul should be delayed for a short time ("Panj roz"). In the interval he will endeavour to disarm the regular troops; raise new levies; and, by the aid of the latter, punish all concerned in the late abominable outrage. His idea is to get rid of Sher Ali's soldiery, always a source of danger, and keep only 15,000 men for the future. It would be very desirable to delay the advance until he could establish his power. The Amir does not mean to imply that any Afghan army, were it 50,000 strong, could resist the British. The mutinous troops have neither organisation nor leaders. But the mutinous troops are of all tribes, and if the British army destroys them, as it would undoubtedly do in case of resistance, the whole country may combine against the British and the Amir. It is for this reason that he advises delay, and that the punishment of the guilty be left to him. The Viceroy may rest assured that he will show no mercy. He will make an example which will be conspicuous in the eyes of the

world as the sun at noonday. Already every one in Kabul regards the Amir as an infidel because of the way in which he and his have thrown their lot with the British Government.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, however, things might go right if the mutinous troops would keep together and attempt a stand. But the Amir feels they will not do so. They are more likely to scatter here and there and raise the country. In that case there will be constant attacks on the communications of the force, and the gathering of supplies will be difficult. They would come chiefly from the direction of Ghazni, partly also from Logar. If the tribes rise it will be hard to collect them. Only one month remains before the setting in of winter.

Of course it is impossible to say what may happen. There may be no opposition, and the Amir is in any case ready to do what the British Government desires. But he feels it is his duty to express his strong opinion that the present season is unsuited for a forward movement.

General Roberts replied that on behalf of the Viceroy he thanked the Amir for his kind advice, which he was confident was the advice of a friend. He said the matter was important and required careful consideration and asked whether the Agents had anything more to bring forward.

The Mustaufi then spoke as follows:—The Amir's advice to delay the advance is that of a sincere friend, and it is the best he can give. But if the British army is to march on Kabul there is one thing more which I am desired to say. Let it march in such strength as to crush all hopes of mischief, and put down all rebellion throughout the country. You cannot wait for reinforcements. If you come you must come in full strength—in sufficient strength to put down all opposition. There may be no opposition, but you cannot count on this.

General Roberts replied:—The Amir's advice is of great importance and must be carefully considered. When His Highness first wrote announcing the outbreak at Kabul and asking for help the first desire of the Viceroy was to send the British forces on without delay. I was ordered to Kurram at once to lead the force here. Simultaneously the Kandahar force was ordered by telegram to return to Kandahar, which it was then leaving, and to advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and instructions were issued to collect a third force at Peshawur. All this was to help the Amir with the least possible delay. The Viceroy from the first contemplated the possibility of such a general rising as the Amir now fears, and the several armies were therefore by his Excellency's order made up to such a strength that all Afghanistan combined could not stand against them for a moment. The Kandahar troops were ready in a very short time, and are now beyond Kandahar, on the road to Kabul.* The Peshawur force was rapidly collected and pushed on; and the Amir may rest assured that the British army is advancing in ample strength. I will think over the Amir's advice nevertheless, for it is important. But His Highness must remember that the late occurrences at Kabul do not affect only the English officers and the 50 or 60 men who were treacherously killed. The honour of the English Government is concerned, and so long as the bodies of these officers and men remained unburied or uncared for in Kabul, I do not believe the English people will ever be satisfied. They will require the advance of a British force, and the adequate punishment of the crime. Still the Amir's advice, which I am convinced is that of a friend, must be carefully considered, and I will think over it and give an answer later.

The Mustaufi then said:—We quite understand what has been said about the strength of the British army. Doubtless it is sufficient, and all Afghanistan could not stand against it. But the Amir asked us to mention, what I have hitherto forgotten, that there are in Turkestan 24 regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and 56 guns. These troops were the first to show a disaffected spirit at Mazar-i-Sharif, and putting aside external enemies there are Abdul Rahman and the sons of Azim Khan waiting their chance. Herat again is doubtful, when the troops there hear what has occurred at Kabul there is no saying what they may do. If Abdul Rahman ingratiates himself with these people Herat and Turkestan will be permanently severed from the Afghan dominions. This is another reason why the advance of the British force should be delayed in order that the Amir may have time to gain over the Herat and Turkestan troops.

General Roberts replied.—All these reasons will have full consideration. The Viceroy's first order was to push on at once to help the Amir, but I am sure His Highness' advice is friendly, and that in any case he will do his utmost to co-operate with

* NOTE.—The Agents here seemed surprised and anxious.—H. M. D.

the British Government. Therefore, every consideration will be given to what His Highness has desired you to say.

The Mustaufi.—The Viceroy may be sure the Amir will do what he pleases.

The Wazir.—When the Amir learnt from General Roberts' letter that the Viceroy had given General Roberts power to deal with the whole matter he was very pleased, knowing General Roberts' character as a soldier and his kindness of heart.

General Roberts replied that he would carefully consider the proposals brought forward, and give an answer later on. Meanwhile he must request the Agents to stay a day or two in camp until he should have thoroughly weighed the Amir's advice, which was of the utmost importance to both the British and Afghan Governments.

The interview then came to an end.

Enclosure 28 in No. 29.

No. 11, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council a copy, in Persian and English, of my reply to His Highness the Amir's letters of the 18th and 19th September.

Enclosure 29 in No. 29.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, to His Highness the AMIR OF KABUL.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I have received your Highness' two letters of the 18th and 19th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered to me by the hands of your Highness' two confidential representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad.

I am much obliged to your Highness for sending to me two such well-known men, and of such high character, as the Mustaufi and the Wazir. They have informed me of your Highness' wishes, and I quite understand all they have told me.

It is unfortunate that the season is so late, and that winter will soon be here, but there is time yet for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold sets in.

The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been any delay in promptly acceding to your Highness' request for assistance and advice, as conveyed in your Highness' letters of the 3rd and 4th instant.

It was his Excellency's earnest wish that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure your Highness' personal safety, and aid your Highness in restoring peace and order at your capital.

Unfortunately, the want of transport and the necessity for collecting a certain amount of supplies have caused a few weeks' delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to the Viceroy to learn that your Highness' safety is not at present endangered, and his Excellency trusts your Highness will be able to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as British troops may reach Kabul.

I am glad to be able to inform your Highness that news reached me yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were advancing rapidly from Peshawur to Jellalabad and onwards, *viâ* Gandamak to Kabul.

My own force will, I hope, be in a state to march before long. As your Highness is aware, the Shuturgardan has been occupied for some days; meanwhile regiments of cavalry and infantry, and batteries of artillery have reached Kurram to replace those I am taking on with me, and to re-inforce my own column, should a necessity for more troops arise, a contingency I do not in the least expect.

The Viceroy of India, in his Excellency's anxiety for your Highness' welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the three armies now advancing on Kandahar, Kurram,

and the Khyber, should be strong enough to overcome any opposition your Highness' enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can be no doubt.

I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to stop the progress of the troops *en route* from Kandahar; there is no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very short time.

The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty of peace made by your Highness with the British Government in May last, have unanimously agreed to assist the troops from Peshawur in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul.

Through the kindness of your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with your Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column.

I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with your Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind assistance to obtain for me supplies and transport,

I have carefully considered your Highness' proposal, that you yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save Her Majesty's troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this season of the year.

I thank your Highness most cordially on the part of the Viceroy and Government of India for this further proof of your Highness' friendly feelings. Under ordinary circumstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly accepted; but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British army marched to Kabul, and there assisted your Highness to inflict such punishment as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.

I have forwarded your Highness' letters in original to the Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day's post for his Excellency's consideration. Meanwhile I have permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad to take their leave, and rejoin your Highness.

It would be convenient, I think, to both your Highness and to me, and would materially assist my future communication with your Highness, if one or other of the above-named gentlemen could remain with me. Should they see no objection to this arrangement, I will request one of them to stay in my camp, pending an intimation of your Highness' approval.

Enclosure 30 in No. 29.

No. 14, dated Ali Khel, 26th September 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, notes of my third interview with His Highness the Amir's officials, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan. They left camp early this morning for Kabul.

Enclosure 31 in No. 29.

Notes of an interview between MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., and the Amir's Agents, MUSTAUFİ HABİBULLA KHAN and WAZİR SHAH MUHAMMAD KHAN, dated Ali Khel, 25th September 1879.

AFTER compliments General Roberts requested the Mustaufi to take charge of a letter for His Highness the Amir. In it General Roberts said he had thanked His Highness for sending him two such distinguished officials as those now in camp, and had informed the Amir that he thoroughly understood all His Highness had charged them to say. But it was impossible for him to accept the Amir's advice in its entirety. In accordance with the Amir's first request, the Viceroy had at once prepared three armies to march on Kabul. The Peshawur and Kurram Forces were now nearly ready, and the Kandahar Force had already pushed forward. To stop the advance of these armies now was a

thing which General Roberts could not do. To begin with, the Viceroy would be much distressed if any misfortune were to happen to the Amir on account of the absence of British support; and, in the second place, the British nation would never be satisfied unless a British force advanced to Kabul and recovered the bodies of the officers and men so foully murdered. The forces therefore must advance. In the meanwhile, General Roberts trusted that the Amir would be able to guard himself, and maintain peace and security at his capital. The Mustaufi replied that the Amir had sent himself and his colleague to assure General Roberts of His Highness' fidelity to the British. Whatever General Roberts thought best should of course be done.

General Roberts requested the Mustaufi to assure the Amir that he had carefully considered His Highness' advice. The conclusion at which he had arrived was shown in his letter to His Highness. Putting aside the question of an advance, the letter contained, he said, his thanks for the assistance of the two officials sent by His Highness, and a request that he might retain the services of one of them. If, however, they both preferred to return now, General Roberts was of course willing to afford them every facility. But he hoped one of them, or some equally trusted official, would soon be sent to his camp. The Mustaufi replied that he was hard worked as Finance Minister, while his colleague had the foreign work, besides other departments of the administration in his charge, and that he feared the absence of either would cause serious inconvenience to the Amir.

General Roberts said, that in that case he could not ask either of them to remain, but, considering the special importance of having constant and easy communication between the Amir and the British camp, he hoped some trusted servant would be sent without delay.

The Mustaufi replied, that since his departure from Kabul he had only received one letter from the Amir, and was therefore ignorant of the state of affairs in Turkestan and Herat. If, when he reached Kabul, all was quiet, the Amir would probably come in person to meet General Roberts, or send his son. If not, it would be necessary to devote all their energies to ensuring the Amir's safety. Meanwhile the Mustaufi thought it necessary that he and his colleague should return at once, and hinted at the desirability of a little delay on the part of the force in order that they might have time to reach Kabul first and make any necessary arrangements.

General Roberts said his own object was to ensure the Amir's safety, and that His Highness should be told exactly beforehand when the force was likely to reach Kabul. His Highness would then be able to make arrangements for coming himself to the British camp. But in any case, to show the people that there was no disunion between the Amir and the British Government, it was especially desirable to send over a trustworthy official.

General Roberts then asked the Agents when they would like to start, in order that a guard might be ready; and he requested them to accept rupees 2,000 each with rupees 1,000 more for their servants.

The Mustaufi and the Wazir both seemed anxious to start at once, evidently fearing that the British force would enter Kabul, almost simultaneously with themselves. It was, however, eventually arranged that they should not leave camp until the following morning, General Roberts being of opinion that they should not spend the night, except in the security of a British encampment.

The Agents then took their leave.

After dismissing the Amir's officials, General Roberts received, with their assent, a son of Padshah Khan, who had accompanied them from Kabul. He assured General Roberts that his father would join the British camp on the advance of the force from Koushi.

Enclosure 32 in No. 29.

No. 16, dated Kushi, 29th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the papers marginally noted, and to report that I left

- (1.) Letter from General Sir F. Roberts to His Highness the Amir, dated 28th September 1879.
 (2.) Letter from His Highness the Amir to General Sir F. Roberts, dated 29th (28th?) September 1879.
 (3.) Letter from Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.
 (4.) Letter containing Kabul news furnished by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan.
 (5.) Letter from Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan to General Sir F. Roberts.

Ali Khel on the 27th instant and arrived at Kushi yesterday.

2. I found His Highness the Amir in Brigadier-General Baker's camp. Early in the morning of the 27th, Major Hastings received a letter from His Highness intimating that he and some of his Sirdars were on their way to Kushi, and shortly after noon the Amir's approach was announced. His Highness was met by Major Hastings a mile from the camp, and later by Brigadier-General Baker, who went out with a squadron of cavalry to receive him. He was accompanied by his son Sirdar Muhammad Musa Khan, by Sirdar Yahya Khan, by Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, and by about 300 sowars, but was without tents or equipage of any kind. 200 of the sowars who had accompanied His Highness returned the same evening to Kabul. Every endeavour has been made by Brigadier-General Baker to consult the Amir's comfort, and His Highness professes himself entirely satisfied with the treatment accorded to him. But on his first arrival in the camp it appeared both to Brigadier-General Baker and to Major Hastings that he was anxious and ill at ease. He has now obtained tents and has requested leave to remove from the centre of the camp, where Brigadier-General Baker had arranged for him to stay.

3. This morning I paid a visit of ceremony to the Amir, and during the afternoon His Highness returned the visit. He was received with the customary honours. Nothing of importance passed at either interview, and I propose to defer until to-morrow any discussion with His Highness of the present state of affairs in Kabul, and the measures to be adopted for the restoration of order. I have, however, already been informed at the Amir's desire that before my arrival His Highness had issued orders to meet the wishes of Government in two matters of some urgency, namely, the arrangements to be made for facilitating the advance of the Khyber column, and the collection of supplies for the force under my command. With regard to the first point His Highness had, he says, before the receipt of any request from me, addressed the Hakim of Jellalabad and the Khan of Lalpura ordering that every assistance should be afforded to the troops advancing from the Khyber, and the orders have now been repeated. With regard to the collection of supplies for this force I am informed that His Highness yesterday offered to place at our disposal the stores of grain and other necessaries which had been collected in the Khalsa villages in the neighbourhood. Some of His Highness' officials were accordingly sent out with all the transport animals available, and I hope that ample supplies will soon be forthcoming.

4. The arrangements for the protection of the road between Kushi and Ali Khel are complete. I have decided to withdraw the troops now at Karatiga, which is not in all ways a suitable position, and to replace them by a mixed garrison of Jajis and Ghilzais; the whole to be under the charge of Allal-ud-din Khan. I have every reason to hope that both this chief and his brother Padshah Khan are in earnest in their desire to preserve intact our postal and telegraphic communications, and to afford us every assistance required on that part of the line with which they are concerned. All arrangements for the road between Kushi and Kabul I propose to leave to the Amir, and I have been given to understand by His Highness' officials that he will gladly undertake the responsibility.

5. Besides His Highness the Amir and the persons who accompanied him, I expect soon to meet Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, and a number of other Sirdars, who left Kabul shortly after His Highness, and arrived yesterday at Zarghun Shahr about 10 miles from here.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan has a feeling of antagonism towards the Amir, and I anticipate some difficulty from the relations existing between them. I shall of course receive with caution any information supplied by the Sirdar, or others connected with him, and shall not accept without every careful examination statements to the prejudice of His Highness.

The Sirdar professes to have in his possession a letter written by the Amir to the hill tribes after the conclusion of the Treaty, calling upon them to join him in a Jehād against the English. Any evidence of this nature will receive due consideration; meanwhile I shall make no difference in my treatment of the Amir, which will be in accordance with the respect due to his rank.

6. It will be seen that one of the inclosures to this letter is a letter to my address from Sirdar Ibrahim Khan. I have lately heard that this Sirdar was yesterday arrested by the Governor of Kabul while attempting to leave the city; and that he is now in confinement.

7. The news from Kabul is conflicting, and I am unable to ascertain with any accuracy the movements of the revolted troops and the number of the armed men now in the city. But all is reported quiet, and I am generally assured that there is no prospect of resistance. I propose to march from Kushi on the 2nd of October and reach Kabul on the 5th.

Enclosure 33 in No. 29.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN, without date (28th September 1879 ?).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Information has reached me that the troops which his Excellency the Viceroy of India had ordered to march from Peshawur to Kabul, have already started. I therefore request your Highness to issue orders to your Highness' officers and subjects to the effect that they should, as far as lies in their power, facilitate the passage of the British troops which will march through the Khyber Pass to Jellalabad and onward. It is necessary that your Highness should prohibit (them from making) any kind of opposition. It also should be fully explained that the above-mentioned troops are going to assist your Highness and to consolidate your Highness' Government, otherwise it is probable that the stupid and ignorant people may make up their minds to offer opposition.

Be pleased to inform me always of your welfare.

Enclosure 34 in No. 29.

Letter from the AMIR to GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 11th Shawal 1296 A.H.=(28th September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your friendly letter has reached me just at this moment, 8 p.m. Monday the 11th Shawal (28th September) and opened the doors of joy and happiness on the face of my heart marked with affection. I feel perfectly certain and confident that the movements of Her Imperial Majesty's victorious troops are merely for the purpose of consolidating the foundation of my kingdom and strengthening the basis of my Government.

In truth the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to a sincere and faithful friend is agreeable and pleasing. I am exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives of the illustrious British Government for their expression of sympathy, and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jellalabad and Lalpura not to let any one oppose or resist the British troops, and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of Jellalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of Jellalabad will be shown to you to-morrow, and sent by an express courier.

Usual ending.

Enclosure 35 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN and 11 other SIRDARS to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that on Friday last the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan went out under the pretext of walking in, and seeing, the garden of Hissar (Bala Hissar ?) and from thence he hastened towards the British camp at the time of sun-set prayer. As we were not aware of the fact we were all perplexed as to where he had gone, and so the whole family being at one with me, we all set out towards you, and are awaiting your orders as to when we may have the honour of meeting you.

To-day Sunday the 10th* (Shawal) we are halting at the village of Zarghun Shahr, and are anxious to know where we may have a joyous interview with you.

* 27th September.

Enclosure 36 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, to MUHAMMAD HAYAT KHAN, C.S.I., dated 6th Shawal H. 1296= (23rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Should you wish to know how I am, thank God I am all right.

I have just heard that you have arrived at Ali Khel in company with General Roberts. I therefore write to ask you to let me know how you are, and that if I can do any service for you I will perform it with pleasure.

Rest assured in every respect about these parts. All the tribes about Kabul are quiet—a fact which you will learn from my report (Memorandum). The bearer of your letter gave me an account of the kindness you have shown to him. It has pleased me greatly; and I hope that in future you will also be as kind.

Thank God, all is well here.

Enclosure 37 in No. 29. (Extract.)

Memorandum of SIRDAR WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, enclosed in a letter from him herewith sent in original.

When the Herat troops were on their march from Kabul, they were instructed to raise a cry on arrival at the capital that they would wage a religious war, and that they would not allow the English officers to remain in the town. In accordance with these instructions they raised cries in the city on their arrival there. They quarrelled with the servants of Major Cavagnari in the streets of the town on one or two occasions. I reported this to the Major, and he remarked in reply that it was the habit of a rabid dog to bite, be the person bit however innocent, and that no one could touch his hair. The Sirdar Bahadur (Gholam Nakshband Khan?) is aware of this. After that, these six Herat regiments left on account of the sickness (cholera), and went to their homes, and none of them have as yet returned.

On Wednesday, the 15th of Ramazan (3rd September), three of these six regiments asked for their pay. They were offered one month's wages, but they refused to take the money, and said that they would take nothing short of three months' salary. The Amir told them that they did not perform any service or any religious act, or protect the honour of their country, and so were not entitled to three months' wages. On learning this they broke out and proceeded towards the residence of Major Cavagnari, saying that they would now engage in a religious conflict. Daud Shah came out to prevent them from their design, but was not successful in his attempts. He was insulted, and was wounded in three or four places. At this juncture, Saif-ud-din Khan (a General) presented himself before the Amir and remarked, that if His Highness gave permission he would aid and save Major Cavagnari. But he was rebuked, and was dismissed from service with the remark that he had no concern in the matter. He is now out of his office of General.

The troops and the people of Turkestan raised a disturbance against General Gholam Hyder Khan, Wardak, and plundered the bazaar, the Serai, and the shops, and fled with their families towards Khulm and Sarbagh. The six regiments sent from Kabul to retain them in Turkestan have arrived at Khulm, but these Turkestan regiments are still there. Saripul and Maimena were occupied by Mir Muhammad Khan of Saripul; and Shubarghan was taken possession of by the son of Mir Hakim Khan. Turkestan is without a chief. Gholam Hyder Khan has also come to Khulm.

The Kabuli troops at Herat raised a disturbance as they were disheartened, and their being in arrears of pay was made an excuse for their rising. They killed General Fakir Ahmed Khan, their chief, and deserted, or are deserting the town.

The greater portion of the three regiments (of the six) who had attacked Major Cavagnari, and were deputed to Kohistan after being paid three months' wages, have deserted.

The cavalry regiments of Kabul have gone to their homes, and it is only possible to re-collect them in two months.

Likewise the men of the infantry regiments and artillery men at Kabul have also gone to their homes, and there are not 1,000 soldiers in the lines.

The three regiments which had gone to Ghazni to collect revenue deserted to their homes when they heard of the massacre of the British Embassy at Kabul.

The people of Afghanistan who used to pay revenue to the Amir refuse to make any payments to the collectors, and are hopeful of the favours of the British Government.

About 2,000 Kharwars (a Kabul Kharwar= $14\frac{1}{2}$ maunds English) of grain belonging to the Amir are lying in Logar. The Amir's people intend to take it away. It would be well for the British troops to hasten their advance to Kushi to take possession of the grain.

If the British troops desire to delay their advance (to Kabul) it would at any rate be better to come to Kushi and there halt. There will be many advantages in at once marching to Kushi.

It would be well if Mullah Shah Muhammad Khan and Mirza Habibulla, Mustaufi come (to Kabul) with the British camp. But if they are given *congé* from Kushi the British authorities may do so.

Enclosure 38 in No. 29.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHAN to GENERAL ROBERTS, without date.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that about five years ago, I had friendship, with the British Government through Nawab Ata Muhammad Khan and Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, for which my father the late Amir threw me into prison at Kabul and sent me to Turkestan. On his death I returned to Kabul to do service to the (British) Government. But by the decree of God I fell ill. The friendly sentiments I entertained for the late Sir L. Cavagnari and the verbal representations which I had made to him out of my fidelity to the British Government are known to Gholam Nakshband Khan Sirdar Bahadur who may have conveyed them to you. As the decrees of God had passed, no remedy was of any avail. I hope you will consider me your well-wisher. I am waiting for an answer, and any orders that may be sent to me I shall endeavour to carry out in the service of the British Government.

No. 30.

Telegram from VICEROY, 10th October 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

Following information just received from General Roberts, dated 8th instant, outside Kabul. :—Hearing that the troops returned from Kohistan had entrenched themselves on a high hill behind Bala Hissar overlooking city, he sent General Massey, with eight squadrons of cavalry, round by north of city to watch roads leading to Bamian and Kohistan, cutting off enemy's retreat. Simultaneously, General Baker, with strong force, was instructed to attack the enemy from the high ground above Bala Hissar. At sunset Massey had reached Aliabad on Bamian road, and found in the Sherpur cantonment, which was deserted, 78 guns, including 17 Armstrongs. At the same hour Baker was about to attack enemy's position.

No. 30A.

From VICEROY, 12th October 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING from Roberts, outside Kabul, 10th October :—General Baker was unable to deliver his attack on evening of 8th on account of darkness; before daylight yesterday General Macpherson joined him with 67th Foot, 28th Native Infantry, and four horse artillery guns on elephants; enemy, however, fled during the night, leaving on their very strong position 12 guns, 6 field and 6 mountain; cavalry pursued for several miles in two detachments under General Massey and Hugh Gough, but the enemy had so completely dispersed that they only overtook a few small parties; we have now in our possession 110 guns, there are some 30 more in the Bala Hissar, and a few I hear in the city. Our camp is pitched on the Sia Sang ridge, immediately overlooking and within 1,300 yards of the Bala Hissar and city. I shall make public entry into and take possession of Bala Hissar to-morrow or next day; the troops have worked splendidly, for several days we have been without tents, and rations have had to be carried for want of transports; two wounded men of 72nd and one Sapper have died, remainder of wounded doing well.

No. 31.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 14th October 1879, to VICEROY.

I most heartily congratulate you upon the success of operations against Kabul. Please telegraph to General Roberts my congratulations on the rapidity and skill with which he has led his forces and my appreciation of the courage and success with which they have achieved their objects.

No. 32.

No. 219 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 16, 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. General Roberts' telegram, despatched on the evening of the 6th October, reporting very briefly his successful engagement with the enemy on the heights between Kabul and Charasiab, formed a postscript to our last despatch. From other accounts it appears that the Afghan regiments and the armed bands of the city held in large numbers a very strong position on the heights above Charasiab, which they defended with tenacity and with some military skill; while the tribal levies, principally Ghilzais from about Tezin and Hazarah, showed in force along the hills upon General Roberts' flank, watching an opportunity to embarrass his advance, and threatening the large convoy that was following under General Macpherson. It is now known that the plans for arresting the advance of our troops upon Kabul had been carefully laid, and that the Ghilzais had been instructed to act against the flanks and rear of our column, while the regular troops and the Kabul people undertook to bar its passage across the hills in front. The information received by General Roberts decided him to attack at once the force on the heights, since delay would have given the enemy time to bring up reinforcements from the city, and to fortify a position that was sufficiently formidable by nature. Moreover, there was good reason for suspecting an understanding and correspondence between the leaders of the resistance in Kabul and the Afghans who were accompanying General Roberts' camp. The attack was opened by a turning movement against the right of the enemy's position, which was executed resolutely and skilfully under a sharp fire. The Afghans fought well, but were beaten back; and when the front attack was delivered, their main body was driven with great loss from the ridge. They continued, however, to contest every point at which the ground favoured a stand, nor was it until dark that the heights were cleared, and the whole position occupied by the British troops. Twenty guns were taken in this action; and it seems certain, from subsequent information, that the regular troops opposed to us were effectively routed, while the tribes who were assembling to co-operate with them are said to have returned to their homes.

3. On the 7th the advanced portion of General Roberts' force was within two miles of the city of Kabul, and the Bala Hissar was found to have been evacuated by the Afghan troops; but three mutinous regiments from Kohistan were reported to have returned to the Sherpur cantonment, on the west side of the city. General Roberts, hearing that these troops were entrenching themselves on a high hill beyond the Bala Hissar, and immediately overlooking the city, detached on the 8th October Brigadier-General Massey with eight squadrons of cavalry to watch the roads leading from the north side of the city to Bamian and Kohistan, in order to cut off the line of retreat. At the same time Brigadier-General Baker, with a force consisting of six companies 92nd Highlanders, two companies 72nd Highlanders, a wing of the 67th Regiment, two companies 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, four mountain guns, and two Gatlings, prepared to attack the position on the hill. By sunset on the 8th General Massey had arrived at Aliabad, on the Bamian road, having found the Sherpur cantonment deserted, and having taken possession of 78 guns, found in it. General Baker was prevented by nightfall from opening his attack on the evening of the 8th; he was joined before daylight on the 9th by General Macpherson with additional troops, but during the night the enemy evacuated their position, and took to flight, leaving 12 guns behind them. The cavalry in two detach-

ments, under Generals Massey and Hugh Gough, were sent in pursuit, but the Afghan troops had so completely dispersed that only a few small parties were overtaken. General Roberts' camp was on the 10th October pitched on the Siah Sang ridge, immediately overlooking the Bala Hissar and the city. He visited the Bala Hissar on the 11th, and made his public entry on the 12th, accompanied by the Amir. The whole of the heavy guns and howitzers presented by the British Government to the Amir have been captured, with sufficient ammunition for present purposes; so that General Roberts has been able to send back to Peshawur the heavy battery which was coming up with the Khyber column.

4. Brigadier-General Gordon telegraphs that his camp at Ali Khel was attacked on the morning of the 14th by the Mangals and some sections of other tribes from Spega and the neighbourhood. He reports that they came on very boldly, but were well met by the 29th and 8th Regiments; and that a counter-attack was delivered by his cavalry and infantry with complete success; that the assailants left many dead, while our casualties were five men slightly wounded.

5. The advanced portion of the force moving by the Khyber Pass reached Barikab on the 10th October, and General Gough has now occupied Jellalabad. Supplies were coming in slowly, and the Afghan officials showed little readiness to assist, having probably received secret encouragements to retard, if possible, the advance of our troops, but the country is generally quiet.

6. From Kandahar General Stewart reports that General Hughes' brigade had halted 14 miles in advance of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, as the country beyond could furnish no supplies. The Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Muhammad Tahir Khan, had no real authority in his district, and the fort is now in the possession of the British troops. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, the governor of Zamindawar, had come to Kandahar; his unpopularity and his want of troops to support his authority had much embarrassed his administration, insomuch that Sir Donald Stewart doubted whether he could continue to maintain himself in his government. It appeared to us essential, on political as well as on military grounds, that in the present juncture of affairs at Kabul the local government at Kandahar should be encouraged and supported in preserving order in the adjacent districts, and that those districts which had been formerly administered from Kandahar should be brought within the sphere of our influence and protection whenever this might be necessary to prevent disorganisation. We have accordingly instructed General Stewart that he has full discretion to make any requisite arrangements for preserving tranquillity and for administering Zamindawar from Kandahar; that Muhammad Yusaf, if he proves incapable, need not return to his government; and that the necessary measures may, under existing circumstances, be taken without previously consulting the Amir. The latest news received at Kandahar from Herat was dated 27th September, on which date Sirdar Ayub Khan wrote to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Governor of Kandahar, that all was well, but that he was perplexed at the news of the Kabul outbreak.

7. There is no further news of importance from the other outlying provinces of Afghanistan.

8. We forward, for your Lordship's information, some further depositions [taken by the Commissioner of Peshawur] of servants of the Kabul Embassy, who escaped from the massacre, and of others who were present in the Bala Hissar when the outbreak took place.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

This morning Major Hastings and Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan with Kazi Muhammad Aslam, under orders from Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts V.C., K.C.B., went to see the Amir. The following is the pith of the Amir's advice and conversation:—

(1.) In my opinion the best thing is to occupy the hill commanding the Pass which leads to Kabul. The mutinous troops have lately occupied that hill, and if they were allowed to keep it in their possession for the night they are sure to fortify it, and it will be rather difficult to dislodge them from there to-morrow.

(2.) I have received a verbal message from Kabul to the effect that the mutinous regiments have plundered the magazine. My mother and wife have left the Bala Hissar and gone to the house of Sirdar Yahya Khan; and that the other members of my family will soon follow them. The Bala Hissar is actually out of my possession. I have received no information to this effect from Nazar Muhammad Khan, Governor of Kabul, or from any other officer. But any trustworthy news which I may receive from Kabul at night will at once be communicated to the General through Major Hastings.

(3.) I have been and am still the true friend of the English, and so long as I live I will remain a staunch ally of the British Government.

(4.) On account of my coming to the British Camp, all people call me an infidel (Kafir), and my private servants desert me every day. No one will obey my order or consider me the Amir.

NOTE.—The Amir appeared in a very unsettled and troubled state of mind.

(Signed) E. G. HASTINGS, Major,

Charasiah, the 6th October 1879.

Political Officer.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 11th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Camp through Shuturgurda, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

KABUL, 7th October.—Advance portion of my force is now within two miles of city and Bala Hissar. The latter which has been evacuated by Afghan troops will be occupied by some of this force to-morrow, a camp for the remainder being pitched on the ridge of hills to the east of city known as Siah Sang. The three mutinous regiments which went towards Kohistan are reported to have returned to-day and to be at Sherpur with the remainder of the Amir's army about four miles from this on the other side of the city. I shall look them up to-morrow or next day. Want of transport necessitates my halting here, as it is desirable to collect my force before taking final steps to occupy city, and rear troops cannot join me until to-morrow.

I am glad to report that 20 guns were captured in yesterday's fight, not 12 as stated in my last telegram. One of them is an English made iron 8-inch howitzer; most of the others are imitation Armstrong guns.

I am opening communications with Khyber line, and hope to arrange in few days for letters and telegrams being sent by that route. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 10th October 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Camp, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Outside Kabul, 8th October.—General Macpherson rejoined me this evening with stores and reserve ammunition. As I am informed three regiments from Ghazni are trying to join force opposed to Baker, and as several people from the city have already joined that force, I am sending Macpherson with wing 67th, 5th Goorkhas, two mountain guns, four horse artillery guns on elephants, and 27th N. I. to be with Baker by daybreak to-morrow. If our cavalry succeed in intercepting the Afghan troops, I don't think they will be able to make another stand. Ghilzais from Tezin, Hissarak and that neighbourhood assembled in large numbers to join the force opposed to us on 6th instant, but arrived too late. Some returned to their homes, but a good many are still waiting to see result of this fresh stand made by the Afghan troops.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 10th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ALL quiet so far, though tribes are reported uneasy, specially in Spega Macha'go posts. All on the alert.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 13th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturgurdañ, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

OUTSIDE Kabul, 11th October.—All accounts agree that troops have been completely routed. Ghilzais, Kohistanis, Logaris, and other tribes, who were assembling to fight against us, have returned to their homes. I hope there will be no great difficulty about supplies. The Sherpur Cantonment will furnish enough firewood for several months, should it not be practicable to bring in a store from the hills before winter sets in. It is nevertheless very desirable that communication should be opened *viâ* Gandamak and Jellalabad as soon as possible. Only two days' ram is in hand. Letters take 10 and 12 days from Simla by Ali Khel and Shuturgurdañ. They should come in half that time by Peshawur. The heavy battery coming up with Khyber Column might return to India. I shall not require it. The heavy guns and howitzers presented by the British Government to the Amir are complete, and there is sufficient ammunition for present purposes.

I visit Bala Hissar to-day, and make public entry to-morrow. Kazalbashis and most of the influential men of the city have come to camp and paid their respects to me. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 32 (Extract).

Telegram, dated 13th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturgurdañ, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

OUTSIDE Kabul, 12th October.—After carefully considering the position and information received from various people, and after giving due weight to facts and circumstances which have come under my own notice, I have decided that it is necessary to place Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan, and his brother Zacharia Khan, under restraint, and that Military Governor must be appointed over city of Kabul.

Entry will be as public and impressive as possible. British troops will line road from camp to Bala Hissar; royal salute will be fired by horse artillery battery as Amir and I enter gateway. British standard will be hoisted over main gate. 67th Foot and 5th Goorkhas will occupy Bala Hissar and hill on which it is situated. Result will be telegraphed to-morrow, and full report of proceedings submitted by post, with copy of proclamation.

Country is fairly quiet. Proceedings of to-day will necessarily cause certain amount of excitement, but I don't anticipate trouble or great opposition. The Kazalbashis have paid their respects to me in camp, and expressed themselves well-wishers to the British. I have received friendly letters from several influential Kohistanis. Asmatulla Khan has written to say he will be here in few days.

Enclosure 7 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From BRIGADIER-GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CAMP attacked at daybreak by large numbers of Mangals, Spagwals, Hassan, and Ahmed Khels. Attack very boldly made, but well met by 29th and 8th. Counter-attack delivered by cavalry detail and infantry with complete success; left many dead in our hands. Twenty-three bodies brought in; more expected. Our casualties, five slightly wounded. Further particulars will follow. Our attacking parties are returning to camp unmolested.

Enclosure 8 in No. 32.

Telegram, dated 9th October 1879. (Extract.)

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

I HAVE exchanged visits with Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, and received several Maliks of Zamindawar, four of whom objected to Muhammad Yusaf Khan as Governor, because, they said, he had oppressed them. I advised Muhammad Yusaf Khan to

return to Zamindawar and try to govern without giving his people just ground for complaint, and shall recommend the Maliks to obey him.

Governor of Herat has advised Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan that troops for Zamindawar cannot at present be spared from Herat. Without aid of his troops I doubt whether Muhammad Yusaf Khan can carry on the Government of Zamindawar, as he is much disliked by the people generally. Amir has been informed by wire through Roberts of state of affairs in Zamindawar and his instructions regarding Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, requested.

Sirdar Sher Ali Khan states no mails from Kabul have arrived here during past week.

Latest news from Herat, 27th September, on which date Sirdar Ayub Khan writes to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan that all goes well in Herat, but he is perplexed at news of Kabul massacre. Travellers state Kandahar—Herat road between Washir and Kushk-i-Nakhud is unsafe for small parties.

At Kandahar, country quiet. Supplies coming in freely.

Enclosure 9 in No. 32.

Telegram dated 10th October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

Your telegram, 9th. If Muhammad Yusaf Khan cannot carry on government of Zamindawar, you are authorised to make necessary arrangements for preserving order and administering country from Kandahar, and Yusaf need not return.

Enclosure 10 in No. 32.

Telegram dated 9th October 1879.

From Mr. RONALD THOMPSON, Teheran, to VICEROY, Simla.

From the Herat correspondent's letter, dated September 16th:—Nothing appears to have been then known in Herat of the Kabul outbreak. When the Kabul Regiments mutinied in Herat, Ayub Khan, it is stated, had been in total ignorance of what was going on, and he endeavoured to quell the revolt, but only arrived on the spot when General Fakir Ahmed had been killed and his house had been pillaged and razed to the ground.

Enclosure 11 in No. 32.

Cross-examination of RUSSUL, 7 Company, Corps of Guides, taken 18th September 1879.

[Original statement taken at Lundikotal, dated 16th September 1879.]

The regiments drawn up below the Bala Hissar had no arms at first; the Sikh Sowars of the Guides did not fire first on the Amir's riotous soldiery, nor do I know of any syces having been stoned to death. The rioters rushed up and secured some nine vessels from the Mussulman members of the escort, these were lying out. The Sowars when they took shelter inside B had not fired a shot. After four shots had been fired by the Amir's regiments, one was fired by Sir L. Cavagnari; the messenger sent by our Envoy to the Amir never came back with a reply; to the best of my belief our fire killed about 300 of the enemy. The guns were dragged up and fired at the Embassy by infantry soldiers, no artillerymen were present; the firing was bad, although the distance was but 100 paces. Dost Muhammad was a Kakar, and his mother a Yusufzai woman: as he lived close to the Bala Hissar he and I became acquainted with one another: the talib who accompanied me from Kabul is named Daman, and his home is in Lughman. I was on the top of roof F when Dost Muhammad saved me. The Amir's soldiers had dark "cloth" (hanati) clothing. Of the sowars who went out with the grass-cutters, I heard four had been killed near Sar-asia by troopers of the Amir's. The bodies of our officers killed were not mutilated. I did not see Sir L. wounded: imagine he never left the house and it fell on him. The city people joined in the attack. I saw two Hindus dead from our fire. Sar-asia is a cluster of villages about 3 to 4 kos from Kabul. The

people of Kabul did not like the arrival of the Embassy, but the Amir is greatly distressed at what has occurred; he was helpless to give aid, as the soldiers threatened to kill him if he interfered, and wounded his General when he came out with his koran; they stoned another General. The Amir will not oppose our advance, but his soldiers might.

Enclosure 12 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of ABDULLA, son of ABDUL MAJID, Resident of Kars, dated 22nd September 1879.

I, Mahammad Omar, and Amad are servants of the Sultan of Turkey, and were taken prisoners with 400 other followers of Osman Pasha by the Russians at the taking of Kars. We were taken to Tobolsk and fled to Kizil-Yar, from thence to Hazrat Sultan, then to Nuri-ata, and ultimately reached Bokhara, and presented ourselves before the Emir who gave us five tillahs. We then came to Balkh by Keshi, asked for help which he denied us; we then came to Tashkurgan, and the ruler of that place would not help us; we then started for Kabul, and arrived there on the 15th day of Ramazan, and two days after went with a petition to the Amir; he ordered us to present ourselves the next day. We left the Durbar at 11 a.m., a great many soldiers had come to the Amir's quarters and demanded pay from him; the Peshkhidmats said they would receive it after two or three days, the soldiers said they must have it then. The officers who came with the soldiers ordered them to kill the Amir, who hid himself. The rioters then went at the Embassy; the defenders closed the gate and guns were fired from both sides. I saw these as I was standing on a mound outside the Bala Hissar; about 400 of the mutineers were killed and 100 wounded. They then fired the Embassy, and all inside were burnt, only three that were outside managed to escape, and were captured afterwards. The rioters then plundered the treasury, and told the Amir they would give him three days' grace, and if their pay was not forthcoming they would kill him; after this period they got their three months' pay and three months' rations. They then went towards Kurram. I am unable to say whether this attack was made with the instigation of the Amir or not. We remained five or six days more in Kabul, asked for help which was not given, and we then came this way, and wish to return to our country, but have not the means of getting there. We came by Jellalabad. On our arrival there some one informed the Governor that we were Englishmen; we were secured and afterwards released, and the Hakim gave us rupees six. We got on to a raft, came down the river to Michni and then Peshawur. I saw no troops on the way, nor did anyone mention that they were coming from Kabul to Jellalabad.

NOTE.

The informants have been forwarded to Bombay to the Turkish Consul. It has been often said that the Amir was threatened openly by the troops, that they made first for the Amir's palace, but were turned by the guard, and I suspect that there is truth in this.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 13 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of HOSEIN, of Hoti Murdan, Syce of the late Lieutenant HAMILTON, V.C., Guides Corps, 23rd September 1879.

ON the day of the attack I went out early in the morning to get grass. Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly also went out about the same time with us for their morning ride. Duffadar Futtah Muhammad Khan and two sowars of the Guides and four sowars of the Amir were with us as guard. About 8 or 9 a.m., while we were cutting grass about two kos distant from the Bala Hissar, we heard shots being fired.

The mounted escort rode about to find out and galloped off across the meadows. Shortly after the villagers of a village turned out armed and attacked us. We mounted our tats and galloped off towards the Bala Hissar. Five or six mounted men rode after us, but when I said I was a Mussulman, they did not kill me at the orders of their captain, but plundered me, took away the pony I rode which belonged to Mr. Hamilton. Three

cavalry regiments of the Amir were encamped upon the grass plain called the "Chaman," it has no other name, below the Bala Hissar, and they mounted about this time.

Some of them were the men who robbed me of my pony and clothes; they told me Cavagnari Sahib had been killed. Then they took me to a village some two kos distant from the Bala Hissar, called Sak, and there a captain in the cavalry, called Muhammad Hassan, brother of Muhammad Afzal, who now has Mr. Hamilton's pony in his possession, kept me concealed for three days. He had saved my life when the sowars plundered me. He concealed me because the people would have killed me. The fourth day I went to Kabul, to the Murad khani mohulla (which is the Shiah quarter, and not on good terms with the rest of the Kabul city, which is Sunni), where I had heard Futtah Muhammad, Duffadar, had found refuge with the relations of Gul Badshah and Muhammad Sherif Khan, native officers in the Guides. I am a Shiah myself, originally from Kabul. There I heard from men who had been in the attack that the three regiments (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Grenadiers?) "Grandilaw-wal" "doyam" and "Grandi Soyam," which, drawn up for their pay on the Chaman, below the Bala Hissar, broke and attacked their general, Daud Shah, who had abused them for not taking one month's pay. They attacked the Residency with stones, plundered the treasury and arsenal, and fired on the Residency. I saw Ghulam Nabi, orderly to Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was beside him, and he said that Sir Louis had been shot in the forehead while on the roof early in the morning. Immediately afterwards, Ghulam Nabi says, Sir Louis wrote a note to the Amir, and gave it to him to take to the Amir. Ghulam Nabi went off to the Amir, through the postern gate at the back of Residency, with the letter; the Amir told him verbally, "What can I do?" and sent a high Sirdar to remonstrate, but it was no use. Ghulam Nabi, who is now in Kabul with his relations in the Murad khani quarter, still has Sir Louis' note to the Amir, and something written by the Amir. Futtah Muhammad told me Taimur had escaped about 11 a.m., and had gone to Peshawur. I was told Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns charged two or three times, sword in hand, and were then shot there. Dr. Kelly lay dead in the Residency; also Sir Louis lay there, but his corpse was never found. Those of Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns and Dr. Kelly were recognised and buried. I don't know where. People said the Amir had privately buried them. I left Kabul 10 or 12 days ago, dressed as a fakir. Ghulam Nabi gave me the striped blanket I have. He and Futtah Muhammad are the only survivors of the escort I know of. The three regiments that attacked the Residency left for Istalif in the Kohi Daman, where there is treasure. I did not see them leave, but their baggage had gone. The Amir was in the Bala Hissar, and had sent regiments towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Kandahar.

None were coming this way. The country is quiet at Jellalabad. I don't know what became of Russul sepoy. I saw Lieutenant Hamilton's horse "Mushki" tied up in a meadow in front of where the mutinous regiments were encamped; also another horse belonging to a sowar. I was about five days in Kabul. I was told that the regiments first went to the Amir's residence, but he escaped into his harem. The Amir sent the regiments towards Kandahar, &c., or else dismissed them to their homes before this attack.

I know nothing about movements of troops after it. All the Chandol quarter arms itself at night, and sentries are posted all round. They are afraid of being attacked by the Sunnis. The city is quiet.

NOTE.

The informant says that it was about an hour after the firing began in the Bala Hissar that the cavalry mounted and came down upon them. Informant did not know of Russul's safety. The departure of the three mutinous "orderly" or household regiments is confirmed.

I believe this statement to be trustworthy.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 14 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of ABDUR RAHIM, of Pujjuggi, Peshawur, dated 23rd September 1879.

My brother, Gul Muhammad, was Duffadar in the Guides escort at the Residency. I was there with him. On the day of the attack I had gone to the bazaar in the morning. Two regiments were on the way to parade to receive their pay from Daud Shah. Bands were playing, and people looking on.

I met the regiments, and turned back to see the sight of the parade. They objected to one month's pay, and commenced to throw stones at Daud Shah, and hit him, and with bayonets wounded him in the right side. I was looking on. They were not armed otherwise. The members of the Mission were looking on from their high house. One regiment then suddenly went off for their arms, and the other regiment fetched the guns. They fired on the Residency, and would not be stopped. About 2 p.m. Lieutenant Hamilton charged out of the gateway, sword in hand, at the guns. He cut over two men, when a number fired at once, and shot him with some Guide sepoy who were with him, and cut them to pieces. The Afghans then ran in and commenced to plunder; others set fire to the building, and threw powder bags into the Residency. About 2 p.m. Sir L. Cavagnari, then on the roof, was shot in the right eye. I heard he had sent a note to the Amir by a Kizzilbash of the Chandol quarter.

By this time the Residency fell in, and many were buried in the ruins and others killed in the "hammam," near the Residency. A sowar of the Guides rushed out at the end, crying he was a Syud, and was spared. Don't know his name. He is in Kabul.

Two Sahibs were lying dead in the courtyard, and were cut to pieces. Sir L. Cavagnari's corpse was not found. I remained a week in Kabul in a mosque, hiding. The day after this the Amir and Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan went to Shahr-i-naw, where the mutinous regiments were camped. He told them they had done badly, and ruined him. They replied, they wished for a religious war, disliked Daud Shah, and begged Muhammad Jan Topchi Bashi to be made general; also Wali Muhammad Khan to be made commander-in-chief. This was done. On the 5th day the two regiments were sent towards the Kohi Daman to get in land revenue.

The road from Gandamak to here is safe. I was searched at Butkhak, and again at Tanga.

This statement is also trustworthy. All said here has been confirmed by others. Muhammad Jan has been made commander-in-chief, and is said by some to have been one of the leaders in the attack on the Embassy. He is also said to have been the author of the death of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan himself has taken away the three mutinous regiments to Kohistan, the object given out being to collect the revenue.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 15 in No. 32.

STATEMENT OF KHAIRULLA, son of GOLAB PATHAN, Anaskhel, resident of YAR HUSSAIN.

Had a land suit. My son was in the Guides, and went with the Embassy escort to Kabul. I went after Sir L. Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I. Passed four nights in Kabul with my son. On the morning of the 5th the outbreak arose, and I witnessed the result myself.

The Ardal Regiment had some words with General Daud Shah about their pay; the General wished to give them a month's pay, whilst the regiment demanded that of seven; the soldiers attacked the General with their bayonets, and struck him with stones and fists; the people rescued him. The regiment then moved towards the quarters of Sir Louis, which were at Azim Khan's place. The gates were locked, the soldiers broke the wall on the eastern side, entered, and commenced firing. Sir Louis told them to desist, and 12 months' pay would be given them. The men remained quiet for half an hour. The Khasadar Regiment with the city people then arrived, commenced firing. In this they were joined by all who were present. Major Cavagnari in a loud voice tried to stop them, but they would not heed; he himself was wounded by a shot in the forehead, and then sent a letter to the Amir by the hands of a Hindu, stating that he was at the point of death; if he could rescue the other officers, it would be a good thing for him.

No reply came to this. At last he (Major Cavagnari) ordered his men to fire, until his men were slain.

Sir Louis was placed on a cot and brought below. A short time after, the other officers and men were driven out, the building set on fire, and then the rioters killed the officers and their remaining companions.

A small portion of the day was left when all was over. My son, Hamzulla, was killed also. I was robbed of my property, and then let go. Two men, a resident of Zeyda,

and the other of either Barikab or Kattakhat were allowed to go, as they said they were "Sayads," and I corroborated their account. I do not remember their names.

I heard in Kabul that Yakub Khan's mother was proceeding to Dakka, and that Yakub Khan had sent letters to Kandahar, Herat, Maimena, to fetch all troops there, and had summoned the country people for a "Ghaza." About 180 of the rioters were killed and 30 wounded. I saw the heads of the officers (3) and one of a Sikh native officer cut by the men of the "Ardal" Regiment and taken by the Amir's dewdi, and placed on a stone outside the Bala Hissar below a bridge, a public place where every one passed by. I saw these heads the day after the fight in the morning. Major Cavagnari's was not with theirs, as his body had been burnt in the fire. I did not hear the heads had been taken before the Amir, but imagine they must have been taken.

NOTE.

This old man feels very bitterly the murder of his son, the loss of his property, including Sir Louis Cavagnari's letter, and his own danger when in Kabul; therefore too much dependence cannot be placed upon his word. He, however, stoutly maintained that the heads of the British officers had been exposed upon a bridge, and I shall not be surprised if this is found to be correct. All natives would, as a rule, deny it.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Peshawur, 23rd September 1879. Commissioner.

Enclosure 16 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of FAKIR MUHAMMAD, syce of TAIMUR SOWAR, GUIDES, Lundikotal, 25th September 1879; also of Fazldin, dhobi of the Sowars Guides Escort, dated 25th September 1879.

FAKIR MUHAMMAD.—I went out grass cutting on the day of the attack on the Residency, and hearing the noise, and being told of what was happening, fled into the city of Kabul, where I found refuge with Ghulam Mohiyudin Hakim, with whom I have come down. I did not see anything that happened.

FAZLDIN.—On the morning in question I went out early from the Bala Hissar to wash clothes, and while doing so heard the firing on the Residency, and saw the beginning of the attack from where I stood. Shortly after the mob plundered me and seized the clothes I was washing, when I fled to the city of Kabul, where I found refuge in the Murad Khani quarter, and came down with Ghulam Mohiyudin the Hakim. Five days before the attack supplies for the Residency ceased to come in.

One sepoy of the escort said that there was some coolness between the Amir and the Envoy. This they said a few days before the attack took place.

Enclosure 17 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of GHULAM MOHIYUDIN, Hakim of Peshawur, MOHALLA RAWALAN, GUZAR SARASIA, Lundikotal, 25th September 1879.

I TRAVEL about as a Hakim, chiefly as an eye-doctor, and in the course of my travels went from Peshawur to Balkh about a year and a half ago. About two months ago I left Mazar-i-Sharif near Balkh to return *via* Kabul to Peshawur. I was present in Mazar-i-Sharif when Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and I saw the corpse myself and joined in the funeral procession. When I left Balkh and Turkestan, all was quiet there, and Ghulam Hyder Khan was Governor. I recollect hearing it said in the Chandol quarter in Kabul where I was living that the troops of the Amir said among themselves, "The escort of the 'Kafir' will not leave Kabul alive." That was the day before the attack. In the attack the town mob joined, about 340 of the assailants were killed by the Residency defenders. I did not see the fight. For about three days there was anarchy in Kabul, but the city was not plundered. The Amir's arsenal was looted. The Amir has little authority in Kabul; the troops are quite out of hand. Daud Shah is only slightly wounded.

The road from Kabul is open and safe. I brought the syce and dhobi down with me from Kabul.

Enclosure 18 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of HASSANGUL, of Gujarat, YUSUFZAI, Sepoy, No. 2 Co., Guide Corps, dated
Lundikotal, 25th September 1879.

MEMORANDUM.

MULLAH AHMEDJI, in his statement taken on the 14th instant at Peshawur, mentioned having met a Guide Sepoy of Gujarat, Yusufzai, at Butkhak.

Hassan Gul.—About 8 a.m. I was outside the Residency, when I heard the cry “dam-i-charyar” (the Sunni cry) from the place where Daud Shah held his durbar, and saw a cloud of dust. Presently troops came running up from that direction towards the Residency. I came into the barracks and saw Hossein, Havildar, standing at the gateway. We shut it and they began to stone us from outside. Mr. Hamilton came out of the Residency to our barracks and told us not to fire but to stand behind the parapet on the roof. We did so, and made long holes in it; 20 sepoys remained on the barrack roof, and the rest, including myself, went into the Residency itself. Just then Syud Mir, sepoy, reported that they were plundering the horses. They then commenced to fire upon us, and we received orders to fire. Sir L. Cavagnari also fired from the roof, and firing grew hot. Sir Louis fired five shots. There were two shouldaries pitched in the courtyard of the Residency, one was full of miscellaneous things, and the other held ammunition and the treasure. The first shouldari stood close to the wall of the courtyard at the rear of the Residency, and the Afghans broke a hole into the wall there and commenced firing through it. I informed Mr. Jenkyns of it; he was in the Residency then, and he sent me, Mihrdil, Sepoy, and a Sikh to the place. We struck the shouldari in order to get at the men firing through the hole, and Mihrdil was shot through the arm. I led him into the Residency, and saw Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns there. I was told there that Sir Louis was wounded. On passing the room where the wounded lay I looked through the open door and saw Sir Louis lying on his back, the knees drawn up, and Dr. Kelly sitting by his head. I asked Amaldin, Sir Louis’ Afridi orderly, what it was, and Amaldin pointed to his forehead. He said nothing. I could not see what Dr. Kelly was doing. Just then the news was brought that the Afghan has reached the roof by ladders, and Lieutenant Hamilton told us to fire from the staircase leading up to the roof. Karak Sing, Havildar, was shot there beside me, also Mehtab Sing, both mortally. Lieutenant Hamilton told us to charge on to the roof. Hossein, Havildar, and I replied that we were too few to clear the roof of the Afghans. There were seven of us. The guns had been brought up by the Afghans at this time to the gateway, and they were firing with them. Lieutenant Hamilton and Mr. Jenkyns then went down to the gateway; the Afghans had got into the building, and were setting fire to it and coming down the stairs. I was then in the building, and I and other sepoys got mixed up with the crowd; we were in plain clothes. Among the crowd was Tor Khan, Subadar in the Amir’s army. I was stripped, and Tor ordered me to be shot, but the others said, “He is a Mahomedan, spare him.” Then Tor told me to put a bundle of loot on my head and to walk out by a hole in the courtyard and come with him. He took me to his house where I stayed five days. I left on the sixth day and came along here with some Syuds of Kunar. I was searched at Tanga.

Cross-examined at Peshawur, 27th September 1879.

I don’t know about any syce being killed in the stable before we fired, but we could see one of the Sikh Mounted Guides lying in the stable by his horse with his head cut open and not dead, and one of the Amir’s soldiers dead beside him. He had been defending his horse, and it was not until they carried off the horses that we had permission to fire. The Orderly Regiment that came for its pay and began the mutiny was not as a rule, armed. All men had their bayonets and knives in their belts, and a few had their rifles, and shots were fired when the stone throwing began. It was not until other shots had been fired that Sir Louis Cavagnari himself fired four shots, killing four men.

There was great feeling against us in Kabul. The regiments in the Bala Hissar spoke of us all as infidels, and we were none of us, not even Mahamedans, upon speaking terms with them; we used to go in parties of four or five into the city armed, for shopping, but could not have gone safely alone, and the Sikh and Hindus never went into the city at all. They used to go out in parties of 10 or 12 to bathe and wash their clothes. The people of the city certainly abused us, and the Envoy and officers never went out of the Bala Hissar unless followed by a troop of about 40 of the Amir’s

cavalry, beside the Guide Mounted Escort. I only saw the Envoy once in the garden walking alone, and then some of the Guides put on their uniforms and joined him. When we first reached Kabul the Envoy or the officers used to visit the Amir every day, but latterly the visits became much less frequent. When we first reached Kabul there was in the courtyard a guard of the Amir's troops, not the "Orderly" but the other regiments, and it was found that they took down the names of all people who came to visit the Envoy. When Sir Louis heard of this he made some excuse and got rid of the guard, saying it was not wanted. When I was in Tor Khan's house during the five days after the massacre of the Embassy, I heard that the day after the Amir had sent for all the native officers, brigadiers, &c., and said to them, "I am in your hands, you have taken all my property, and my family and wives and children are yours also; you can do what you like, and can make me a prisoner and hand me over to the British Government if you like," upon which the officers all said they would fight, and have "a religious war."

When Daud Shah was paying the troops their pay, they refused; he offered them only one month's pay and told them they were to go off the next day to Kohistan to get in the revenue. When they asked for more he told them to go and get it from Cavagnari Sahib. He was angry, and said this to annoy them. He was stoned and wounded in the side by a bayonet.

We were too few, and the Residency was too large for us to hold; they completely surrounded us.

The Amir's troops broke a hole in the wall so as to fire into the courtyard where the magazine was; against this wall were a number of tent poles, and through them the enemy could fire at us, whilst in returning the fire we only hit the tent poles. I was sent by Mr. Jenkyns to clear away the tent poles and the tent, which prevented us from getting a fair aim at the men who were breaking through the wall. In doing this Mehtab Sing who was with me was wounded in the arm, and I got splashed with his blood. I got him away and brought back his rifle. I pushed down all the poles and cut the tent down, then they made a hole as large as a doorway and fired through it. The officers cheered me on, calling out "Well done," "Well done." Tor Khan gave me afterwards to carry to his home, a double-barrelled rifle and a pea-rifle and some clothes, part of his plunder. A Subadar in the Amir's army ranks below a Jemadar, the reverse of our system.

We used not to complain to the Sahibs that we were abused in the streets and called Kafirs; we should have been ashamed; they would have said we were afraid; we sepoy used to talk together and say something of this kind would happen.

There were three regiments in the Bala Hissar, two Orderly regiments who also, when in uniform, wear the kilt and a third line regiment on the magazine.

It was the kilted, or Orderly Regiments, that began the outbreak and refused their pay. They had been ordered to Kohistan on the 4th. They had nothing to do with Herat. Some Herat regiments had come in perhaps 15 days previously, and they had threatened to attack the Embassy. So it was common bazaar report, and we were warned by the Sahibs not to go to the bazaar. Then a few days afterwards the Amir gave nearly all leave, only a few men in a company remained. They were two kos off in the new cantonments, and never joined in the attack at all.

There were 12 boxes of treasure. I hear we started with 21,000—one box was emptied, the rest full—all must have been plundered before the house fell. The room in which Sir L. Cavagnari was lying was full of men, Guides as well as the Amir's, all dead.

On the night of the 4th I went after dark with Guldin Mohmand of Sultanpur in Kunar, a servant of Hussain Ali Sayad, to see the bodies, which had been dragged out of the houses and thrown over the wall of the fort by the Amir's order on the 4th.

Most of them were stripped—not all—none of them had their heads cut off, but they were lying as they fell in a heap under the wall: officers and men all covered with dust and they had begun to decompose. They were all scanted (?) and most of them stripped where they were killed. (Khairulla says, he saw the heads exposed, but I think this is untrue). The Amir did send his son to the sepoy with the Koran on his head, and they took the Koran away and told him to go home. This is what I heard all the sepoy saying afterwards. The sepoy all said they would fight, but the officers one and all used to say; "You won't fight and can't resist, and the British force will come and Kabul is doomed."

I came by Butkhak, Barikao—Asmatulla Khan's country, and Lughman; troops and a mule battery can go the way I returned.

Enclosure 19 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of PIR MUHAMMAD, HALIMZAI, Resident of Kunar, dated the 27th September 1879.

I AM a servant of Sirdar Zulficar Khan and Sirdar Saleh Muhammad Khan who are in Lahore. They sent me to Kabul two months ago to solicit Major Cavagnari to get their lands released which had been confiscated by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan. I reached Kabul four days after the arrival of Major Cavagnari at that place, and submitted to the Amir the letter from the above-mentioned Sirdars (on the above subject). His Highness observed that he would make inquiry when he could go to Lahore for a meeting with the Viceroy.

The sister of these Sirdars who is married to Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the brother of the Amir, received a similar reply from His Highness on inquiry. I was at Kabul when the Embassy was attacked at noon.

Sirdar Bahadur Ghulam Nakshband Khan was sitting with Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan in the latter's house in the Bala Hissar, when a noise was heard from the Duftar where the pay was being distributed to some regiments. The Sirdar Bahadur sent a man to bring information, the man returned quickly saying that he could not go farther as the regiments had mutinied, and were killing men. The Sirdar Bahadur went to the house of the Mustafi, and I went to Deh-Afghanan to tell the men of the Sirdar Bahadur to conceal their property. From Deh-Afghanan I returned to the Bala Hissar to the house of Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, and the son of the Amir, about eight years old, and Sirdar Muhammad Yahya Khan, with a copy of the Koran, went and prohibited the regiments from mutinying. The regiments were firing on the Residency, and would not obey the order of Yahya Khan and of the Amir's son.

One Orderly Regiment was standing by the gateway of the Amir's house, having made up their mind to kill him if he came out, but His Highness went into the harem. The son of the Amir and Sirdar Yahya Khan returned to the Amir when their entreaties failed. The two regiments who attacked the Residency were the Amir's "Orderly" Regiments, and consisted of men of various classes and sects. I have heard from all sources that when the pay was being distributed by Colonel Karim Khan, nephew of Arsalan Khan, General Muhammad Jan Khan, Wardak, gave orders to use violence.

Three regiments were standing to receive their pay; they said that the Amir had given orders for three months' pay, but Colonel Karim Khan told them that only one month's pay had been ordered, and referred them to Major Cavagnari. In the meantime General Daud Shah came from the Amir and beat a sepoy with a stick, another sepoy asked him why he beat his comrade, and a captain hurt the General with his sword. The mutinous sepoys proceeded towards the Residency, were fired at, and 25 of them were killed; then the sepoys who were unarmed went into the arsenal and brought arms and attacked the Residency. They brought two guns and fired at the Residency and demolished the upper story, then they set fire to the gateway, and went into the Residency, and attacked the Embassy after 2 p.m.

After this the mutineers plundered the bazaar in the Bala Hissar and the Amir's arsenal and other things, but the treasury was spared. The General in the upper Bala Hissar allowed the mutineers to take arms from the arsenal and joined in the mutiny. The fire burnt out in six or seven days. The Amir gave an order that the bodies should be discovered by removing the earth over them. No bodies were discovered during my stay at Kabul, excepting that of the young Sahib, who rushed over the gun, by coming three times out of the gate, and who killed two mutineers, went back by the gate, and was wounded and fell.

Major Cavagnari was wounded first of all with a bullet, and on receipt of this information the Amir sent his son, but the mutineers would not obey his order. The Amir was coming out from his house, but Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan and Sirdar Shahbaz Khan prevented him, saying that he would be killed. The Amir observed that the outbreak would lead to his disgrace, that Major Cavagnari had been wounded, and that he would save other members of the Embassy and send them away.

Formerly a Guard of the "Shabi" Regiment was placed on the gate of the Residency, but Major Cavagnari dismissed it 20 days before the occurrence. Nothing was heard of intention to mutiny before the actual outbreak; the Herati regiments of course talked loudly and asked where Cavagnari was, and why he had come. The Amir disarmed them and they went to their homes.

I left Kabul shortly after the occurrence. One day before my departure the Amir had the agent of Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, killed, and sent three Orderly Regiments to Kohistan with General Muhammad Jan Khan to remain in that province. The

Amir began collecting men of the Herati Regiments and of other regiments to ask them if they would make the three Orderly Regiments prisoners. The next day the mutineers proceeded to the house of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, but he came out with the Koran, read "the Kalama," and was spared. The Amir intended to collect some tribesmen and regiments to take their opinion how the massacre of the Embassy should be avenged. The three regiments who had mutinied were sent by the Amir to Turkestan to avoid further disturbance by them in Kabul. Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan was suspected by some people to have instigated the mutiny.

Enclosure 20 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of FATTEH MUHAMMAD, son of Muhammad Yar Tajak, Resident of Kohistan.
Taken on 30th September 1879.

I SERVED as a syce in the Guides Corps for 12 years and went to Kabul with Taimur, a sowar of the British Embassy. On the day of the massacre I and 24 other grass-cutters went towards the village of Bini Hissar at 6.30 a.m., with two sowars of the Amir, and two sowars and one duffadar of the Guides. At 12 o'clock a cry was heard and many people and some Bini Hissar villagers coming up with knives and sticks in their hands, they carried off our ponies, and plundered our things, and killed three or four men, sparing others who ran away. I hid myself in a maize crop, and at night came to the city, and remained two days in a shrine in the Murad khani quarter. From Kabul I returned to Peshawur *via* Jellalabad.

Enclosure 21 in No. 32.

STATEMENT of SAID MUHAMMAD, son of SAID MIRAN, age 50, taken at PESHAWUR, on 30th September 1879.

I HAVE served as a syce to Major Cavagnari, and was with him at Kabul. When Major Cavagnari went to visit the Amir I used to go with him to hold his horse outside the Durbar. His interview with the Amir generally lasted from half to one hour, but an interview held two days before the massacre took *two* hours, and I asked Ghulam Muhammad orderly what was the reason of the long interview, and why did Major Cavagnari seem annoyed when he came out from the Durbar, and he told me that the Amir had refused to go to Turkestan and Herat, and that Major Cavagnari would go to Peshawur *via* Jellalabad. On the day of the occurrence I was sitting on a mound with some sepoy of the escort of the Residency, when a cry of "Ya Char Yar" by some regiments was heard from the direction of the Amir's Durbar. On inquiry from a Kabuli, we ascertained that some regiments had become disaffected because General Daud Shuh had refused to pay their pay for more than one month, and that they had thrown stones at the General, and were coming towards the Residency. I and the sepoys went in, and the sepoys shut the door against the mutineers; the mutineers were unarmed; and they went to fetch arms while the armed regiment in the Bala Hissar who were guarding the arsenal came up and fired at the Residency. The city mob and some sepoys came into the stable and plundered the horses and other things. I had put two saddles and four swords in a room, and had closed the door and hidden myself there, but two mutineers broke the door and took away the saddles and swords, and inquired about treasury. I left the room, and finding that firing was going on, I concealed myself in an underground room until evening, and then I found that fire had been set to the Residency. I came secretly to Charikar, Nijrab, Tagab, Lughnan, Jellalabad, and Peshawur. At Charikar I heard that three Infantry Regiments had been sent from Kabul towards Jellalabad, and that Abdul Karim Khan, Kohistani, had been killed by order of the Amir. The regiment which first mutinied on account of a dispute about their pay was an "Orderly" Regiment, and the regiment which joined the mutineers from the Bala Hissar wore black uniform.

MEMORANDUM.

THIS syce is an Afghan, and had been seven years in the service of Sir Louis Cavagnari.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

Enclosure 22 in No. 32.

Translation of Proclamation issued by the AMIR YAKUB KHAN to the Mohmand Tribe, dated 8th Shawal H. 1296 (25th September 1879).

It is hereby notified that whereas the old treaty engagements between the God-granted Government of Afghanistan and the Sublime British Government are still firm, and the same cordial friendship and concord (as before) still subsist between them; and whereas the troops of the latter Government have started only for the purpose of rendering aid and restoring order to the Government of His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan, you should lend your friendly assistance in the best way you can to that Government, and should know that the foundation of friendship and concord (between the two Governments), which other Governments have acknowledged (lit. made known) is firm, and that it has been proved to me to be sincere. It is therefore incumbent on you who are the well-wishers of the God-granted Government, to provide, to the best of your ability, the camp of the British Government with supplies and carriage, for which you will receive payment.

No one should interfere with, or oppose those, who belong to that camp, but you should restrain your hands, feet, and tongue from causing injury to their lives and property. Under any circumstances do not act contrary to the spirit of this Proclamation. Should you behave or act improperly towards the troops of the above-mentioned Government, you will certainly have to account for it.

Enclosure 23 in No. 32.

No. 15, dated Ali Khel, 26th September 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward in original, for the information of his Excellency the

i.—From His Highness the Amir of Kabul to Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Muhammad, dated 24th September 1879.

ii.—Ditto ditto forwarding letter from Muhammad Jan Khan.

iii.—From Muhammad Jan Khan to His Highness the Amir, dated 23rd September 1879.

iv.—From Sirdar Sher Ali Khan to His Highness the Amir, dated 16th September 1879.

Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted, which were sent to me by the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan this morning after his departure from the camp.

Enclosure 24 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR to MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH, MUHAMMAD KHAN, dated 6th Shawal, 1296 H.=(23rd (24th?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Be it known to you that yesterday, Tuesday (*sic*) the fifth current (22nd September) I received a letter from Muhammad Jan Khan, the "Ghat Mashr" (General?) which I send herewith, in original, so that you may read it and know to what extent the seditious and ill-disposed persons excited and are instigating disturbances. The "Ghat Mashr" (General?) has placed a certain person in confinement. The latter confesses that so and so had sent him to the Kohistan camp to tell such and such things to the troops and the people. The man is in prison and will be kept there till you arrive here safely. When you come, and he repeats the same confession in your presence, he will, please God, receive his punishment.

I hope that through God's favour the friendship between me and the British Government will neither be interrupted nor diminished; that the basis of the treaty engagements between us will become stronger than before; and that the enemies and evil-wishers of the two Governments will suffer shame and disgrace and lose their credit.

Enclosure 25 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from GHAT MASHR (General?) MUHAMMAD JAN KHAN, to the AMIR, dated the 5th Shawal=(22nd (23rd?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.— I beg to inform your Highness that yesterday Monday (*sic*) the 4th current*, a man in disguise and in appearance a beggar entered my camp. By the favour of your Highness' fortune his treacherous and spy-like manner came to my notice. I called him and examined him. But he endeavoured, as much as he could, to avoid mentioning the object (of his visit) and talked nonsense. At last I prevailed upon him, partly by threats, and partly by coaxing, to state that Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan had sent him to spread a report in my camp that the Amir has invited the English of his own accord, and that he is going to make his country over to them, and to transplant the people of Kohistan to Turkestan, as well as to ascertain how the "Ghat Mashr" (General) is treating the officers, and whether he and they are united or not. Having ascertained the above, I have sent him to your Highness with Muhammad Aslam Khan, who will represent the whole circumstance from the beginning to the end.

I have applied to your Highness for some sowars as well as for a physician and a druggist. Both the sowars and the physician are required.

* 21st September 1879.

Enclosure 26 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from the AMIR, to the MUSTAUFI and WAZIR SHAH MUHAMMAD, dated 6th Shawal, 1296 H.=(23rd September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your letters dated 5 P.M., Monday, the 4th Shawal (21st September) have reached me this morning, Wednesday the 6th idem*. I have learnt (from them) the account of the honourable reception accorded to you by the officers of the illustrious British Government as well as of your interview with General Roberts. It is sincerely hoped that through the favour of God the hearts of the representatives of the illustrious Government will be entirely satisfied with and assured of my sincerity and honesty, and that whatever may lead to the welfare of the two Governments and increase their mutual friendship, will be planned and arranged by you and the General, and that the matter will be settled according to our wish and desire.

* 23rd September 1879.

Enclosure 27 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN, GOVERNOR of Kandahar, to the AMIR, dated the 27th Ramazan=(15th (16th?) September 1879).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—Your Highness' sublime letter of the 20th Ramzan (8th September) has reached me and enhanced my honour, and as it contained the news of your Highness' good health I rendered thanks to God.

The state of affairs (here) is that before the news of the disturbances in Kabul was known here, I received a letter from my brother Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan bitterly complaining of the people of Pusht Rud, and stating that he considers it extremely difficult to deal with those ignorant people. As the report of the mutiny of the Kabul troops had not then been verified and was only a rumour I did not reply to him. Although he had heard from your Highness, yet when I received your Highness' royal letter, I addressed him two letters, one in the ordinary form containing the news of my welfare, and another confidentially giving an account of the affairs in Kabul. The former letter, in order to furnish him with an excuse (to leave Pusht Rud) was written to the following effect: "As Major St. John is leaving for Herat and His Highness the Amir has sent strict orders to accord him an honourable reception (on the road), you should come to Girishk to receive him and appoint the Khawanin (officials) to collect the revenue." In the other letter I wrote to him to the effect that "If you think you can deal (with the people) and remain (at the place), well and good, and should you apprehend any danger and think you cannot remain there, show the other letter to the people and come to Girishk."

Yesterday I received another letter from my brother's servant to the effect that "the people of Pusht Rud having heard of the disturbances in Kabul are about to revolt, and as I noticed the improper attitude of those people, I have by a thousand devices

“ succeeded in getting to Sirhind to the Kila of Najib-ullah Khan, Ghilzai, who is a faithful servant of His Highness (the Amir). Girishk is too far. I cannot go anywhere else, and I am unable to live here with my men and horses. I am in great straits.”

Having received such an account from my brother, I sent Taj Muhammad Khan and Sabib Khan, Ghilzai, yesterday, Sunday the 26th Ramazan (14th September) to bring him from Kila Najib-ullah Khan. The two above-named persons left yesterday.

Nothing else worthy of notice has taken place. Since it was necessary to acquaint your Highness with my brother's state I have done so. Further, rest assured in every respect about this place. Things are going just as I represented before.

Enclosure 28 in No. 32.

No. 250, dated Kandahar, September 29, 1879.

From MAJOR M. PROTHEROE, Extra Political Officer, Kandahar, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

I HAVE been desired by the Lieutenant-General Commanding to forward for your information translations of two letters received on the 27th instant by Sirdar Sher Ali Khan from Sirdars Muhammad Hassan Khan and Roshundil Khan, now at Kabul.

2. The letters are somewhat ambiguous, but Sirdar Sher Ali Khan's interpretations have been added in footnotes.

Enclosure 29 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I arrived at Kabul on the 5th of September, and waited on the Amir, who told me that he had made proper arrangements (for his government), though contrary to the wishes of the wise men who have brought his government to grief (meaning Mustaufi Habibulla and Daud Shah Khan). It now remained to be seen what would be the result. The Amir also narrated to me the particulars of the fight at the Residency. I replied to the Amir that it was God's will, and he may bring good out of it. My brother Roshundil has sent to you by Kasid "Poyendah" an account of the fight between Sir L. Cavagnari's escort and the mutineers. You who are the wisest men in the world well know that the action of these regiments (the mutineers) emanated from their chiefs. The Amir has received news from the English that the Treaty which had been made is still in force, and that the Cavagnari disaster will not interfere with it, as such incidents have previously occurred in other governments. The English desire to add two articles to the Treaty to strengthen it, and have requested him (the Amir) to send a confidential man with full powers. His Highness accordingly sent Mustaufi Habibulla and Shah Muhammad Khan, who started on the 1st Shawal for the English camp. English troops have passed the Shuturguridan, and halted. We are anxious to know what the two articles are. (The rest of the letter refers to the writer's private affairs.)

[Sher Ali Khan states that the "proper arrangements" referred to in this letter were an intention expressed by the Amir to his Treasurer, Lall Khan, to appoint Sirdar Sher Ali Khan as chief of the administration of Afghanistan, an intention which was subsequently set aside through the intrigues of Daud Shah and Mustaufi Habibulla, and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan was sent to Kandahar.]

Enclosure 30 in No. 32.

Translation of a Letter from ROSHUNDIL KHAN to SIRDAR SHER ALI KHAN (without date).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I acknowledge receipt of your letter on the 3rd Shawal (19th September). I have sent you an account of the murder of Cavagnari and of the talk here by the Kasid whom you sent. I send you some more news. There are five* persons belonging to the army who are the instigators of this mutiny. Of course they are known to you, but they could

* Probably means "a few."

not control the mutiny after it had once begun. The cause of the mutiny was as follows: Ten days before this occurrence the Naibs through Sidar Yahya Khan claimed the arrears of the accounts. The Amir agreed to the amount of their claims; the Naibs told the Amir he had been cheated out of 15 or 20 lakhs in the accounts of the army alone. The Amir acted on this statement, and then the mutiny broke out. * * *

The Amir has discharged two cavalry regiments, and has no confidence in his troops, and his army does not obey him. The English have no ill-feeling towards the Amir. * * *

[Sirdar Sher Ali Khan states that the five persons herein referred to who were the instigators of the mutiny are Daud Shah Khan and his adherents. The meaning of the passage regarding the Naibs, &c., is that Daud Shah Khan and the Mustaufi were accused by the Naibs of having misappropriated some 15 or 20 lakhs, and to avert an inquiry which the Amir intended to make, got up the disturbance which they were subsequently unable to control.]

(Signed) M. PROTHEROE, Major,
Extra Political Officer.

No. 33.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE, 22nd October 1879, to VICEROY. (Extract.)

PROCLAMATION, which must now be issued by General Roberts, should leave the future for future consideration, but you may assert present military supremacy of the British Government to this effect:—

“ I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own freewill abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.

“ The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities, Chiefs, and Sirdars, do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me whenever necessary.

“ The British Government desire that the people shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected.

“ The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognised, but all disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment.

“ The British Government, after consultation with the principal Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people.”

No. 34.

No. 224 of 1879 (Extract).

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 23, 1879.

WE have the honour to submit a summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, and the progress of our military operations in that country.

2. On the 13th October General Roberts telegraphed that early on the preceding morning the Amir Yakub Khan came on foot to his tent, with two attendants, and that His Highness had declared his resolution to resign the government of Afghanistan. His Highness was treated with great courtesy by General Roberts, who begged him to think over the matter; but at a second interview, a few hours later, the Amir said that his determination was unchanged, and General Roberts has since reported that he believes it

to be irrevocable. This important and unexpected declaration has been communicated to your Lordship for the information and orders of Her Majesty's Government; and General Roberts was at once desired to report further upon the circumstances in which the resignation, as soon as it is publicly known, will have placed him, and upon the various and complicated political considerations involved.

3. General Roberts entered the Bala Hissar on the 12th October. The Amir did not accompany him, but Sirdar Musa Khan, the eldest son of the Amir, and other principal Sirdars were in attendance; and special care was taken that the proceedings upon formal occupation of the capital and its fortress should be impressive. After reaching the Amir's garden in the Bala Hissar, General Roberts issued the proclamation, which will be found among the enclosures to this despatch. It notified to the inhabitants of Kabul the penalties which would be inflicted on the city for participation in the massacre of the British Embassy, the arrangements for repression of disorder, the restrictions as to bearing arms which would be enforced, and the rewards which would be given for the surrender of guilty persons. General Roberts has found it necessary to detain in safe custody Mustaufi Habibulla, Wazir Shah Mubammad, Yahya Khan, and Zacharia Khan, pending a detailed inquiry into the circumstances of the attack on the Embassy. The Amir Yakub Khan is provided with quarters in the British camp on the Siah Sang hill, outside the Bala Hissar. On the 13th instant the troops marched through the city. There was no kind of opposition, and the demeanour of the inhabitants was respectful. Brigadier-General Hills has been appointed Governor of the city and surrounding district; and martial law has been proclaimed within a radius of 10 miles from the walls. The intelligence since received from Kabul is scanty, owing to interruption of communications; but we enclose a telegram reporting that explosions, causing, we regret to say, some loss of life, have taken place in the Bala Hissar; though the fire, of which the origin is not explained, was extinguished in time to save the principal magazine.

4. The tribes in the vicinity of Ali Khel and the Shuturgurdan had been gathering for some time past for a combined attack upon the British posts beyond Ali Khel; and their hostile demonstrations have kept our troops continually occupied during the past week. They destroyed a portion of the telegraph line, and for some days the communications of Ali Khel with the Shuturgurdan and Kabul were interrupted. A party threatened the Sirkai Kotal post, and a British detachment was consequently sent in that direction from the Shuturgurdan, when the enemy delivered a very bold and obstinate attack upon the camp at the Shuturgurdan, charging up to the British guns. They were driven back after five hours' severe fighting, having lost and wounded some 200 men, and leaving two standards in our possession. On receiving news which convinced them that Kabul was actually in the possession of British troops, the tribes began to disperse; and on the 20th General Hugh Gough arrived at Shuturgurdan from Kabul, when Colonel Money's position was completely disengaged. A successful demonstration from Kurram along the Chakmani valley dispersed the Chakmanis, Mangals, and Jajis who had assembled and threatened Ali Khel.

5. On the 17th October the advanced guard of the Khyber Column had reached Rozabad between Jellalabad and Gandamak. As soon as communications with General Roberts have been completely established by the Khyber route, the necessary measures will be taken to abandon the line by Ali Khel and the Shuturgurdan Pass, which will be no longer required, and would be difficult to hold during the winter.

6. The situation at Kandahar remains unaltered. The country is perfectly tranquil; the Sirdar Sher Ali Khan continues to co-operate unreservedly with General Stewart in maintaining order throughout the province; and the adjacent districts of Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Zamindawar have now been brought under the central authority at Kandahar.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Bala Hissar, through Shuturgurdan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

[13th October (?)]. Early yesterday morning, Amir walked to my camp, accompanied by only two attendants, and expressed his determination to resign Amirship. He said he had intended doing so before going to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be over-persuaded. He was in very low spirits; said his life had been a miserable one; that he would rather be a grasscutter in the English Camp than Ruler of Afghanistan, and begged he might live in this camp until he could be sent to India, or London, or wherever Viceroy might desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal; ordered breakfast to be prepared for him; and begged him to think over the matter for two or three hours; and said that I would see him at 10 o'clock, the time appointed the previous evening for His Highness to come to my camp and accompany me to the Bala Hissar. The Amir knew nothing of the proposed proclamation, and was quite ignorant of any intentions towards the Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan and his brother.

At 10, I had a second interview with the Amir, who stated that he had quite decided to give up the throne of Kabul; that he could not possibly accompany me to the Bala Hissar; but that he would send his eldest son; and all his Ministers would be in attendance. I again pointed out the serious step His Highness was taking; but finding his mind (?) was made up, I said I would telegraph to the Viceroy for instructions; that of course he could not be forced to remain on as Amir against his will; but that I should ask him to retain the title until I could receive a reply to this telegram.

The eldest son accompanied me to the Bala Hissar. The programme as telegraphed yesterday was strictly carried out, and the ceremony was most impressive. After reading out the proclamation, a copy of which I am telegraphing to you to-day, I dismissed all the Sirdars, and native gentlemen, except the Mustaufi, the Wazir, Yahya Khan, and Zacharia Khan. I told these four that it was necessary to detain them, until the circumstances connected with the attack on the Embassy had been thoroughly inquired into.

The Proclamation is being translated into Persian, and will be widely circulated at noon to-day. The troops will march through the city; certain positions will be held by guards (there is only one gate); and General Hills will take over military control as Governor, assisted by Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 14th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Shuturgurdan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Bala Hissar, Kabul, 13th October. Following is copy of the Proclamation I issued yesterday on taking possession of Bala Hissar:—

In my Proclamation of the 3rd October, Shawal, dated, Zarghun Shahr, I informed the people of Kabul that a British army was advancing to take possession of the city, and I warned them against offering any resistance to the entry of the troops and the authority of His Highness the Amir: that warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has now reached Kabul and occupied the Bala Hissar; but its advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have, therefore, become rebels against the Amir, and have added to the guilt already incurred by them in abetting the murder of the British Envoy and his companions. For the treacherous and cowardly crime which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people, it would be but a just and fitting reward, for such misconduct, if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed and its very name blotted out. But the great British Government ever desires to temper justice with mercy; and I now announce to the inhabitants of Kabul that the full retribution for their offence will not be exacted, and that the city will be spared. Nevertheless, it is necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and further that the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore, such portions of the city buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops to be quartered in it, will be at once levelled with the ground, and, further, a heavy fine, the amount of which will

be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants of Kabul, to be paid according to their several capacities. I further give notice to all that, in order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Cabul and the surrounding country, to a distance of 10 miles, are placed under martial law. With the consent of His Highness the Amir, a Military Governor of Kabul will be appointed to administer justice and punish with a strong hand all evil-doers. The inhabitants of Kabul and neighbouring villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. This punishment inflicted upon the whole city will not, of course, absolve from further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching inquiry into the circumstances of the late outbreak will be held; and all persons connected with, or bearing a part in it, will be dealt with according to their deserts. With the view of providing effectually for the prevention of crime and disorder and the safety of all well-disposed persons in Kabul, it is hereby notified that for the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, within the streets, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this Proclamation, any person found armed within those limits will be liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession any articles whatsoever which formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy are required to bring them forthwith to the British Camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will, if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subjected to severest penalties. Further, all persons who may have in their possession any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to or seized by the Afghan troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle whether breech or muzzle-loading, the sum of Rupees 3 will be given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture, Rupees 5. Anyone found hereafter in possession of any such weapons will be severely punished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of Rupees 50 for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, or such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar sum will be given in the case of any person who may have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, Shawal, last, and therefore become a rebel against His Highness the Amir. If any such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or subaltern officer of the Afghan Army, the reward will be increased to Rupees 75, and if a field officer to Rupees 120.

Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 14th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 13th October. Bala Hissar was occupied yesterday; very impressive sight. Amir pleaded indisposition. His eldest son accompanied me, and principal Sirdars were summoned to hear proclamation read. 67th Foot and 5th Goorkhas now occupy Lower and Upper Bala Hissar respectively. To-day troops march through city. Guards will be placed at all important points. There is only one gate. General Hills takes over office of Military Governor, assisted by Nawab Gholam Hussan Khan.

Three regiments, with 12 guns, left Ghazni a few days ago to join the Afghan troops fighting against us here; meeting the dispersed Kabul troops they fled, leaving the guns. I have sent regiment of cavalry to bring them in.

Eighty-five guns, mortars, and howitzers were found in Bala Hissar, making a total of upwards of 200 guns in our possession. Vast quantity of powder, accoutrements, arms, saddlery, musical instruments, &c., also found. Snider cartridges have apparently been made locally in great numbers. Wounded doing well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 16th October 1879.

FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Finding that Colonel Money has not communicated details of attack on Shuturgardan and Sirkai Kotal on 14th, I now report them. At 9 p.m., 13th, Colonel Money heard wire was cut and enemy intended attacking Sirkai Kotal post at 7 a.m., 14th

Despatched wing 21st and two guns under Major Collis to patrol road, at 8 a.m., heavy firing heard, and information given that 2,000 enemy attacked post and were engaged with Major Collis. At same time enemy advanced in force on camp from south. Major Collis was reinforced by two companies. A feint was made with a view of drawing troops from camp and real attack made on camp by 2,000 enemy desperately enough, twice charging up to guns. A decisive bayonet charge was made, and enemy fled leaving 40 dead and two standards. They were pursued for two miles. Enemy must have lost 200 killed and wounded. Our loss, Captain Waterfield severely wounded, two killed and 14 wounded.

Enclosure 5 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 17th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE sound of guns was heard yesterday afternoon in direction of Shuturgurdan; has proved by intelligence received this morning to have been at Sirkai Kotal, where numbers of enemy still said to be collected on the road, especially between Karatiga and Sirkai Kotal.

There has been considerable destruction of line in that locality, both posts and wire. It has also been cut in three places between this and Karatiga, and also quite close to camp last night. In present insecure state of upper part of road, and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Jajis, I have considered it advisable to suspend further repairs here just now, as it entails constant employment of strong escorts which our numbers do not allow of. Meanwhile I am hourly expecting return of the Jaji Maliks from Kabul, which will no doubt have a quieting effect, for people are not yet reassured of their safety, false reports having been sedulously circulated as to their death or detention.

Received letter General Roberts yesterday, date 13th; says in a few days will be time to give up Shuturgurdan communications and open it by Jellalabad, this being arranged to take place very shortly, and saving in time between Shuturgurdan and Ali Khel being small. It appears to me, especially as we are unable to patrol road in sufficient strength and frequently, that wisest course at present is to limit telegraphic communication to Ali Khel. General Roberts has proposed to take on 3rd Sikhs and the British or No. 1 Mountain Battery, also 9th Lancers; but 1-8 Royal Artillery and 9th are engaged under General Tytler, now at Balesh Khel. If not sent on at once may be late.

Enclosure 6 in No. 34.

Telegram dated 19th October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER just received from Colonel Money, dated to-day, says been surrounded by large force enemy since 15th. Column under General Gough to reach Kushi (?) to-day. General Roberts' orders were to send 3rd Sikhs and mountain guns to Kabul and return 21st here to reinforce, but if impossible to open Ali Khel road, the whole force to go on to Kabul. General Gough takes up carriage for all.

Enclosure 7 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 15th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 14th October. Infantry and cavalry marched through city yesterday. Streets were crowded. People respectful, and did not appear sullen. Three cases of cholera occurred yesterday—one in 67th, one in 92nd, and one 72nd; first two fatal. All in camp on Siah Sung. Water supply is most impure. Any amount of fruit is to be had. Cavalry found 12 guns from Ghazni abandoned 28 miles from this; six nine-pounders, six mountain, elephants were sent this morning to bring them in. Snow fell on Hindu Kush range yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

JAJI Maliks returned from interview with enemy, whom they have convinced of fall of Kabul, and inutility of fighting; they are dispersing. Letters from Shuturgurdan just received, dated 19th, reporting arrival of 5th Punjab Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns at Kushi yesterday under General Gough to advance on Shuturgurdan to-day. Two guns and two companies 5th Punjab Infantry had occupied Sirkai Kotal. Enemy dispersing; their position having been freely shelled yesterday, and sharpshooters (having) driven back scouting parties with great success. I hope to hear more to-morrow. Steps taken to keep Karatiga road open to pass on daks as well as officers and details waiting here to join regiments at Kabul. Much will depend, however, on the news I receive to-morrow.

Enclosure 9 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Basawul, to VICEROY, and to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 17th October.—Portion of the magazine in upper Bala Hissar blew up soon after noon yesterday, and constant explosions have occurred since. Nothing seems to be left but the large powder magazine, which is said to contain about 250,000 pounds. All small arms, ammunition, and other munitions of war collected by Sher Ali must have been destroyed. Captain Shafto, with two or three Khalassies, are the only people known to have been inside the enclosure at the time. They, with Goorkha guard at gate, and small party of Goorkhas, including the Subadar-Major, who were sitting near, have, I fear, been blown up. Altogether about 20 lives lost. A soldier signaller, 67th Foot, was killed in the garden below by beam falling on him. 67th and Goorkhas were moved out of Bala Hissar at once, and are now encamped with rest of force on Siah Sang range. There is no reason to suppose explosion occurred, except by accident; powder and ammunition were lying all over the place. Every precaution was taken, gate shut, guard placed, and no one admitted except on business. Endeavours are now being made to check progress of fire and save large magazine, the blowing up of which would doubtless cause considerable damage to life and property in city.

General Hugh Gough, with 5th Punjab Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns, leaves this to-day for Kushi to open communication, and if necessary, reinforce Shuturgurdan, which was threatened with another attack yesterday. Communication between Ali Khel and Shuturgurdan is interrupted, and there are rumours that Ali Khel was attacked on 13th.

I am sending letter and telegrams by Jellalabad. Two cases of cholera yesterday, one in 72nd, one in 92nd; neither fatal.

Enclosure 10 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CAMP threatened about noon to-day by parties of enemy supposed to be preceding main body. Cavalry detachments sent out to watch them; shots exchanged. Just at this time the Jaji and Turi Maliks arrived from Kabul, having accompanied General Gough's column as far as Dobandi, and thence taken the Hazro Ghogiza route to this, avoiding Shuturgurdan. Gough was to reach Shuturgurdan last night or this morning; and enemy was reported to be dispersing. The Jaji Maliks, offering immediately on arrival to interview and disperse the enemy here by acquainting them with true state of affairs at Kabul, went off with this object. Result will be reported when known.

Enclosure 11 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th October.—Country quiet. Supplies coming in fairly. Bala Hissar and Sherpur Cantonment being cleared and prepared for occupation by our troops. Wounded doing well. Troops healthy. Post still very irregular, owing to internal feuds amongst Ghilzais, each small section wishing to have its own Chief acknowledged. Padshah Khan's authority is limited. Latest date from Simla, 3rd October; by telegraph 12th. All well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

NEWS by spies from Shuturguridan that besieging force, hearing of approach of two regiments our cavalry from Kabul, and being short of food, have begun to disperse. The enemy still continues to collect in our vicinity, chiefly Chakmanies, our own subjects, and Mangals. I hope in a few days to be able to punish them, and also the Chakmanies themselves, from Kurram direction. In order to make our communications safe, I have asked General Tytler to have two guns, 1—8 R. A., and a Company 86th at Thull. This will bring up strength of Thull to 1,255 cavalry, and infantry with two guns. The road posts are also very strong. I intend to send 1—2 battery, C-4 from Kotal to Kurram on relief by two guns, 1—8 R. A., which will be more useful there. The other two guns, 1—8 R. A., will come here with such portions of 85th, 9th Lancers (as) may be advisable according to circumstances. The cavalry pursuit on 14th had a great effect.

Enclosure 13 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 21st October 1879.

FROM GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from General Gough, Shuturguridan, dated 20th. He reached that day without opposition, the enemy having completely dispersed. He took up six companies, 5th Punjab Infantry, and four mountain guns.

To-day he intended sending 21st Punjab Infantry to Kushi with stores; carriage to return for more, himself remaining on Shuturguridan, and awaiting intimation from me as to possibility of opening road; to which I replied at once that I am only awaiting arrival of 4th Punjab Infantry, expected in a day or two, to forward it and details, the former returning, the latter proceeding, in accordance with General Roberts' original programme. I have suggested to Gough that the 21st might return from Kushi and come back with 5th.

The demonstration ordered to be made from Kurram up Chakmani Valley was carried out, and had the desired effect. The news of the approach of the troops spread rapidly to this neighbourhood, and the Chakmanis with Mangals thus immediately dispersed, the Ahmed and Hassan Khels Jajis alone wavering for a while, though they also have now gone.

Our left picket was fired on last night, and nearly half a mile of wire cut and carried away close to Ali Khel, the Maliks of which have been punished.

General Gough begs me to add all well.

Enclosure 14 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 15th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL BRIGHT, Luddikotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

General Gough holds Jellalabad with Hazara Battery, four guns C.-3 Artillery, five troops Bengal Cavalry, 9th Foot, and wing 24th Native Infantry. All quiet along line. Jellalabad Governor professes great readiness assist with supplies and transport, but thinks latter difficult.

Enclosure 15 in No. 34.

Telegram, No. A.-917, dated 19th October 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar.

You can place Kelat-i-Ghilzai and subordinate districts under Kandahar authority and control administration, especially revenue collections.

Enclosure 16 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 19th October 1879. (Extract.)

From SIR D. STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR reports to-day that travellers have brought news from Kabul, dated 7th instant, to the effect that, after the massacre, Mustaufi, Daud Shah, some Ghilzai Chiefs, and mutinous regiments met in garden of Bala Hissar, and swore on Koran to resist British advance. Amir was present, and also took the oath, but it is believed under compulsion.

Sirdar proposes to at once issue proclamation declaring his allegiance to British Government, and separating from Amir; but this might be premature.

Enclosure 17 in No. 34.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

ST. JOHN reports news from Kabul that Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, the Amir's brother, who has been under arrest, tried to escape from Kabul in a woman's clothes, but was caught and imprisoned (by?) Nazar Muhammad Khan, the late Amir's brother, who was Acting Governor.

The Governor of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Muhammad Tahir Khan, has applied for permission to return to Kabul; and, as he is of no use, his resignation has been accepted; and, with reference to your telegram of yesterday, I hope to be able to arrange for the Government of Kelat under a Ghilzai Chief subordinate to Kandahar.

Muhammad Yusaf Khan has resigned Governorship of Pusht-i-Rud. Arrangements will now be made for the Government of this province from Kandahar.

Enclosure 18 in No. 34.

No. 1,049 C, dated Simla, 16th October 1879.

From LEPEL GRIFFIN, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to submit, for the information of the Government of India, translations of letters dated the 29th September and 1st October, from the Governor of Jellalabad to the address of the Commissioner of Peshawur and the Political Officer, Khyber.

Enclosure 19 in No. 34.

Translation of Letter dated 11th Shawal (29th September 1879) from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jellalabad, to COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur.—Received by Post on 3rd October 1879.

AFTER TITLES AND COMPLIMENTS.—I have received by hand of a Hindu of Sourji ten copies of the declaration in Persian and Pushtu, and two letters from you and have understood them. You write that British troops are about to advance *via* Dakka. As I have received no instructions from the Amir regarding the advance of British troops I must be excused (meaning I cannot allow it). Should I receive information from the

Amir in this matter well and good, otherwise the advance of troops *via* Dakka without the permission of the Amir will not be free from resistance and annoyance, because the tribesmen of Afghanistan are headstrong and disobedient and uncontrollable, and I fear lest by the advance of British troops disturbances will be raised and some misconduct by these tribes may take place which may tend to my disgrace and to your anger. It is necessary that the advance be postponed until I receive instructions from the Amir. I will let you know my orders, and it will look better if the troops only advance then.

Enclosure 20 in No. 34.

Translation of Letter dated 13 Shawal (1st October 1879) from SIRDAR MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jellalabad, to CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Political Officer, Khyber.

TO-DAY the Wednesday I have received instructions from His Highness the Amir that the friendship existing between the British Government and the Amir still firmly exists, and that he has invited British troops of his own accord. I therefore write to you, my kind friend, that as I had not hitherto received any instructions from the Amir, excuse me if any fault has been found in your reception. Now that I have received orders from the Amir, I have written to my subordinates to receive British troops with every honour, and I will myself come to Sherpur on Friday the day after to-morrow to wait on the Sahib Bahadur (meaning the General Commanding).

Enclosure 21 in No. 34.

No. 2 P., dated Camp Lundikotal, 10th October 1879.

From Major-General BRIGHT, C.B., Commanding, Jellalabad Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for information, English version of Persian letter this day addressed by me to the Governor of Jellalabad, informing him of arrival here of my head-quarters, thanking him for the courtesy and assistance shown by him, so far, to the British forces, and urging him to continue exertions for the facilitating of our advance.

Enclosure 22 in No. 34.

English version of Persian Letter, addressed from Lundikotal, by MAJOR-GENERAL BRIGHT, C.B., to MUHAMMAD HASSAN KHAN, Sahib, Governor of Jellalabad, under date October 10th, 1879.

You are aware that a British army is again advancing by the Khyber route upon Kabul for the purpose of supporting the Amir's authority over his rebellious troops. My head-quarters reached this place yesterday, and I take an early opportunity of informing you under my own signature of the satisfaction with which I have from time to time received accounts of the friendly spirit which you have evinced, and the assistance you have afforded, to the advanced portions of the force under my command. The friendly feelings towards the British Government which have prompted you to act in this manner are on my part cordially reciprocated, and I look forward with pleasure to a personal meeting with you at Jellalabad on the head-quarters arriving there. In the meantime further instructions should be issued from time to time to all over whom your influence extends that exertions should be used in order to supply the British camps and forces with provisions and transport, the owners of which will, according to the invariable custom of British armies, receive full prices, while at the same time meriting the favour at once of the British Government and of yourself and other constituted authorities of Afghanistan.

No. 35.

No. 226 of 1879.—(Extract.)

Government of India, Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, October 30, 1879.

WE submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the following summary of the intelligence received during the past week regarding affairs in Afghanistan and the progress of military operations in that country.

2. We enclose copy of a letter, dated 16th* October, from Sir Frederick Roberts, reporting the measures which he has taken in execution of the instructions sent to him by the Government of India

* (Received 28th October.) on the 29th September last, for his guidance on his arrival at Kabul. General Roberts also describes in this letter the general situation of affairs and the state of parties at the capital. It will be seen that the Amir appears to have retired altogether from participation in affairs, and that Sir Frederick Roberts considers him much broken in spirits and unfit to resume his former position or responsibilities.

3. We also enclose copy of a proclamation which General Sir Frederick Roberts has been directed to issue at Kabul; in consequence of the Amir Yakub Khan's abdication of his government of Afghanistan.† The proclamation was transmitted by telegram to General Roberts on the 23rd

† See No. 33. p. 133. October, with orders to issue it immediately; and a copy was also sent to General Sir Donald Stewart at Kandahar. We have just heard by telegraph from Sir Frederick Roberts that he has received and was about to publish the Proclamation.

4. No complete explanation has yet reached the Government of India of the causes of the explosion in the Bala Hissar reported in paragraph 3 of our despatch, dated 23rd October. The fire was overcome on the 17th October after it had reached and scorched the wall of the principal powder magazine; and Captain Shafto's body was recovered and buried on the 18th October. There is little or no news from the outlying provinces of Afghanistan, and the country round Kabul is reported quiet except in the direction of Tezin and Hissarak where the Ghilzais are stirring. General Saifudin, who commanded the parade of Kabul troops on the 3rd September, was captured on the 21st October, and has since been tried and executed. Very large stores of English made Snider ammunition and other material of war, together with ample stocks of clothing for the troops, have been found in the Bala Hissar, and the cantonment of Sherpur is being rapidly prepared for occupation by British troops, while supplies are now coming in plentifully. Various articles of property belonging to the British Embassy, including books, horses, rifles, and money, have been recently brought in.

5. General Gough remained in position upon the Shuturgurdan, in order to keep open the road thence toward Kabul, and to superintend the passage of the convoy from Ali Khel; but he will have withdrawn by the end of this month. This line of communication will then be suspended for the winter, and a force from Kabul, co-operating with General Bright's advance from Jellalabad, will open and secure communications with Kabul on that route. Before evacuating the Hariob Valley General Gordon proposes to punish some of the tribes who have been prominently active in annoying our posts during October; and he will take measures to this effect on the arrival of General Tytler with some additional troops from Thull.

6. General Bright reached Jellalabad on the 24th October; the Guides and a mountain battery entered Gandamak on the previous day too late to save the grain and flour stored there, which has been plundered by the Ghilzais and Khugianis. A reconnaissance has pushed two miles beyond the Surkhab river on the Jagdallak road, and the country has been found quiet, though there are reports that the Ghilzais are collecting above the Pass to dispute our advance. The Amir's governor at Jellalabad has continued to exercise his functions under the political direction of the British Commandant, has assisted materially in procuring supplies, and has generally attended to the requisitions made on him. General Bright has been instructed to guarantee the Khan of Lalpura and neighbouring Chiefs from any harm in consequence of assistance they may render to the British Government, and at the same time to warn them that, while good service will be rewarded disobedience to orders will entail punishment.

7. From the Kandahar side Major St. John reported that the governor of Ghazni had officially informed the governors of Mukur and Kelat-i-Ghilzai that Yakub Khan had been reinstated in full authority, and that General Roberts had proclaimed that the British forces are merely temporary guests of the Amir and will return immediately to

India. As this fabricated story appeared to have spread over the country, and to be producing some effect, the Government of India directed General Roberts to inform the governor of Ghazni of Yakub Khan's abdication, and to warn him that he must obey the orders of the British authorities on pain of being treated as a rebel.

Sirdar Sber Ali Khan reports that the Tarin District is quiet, and that the Hazaras have agreed to pay their land revenue. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan has resigned the governorship of Pusht-i-Rud and has been advised to return to Kabul. The Ghilzais in the neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Ghilzai are more or less in an unsettled state; though at Kelat itself everything is reported quiet, and supplies are being stored for the use of the British garrison. The Tokhi clan of the Ghilzais is content with the present régime at Kandahar; but the chief of the Hotak clan refused to visit Major St. John at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. News has just arrived from Kandahar that Sahib Jan, a Tarakhi Ghilzai, and a notorious freebooter, who had gathered a force about Mukur with the intention of attacking our camp at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was himself attacked, defeated with loss, and killed near Shahjui on the 25th. Sahib Jan had advanced to Shahjui, where he was met by Colonel Kennedy of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and his force completely dispersed, after an action in which the British troops suffered very slightly.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 18th October. Fire ceased yesterday after reaching and scorching wall of main powder magazine. Captain Shafto's body recovered; will be buried to-day. Gough's party reached Charasia yesterday. No news yet from Shuturgurdan or Ali Khel. No post for several days. Country round Kabul quiet. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 19th October. Gough will occupy Sirkai Kotal between Shuturgurdan and Kushi to-day, and will then be in heliographic communication with Colonel Money. Ghilzais are occupying Hazardarakht; and as General Gordon is evidently unable to re-establish communication with Shuturgurdan, and the troops there are dependent on Ali Khel for supplies, I have ordered Gough to withdraw the garrison to Kushi. This will probably be done to-morrow. Ghilzais have assembled in large numbers, so, no doubt, there will be opposition. Country round Kabul quiet but Hissarak and Tezin. Ghilzais are assembling between Khurd Kabul and Jagdallak. General Gough will be kept fully informed. General Saifudin Khan was captured by our cavalry yesterday. Private Mitchell, 72nd, wounded on 6th, died on 17th. Sherpur Cantonment being cleaned out and prepared for occupation. I have sent daily telegrams, please let me know if all have been received. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 20th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 15th October. Amount of war material here beyond belief. Nearly 10 lakhs of English made Snider ammunition is stored in the Bala Hissar; all apparently in

perfect order. Native troops coming this way need not, therefore, bring more ammunition with them than may be required for the road. There is also great quantity of local made Snider ammunition, which will be tested shortly. Of powder, we have found upwards of two hundred thousand pounds; a great deal was destroyed before we took possession of the Sherpur cantonment. There is any amount of lead, copper, tin, shot, shell, caps, accoutrements, and clothing for troops. Rifles have been made away with, but some are being brought back daily. Also horses, ponies, and other property belonging to the Embassy. All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 25th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 22nd October. No news from Shuturgurdan since evening of 19th. Enemy were then said to be dispersing.

Letters and telegrams despatched from this on 14th were destroyed by Ghilzais in Hazardarakht. Those despatched before and since will, I hope, reach destinations.

Sherpur cantonment being rapidly prepared for reception of troops. Supplies being collected fairly well. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 5 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 26th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 20th October. General Hugh Gough reports that on his troops reaching Sirkai Kotal between Kushi and Shuturgurdan, enemy dispersed. I hope communication will now be restored with Ali Khel. General Gordon reports that he has urged postponement of General Tytler's expedition. This seems unnecessary; we have enough troops to do all that is required between Ali Khel and this. Small explosions still continue at Upper Bala Hissar, all precautions are being taken to prevent larger powder magazine exploding. All principal men from Kohistan and intervening country have come to Kabul to pay their respects. Country all round quiet. Weather fine; nights cold. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 27th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 25th October. Letter from Simla, dated 16th, and telegrams dated 21st October, reached this yesterday, also several mail bags of earlier dates, more expected to-morrow. Heliographic communication with Ali Khel was established yesterday. Telegraph lines from Kabul towards Jellalabad will be commenced on 28th. Mr. Josephs' Telegraph Department left Kushi for Kabul yesterday. Large numbers of poles are ready at hand. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 27th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 23rd October. General Hugh Gough heliographs from Shuturgurdan that Ghilzais began to disperse on hearing of approach of his small force, and cleared off completely as soon as he occupied the Sirkai Kotal. Ghilzais are said to have numbered not less than eight or ten thousand. Gough had with him five hundred rifles, one squadron of cavalry, and four mountain guns, two squadrons of cavalry being kept at Kushi. Communication with Ali Khel was restored soon afterwards.

I propose now closing Shuturgurdan route, sending 21st Native Infantry back to Ali Khel, and bringing on 3rd Sikhs and four guns No. 1 Mountain Battery to Kabul, and, as soon as Gough returns, sending a brigade under Macpherson towards Gandamak to open up communication with Khyber column.

Ghilzais from Tezin and Hissarak have sent messengers to know if I will receive their head men. They will probably come in soon. If not, presence of troops on that road will speedily settle matters, and it is very desirable that safe and regular communication should be established by Khyber route as soon as possible. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 24th October. All quiet on Shuturguridan and elsewhere below. All other officers detained there leave Kushi for Kabul to-day. Gough remains for convoy from Ali Khel and to keep road open to end of this month. Reconnoitring parties are out in all directions collecting supplies and obtaining information. Weather splendid, nights being cold already. Troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 26th October. Dr. Bellew and officers detained on Shuturguridan arrived this morning. Supplies coming in plentifully. By 15th November I hope to have five months stored, except possibly forage, which, however, is being collected satisfactorily. Improvement of road towards Butkhak will be commenced to-morrow. Shelter for British portion of force nearly complete in Sherpur cantonment. Native regiments have commenced hutting themselves. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 24th October 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad.

THE Khan of Lalpura and all Chiefs should receive positive guarantee of protection by British Government from any harm in consequence of services rendered to us, and it should be made known that, while good service is rewarded, disobedience to orders will be punished.

Enclosure 11 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 22nd October 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE Governor of Ghazni has officially informed Governors of Mukur and Kelat that the Amir has been reinstated in full authority, and that Roberts has proclaimed by beat of drum that he and the army are only guests of four days, and will retire at once to India. This news has spread over country, and has had bad effect. Governor of Ghazni, Muhammad Saib Agha, is said to be a dangerous intriguer.

Enclosure 12 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 23rd October 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

MAJOR ST. JOHN'S telegram, 22nd. We have told Roberts to send to Ghazni Governor notice of Amir's abdication and orders to obey Roberts' authority under pain of treatment as rebel.

Enclosure 13 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 23rd October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla. (Extract.)

SIRDAR Muhammad Yusaf Khan having resigned his Governorship has been advised to return to Kabul.

In reply to communications asking for his advice, Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has addressed letters to Muhammad Afzal, Hotaki Ghilzai, recommending him to wait on Major St John and afford assistance in collecting supplies at Kelati-Ghilzai. Muhammad Afzal has written to Major St. John declaring himself an adherent of Yakub Khan, and asking at the same time for pay and rank. He alleges that he cannot visit Kelat because his tribesmen are troublesome and require his presence: this is a mere excuse.

Inquiry into thefts at Mundi Hissar and Tuktapul progressing satisfactorily; thieves traced, and some of the stolen goods recovered.

I announced in Durbar on Saturday that the Barakzais would not again be allowed to molest those who had made their submission to us; the announcement afforded great satisfaction.

Sirdar reports that Tarin District is quiet, and that the Hazaras have agreed to pay up their land revenue.

Enclosure 14 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 24th October 1879.

From SIR DONALD STEWART, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SIRDAR reports that two Heratis, Naib Futteh-ulla Beg, Firozkoti, and Mirza Gholam Muhammad, son of Mirza Gholam Sadik, and four Kandahari Barakzais, Muhammad Zaman Khan, General Muhammad Jan Khan, Brigadier Ahud Khan, and Dam Muhammad Khan, are at a village a few miles hence, having just arrived *via* Moraf from Kabul. I have requested Sirdar to secure them, pending receipt of a reply from Roberts, to whom I have telegraphed the above information.

Enclosure 15 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 26th October 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

RETURNED here last night. Everything quiet at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and arrangement made for bringing in Government grain for winter use of garrison. The Tokhi tribe is content with new state of affairs; but Hotaks are less so, their Chief, Muhammad Afzal, refused to come in. Sadu Khan, Chief, who was there last winter, has now returned, and it may be advisable to put him in Afzal's place, but the Hotaks have little power for mischief under any circumstances. Beyond Kelat country is in complete anarchy, but not apparently unsafe for caravans. Governor of Ghazni said to have shut himself up in his citadel. Governors placed by Amir over Taraki and Andari tribes have been plundered and forced to fly to Kabul.

Enclosure 16 in No. 35.

Telegram, dated 28th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SAHIB JAN, Taraki Ghilzai, a notorious ruffian and freebooter, had assembled force of about thousand men of his tribe about Mukur. On 23rd, he reached General Hughes, through Tokhi Ghilzai, that he had advanced to Shahjui with avowed intention of attacking our camp at Tazi. Hughes sent out Colonel Kennedy, 2nd P. C., with force of all arms at 2 a.m. on 25th to reconnoitre towards Shahjui and followed with remainder of force in morning. Kennedy drove in enemy's pickets near Shahjui and found Sahib Jan in position with 200 horse and 700 foot, which he attacked and completely dispersed. Sahib Jan and 41 others found dead on field. Our loss one private, 39th, one 2nd Punjab Cavalry killed, Captain Sartorius, 59th, Captain Broome, two native officers and 24 men, 2nd P. C. wounded. Neither Broome nor Sartorius dangerously hurt. Affair will have excellent effect, Sahib Jan having been terror of district.

Enclosure 17 in No. 35.

No. 19, dated Bala Hissar, Kabul, 16th October 1879.

From Major-General SIR F. ROBERTS, V.C., K.C.B., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALI, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 506, dated the 29th September 1879, conveying to me, on the part of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, general instructions for my guidance on arrival at Kabul.

2. His Excellency in Council will have learnt from my telegrams that these instructions had been in great measure anticipated. I have taken possession of the Bala Hissar, and assumed supreme authority in Kabul; and I have announced in a proclamation, of which a copy is enclosed, that the city will be subjected to a heavy fine, and that all buildings which now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the troops to be quartered in it, will be levelled with the ground. I am now making inquiries to ascertain the amount which the city is capable of paying, and the buildings whose demolition is desirable are being selected. A considerable extent of ground now covered with streets and houses will probably be cleared, and the fine will be fixed at the highest possible sum, so that I hope the punishment inflicted on the city will be severely felt now, and remembered hereafter.

3. For the thorough investigation of the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak, and the collection of all possible evidence regarding the conduct of individuals since the arrival of the British Embassy in Kabul, I have nominated a Commission consisting of the members marginally named. Their duties will be comprehensive, and will include the submission of recommendations regarding the punishment to be inflicted on all persons whom they may find guilty of participation, direct or indirect, active or passive, in the attack on the Residency, or of other connected offences calling for notice. Every such recommendation will be carefully considered by me, and his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council may rely upon my carrying out most strictly the instructions conveyed in paragraph 8 of your letter under reply.

4. It will be seen from the terms of the proclamation to which I have referred above that in one particular I have not exactly anticipated his Excellency's instructions. I have not considered it necessary or desirable to insist for the present upon the absolute disarmament of the whole city population. But I have prohibited under penalty of death the carrying of arms within the city, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates. This prohibition, backed by the occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the holding of all important points in the city itself, will, I believe, be sufficient to guard against the possibility of any disorder, and to ensure the personal safety of the officers and troops under my command. I have the honour to request that I may be informed whether the arrangement meets with the approval of his Excellency in Council.

5. The exercise of supreme authority in the city, and over the surrounding country to a distance of ten miles from the city walls, I have delegated to Major-General Hills, V.C., C.B. He will be assisted in the performance of his duties by Nawab Sir Gholam Hussan Khan, K.C.S.I., and every measure of importance which he may consider it desirable to introduce will be submitted for my sanction, and carried out under my general supervision.

6. Every effort is being made for the early collection of supplies. Some difficulty has hitherto been experienced in this matter, particularly in procuring forage for the horses and baggage animals, but the difficulty will, I believe, be overcome. I expect to obtain large stores of grain and other necessaries from the Khalsa villages, the resources of which His Highness the Amir has placed unreservedly at my disposal; and I have little doubt that by prompt and liberal payments, by enforcing strict discipline among the troops, whose conduct has hitherto been unexceptionable, and by considerate treatment of the people, I shall before long be enabled to draw freely on the produce of the surrounding country.

7. My telegram of the 13th instant will have made known to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council the Amir's determination to abdicate, and his desire to leave Afghanistan for ever. It will also have informed his Excellency of the fact that I have considered it necessary to place under surveillance, pending the result of the inquiry into the circumstances of the outbreak, Sirdar Yahya Khan, Sirdar

Zakaria Khan, the Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, and the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan. His Highness' determination, which I believe to be irrevocable, was arrived at without any knowledge of my intentions towards his father-in-law and ministers. It appears to have been prompted by the conviction of his inability to control the Afghan people, by weariness of a life of incessant trouble and intrigue, and possibly in part by the feeling that suspicion had been thrown upon his own action and motives. His Highness is now in my camp, where he wishes to remain until the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy are received regarding his future movements. He seems much broken in spirits and wholly unfit to resume his former position and responsibilities. There is, so far as I can judge, no influential party in Kabul to which he could now look for support. The Barakzai Sirdars in general form an adverse faction of which Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan is the head. Sirdar Ahmad Ali Jan alone stands aloof from this party, and, putting aside his youth, he has, in my opinion, no political weight whatever. Sirdar Yahya Khan and his brother Sirdar Zakaria Khan are of course attached to the fortunes of the Amir, but their influence by itself is inconsiderable. Nevertheless, it is not improbable that if Yakub Khan could rouse himself to the effort he would still be able to maintain himself as Amir in the event of the retirement of our forces; but he would be weak, and unable to co-operate effectually in furthering the policy of the British Government. This question, however, is not of great importance, for, as I have remarked above, I believe his present determination to be irrevocable. It is probably unnecessary for me to add that none of two Amir's sons (*sic*) are fitted to take his place. Moreover, His Highness wishes them to accompany him in his retirement. I await the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council regarding the measures to be adopted in view of the present situation of affairs. In the meantime the Amir will remain in my camp.

8. Before closing this letter I would observe that the military resources of Afghanistan during the time of the late Amir, and the attention paid to their development, appear to me to have been much greater than was generally supposed. The troops under my command have now in one way or another taken possession of more than two hundred guns. Immense quantities of military stores have been found in Kabul and the neighbourhood, amongst them supplies of home-made Snider ammunition. The number of regular regiments at the time of the outbreak is stated by General Daud Shah at sixty of Infantry and sixteen of Cavalry, and they have certainly not increased in numbers since the death of the late Amir. Very large sums of money must have been expended in the erection of the fortifications near Kabul, in the arming and equipment of the troops, and in the accumulation of the military stores now brought to light. In every way Sher Ali seems to have endeavoured to place the nation in a state of complete preparation for war, and the Afghan army only wanted competent leaders to become a sufficiently formidable military power.

9. In conclusion, I have the honour to request that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council will rest assured of my earnest desire to respect the religious belief, feelings, and customs of the people of Afghanistan, and to convince them of the justice and benevolence of the British Government, now that they have had unmistakable evidence of its strength. I shall use every endeavour to impress upon the military and political officers under my orders the necessity for treating the population of the country in a just and conciliatory manner; and I trust that the presence of a British army in Kabul will be found in course of time to have removed rather than embittered the feelings of vindictive hostility which are now undoubtedly entertained towards us by a considerable portion of the Afghan people.

Enclosure 18 in No. 35.

Dated Camp Ali Khel, 13th October 1879.

FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. E. GORDON, C.S.I., Commanding Kurram Field Force,
to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department.

IN continuation of my No. 1 of yesterday's date, and my telegram of to-day, I have the honour to report that the people who assailed camp this morning were a mixture of Mangals, Ahmad, and Hassan Khels Jajis aided by some Ghilzais and Shinwaris from across the Lakerai route, also a few Spegawal.

We had previously heard of a projected combination against us by the surrounding tribes and of even a correspondence with this object passing between Ningnabar and

the Lujja Mangals. We were also aware that the people who had for some days previously been gathering to attack us were incited thereto by the presence of many Mullahs, one of whom was taken prisoner and proved to be a Mangal resident of Bagiyar Chakmani at the upper end of the Kurram valley.

The comparative absence of fire-arms among the assailants in the early attack on our right, and the confidence with which they crept close up to our position, proved the truth of what we afterwards heard, that their superstitious belief in the Mullahs had been worked on by these unscrupulous agents who had been busy circulating stories to the effect that our troops had been utterly routed in Kabul and their camp plundered. The tribes around us had been induced to believe that we too would fall an easy prey, and the plunder of camp be their reward.

I have sent a detailed military report of the attack and defeat of the enemy by to-day's post to the Chief of the Staff.

The attitude of the surrounding villages was unsatisfactory, no intimation of the approach of the enemy being given by them, and numbers of the assailants having been sheltered by them when retreating, while the bodies of those killed by the cavalry were carried off or concealed when our troops passed on. In one of these villages two killed and wounded, residents of the place, were discovered. The houses of these men have been destroyed.

Twenty-four corpses having been recovered and brought into camp, it was given out that all would be given up on identification by their own relatives or tribesmen. An ambiguous message has since been received from the Lujja Mangals demanding compensation for their killed and threatening revenge if not given up, though they have so far refused to come in for the bodies.

I have decided that such bodies as are not thus disposed of shall be buried according to Mahomedan rites by the captured Mullah. The religious scruples of the people will not have been violated, and the proceeding will, I trust, be held to be in accordance with the conciliatory spirit which Government has lately desired should govern our dealings with the surrounding tribes.

No. 36.

No. 231 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 6th November 1879.

IN continuation of previous despatches we have the honour to submit the following summary of the principal political intelligence relating to affairs in Afghanistan received during the past week, and of the progress of military operations in that country.

2. General Macpherson's brigade left Kabul on the 1st November for Butkhak, on the road toward Jellalabad. The position at Siah Sang was then abandoned, and the British force at Kabul has been concentrated at Sherpur. General Roberts himself joined General Macpherson and reconnoitred the Jagdallak and Khurd Kabul passes. General Macpherson's brigade has marched toward Gandamak by the Khurd Kabul pass, while General Bright's force is advancing to meet it from the opposite direction. The principal headmen of the Ghilzais are with the camps; and it is understood that after a conference held at Tezin some days ago the leading chiefs of the tribe decided not to resist the operations of our troops on the line between Gandamak and Kabul. The Khyber is, and has been for some time, entirely quiet under the arrangements recently made by the Commissioner of Peshawur with the tribes who are responsible for the pass; the Mohmands have given no trouble; and the Barakzai governor of Jellalabad is actively assisting the British officers. The telegraph line is being pushed on from both sides without interruption; so that on the whole there is good ground for anticipating that our communications between Peshawur and Kabul will be successfully opened in a few days, and will be firmly established for the winter. General H. Gough was expected to return from Kushi to Kabul about the 3rd or 4th November, marching through the Logar valley. The weather is very cold at Kabul, but the troops are reported to be in excellent health and spirits. Among the enclosures will be found a

letter from General Roberts, dated 20th October, reporting the principal occurrences at Kabul since the end of September.

3. General Gordon reports from Ali Khel that the Ahmad and Hassan Khel sections of the Jaji tribe have accepted his terms, which included the payment, within six days, of Rupees 1,000 and the delivery of hostages, four of whom had been sent into Kurram. He is now proceeding to punish other neighbouring tribes who participated in the recent attacks on our posts and in the attempts to interrupt our communications with the Shuturgurдан. The Shuturgurдан line has been finally closed; and the Hariob valley will be immediately evacuated by our troops.

4. The proclamation issued by General Roberts at Kabul, commanding all Afghan authorities to continue their functions and to preserve order in the country, was read in full Durbar at Kandahar on the 4th November. The Sirdar Sher Ali Khan was at the same time formerly invested by General Stewart with the government of the Kandahar province, including Pusht-i-Rud and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The Sirdar has placed his nephew, Shirindil Khan, in charge of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and his brother-in-law, Sirdar Abbas Khan, in charge of Zamindawar.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 29th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 28th October.—9th Lancers arrived at Kushi yesterday accompanied by 583 native details, 19 officers belonging to regiments, and detachments at Kabul, and with last convoy that will come from Ali Khel this season. All troops will leave Shuturgurдан to-morrow. Gough with small column will then march through Logar valley, reaching Kabul on 3rd November. On 1st November, Macpherson, with 67th Foot, 23rd and 28th N.I., two guns F.-A., with elephant equipment, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, will march to Butkhak. On 2nd and 3rd route *via* Latabund will be reconnoitred, and about 7th or 8th November I hope Macpherson will be at Jagdallak to open communication with Khyber column. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 29th October.—Shuturgurдан will be abandoned to-day. Letters and telegrams will henceforth be sent to Jellalabad. Country quiet. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1879.

From GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

AHMAD and Hassan Khel Jajis submitted yesterday to terms imposed, namely, payment in six days of Rupees 1,000 and delivery of hostages, four of whom were sent to Kurram at once. As there is nothing beyond the fulfilment of these terms to detain the force in this valley, I propose, as soon as surplus stores, baggage, &c., now in course of removal, have all gone, to withdraw from the Hariob and proceed to Chakman to obtain satisfaction for its treachery as previously explained, after which the troops will be available for the Zaimusht expedition. This should be about 15th November.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 30th October.—Siah Sang position will be abandoned when Macpherson marches to Butkhak on 1st November. Remainder of force will then be collected at Sherpur. Gough will return from Kushi on 3rd or 4th November; and as soon as communication with Khyber column has been properly established and country round Hissarak and Tezin thoroughly examined, a small column will proceed from this towards Istaliff, and perhaps as far as Charikar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 2nd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 31st October.—No particular news. All well.

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 1st November.—Many of the leading men are coming in from the country about the Jellalabad road. They were informed of the Amir's abdication, and received a copy of the proclamation of 28th October. This seems to have reassured them as to the possible consequences of joining us. Asmatulla Khan is expected in a day or two, and several other influential men from Tezin and the neighbourhood are now in camp. The fact of these men being with us will probably prevent any opposition being offered to the advance of Macpherson's and Charles Gough's brigade.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Kabul, 1st November.—Macpherson's brigade marched to-day Butkhak. I join him to-morrow to reconnoitre Latabund Pass, returning to Kabul on 3rd or 4th. Headmen from Tezin and country as far as Surkhak are now with me, and Asmatulla Khan is reported to be on his way to Kabul. Communication with Khyber column will probably therefore be opened without opposition. General Bright has been informed. Privates Macready and Conn, 72nd Highlanders, died yesterday of wounds received; former on Shuturgardan on 14th; other at Charasiab on the 6th October. Nights very cold; thick ice. Warm clothing and blankets urgently required. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Butkhak, 2nd November.—Telegraph wire completed to this. Just starting to reconnoitre Latabund route. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

Butkhak, 3rd November.—Latabund route is fairly easy, and will probably be adopted as main line of communication. I look at Khurd Kabul route this morning, returning

to Kabul by evening. Macpherson's brigade will march towards Gandamak to-morrow by Khurd Kabul and Tezin. All well. Telegraph line finished to this.

Enclosure 10 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

GENERAL BRIGHT, with his Political Secretary and four members of staff, left this morning for Rozabad, proceeding towards Gandamak.

Everything here very satisfactory. Governor of Jellalabad has expressed a desire to come and see me to-morrow. I will inform you duly of all he mentions at interview, and communicate to General Bright everything that he ought to know that springs up at visit.

Enclosure 11 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1879.

FROM GENERAL GORDON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

LETTER from Gough, Kushi, 31st. Starting for Logar on way to Kabul; evacuating and clearance of Shuturguridan most complete. Convoy with 9th Lancers reached safely. Not a shot fired between Ali Khel and Kushi.

Enclosure 12 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 3rd November 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

GOVERNOR called on me yesterday. He seemed greatly pleased with the way he has been treated at Durbar—and since we came here—and with some news he had received from Kabul. He himself continues to give every assistance through his officials. All about here the political situation continues very satisfactory.

Enclosure 13 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN WARBURTON, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

THE Governor has issued orders for all grain paid in as revenue, and remaining stored, to be handed over to Commissariat without payment, merely receiving a receipt for the same. All well here.

Enclosure 14 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 29th October 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

It is reported that the Kabuli regiments at Herat have deserted with their arms, and are making their way to their homes in the north in scattered parties *via* Zamindawar and the Arghandab.

Enclosure 15 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 30th October 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

FURTHER reports confirm desertion of Kabuli regiments from Herat, but state that the majority have gone by the Hazarah route towards Kabul.

Enclosure 16 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 30th October 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. The only event of importance during the week has been the action at Shahjui, which may be expected to have good results in quieting the southern Ghilzais. The tribe of Tokhi Ghilzais, in whose land action took place, expressed themselves delighted to have got rid of Sahib Jan and his Tarakis; while Muhammad Aslam Khan, Chief of the Kotaks, the other Ghilzai tribe in Kelat, when asked to combine with Sahib Jan against the English, refused and sent intelligence to Kelat. There is no doubt that the false news of proximate withdrawal of British from Kabul, disseminated by Ghazni Governor, emboldened Sahib Jan to plan attack on British camp.

Major St. John returned from Kelat on 25th, having made arrangements for collection of revenue and supply of garrison. Captain Molloy has been appointed Political Agent at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and left for that place yesterday. The district has been placed under the Government of Candahar, from which it was separated about twenty years ago, and Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has appointed his nephew, Sirdar Shirindil Khan, Lieutenant-Governor.

Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, former Governor of Zamindawar, leaves for Kabul to-morrow. His successor, Abbas Khan, brother-in-law of Sirdar Sher Ali, leaves for Zamindawar shortly with the Alizai chiefs, who have been here for some time and express themselves perfectly satisfied with the new arrangement.

General Hughes' return is not affected by Shahjui affair. He returns here at once with heavy guns, Goorkhas, two companies 59th, and two squadrons 2nd Punjab Cavalry, leaving two field guns, two mountain guns, two companies 59th, the Biluchis, and one squadron cavalry to garrison Kelat-i-Ghilzai, under command of Colonel Tanner.

Weather cold and cloudless. Health of troops good.

Enclosure 17 in No. 36.

Telegram, dated 4th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION read this morning to full assembly of notables, including Mullahs and merchants. Announcement was then made that in consideration of general peaceable conduct of Duranis of Kandahar and straightforward and loyal conduct of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, British Government has been pleased to appoint him Governor of the province, including Pusht-i-Rud and Kelat-i-Ghilzai, till new arrangements alluded to in proclamation shall be made. Hope and confidence were expressed that people would show by good conduct that the good will and confidence shown in the appointment of their fellow-townsmen and representative of their old rulers are properly appreciated.

Enclosure 18 in No. 36.

No. 21, dated Kabul, 20th October 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letters marginally noted I have the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, the following account of my proceedings since the end of last month.

2. After several interviews with His Highness the Amir, who seemed anxious to meet my wishes and to afford all the assistance in his power, I left Kushi on the 2nd October and marched to Zarghun Shahr, where I was met by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan and a number of other Barakzai nobles who had accompanied him from Kabul. I thought it desirable to receive them in a friendly manner and to ignore entirely their estrangement from the Amir, of which, however, I was well aware. They were permitted to remain with my camp, space being allotted to them at some distance from His Highness'

tents. I have now made the acquaintance of several among them, and have obtained from them a considerable amount of information which would not otherwise have been easily procurable. As stated in my letter No. 19 of the 16th October, and in my telegram of the 18th, the Sirdars form a party adverse to the Amir, and Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, in particular, is at no pains to hide his feelings in the matter. I shall, however, continue to ignore their views in this respect, and shall treat them for the present as loyal subjects of His Highness.

3. On the 3rd October I left Zarghun Shahr for Zahidabad, and halting there one day pushed forward on the 5th to Char Asiab. His Excellency in Council is aware of the severe action which took place on the 6th between a portion of my force and the Afghan troops, supported by a large number of the people of Kabul. The Afghan position was carried, and the enemy defeated with heavy loss. While the action lasted, the people of the neighbouring villages ceased to bring in supplies, which during the morning had been coming in freely; and there were indications that a large number of tribesmen were collected upon the hills in our rear, ready no doubt to take advantage of any opportunity which might be afforded them by a mishap to the force. After the defeat of the Afghan troops these bands apparently dispersed, and the country people again came forward with supplies.

4. I think it desirable to mention here that some doubt has been thrown upon the conduct of His Highness the Amir in connexion with the fight at Char Asiah. It is said that Sirdar Nek Muhammad, uncle of Yakub Khan, who had been left in charge of Kabul during His Highness' absence, came out and had an interview with His Highness on the 5th; that he was directed to return at once and stir up the troops and city people to oppose us; and that the action of the 6th was fought in direct obedience to the Amir's orders. Nek Muhammad after an attempt to treat for pardon has now disappeared, and it is not easy to ascertain the truth of the story; but I have reason to believe that an interview took place, as stated, that Nek Muhammad thereupon called out the troops and city people for a holy war in the name of the Amir, and that he commanded in person during the action of the 6th. I shall do my best to obtain further evidence in the matter.

5. On the 7th October, I advanced to Bini Hissar, a couple of miles from Kabul, and on the 9th the camp was moved to the Siah Sang heights immediately overlooking the city. Three days later, as stated in my telegram of the 13th, I made my formal entry into the Bala Hissar, and announced to the people of Kabul the punishment which would be inflicted upon them for their participation in the massacre of the 3rd September, and in the opposition offered to our advance. Since then all has been quiet, and I have no reason to anticipate any further disorder.

6. In my letter of the 16th October I wrote that a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak, and to try all persons suspected of participation in the attack on the British Embassy or other connected offences. I have now found it necessary to relieve the Commission of a portion of their duties, the collection of evidence regarding the outbreak having proved to be a sufficient task in itself. The actual trial of accused persons has been entrusted to a second Commission, of which I have appointed Brigadier-General Massy to be President and Major Moriarty and Captain Guinness to be members. They have begun their work, and five men were hanged this morning in accordance with their recommendations.

7. His Highness the Amir remains in my camp. In my letter of the 16th instant I remarked that His Highness seemed much broken in spirit and unfit to resume his position and responsibilities. He is now more cheerful, and has been of considerable assistance to me in obtaining information and supplies. But he appears to have been crushed by his long imprisonment and to have lost all strength and energy. I have in vain tried to persuade him to leave his tent and ride with me. His answer is that all exercise has become a burden to him, and that he cares for nothing but rest and quiet. He seems to take little interest in what passes round him and even to feel no desire for the society of his children, whom he rarely sees. Altogether I consider him hopelessly incapacitated for a life of action and responsibility, and I am certain that no reliance could be placed on him for the future were he to remain here as Amir.

8. The state of political parties in Kabul I have described. There is in fact one party only, that of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, who has succeeded in attaching to himself for the time the mass of the Barakzai Sirdars. So far as I can judge there is none else who would be able at present to make a respectable struggle for power in the event of our retirement. Nevertheless, I do not consider that Wali Muhammad is positively strong. I believe he is not popular, and I doubt whether he could maintain himself long even in Kabul unless helped from the outside; while the disorganization of the country consequent on recent events would be entirely beyond his power to overcome.

9. Little or no news reaches me from the outlying provinces. I have to-day addressed the Governor of Turkestan, informing him that I have no intentions against the troops or people in that quarter except such persons as were concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, and requesting him to carry on the Government in accordance with the Amir's instructions, and to supply me with news. But I know nothing of what is passing in the north, and am quite unable to say what line he will take. Nearer home, there is I think a fair prospect of the country becoming settled. Many of the leading men of Kohdaman and Kohistan have come into my camp and asked to see me. They seem well disposed towards us, and I believe that if the country people could only be assured of our permanent protection we should profit very greatly by their recollections of Barakzai tyranny, particularly among the Kohistanis and others whose districts lie within easy reach of the capital.

10. No direct evidence has yet been brought forward against Yahya Khan, Zakariah Khan, the Mustaufi, or the Wazir. In case none should be brought forward I should be disposed to recommend the immediate deportation of these persons to India, with the exception possibly of the Mustaufi. I cannot but feel that they are in fact to a great extent responsible for the outbreak, and that their influence will always be used against us. I think, therefore, that the absence of positive proof of their complicity should not stand in the way of their removal from Afghanistan as an act of State. The Mustaufi it might perhaps be desirable to release and employ. He is generally spoken of here as less hostile to us than any of the others, while his knowledge of the country and long experience of its administration would make him, if he could be depended upon, a very useful servant. But I am not yet convinced that he could safely be treated differently from the rest.

11. I enclose, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, copy and translation of a letter to my address from Asmatulla Khan. I have written to him and requested him to come in here, which I hope he may do. His help would be invaluable, now that an attempt is being made to open up communication with Jellalabad. The arrangements for the carriage of mails between my camp and Ali Khel have not been altogether successful, and the rapid establishment of a regular postal line between Kabul and the head of the Khyber force is most desirable. With Asmatulla Khan's sincere co-operation this could I believe be easily effected. Padshah Khan and his brother, Allal-ud-din, appear to me either to have overrated their influence with their clansmen or to have acted with questionable good faith. The Shuturgurda has been attacked by Ghilzais; the daks have been slow and irregular, owing to Ghilzai interruptions; some of the mails have, I believe, been robbed; and altogether the line of the road between this and Ali Khel has been disturbed and unsafe. I am inclined to think that Padshah Khan and his brother have not done all they could to keep things quiet.

12. The terrific explosions which occurred in the Upper Bala Hissar on the 16th instant have convinced me that large quantities of powder must have been stored underground. This may also be the case in the Lower Bala Hissar which the troops under my command were to have occupied for the winter. Under these circumstances I have decided, unless his Excellency in Council considers the measure objectionable, to destroy the Bala Hissar and move the whole force into the Sherpur cantonments under the Bamian heights. The position is a strong one, and can be made unapproachable. Moreover, I shall in this way be able to keep all the troops together, which would be impossible if the former arrangement were to hold good, for there is not sufficient room in the Bala Hissar. The total destruction of the Bala Hissar will, if his Excellency in Council sanctions my present proposal, renders unnecessary the partial destruction of the town, which was announced in my proclamation of the 12th instant. It will, I think, be preferable as a measure of national punishment, for it will be more striking to the mass of the nation, and, moreover, the weight of the blow will fall with peculiar severity on the Sirdars and other influential persons, who nearly all have houses within the Bala Hissar, while the destruction of a quarter of the town would chiefly affect the lower orders. I hope, therefore, that my proposed action will be approved.

Enclosure 19 in No. 36.

Translation of a Letter from ASMATULLA KHAN to the Address of MAJOR-GENERAL SIR
FREDERICK ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.

I RECEIVED your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal (28th September) and understood its contents, and also those of the enclosed proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom I thought fit of the contents of the proclamation.

Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir and made me over to His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned (to India) the Amir's officials confiscated my property and gave the chiefship to my cousin (or enemy) Bahram Khan.

The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description. They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul I sent my Naib to him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul until I heard from him. In the meantime I received the news of the murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills.

The letter is not dated. It was received on the 20th October 1879.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

No. 37.

Telegram from VICEROY, 12th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

We propose to bring Amir to India, whenever communications are secure.

Amir himself anxious to depart, and his removal is for several reasons, highly expedient.

No. 38.

No. 234 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 13th November 1879.

WE have the honour, in continuation of previous despatches, to submit a summary of the principal occurrences reported from Afghanistan during the past week.

2. The chief event has been the establishment of communication between General Roberts' force and the Khyber column. The junction was effected by General Macpherson's brigade which marched through the Khurd Kabul Pass on the 4th November and met the advanced guard of General Bright's forces under the command of General C. Gough at Katta Sang. General Roberts has personally examined the Chinari, Khurd Kabul, and Lataband passes, and has adopted the Lataband pass as his permanent line of communication toward Jellalabad. The country beyond Khurd Kabul is reported to be fairly open, and the road easy. The arrival in General Macpherson's camp of two leading Ghilzai Chiefs from the neighbourhood of Hissarak, has greatly facilitated the arrangements for keeping this road open and quiet. Two Kabul regiments have returned from Turkestan, and disbanded at the Bamian pass, sending in arms and tents to General Roberts at Kabul. General Hugh Gough returned to Kabul on the 4th November, bringing with him the 9th Lancers, the 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1, Mountain Battery. The troops at Kabul continue in excellent health and spirits. General Watson reports from Ali Khel that the Jirgas of the Hassan and the Ahmad Khel have paid their fine of a thousand rupees and given hostages.

The publication at Kandahar of the proclamation inclosed in our Despatch No. 226, dated 30th October 1879, and the confirmation of Sirdar Sher Ali's authority pending a final settlement of the country, has been well received by the mass of the people. Copies of the proclamation and of the order maintaining Sirdar Sher Ali Khan have been forwarded to Furrak and Herat. We have no further news regarding the reported dispersion of the troops at Herat; and from our latest intelligence, via Teheran, the place appears to be in a state of anarchy, while Ayub Khan is unable to manage his mutinous regiments. From another source, indeed, we learn that he is virtually shut up by them in the Herat citadel. The Governor of Ghazni had not yet made up his mind to tender submission to British authority; at Furrak Mir Afzul is still holding aloof; and the general impression is understood to be that the tribal Chiefs and Sirdars in that part of the country which is not yet within the effective range of our authority, will

endeavour to maintain a neutral position until it shall have been seen whether the Amir Yakub Khan is to be restored to power.

We have, &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 JOHN STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 6th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 4th November. I reconnoitred yesterday to within three or four miles of Tezin, proceeding by Chinari Pass and returning by the Khurd Kabul. Former is impracticable; latter is easy as regards road; but there is a great deal of water even now after rain, and when snow melts it would be impassable. Besides it is difficult pass to force when occupied by an enemy; it can be turned, but it is doubtful if a cart road could be made over the hill which turns it.

Macpherson will be at Khurd Kabul to-day and Tezin to-morrow, and after meeting Charles Gough will work back towards Latabund, when we can decide on best line of road to adopt. Macpherson is not likely to meet with opposition. Headmen of neighbouring Ghilzais accompanied me yesterday. Hugh Gough returns to Kabul to-day with 9th Lancers, 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1 mountain battery. All well.

Letters dated Simla, 24th, and telegram, 28th, were received here yesterday. Private Cockburn, 92nd Highlanders, who lost his leg at Charasiah, died on 1st instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL WATSON, Ali Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

HASSAN and Ahmad Khel Jirgas have paid the fine rupees one thousand and given hostages. Force leaves this to-morrow.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

No special political news. Asmatulla Khan not yet in, but daily expected. On 2nd, I rode to Butkhak, and thence reconnoitred Latabund Pass up to the Kotál. It is fairly open so far, and can be made practicable for guns without much difficulty. On 3rd, rode through Chinari Pass to its junction with Khurd Kabul Pass and back to Butkhak by latter. Both are difficult, and the first not capable of improvement. Khurd Kabul, or Latabund, seems decidedly best for a permanent road. Saw no signs of tribesmen being out. Headmen of Khurd Kabul were with us, and Maliks of Tezin are now here going to join General Macpherson, who advances to Khurd Kabul to-day, and Tezin to-morrow. Ramsay accompanies. No news from outlying provinces. All well here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 7th November 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 5th November.—9th Lancers, 3rd Sikhs, and No. 1 Mountain Battery arrived yesterday. Macpherson's brigade marched through Khurd Kabul Pass yesterday, and

to-day goes to Padshah-i-Mina near Tezin. This route is the direct one to Katta Sang, and the Haft Kotal is avoided. All well.

Enclosure 5 in No. 38.

Telegram, No. A.-1344, dated 8th November 1879.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL WATSON, Ali Khel.

MACPHERSON met Gough at Katta Sang, 7th; his brigade has marched by Khurd Kabul to Tezin. Headmen of villages accompanied. No signs of tribes stirring. 9th Lancers reached Kabul, 5th.

Enclosure 6 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 8th November.—General Macpherson met General Bright's advance force at Katta Sang on 6th instant. Yesterday road on eastern side of Latabund Kotal, the point I reached on 2nd instant, was reconnoitred by Macpherson and reported easy. As further inspection of Khurd Kabul line confirms its difficulties, I have decided to make main communication by Latabund route. Construction of road and telegraph will now be pushed on rapidly.

Enclosure 7 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 8th November.—Muhammad Shah Khan and Mazula Khan, two influential Ghilzai Chiefs of Hisarak, have joined General Macpherson, and will be here to-morrow or next day. Their coming in relieves me of anxiety for safety of road about Jagdallak.

Enclosure 8 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 11th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 7th November.—Two Kabul Regiments, stationed in Turkestan, returned of their own accord few days ago, and dispersed on arriving this side of the Bamian. I sent messengers to try and make them come in here and deliver up their arms, promising they should not be in any way molested: they were not to be persuaded, but sent in nearly 500 stands of arms, upwards of 100 camels, and some tents.

Macpherson reports from Camp near Tezin, that country beyond Khurd Kabul is fairly open and road easy. All well.

Enclosure 9 in No. 38.

Telegram, dated 5th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN TO FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION sent to Herat and Furrab with copies of order entrusting government of Kandahar to Sher Ali. Have enclosed them in letters to Ayub and Mir Afzal, adding only that from these papers actual state of affairs will be seen, and kindness and moderation of British Government be displayed. Letter to Mir Afzal goes by his son, who returns to-day.

Enclosure 10 in No. 38.

Telegram dated 6th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. We hear from Kelat-i-Ghilzai that the Tarakis gathered in considerable numbers after the action at Shahjui, expecting an advance into their country, but dispersed on becoming assured of the return of the troops to Kelat. Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan left on Sunday for Kabul, accompanied by Subadar-Major Abdullah Khan, 26th N. I., who has done excellent service here in the Political Department, and goes to join General Roberts. General Hughes is expected on the 8th. General Palliser left for India on the 3rd. Captain Molloy has arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

A recent caravan from Herat does not confirm news of dispersion of Kabuli regiments there. Muhammad Ayub Khan is practically imprisoned by them in the citadel. The result of news of Amir's abdication reaching Herat as yet unknown.

Publication of proclamation and confirmation of Sher Ali's authority until final settlement of future of country has had excellent effect here on mass of people. But the extreme fanatics are much disturbed, though they have little influence. An influential Mullah, disgusted at the apathy of his countrymen, has sold his property and gone to Mecca. Weather still very fine. Health of troops excellent.

Enclosure 11 in No. 38.

Telegram No. A.-1326, dated 7th November 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla, to GENERAL STEWART, Kandahar.

FOLLOWING from Teheran:—

The Herat correspondent reports, writing on the 12th ultimo, that Ayub Khan was then endeavouring to send the three Kabul regiments, who recognized and killed General Fakir Ahmed Khan, to Kabul, without arms; but that they had refused to go without the other Kabul regiments, their arms, and artillery. In (*sic*) these a conflict anticipated between the Herat and Kabul regiments. He had collected three thousand Irregular Cavalry outside the town, which is very disturbed; and he has no money, having collected and spent the year's revenue in advance. The correspondent adds that affairs are in such state that, if the English appear at Sabzewar, the troops would disperse without offering resistance. He describes Turkestan as in condition of anarchy.

Enclosure 12 in No. 38.

Telegram dated 7th November 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A SEPOY of the 15th Sikhs was murdered on Wednesday evening by two men unknown. Sirdar has offered a thousand rupees reward for their detection; and issued proclamation warning people that such outrages may cause the English Government to repent of the lenity with which Kandahar has been treated.

On 1st November a Ghazi attempted to murder men of guard of Captain Molloy on way to Kelat, and stabbed two men, not dangerously. He was secured and made over to Governor of Kelat for execution. He is a Kakar, and was on road to join Sahib Jan when he heard of that Chief's defeat and death.

Enclosure 13 in No. 38.

No. 31, dated Kabul, 29th October 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C.,¹ Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, Persian translation of the proclamation forwarded with your telegram

of the 23rd instant. It was issued by me yesterday, and copies in Persian will be widely distributed.

2. I also forward copy and Persian translation of a proclamation issued by me to-day, in which I announce that I have assumed control of the State Treasury, the collection of revenue, and the expenditure of public money.

Enclosure 14 in No. 38.

Telegram No. E.-7, dated 28th October 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

PROCLAMATION, as received with your message of 23rd, will be issued to day. Further proclamation, as directed in your telegram of 24th, will be issued to-morrow.

Enclosure 15 in No. 38.

PROCLAMATION to the People of Kabul, dated 29th October 1879.

IN my proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that, for the present, the Government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost of administration, I have taken possession of the State Treasury; and that until the British Government shall declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good government of the country, the collection of revenue and the expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain warning that any one resisting or obstructing the execution of such orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy of the British Government.

No. 39.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 17th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRESS letter from Kabul reports atrocities by 72nd on wounded Afghans. On inquiry, Roberts reports charge refers to Goorkhas, not 72nd. Believed to have set fire to clothes of dead Afghans.

Full inquiry ordered.

No. 40.

No. 236 of 1879.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, the 20th November 1879.

WE have the honour, in continuation of former despatches, to submit a summary of information received from Afghanistan during the past week.

2. General Roberts has reported that on the 11th instant he issued a Proclamation, granting a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since 3rd September, provided that they give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. From this amnesty are excluded all persons concerned in the attack on the Residency, or found in possession of property of the members of the Embassy, and those who, knowing the Amir's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops.

3. Sirdar Wali Muhammad has offered to undertake the charge of Afghan-Turkestan, and desires to proceed to that province with the object of bringing its administration into subordination to the central authority at Kabul; but his proposals are still under

consideration. Sirdar Shahbaz Khan has been sent by General Roberts into Kohistan. The Governor of Ghazni has arrived at Kabul, having been induced to tender his submission to the British authorities mainly, it is understood, by his inability to control the tribes in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, where some disturbances are reported to have occurred. A foraging party from General Macpherson's brigade has been attacked by a number of Safis of Tagao, at Doaba, the junction of the Panjsher and Kabul rivers, but the attacking party was successfully driven off with severe loss. General Watson reports from Kurram that the Chakmanis have submitted to the terms imposed upon them. The troops under General Gordon, which were sent against this tribe, have returned; and General Tytler moves into the Zaimusht country within a few days.

4. At Kandahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzai all is reported quiet; many Chiefs of the Taraki tribe have tendered their submission to the British officer at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. From Herat there have been reports that Sirdar Ayub Khan is levying cavalry among the tribes, but the state of affairs in that part of Afghanistan is still very little known, though it is believed that the Sirdar's situation is precarious; and there are various indications that both he and Mir Afzul (who is still holding Furrak) meditate a retreat towards Persia whenever their independent position at Herat or Furrak becomes no longer tenable.

5. We enclose copy of a letter from Sir Frederick Roberts, reporting his proceedings at Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 9th November. Yesterday General Baker with small force surrounded Indiki, a village at south end of Chardeh Valley, and from which our reconnoitring parties were fired at on 5th October. Between 40 and 50 soldiers were made prisoners and information received of whereabouts of some 60 more; 40 muskets and rifles were found, also number of swords and knives. I inflicted, in addition, heavy fine of grain on village for part it took in the opposition we experienced on 6th October.

General Macpherson reconnoitred on 7th instant to entrance of Lughman Valley, crossing Kabul river and encamping about eight miles from Katta Sang. Last three miles of march through cultivated lands of Sarobi, a very prosperous looking settlement; people civil; supplies and forage abundant; elevation of the camp 3,400 feet; climate of course much milder than that of Kabul. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879,

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 10th November. Macpherson reports that road on left bank of Kabul river leading towards Lughman is good so far as he has been, and that merchants met on road state it is easy to Jellalabad. This information has been sent to General Bright.

Bala Hissar is being rapidly dismantled; all guards will be withdrawn to-day, and destruction of gunpowder commenced to-morrow, sufficient being kept to blow up defences and to meet other requirements.

Letters posted at Simla on 28th October have apparently been lost *en route*. Latest date by post 31st October; by telegraph 6th November.

Major Cavagnari's watch was brought in yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL WATSON, KURRAM, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHAKMANIS submitted to our terms. I returned to Kurram to-day, leaving General Gordon and Captain Conolly with the troops to complete arrangements.

Enclosure 4 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, eleventh November. Following is text of Proclamation which will be issued to-day:—To all whom it may concern. On the twelfth October, Shawal, a Proclamation, was issued, in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against the British troops since the third September, fifteenth Ramazan, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that some at least of those who shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their advance on Kabul were led to do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government, were not rebels against their own Sovereign. And the great British Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men; but rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the third September, fifteenth Ramazan; provided that they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of their opposition to the British advance. But it must be clearly understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to any one, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir's authority, and they will be considered and treated as rebels, wherever found.

Enclosure 5 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 13th November 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 11th November. Wali Muhammad has agreed to go to Turkestan; and Shahbaz Khan to Kohistan. Wali has orders not to interfere with Shahzada Hassan of Badakshan. After inquiries as to his present position, I will deal with him direct.

Dull grey sky to-day and heavy clouds upon the hills; it looks like snow.

Bala Hissar completely evacuated yesterday, pending destruction of powder. Guards replaced by native chowkidars.

Enclosure 6 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 12th November. General Macpherson reports that a Company 67th Regiment under Captain Poole, escorting foraging party to Doaba, at junction of Panjsher and

Kabul Rivers, was attacked by 700 to 1,000 Safis of Tagao. He went to assistance of Company with 150 of 67th foot, 80 of the 28th Native Infantry, four mountain guns, and a Squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry. The latter arriving first were dismounted and sent forward. The guns came into action twice with good effect. Pursuit continued for six miles. Severe loss inflicted on the enemy who fled, leaving their dead on the ground. Our casualties were three, 67th Foot, and one, 28th Native Infantry, killed. Captain Poole and four, 67th Foot, wounded. All wounded doing well. Macpherson will be at Latabund to-day, and will commence construction of road over that Kotal.

Telegraph line completed eight miles beyond Butkhak will be finished to General Macpherson's camp this evening.

Snow fell here yesterday, but has nearly disappeared. All well.

Enclosure 7 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jagdallak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 13th November. Six thousand seven hundred and twenty-nine rifles and guns have been brought in to date. Of these, seven hundred and forty-two are English Enfield, and five hundred and sixty English Snider, rifles.

Telegraph line completed to 25 miles beyond Kabul.

I am sending away with the sick and wounded all the elephants, spare bullocks, and sick transport animals to economise consumption of forage here as much as possible. Weather clear. All well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 12th November. Snow fell on hills all round last night, and a little fell here.

Enclosure 9 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 16th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 14th November. Convoy of sick and wounded started to-day for India. All sick left at Kabul are now comfortably housed. Quarters for British portion of force will be ready in few days; huts for natives are progressing. Two severe earthquakes yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 15th November. There will be no difficulty in making a road from Kabul to Katta Sang, 40 miles on the road towards Gandamak. It will probably be ready for wheeled traffic in a month. Beyond Katta Sang report on road has no doubt been submitted by General Bright. Post now comes in fairly regularly, letters from Simla arriving on seventh day. I am making inquiries about carrier pigeons, and suggest that Officer Commanding at Peshawur and Jellalabad do the same. They would prove useful in event of telegraph line being cut or road communication being temporarily interrupted. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Jagdallak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th November. Governor of Ghazni reached this yesterday. Macpherson's brigade will remain at and near Butkhak, while sick and wounded are *en route* to

Jagdallak. Road to and beyond Butkhak progressing fairly well. No news of importance. Weather fine; troops healthy. All well.

Enclosure 12 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 16th November. Macpherson reports all quiet about Tezin, and the people very civil. Sirdar Shahbaz Khan has started for Kohistan as Governor, with an advance of twenty thousand for collection of forage. Muhammad Hassan Khan goes to Maisan with ten thousand for same purpose. Abdulla Khan with twenty thousand goes to Logar. I propose to abandon system of district collections and to assess each district for lump payment of bhoosa, grass, &c. Asmatulla Khan has not come in, and I doubt his doing so until he has a promise of being reinstated in all his former possessions and compensated for all loss suffered since the peace. I have now directed Warburton and Tucker to hold no further communication with him, leaving Hastings to do all that is required from this.

Enclosure 13 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 17th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

SUBADAR-MAJOR ABDULLA KHAN, of the 26th Native Infantry, and Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf, a brother of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan, and recently Governor of Giriskh and Zamindawar, have been sent in by General Stewart. They report the country about Ghazni very unsettled, and the whole road more or less unsafe.

Enclosure 14 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

KABUL, 17th November. Macpherson's brigade will return here on Thursday. On same day Baker with small force will proceed towards Maidan in direction of Ghazni to collect supplies and to settle country, reports having reached me that a Mullah is trying to create disturbance, and has collected a certain number of men between this and Ghazni. All well.

Enclosure 15 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

18th November. Telegraph line will be completed between Kabul and India on 20th. I hope sick convoy from this and convoy of treasure from Gandamak met at Sch Baba, 23 miles beyond Butkhak, yesterday. All well.

Enclosure 16 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 19th November 1879.

FROM GENERAL BRIGHT, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

TELEGRAPHIC communication open through to Kabul to-day.

Enclosure 17 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

A DESERTER from Kandahar regiment stationed at Herat, which he left 23 days ago, states that Ayub was assembling tribal mounted levies, and had issued five months' pay to soldiers.

Enclosure 18 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 14th November 1879. (Extract.)

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

WEEKLY summary of news. General Hughes returned from Kelat-i-Ghilzai on 8th. Captain Molloy writes that everything is quiet at that place. Muhammad Afzal and Sadu Khan, rival chiefs of Hotak clan, were both with him. Many chiefs of the Taraki, Sahib Jan's tribe, had also sent in offering submission. Supplies were coming in plentifully.

On the 10th, Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, nephew of Sirdar Sher Ali, arrived here from Kabul, where he went with Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan. He reports road unsafe for small parties. Most of the Duranis in Amir's service are on their way back to their homes at Kandahar.

His Excellency the Governor of Bombay arrived here on short visit to Sir D. Stewart on the 13th. He leaves on the 16th, *viâ* the Gwajjeh Pass.

There is no news from Herat.

Enclosure 19 in No. 40.

Telegram, dated 18th November 1879.

FROM SIR D. STEWART Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Simla.

CHIEFS of Taraki Ghilzais from country beyond Kelat-i-Ghilzai frontier have come here to submit, and ask for service. Have referred them to Kabul, and informed Roberts.

Enclosure 20 in No. 40.

No. 34, dated Kabul, 4th November 1879. (Extract.)

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, a brief account of the political situation in Kabul during the last fortnight.

With regard to the Amir Yakub Khan, I have already reported by telegraph that the instructions conveyed have been carried out. On the 28th His Highness was informed that his resignation had been accepted; and the Proclamation forwarded to me by order of Her Majesty's Government was published for general information the same day. The government of the country will for the present be carried on under my immediate supervision, without the declared aid of any Afghan Chief or Sirdar. I have explained my reasons for thinking this arrangement preferable to the formation of a provisional native government, and I need not therefore state them here. I am convinced that no good could result from the introduction of any Afghan element into the administration, pending the final orders of Government as to the disposal of the country.

Yakub Khan has surrendered treasure amounting to some eight or nine lakhs of rupees in gold coin; there must be more, as I understand he quite recently took by force from Abdulla Jan's mother the sum of rupees 1,700,000. I have given him a receipt for the money, which he claims as his own property, and have informed him that

if his Excellency the Governor-General in Council holds his claim to be valid, the money will be returned to him hereafter. With this arrangement he has expressed himself satisfied. I have also informed him that I shall not be content until he has delivered up the whole of the treasure he was in possession of as Amir of Kabul.

In obedience to instructions I have assumed possession of the State Treasury, and have announced that for the future the collection of revenue and expenditure of public money will be under my control. A copy of the Proclamation in which this announcement was made I have already submitted.

I mentioned in my letter No. 21 of the 20th October that some doubt had been thrown on Yakub Khan's conduct in connexion with the fight at Charasiah. The suspicion has, to a certain extent, been strengthened by the production of a letter supposed to have been written by Yakub's uncle, Nek Muhammad Khan, in which he states that he was personally ordered by the Amir to raise a holy war against us. A copy of this letter has also been submitted for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council. It is not, however, conclusive proof of Yakub's bad faith, for there is some doubt as to its being authentic, and it was brought to me by Sirdar Wali Muhammad, whose feelings towards Yakub are openly unfriendly. I have been unable to ascertain the name of Nek Muhammad's supposed correspondent.

The city is quiet and seems likely to remain so, and I am in hopes that the country in general is settling down. Certainly the collection of supplies has become much easier. I have now nearly enough for the winter, and large quantities of grain and other necessaries are coming in daily. It is probable that the Afghan troops formerly in Kabul, have carried disaffection with them into a good many parts of the country. Some hundreds of men, armed with Enfields or Sniders, are believed to have assisted in the late attack on the British position at the Shuturgurdan, and similar bodies would very likely be found elsewhere if any disturbance occurred. Further, there is no certainty as to the intentions of Ayub Khan, and the state of affairs generally in Herat and the northern provinces. But I hope to bring in and disarm a good many of the troops, who are probably holding together from fear rather than from any fixed intention of giving trouble; and I think that I shall ere long succeed in exerting some pressure on the outlying provinces. On the whole, therefore, though the situation is not without its difficulties, I feel that there is a fair prospect of tiding over the winter without disorder here or elsewhere.

The proclamation of the Amir's resignation has I believe, had a favourable effect on the tribes around Kabul. Asmatula Khan seems now resolved to come in; and many other influential men from Tezin, Khurd Kabul, and the neighbourhood have already done so. I have strong hopes that the advance of General Bright's and General Macpherson's forces will now be unopposed, and that regular communication will soon be opened with Jellalabad. As it is, I have only heard of two mail robberies on this road, though runners have been constantly passing over it for the last fortnight. In order to co-operate with the Khyber column, a brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., marched from here for Butkhak on the 1st November. To-day General Macpherson advances to Khurd Kabul, and he will go on by the Tezin route to meet General Bright.

On the 2nd, I went out myself to Butkhak, and examined the Latabund Pass as far as the Kotal. The hills through which the road passes are fairly open, and the road itself can I think without difficulty be made practicable for guns. On the 3rd I rode through the Chinari Pass to its junction with the Khurd Kabul Pass; and back to Butkhak by the latter. The former pass, so far as I went, was difficult and not capable of improvement. The road lies for considerable distances between precipitous rocks along the bed of the stream, which has to be crossed and re-crossed incessantly, and the heights could not easily be occupied during the passage of a force. I think the Latabund or Khurd Kabul will prove decidedly the best for a permanent route.

The camp was moved on the 31st ultimo from the Siah Sang heights to the Sherpur cantonments, which I propose to occupy during the winter. The buildings inside the cantonment are not yet fit for use, but though frost has now set in at night, the days are warm, and the troops will not suffer any inconvenience from remaining a few weeks longer in the open.

Brigadier-General Gough, after relieving the force which had been surrounded and attacked on the Shuturgurdan, arrived in cantonments this morning with the 9th Lancers, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 5th Punjab Cavalry.

On leaving Ali Khel I purposely brought with me certain Maliks of the neighbouring tribes, with the view of sending them back later on, after our occupation of Kabul should have been completed. I took the opportunity of General Gough's

return to the Shuturgurdan to let those men re-join their people, feeling confident that their account of our successes here would have a quieting effect upon the tribes. I have since heard both from Colonel Money and from General Gordon that their arrival was in fact most opportune. They were able at once to contradict all the unfounded reports then in circulation among the ignorant tribesmen, and to vouch for the fact that a British army was in possession of the Bala Hissar. I am assured that this information had much to do with dispersing the numerous bands which had gathered round Ali Khel and the Shuturgurdan.

Major Hastings is now engaged in collecting information for a report upon the revenue system and financial condition of the country; and I hope to forward at an early date approximate statistics regarding the receipts and cost of administration.

Now that there is a fair prospect of rapid and uninterrupted communication with India, I will submit weekly Political Diaries in the usual form. It seemed useless to do this so long as our communications were slow and uncertain, but from the 8th instant diaries will be despatched regularly; and telegraphic summaries of news will also be submitted twice or thrice a week as may be necessary.

Enclosure 21 in No. 40.

No. A.-1346, dated Simla, 8th November 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Expeditionary Force, Kabul.

I AM directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated Bala Hissar, Kabul, 16th October 1879.

2. In reply, I am to inform you that His Excellency the Viceroy approves and confirms your nomination, as reported in your letter, of a Commission for the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the attack upon the British Residency at Kabul. The appointment of Major-General Hills, C.B., V.C., to exercise the chief authority in and around Kabul, is also sanctioned.

3. You have prohibited under severe penalty the carrying of arms within or in the vicinity of the city. These orders, with all the other precautions which you have found necessary for the security of your position, the prevention of disorder, and the personal safety of the British officers and soldiers under your command, are approved by His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, who desires me to add that the Government of India fully appreciate the judgment and ability with which you are executing your instructions.

4. With regard to the measures to be taken in consequence of the Amir's definite abdication, and in view to the existing situation of affairs in Afghanistan, I am to observe that you have already received and published the Proclamation ordered by Her Majesty's Government. Upon these matters, and in respect to the future movement and position of His Highness the Amir [who is to remain for the present in your Camp] you will await further instructions from the Government of India.

No. 41.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 30th November 1879, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

ROBERTS telegraphs that the movements of a well-known Mullah are causing uneasiness in the country, especially in Wardak and Kohistan, where people are reported under some excitement. Roberts expects that departure of Amcer from Kabul for India tomorrow, 1st, may have quieting effect. His proposal to deport also Yahya Khan and Ministers, arrested 12th October, has been sanctioned as politically necessary.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL
(No. 49).

MY LORD,

India Office, London, 11th December 1879.

PARA. I. I have to acknowledge the receipt of the letters of your Excellency's Government, marginally noted, reporting the particulars, received from various sources, of the attack made on the British Mission at Cabul on the 3rd September, the measures taken under the orders of your Excellency in Council to enforce redress for that murderous outrage, and the course of events in Afghanistan subsequent to the renewal of military operations.

Letter, No. 202, dated 15th Sept. 1879.	
" " 204, " 25th " "	
" " 210, " " " "	
" " 215, " 2nd Oct. "	
" " 216, " " " "	
" " 217, " 9th " "	
" " 219, " 16th " "	
" " 224, " 23rd " "	
" " 226, " 30th " "	
" " 231, " 6th Nov. "	
" " 234, " 13th " "	

2. In my despatch of the 18th September, written upon receipt of the telegraphic reports of the disaster of the 3rd idem, I reserved the expression of any opinion on the part of Her Majesty's Government as to the causes to which the catastrophe might be attributed. The further details which have since reached them in your letters under reply are so conflicting in character that they throw but little light on the question. It is clear, from the last reports and letters received from the late Sir L. Cavagnari, that, in spite of some manifestations of turbulence by certain of the Amir's regiments, that able and experienced officer was, under no apprehension in regard to the immediate future; and it is still impossible for Her Majesty's Government to arrive at any positive conclusion whether the outbreak, which had such deplorable consequences, was a mere ebullition of mutinous troops not in the first instance directed against the British Mission, whether it was the result of popular discontent at the residence of a foreign Envoy at the Court of the Amir, or whether it was the outcome of intrigue on the part of Afghan notables at Cabul or elsewhere, set on foot for their own purposes. Scarcely less obscure up to this time is the further question of the complicity of the Amir Yakub Khan, who cannot, however, even if wholly innocent of participation in the crime, be acquitted of discreditable timidity and want of resource in the presence of a grave emergency.

3. Her Majesty's Government have followed with gratification the military movements which resulted in the occupation of the city of Cabul by the force under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts. They highly appreciate the skill with which the operations were conducted, and the cheerfulness and courage shown by all ranks in their execution in the face of a foe, not insignificant in numbers, with the advantage of strong positions, and having the sympathy probably of many thousands who would have become open allies had the success of the British arms been less rapid and decisive. It is also very satisfactory that the communication between Cabul and India by the Khyber Pass, and the military re-occupation of Candahar, should have been effected without opposition.

4. Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the measures taken by General Roberts after his arrival at Cabul for the conviction and punishment of persons concerned in the attack on the Embassy, and for the maintenance of order in the city and surrounding district. They still await information of the amount of fine intended to be levied on the inhabitants as a penalty for the part taken by them in the outbreak.

5. Her Majesty's Government will be glad to receive at an early date, the views of your Excellency in Council in regard to the re-organization of the administration of Afghanistan. The determination of the Amir Yakub Khan to retire from the position to which, by his father's appointment and the assent of the Sirdars and people, he so lately succeeded, left no alternative but to proclaim the temporary assumption by the British Government of authority throughout the country. At Candahar, under the judicious supervision of Lieutenant-General Sir D. Stewart, the native Governor, Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, to whom control over a wide district has been delegated, appears to be conducting affairs with ability and success; but elsewhere the ordinary functions of Government are necessarily in abeyance.

6. Pending further information, Her Majesty's Government will not attempt to decide the mode in which the several provinces of Afghanistan shall eventually be governed, but it seems clear that there is no chance of the establishment of one Government for the whole of the late kingdom which would give promise of permanence. They reserve their final opinion on the point until they are in possession of the views of your Excellency in Council. Her Majesty's Government fully recognise the many difficulties by which the question is surrounded, but they trust that, with the assistance of your Excel-

lency, it may be possible to frame arrangements which will reconcile the interests of the Afghan Chiefs and people with the essential condition of security to the British Empire in India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CRANBROOK.

No. 43.

No. 243 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, the 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter No. 24, dated 24th October 1879, from the Political Assistant, Kabul Expeditionary Force, with accompanying translation of a letter from Major-General Ivanoff, Governor of Zarafshan, to the address of Muhammad Musa Khan (son of Amir Yakub Khan) and others, mentioned in the margin.

General Gholam Hyder Khan, late Deputy Governor of Afghan-Turkistan. Habibulla Khan.

Nur Muhammad Khan, son of the late Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, half-brother of the late Amir Dost Muhammad Khan.

Lal Muhammad, a confidential servant of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 43.

No. 24, dated Kabul, 24th October 1879.

From H. M. DURAND, Esq., Kabul, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, a letter, in original, with translation, from Major-General Ivanoff, Governor of Zarafshan, to the address of His Highness the heir-apparent, Muhammad Musa Khan, and others.

Translation of a Letter from MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, Governor of Zarafshan, to the Address of the Heir-apparent, MUHAMMUD MUSA KHAN, and others.

ON the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received your letter which you sent to me, and understood its contents. I was very much pleased and at once communicated it to General Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened by Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan. May God change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened. I have been forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General Kauffman. May God keep you safe.

The Zarafshan Province, Governor Major-General Ivanoff.

Written and sealed by the General.

Written on 29th Mart (March) 1879=5th Rabi-ul-Sani 1296.

No 44.

No. 244 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William December 19, 1879.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter received from Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, reporting the substance of a conversation between himself and the ex-Amir Yakub Khan regarding the political events and transactions which preceded the negotiations between the Russian authorities at Tashkend and the late Amir Sher Ali Khan, and led to the Amir's eventual rupture with the British Government.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
H. J. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 44.

No. 50, dated Kabul, 22nd November 1879. (Extract.)

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief account of an interview which took place between the Amir Yakub Khan and myself on the 22nd October. The interview was a private and informal one; but recent events have lent some interest to what passed on the occasion, and I have, therefore, thought it desirable that a report should be prepared for the information of the Governor-General in Council.

2. After some conversation upon matters of no special importance, the Amir introduced his father's name, and thus gave me the opportunity I had often wished to have of leading him on to speak naturally and unconstrainedly about Sher Ali Khan's feelings and policy during the last ten years. I was most careful to avoid any expression of my own views upon the subject in order that I might, if possible, obtain from the Amir a perfectly spontaneous and truthful account of the circumstances which led, in his opinion, to Sher Ali's estrangement from ourselves and rapprochement to Russia. In this I think I succeeded. Yakub Khan spoke readily and freely of all that had passed, and needed no question or suggestion from me to declare his conviction regarding the cause of his father's unfriendly attitude towards us during the past few years.

3. The substance of the Amir's statement was as follows:—

“In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but, nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Muhammad Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Muhammad Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended.

“When my father received from the Government of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to Cabul, he read it out in Durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir and asked permission to leave Kabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to Tashkend, and report the state of affairs to

General Kauffmann, who would inform the Tsar, and thus bring pressure to bear on England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and urged the Amir to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent the British Mission from reaching Kabul.

“Colonel Stolietoff never returned to Kabul. He lost no time in reaching Tashkend, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then started for Russia.

“The Afghan official, Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan generally known as the ‘Dabir-ul-Mulk,’ who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff from the Oxus to Kabul, accompanied him on his return journey to Tashkend. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my father’s flight from Kabul reached General Kaufmann. He was then permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one an European, the other a Native of Bokhara.

“My father was strongly urged by General Kauffmann not to leave Kabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to return to Tashkend, the Doctor being permitted to remain with my father if his services were required.

“Throughout, the Russian Embassy was treated with great honour, and at all stations between Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul, orders were given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on their arrival and departure.”

4. I cannot, of course, vouch for the exact words used by Yakub Khan, but I am confident that the foregoing paragraph, which is written from notes taken at the time, contains a substantially accurate record of the conversation.

5. It would be superfluous for me to advance any proof of the fact that for one reason or another, Sher Ali did during the latter part of his reign fall away from us and incline towards an alliance with Russia. But I think the closeness of the connexion between Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir’s hostility towards ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognised. Yakub Khan’s statements throw some light upon this question, and they are confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul, and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub Khan’s assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact, been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security of our Indian Empire.

6. The magnitude of Sher Ali’s military preparations is, in my opinion, a fact peculiarly significant. I have already touched upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68 regiments of infantry and 16 of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to near 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder and I believe several million rounds of home-made Snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities. Finally, Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the Sherpur Cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during the winter within the cantonment and its outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bemaru hills. Sher Ali’s original design was apparently to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of five miles, and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves, and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could have been met from the Afghan Treasury, the gross revenue of the country amounting only to about eighty lacs of rupees per annum.

7. I have referred to the prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul as evidence of the growing connection between Russia and Afghanistan. I am unable to find proof that the Tsar’s coin was introduced in any other way than by the usual channels of trade. It is quite possible that the bulk of it, if not the whole, came in gradually by this means, the accumulation of foreign gold in particular being considerable in this country, where little gold is coined. Nevertheless, it seems to me a curious fact that the amount of Russian money in circulation should be so large. No less than 13,000 gold pieces were found among the Amir’s treasure alone; similar coins are exceedingly common in the city bazaar; and great numbers of them are known to be in possession of the Sirdars. Of course English goods of all kinds are plentiful here—that is inevitable, particularly

with a considerable body of Hindu merchants settled in the city, but Russian goods also abound. Glass, crockery, silks, tea, and many other things which would seem to be far more easily procurable from India than from Russian territory, are to be found in great quantities. A habit, too, seems to have been growing up among the Sirdars and others of wearing uniforms of Russian cut, Russian buttons, Russian boots, and the like. Russian goods and Russian ways seem, in fact, to have become the fashion in Afghanistan.

No. 45.

No. 246 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To The Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., submitting his Kabul Diary for the period from 1st to 8th November 1879.

* No. 39, dated 9th November 1879.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 45.

No. 39, dated Kabul, 9th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Depôt.

I HAVE the honour to submit Diary for the period between the 1st and 8th November, both days inclusive.

Kabul Diary, dated 1st to 8th November 1879. (Extract.)

1st November 1879.—A brigade under Brigadier-General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., marched this morning for Butkhak, to open up communications with the Khyber column. Many of the leading men about Khurd Kabul, and Tezin have come in, and arrangements have been made with them for the establishment of a regular postal service between Butkhak and Seh Baba. They have now been ordered to report themselves to General Macpherson.

Lieutenant Ramsay arrived in camp this afternoon. He has been ordered to join General Macpherson as Political Officer.

2nd November 1879.—This morning I rode out to Butkhak, and afterwards reconnoitred the Latabund Pass as far as the Kotul.

3rd November 1879.—Rode through the Chunari Pass to its junction with the Khurd Kabul, and back by the latter to Butkhak, 32 miles.

In the evening I rode back to Sherpur Cantonments, following the line of telegraph, which has now been laid as far as Butkhak. The distance as measured by the Telegraphic Department is about 15 miles.

4th November 1879.—Captain Turner, who has been in political charge of arrangements on the Ali Khel road, came into camp to-day. He brought a number of prisoners,

among whom were some Ghilzai Maliks, who had instigated the recent rising of the clans round the Shuturgurdan, and some Afghan soldiers. These will be tried by the Military Commission.

5th November 1879.—The Kohistani headmen, who have been here for some time and have a good many grievances against Sher Ali and Yakub Khan, were assembled by Major Hastings this afternoon, and told that to prove their good faith they should at once gather and give up all arms formerly belonging to the Amir, a large number of which are believed to have found their way to Kohistan. For this purpose some of the headmen were dismissed, the remainder being retained as a measure of precaution. I do not think the Kohistanis will prove very tractable about the surrender of arms, which are valued by them beyond everything; but the experiment is worth a trial. Before being dismissed the headmen were informed that a Governor would shortly be appointed to the district, who would inquire into their complaints. They seemed satisfied.

Amin Khan of Hangu, who accompanied me here, was allowed to return to-day; his presence being no longer of any use.

6th November 1879.—General Macpherson reports that on the 5th he advanced to within a short distance of Tezin.

This afternoon news arrived in camp that two Turkestanian regiments which were marching on Kabul, had disbanded at Kot-i-Ashen, nine miles from here, and dispersed to their homes. Four hundred and fifty stands of arms, some tents, and 110 camels, belonging to these regiments, have been brought in. They had no guns.

7th November 1879.—I have determined to appoint Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan Governor of Turkistan, which I am assured he has more chance of holding than anyone else. He was asked to-day whether he would go. I caused him to be informed that if so I would advance him a lac of rupees, which would be recoverable from the revenues of the province; that he could raise and take with him 1,000 Jezailchis and 500 horse, and that his great object must be to conciliate the troops and people, and preserve quiet in the province during the winter. The Sirdar objected to the sum offered as too small, and said that if he went he must have at least two lacs to start with, as a good deal of money would be required for the pay of his force, and for other purposes. I agreed to give the larger sum, and expect the Sirdar's final answer to-morrow. If he goes, one of his sons remains in my camp.

For Kohistan, I think Shahbaz Khan is perhaps best fitted. His mother was a Kohistani, which makes him more acceptable to the people than other Sirdars; but he is not a man of any talent, and I propose to send with him Sayud Muhammad, son of the late Nur Muhammad Shah, who will, I think, supply the deficiency.

The Kohistani headmen will be informed to-morrow of the appointment of Shahbaz Khan, and ordered to accompany him without delay.

Careful inquiries are being made regarding the manufacture of guns, rifles, ammunition, saddlery, and military equipments in general during the time of Sher Ali. Considering the very rough means at their disposal, the Amir's artizans have turned out some remarkably good work. They are now being examined.

General Bright, after meeting General Macpherson near Tezin, has marched back to Jagdalak.

The eastern side of the Latabund Pass is reported easy and open. I am sending out the Chief Engineer to make a thorough examination, and if I find no unforeseen difficulties in the way, I shall try to make the pass practicable at once before the snow sets in.

8th November 1879.—Muhammad Shah Khan and Mazulla Khan, two leading Ghilzais of Hissarak, have come in. This will, I hope, ensure the safety of the road as far as Jagdalak.

The Bala Hissar will be completely evacuated by our troops to-day or to-morrow. I am having the powder destroyed, and I think it safer to keep all troops out of the way for the present. I have made arrangements for guarding the gates and principal points by means of chowkidars.

The principal medical officer reports that the searching parties have failed to find any European bodies among those buried near the Residency. I have ordered the pits to be closed, as further search seems useless.

No. 46.

No. 248 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from Lieut.-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., commanding Kabul Field Force, No. 45, dated 19th November 1879, submitting his diary for the week ending 15th November.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 J. STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 46.

No. 45, dated Kabul, 19th November 1879.

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force,
 to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
 Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit diary for the week ending 15th November 1879.

Kabul Diary, 9th to 15th November 1879. (Extract.)

9th November 1879.—The Kohistani head men were informed to-day that Shabbaz Khan was to go to Kohistan as Governor. They seemed satisfied with the arrangement.

Letters received from Ghazni give news of disturbances there. It is said that Mullah Mushk-i-Alam has assembled a number of people with the intention of raising a holy war. Muhammad Sayad, the Governor of Ghazni, professes his willingness to come in, and assures me he is doing his best to keep matters quiet.

10th November 1879.—Abdul Jabbar, formerly a Captain of Artillery in the Afghan army, and his father, Muhammad Akram, who had been sent down to collect information by Colonel Macgregor, have brought in a report about the disturbance at Ghazni and the state of affairs in the surrounding country. Muhammad Akram speaks of large bodies of tribesmen having assembled about the town under the orders of Mushk-i-Alam, but his evidence is not altogether to be depended upon. He did not himself see any of the insurgents. The Wardak country he reports perfectly quiet, but full of disbanded soldiery. Abdul Jabbar calculates that four and a half or five complete regiments of infantry could be brought together in Wardak, all well armed, but says they have no guns.

A letter, dated the 5th, received from the Governor of Ghazni professing his willingness to come in, and his hope of dispersing the insurgents. In a second letter he announces that he has left Ghazni, and is on his way to Kabul.

Abdul Kadir, a former Governor, writes, accusing Muhammad Said of fomenting this disturbance himself.

11th November 1879.—Heavy clouds on the hills all day, and a dull grey sky. At 2 o'clock a dust storm came on which was succeeded about sunset by a slight fall of snow.

I have completed my arrangements for the safe custody of the Bala Hissar during the destruction of the powder stored in the citadel. The gates will be held, and the walls and streets patrolled, by some 60 native chowkidars under the orders of Najaf Ali Khan, head man of the Arab community in Kabul. All military guards have been withdrawn.

12th November 1879.—A proclamation was published to-day granting an amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September. I am assured by General Daud Shah and others that this will have a quieting effect on the country and facilitate the collecting of supplies.

This morning a telegram came in from General Macpherson reporting that a small party of the 67th Foot had been attacked on the 10th near Doaba, that a force had been sent out in support, and that the enemy, who were in considerable strength, had been defeated, and pursued for several miles. The assailants were Safis of Tagoo on the left bank of the Kabul river.

I have arranged to discontinue the direct collection of forage. Each district will now be required to produce a certain amount of bhoosa, grass, &c. An influential man will be sent out to each with an advance of money, and made responsible for the collection of the whole amount assessed. This plan seems likely to prove less troublesome and more effective than the system of direct collection.

13th November 1879.—Two shocks of earthquake were felt to-day.

Some Tajiks, who have come in from Ghazni, report the disturbance quieted and the insurgents dispersed. They say the Governor has left the city and is on his way to Kabul, or professes to be so.

Sirdar Shahbaz Khan and the Kohistani head men were dismissed this afternoon. The head men were told that they must submit to the Sirdar's authority, and exhorted to give up their family feuds and live quietly. I also impressed upon them the necessity for procuring the surrender of Government arms. Muhammad Afzul Khan, son of Abdul Karim Khan, was anxious for leave to avenge his father's murder. He was told that inquiries would be made, and that in the meantime he must keep the peace.

Shahbaz Khan gets an advance of Rupees 3,000 for immediate expenditure, and Rupees 20,000 to collect forage. He will be accompanied by Mirza Habibulla Khan, son of Khan Shirin, Sayad Muhammad Shah being unwilling to go, and by any other Mirza he may name.

14th November 1879.—Lieutenant Ramsay came in from Butkhak.

Letters arrived from Lal Muhammad and other men sent by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan to Asmatulla Khan, with the view of inducing the latter to come in. They think he will not come unless his fort and all other property formerly held by him are first restored, and compensation promised for all losses inflicted on him since the Treaty of Gandamak.

15th November 1879.—The Governor of Ghazni came in to-day.

General Macpherson reports all quiet at Fezin, and the demeanour of the tribes friendly.

Shahbaz Khan has not yet gone. He starts to-morrow morning.

Sirdar Muhammad Hussein Khan, brother of Wali Muhammad, goes to Maidan to collect supplies. He has been given rupees 10,000 advance. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of Sirdar Sultan Muhammad Khan, will collect supplies in Logar. I have advanced him Rupees 20,000.

The work upon the Lataband road is being pushed forward as rapidly as possible. The Chief Engineer will go out himself in a day or two to superintend.

Telegraphic communication with India will, I hope, be established in a few days. The line is now complete from here to Barikab.

The Military Commission disposed of 16 cases during the past week. 78 persons in all have now been executed upon the recommendation of the Commissioners.

No. 47.

No. 249 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANDROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the letters noted on the margin, from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.,

No. 54, dated 26th November 1879.
" 58, " 1st December "

Commanding Kabul Field Force, submitting his political diaries for the weeks ending 22nd and 29th November 1879, respectively.

We have &c.
 (Signed) LYTTON.
 F. P. HAINES.
 A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
 A. CLARKE.
 J. STRACHEY.
 E. B. JOHNSON.
 W. STOKES.
 A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

No. 54, dated Kabul, 26th November 1879.

From LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit Kabul Diary for the week ending the 22nd instant. The despatch of the diary has been delayed until to-day by my absence from Kabul.

KABUL DIARY, 16th to 22nd November 1879.

16th November.—I have asked Dr. Bellew to make a complete inquiry into the case of Muhammad Syud, Governor of Ghazni. There are a good many people now in camp who have, or profess to have, information regarding the recent disturbances in that quarter.

17th November.—It is reported that five Kabuli regiments from Turkestan have arrived near Charikar on their way to their homes. They are said to have two guns with them, and to number about three thousand men. I have sent out General Parvez Shah Khan with orders to prevent their dispersion if possible, and to bring them in here. They are to be assured that no harm will happen to them, and I have sent them word that they will get something more than the usual reward for surrendered weapons if they march in in a body and lay down their arms. I fear they will hardly be persuaded to do so; but it is important to keep them from dispersing and carrying away their arms, if this can in any way be managed. General Daud Shah and others think it probable that all the Kabuli troops in Turkestan will come down before the winter sets in. They are receiving no pay, and seem to have no reason for remaining away from their homes.

18th November.—I have sanctioned, subject to Government approval, the establishment of a civil dispensary in Kabul. A large number of applications for treatment have already been received, and among the applicants are several ladies belonging to the families of Sirdars and other well-to-do people.

19th November.—Letter from Baz Muhammad Khan, son of Sirdar Nur Muhammad Khan, who accompanied Shahbaz Khan to Kohistan, reports that General Ghulam Hyder Khan and Nek Muhammad have crossed the Amu.

The line of telegraph has been completed from here to Jalalabad. A sowar from a cavalry regiment stationed at Ghor, who came down with the Kabuli troops mentioned in my entry of the 17th, reports that the Turkestan road is unsafe for small parties. The troops were fired upon by villagers during their march from Ghor and lost some men. The same Sowar also reports that Muhammad Khan, Uzbek, has seized Shihurghan and Saripul. He says the troops in Turkestan are disaffected for want of pay, and that Ghulam Hyder Khan has lost a great deal of his power.

Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan tells me he has heard the report about Shihurghan and Saripul, but attaches no importance to it.

General Parvez Shah Khan has returned, and reports that he has failed to induce the Turkestan regiments to come in with their arms. They have dispersed to their homes, leaving a gun and some tents at Charikar.

20th November.—Hassan Raza, an Afghan official in Turkestan, writes from Ghor that Abdul Rahman is at Tashkend, and that Nek Muhammad, after being plundered

by the Ghorbandis, has gone to Mazar-i-Sharif. He says the people of Turkestan are in a disturbed state and anxiously expecting British interference.

500 men, 92nd Highlanders.
400 " 5th Punjab Infantry.
400 " 3rd Sikhs.
4 Mountain guns.
2 Guns G.-3.
1 Squadron, 9th Lancers.
2 Squadrons 14 B. "

21st November.—Brigadier-General Baker marched this morning for Maidan with the force marginally noted, to aid Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan in the collection of forage and to disperse any armed bodies of men who may be found in the neighbourhood.

22nd November.—I left cantonments this morning and rode out to Arghandeh to join General Baker, but found he had gone on to Maidan. It is reported that a force has been collected by Mullah Mushk-i-Alam in the Wardak country, and is advancing in this direction. I propose to go on to Maidan to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

No. 58, dated Kabul, 1st December 1879.

From LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit Political Diary for the week ending the 29th November 1879.

POLITICAL DIARY FROM 23RD TO 29TH NOVEMBER 1879. (Extract.)

23rd November.—I rode this morning from Urghandeh to Maidan, where I found Brigadier-General Baker encamped. He had received information that a number of men had assembled in the north of the Wardak district with the intention of crossing over into the Nirkh valley immediately to the west of Maidan. Further, Bahadur Khan, headman of the Umar Khel section of Ghilzais in that valley, had refused to come in, and the neighbouring villages were believed to be withholding their quota of bhoosa in anticipation of a disturbance. The disaffection was said to be due to the influence of Mullah Mushk-i-Alam, who is now in Wardak. I at once ordered Captain Turner to go out to Nirkh with two squadrons of cavalry, and bring in Bahadur Khan quietly, if possible, if not, by force. Near sunset this evening I received news that the cavalry had been received with a heavy fire from Bahadur Khan's village, which was found to be strongly fortified, and that the enemy had appeared in force on all sides. I had, however, no doubt that our men would be able to effect their retirement without serious difficulty, and determined, as it was getting late, to send out no reinforcements. Later in the evening the cavalry returned to camp. They have lost three horses. No other casualties.

24th November.—The camp was struck this morning at daybreak, and the whole of the tents and baggages being collected in a small fort close by, the force moved off in the direction of Nirkh. I was in hopes, from the information brought to me, that the enemy might attempt a stand in their former position, and that an example might be made. Before our arrival, however, they had deserted Bahadur Khan's fort and made off to the hills. Small bodies of them were seen, but they were far out of reach and on ground that made pursuit hopeless. Under these circumstances, I gave orders that Bahadur Khan's fort and the whole of the Umar Khel villages in its neighbourhood should be destroyed.

I rode back to Maidan, arriving about 4 o'clock. Since then a strong wind has been blowing with clouds of dust, and the cold is intense.

The country which I saw to-day is apparently rich and populous. From our camp, and from the road to Nirkh, a number of fertile valleys are to be seen studded with villages and full of cultivation. Good timber, a rarity in this country, is not altogether wanting here, and water is plentiful.

25th November.—Rode into Sherpur. The view from several points of the road was exceedingly fine, particularly about Urghandeh, where the ground is high, and the hill slopes comparatively well-wooded. The line of the Hindu Kush, which is almost entirely shut out from view at Kabul by nearer ranges of hills, was from this point clearly visible. The whole range was covered with snow.

I arrived in the afternoon and found awaiting me news that a small party of Kabul mounted police were treacherously attacked yesterday in a village near Dakir, where they

had been sent by General Hills in the hope of securing some of Nek Muhammad's property. They were set upon by the villagers, who had received them in a most friendly manner, and lost five killed and three wounded. The men were all Kabulis.

A letter from Sara Khan Beg, formerly Mir of Kulab, who is now in Turkestan, states that the country is in a very unsettled condition. Nek Muhammad is believed to have crossed the Amu, and it is reported that the Russians are urging the Amir of Bokhara to occupy Balkh. Malik Hamid, Lal Muhammad, and others, sent by Sirdar Wali Muhammad to induce Asmatulla Khan to come in, returned this morning. They report that he is holding back partly on account of the dissuasion of Mullah Muskh-i-Alam, his spiritual backer, and partly from the fear that we may again retire from the country and leave him in the lurch.

26th November.—Rumours have reached Kabul to the effect that a rising is contemplated by the Kohistanis and men of Tagao. I have not received any trustworthy information on the subject.

27th November.—Further reports of an impending disturbance in Kohistan and the neighbourhood. It is said that emissaries from Mullah Muskh-i-Alam have been at work in this part of the country, and that a holy war is being assiduously preached.

Brigadier-General Baker informs me that he to-day fell in with a small body of insurgents near the village of Beni Badam while reconnoitring with the cavalry. A few shots were exchanged.

28th November.—Brigadier-General Baker reports that he went out to-day and destroyed the village of Beni Badam, the inhabitants of which he believes were in league with the insurgents. The latter dispersed. They are said to have been Wardaks raised by Mullah Muskh-i-Alam. According to information brought in by neighbouring villagers, their leader was killed yesterday by a chance shot from one of our men.

Sirdar Fakir Muhammad Khan, a cousin of Yahya Khan's, and father-in-law of Abdur Rahman, came into Kabul to-day. He has for the last five or six years been living in Kohdaman on a small pension granted him by the Amir Sher Ali. He says that the people of Kohistan and the neighbourhood are in an excited state, and that an outbreak may be expected at any moment.

29th November.—Early this morning a letter came in from Shahbaz Khan reporting that the headmen and people of Kohistan are on the point of rising. He had sent for some of the headmen, but they refused to come in, and openly declared that they intended to raise a holy war and destroy the British force in Kabul. A reply was sent to Shahbaz Khan urging him to do all in his power to keep matters quiet, and he was furnished with letters for the most influential men of the Kohistani Maliks calling upon them to come in. It is generally believed that a considerable force is assembling in this quarter with the avowed intention of making a night attack upon our cantonments.

Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan has been sent to Kohistan, where he is believed to possess some influence, with orders to re-assure the people and bring the Maliks in if possible.

General Baker reports that all is going well in the direction of Maidan. The Wardak insurgents have completely dispersed, and have returned to their homes, in spite of the exhortations of Mullah Mushk-i-Alam. Supplies are coming in freely, and the greater portion of the amount stipulated for the district has already been produced.

A Peshawari merchant from Tashkurghan has come in to camp. He says the country beyond the Hindu Kush is thoroughly unsettled, and that the roads between this and Ghoris are impassable for small parties. According to him Ghulam Hyder Khan is making great efforts to secure the troops who have kept together in Turkestan. He has promised them an increase of pay and regular payments. He is said to have seven regiments of infantry at Mazar-i-Sharif.

It is confidently asserted here by city bankers and others that the Kohistanis are in force at Khoga Sarai, and that a night attack upon cantonments is imminent. Muhammad Usman Khan of Tagao is said to be acting in concert.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND,
for Lieut.-General Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force.

No. 48.

No. 251 of 1879. (Extract.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 19th December 1879.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a further collection of telegrams, received from our officers in Afghanistan.

* From General Roberts, No. 37, dated 7th November 1879.

To General Roberts, No. 28C.P., dated 30th November 1879.

From General Roberts, No. 42, dated 14th November 1879.

From General Roberts, No. 44, dated 15th November 1879.

2. We further enclose copy of letters* received from Lieutenant-General Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 1st December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

GENERAL BAKER'S force returns here to-day. He reports that the forage demanded from the Maidan district has all been provided, and that the neighbourhood is quiet. The Wardak people have been trying to make the Logaris join them, in view to giving trouble. They have not responded, and are daily sending in large quantities of forage. In Kohistan there is some excitement; but I am in hopes matters will quiet down, and that it will not (be) necessary to send troops there at present. Weather is very cold, and all hands are well employed in providing shelter for the winter. Convoy which started on 27th November, met up convoy at Seb Baba yesterday. General Kennedy and party expected here to-day. All well.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 3rd December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

HELIOGRAPHIC communication has now been established between Kabul and Landi Kotal, with intermediate stations at Lataband, Jagdalak, Gandamak, Jalalabad, and Ali Boghan. Some of the headmen from Kohistan are now on their way to Kabul. The excitement there will probably cease. All well.

Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 7th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

KOHISTANIS are assembling and inclined to give trouble. Some men under a Mullah, named Mushk-i-Alam, have collected again near Beni-Badam; these people and the Kohistanis are too far away at present to take notice of. I am endeavouring to settle matters without proceeding to extremities. City and neighbourhood of Kabul quiet. All well.

Enclosure 4 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 7th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

AFFAIRS round Kabul less satisfactory of late. In Maidan, Sirdar Muhammad Hosain Khan has been murdered, apparently by men of Mushk-i-Alam's raising. Sirdar Abdulla Khan has been attacked by armed bands in Logar, and for a time besieged in a fort. Some Kohistani Maliks have come in; but the leading man sends excuses, and the country is reported very unquiet. Anxious as I am to avoid any further expeditions at present, I may be forced, if this movement spreads, to send the troops out again.

Enclosure 5 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 8th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp, Gwalior.

Parade of all troops was held this morning to present distinguished conduct medals to men of 72nd Highlanders. The sight of the splendid-looking troops cannot but impress the people of Kabul, a large number of whom attended the parade. As the excitement in Maidan and Kohistan directions continued, General Macpherson will move this afternoon a short distance on direct road towards Maidan, and to-morrow General Baker will proceed to Charasia, and on Wednesday by the valley of the Kabul river to a point on the Ghazni road in rear of Maidan. As bringing up troops from the direction of Jellalabad will have a good political effect, I have ordered the Guide Corps to Kabul. They will probably only remain a few days here.

Enclosure 6 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 10th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

Baker continues his movements to-day by Valley of Kabul river towards Maidan. Macpherson has altered his course somewhat in consequence of the enemy being yesterday discovered trying to reach Kohistan from Arghandi, and this morning he occupied the Surkh Kotal, which divides Kohistan from Paghman. He will probably be engaged with the enemy this afternoon or to-morrow. Baker will then be on their line of retreat.

Enclosure 7 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

General Macpherson occupied the Surkh Kotal yesterday morning, and prevented the enemy from Ghazni direction, joining the Kohistanis. He was just in time, for shortly after his arrival 5,000 or 6,000 Kohistanis reached near Kotal. Their advance party was met at close quarters and driven back on the main position, which was assaulted and taken in good style by 67th Foot, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Goorkhas. Kohistanis fled, leaving six standards in our hands, and losing number of men. Our loss, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh and one Goorkha, two, 67th Foot, four, 3rd Sikhs, all slightly wounded. Practice of Captain Morgan's battery was very effective, also dismounted practice of 14th Bengal Lancers. General Macpherson's brigade with cavalry and horse artillery under General Massy will advance to-day towards Arghandi and Maidan, and should effect a junction with General Baker.

Enclosure 8 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY and FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

GOUGH reports from Gandamak, Ghilzai state of feeling very suspicious. Asmatulla's influence supposed cause; he believes thwarting us every way. Rumours prevail

Jagdalak may be attacked. Vague impression here that when winter becomes severe our Kabul position will be seriously threatened by hordes from direction Kohistan and Ghazni. Increased preparations and vigilance requisite.

Enclosure 9 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 12th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY and FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

As reported in my telegram of yesterday Macpherson's brigade advanced by Paghman Valley toward Arghandi, while the cavalry and horse artillery under Massy made for Ghazni road. Enemy appeared in very great number and quite outflanking Massy forced him to retire. Ground is much cut up by deep water-cuts, the guns upset, and had to be temporarily abandoned. Cavalry charged several times, but the numbers against them were too great. Macpherson's brigade came up soon afterwards and drove off the enemy. Meanwhile Colonel Macgregor had been enabled to recover the guns. Macpherson bivouacked for the night at Deh Mozang, which had been previously occupied by 200 of 72nd Highlanders. Large body of enemy retreated to hills south of Bala Hissar with the intention of capturing that position, and thus getting command of the city. The picquets on this point had been strengthened, enemy assaulted it repeatedly during the night, but were beaten off with loss by detachment of 67th and 72nd under command of Captain Jervis of former regiment. Macpherson is now reinforcing the position and will then drive enemy off neighbouring heights. Baker is on return march to Kabul; he engaged enemy repeatedly yesterday and inflicted great loss. He reports in high terms of work done by 5th Punjaub Cavalry under Major Williams, his advance guard under Major White, 92nd Highlanders, and by a company of that regiment under Lieutenant J. Napier. The combination against us is undoubtedly very extensive. Guides arrived last night. Thinking that excitement might spread along line of communication have requested General Bright to reinforce Gandamak to admit of troops there being used as a moveable column; it is very desirable tribes should see that our communications are strongly held. At same time I don't think more troops are required from India. Wali Muhammad Hassan Khan and all other Sirdars are with me and affording every assistance. City is quiet. I entrusted command of Sherpur cantonments to General Hugh Gough during my absence, his arrangements were admirable. Our loss yesterday was 18 killed and 25 wounded. Amongst the killed Lieutenant Hardy, Royal Horse Artillery, and Lieutenants Hearsey and Ricardo, 9th Lancers, and amongst the wounded Colonel Cleland and Captain Mackenzie, 9th Lancers, former dangerously. Lieutenant Cook, 3rd Sikhs, and Forbes, 14th Bengal Lancers, both severely.

Enclosure 10 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 13th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

Enemy continued collecting. Yesterday a few appeared to the north-east on lower spurs of Kohistan hills. Large number assembled in and around Benishahr, while those in neighbourhood of Indiki were considerably strengthened. Macpherson held point above Bala Hissar, but failed to dislodge enemy from high peak, where their position was of great strength and held by a large force, chiefly men of the Ardal regiments. Baker returned by evening, having engaged the enemy repeatedly during the day, with but slight loss to his own troops. Night passed quietly. This morning Baker moved out with 72nd Highlanders, Guide Infantry, Wing 3rd Sikhs, 4 guns, G-3, 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, 1 Squadron 9th Lancers, and 5th Punjab Cavalry. He found the enemy in great force near Benishahr. Attacked and drove them before him until his men ultimately occupied the high peaks which the enemy were holding all yesterday, and which the 5th Goorkhas from the Bala Hissa Hill had reached a few minutes previously. Casualties yesterday: Lieutenant Ferguson, 72nd Highlanders; Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas; and Lieutenant Fasken, 3rd Sikhs, wounded; one man, 67th Foot, three of 72nd, five of 5th Goorkhas wounded, and two men of the 3rd Sikhs killed yesterday. No report of casualties yet received from General Baker. Will telegraph again shortly.

Enclosure 11 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 13th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

The enemy have been defeated on all sides to-day. A combined attack was to have been made on our position to-night. City people had agreed to join the tribesmen who amount, at a moderate estimate, to about twenty thousand men, a large number of whom were armed with Snider rifles, and fought to the last, especially with their knives, against our cavalry on taking the initiative to-day; the very heavy loss the enemy suffered have, I hope, broken up the combination, but large bodies of the enemy are still hanging about southern end of Chardeh valley, and north-western slopes of Kohistan hills. They will be attacked to-morrow unless they disperse during night. 92nd Highlanders led the advance of General Baker's brigade under Major White. The attack on the enemy's position was most brilliantly headed by Lieutenant Forbes, who, with his Colour Sergeant Drummond, was killed in a hand-to-hand fight. The Guides Cavalry under Major Stewart were very successful and made a grand charge, as did the 9th Lancers under Captain Butson, who was killed with one Sergeant-Major and three of his men. Captain Chisholm and Lieutenant Trower, of same regiment, with eight men, are wounded. The 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams distinguished themselves, Majors Hammond and Stewart both leading successful charges. Our total loss during last three days is 43 killed, of whom six are officers, and 76 wounded, of whom ten are officers. Lieutenant Forbes, 14th Bengal Lancers, reported as wounded in my telegram of 11th, was, I regret to say, killed. The troops have behaved admirably, and, notwithstanding the hard work and extreme cold at night, are in good health and famous spirits. The large proportion of killed to wounded is mainly owing to the enemy killing all wounded men who may have fallen into their hands. I am deeply indebted to Brigadier-General Baker.

Enclosure 12 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 14th December 1870.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

We have been fighting all the morning and gained great success at first, but the enemy are coming on in such numbers that I have decided to collect my force within Sherpur entrenchments giving up heights above city and Bala Hissar as it is not possible to hold such an extended position while the enemy are so numerous. Keeping up communication with the outposts would be very difficult. I have ordered Gough to push on from Gandamak as fast as he can, withdrawing Latabund detachments as he passes by, as this excitement and combination are now sure to spread along line of communication. I strongly recommend more troops being pushed up so as to admit of General Bright being able to keep open communication and to enable me to clear the country should I find it impossible to do so with my present force, which seems likely, looking to the overwhelming numbers and the great determination the enemy exhibit. Your Excellency may depend on my doing all that is possible, but I foresee that I shall not be able to do all I ought unless strongly reinforced, which should be done without delay. I have ordered Arbuthnot's brigade from Jalalabad to Kabul immediately.

Enclosure 13 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 15th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

SIBDAR MUHAMMUD HASSAN, Governor, left city secretly about three this morning presumed fled.

Enclosure 14 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 15th December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

THE force is now collected in Sherpur. Our losses to-day 19 killed, including Captain Spens and Lieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders, and 88 wounded, including

Captain Gordon, 92nd Highlanders, Captain Battye, Guides Corps, and Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd Highlanders. To-morrow the force, if not attacked, will be employed in completing our defences; afterwards shall move out daily and prevent enemy from surrounding our position, but while they are in such numbers nothing is gained by capturing difficult hills, which are far from Sherpur.

Enclosure 15 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 17th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

No communication with Kabul by telegraph since 14th. On 15th General Gough reported from Jagdallak line cut on both sides of him. Is so still, but is open to Pezwan, which is within 13 miles of him.

Enclosure 16 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 17th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

I HEARD last night from Gandamak that Gough's posts were being attacked, and he had called for reinforcements. Three companies, 51st, were to go to him from Gandamak this morning. I ordered remaining wing, 45th Sikhs, and 4th Goorkhas relieved from Ali Boghan to start for Gandamak this morning. Arbuthnot and staff also go there to-day. The telegraph is still working to Pezwan, but we have no communication either with Kabul or Gough. Weather is cloudy and heliograph useless. From information received Warburton believes the attack on Gough is from the south, not by Asmatullah; but it is probably both.

Enclosure 17 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 9th December 1879.

From SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab, Lahore, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

YAKUB KHAN reached Peshawur last night. Leaves to-morrow. Reaches Meerut on morning of 14th as at present arranged. Kindly send orders regarding destination and treatment of Mustaufi and others who were at Gandamak to-day.

Enclosure 18 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 9th December 1879.

From FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp, to PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, Lahore.

YAHYA and Zakaria Khan and Wazir, not Mustaufi, should be sent to Lahore to await further orders. They should be treated as State prisoners. Otherwise well.

Enclosure 19 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 16th December 1879.

From PUNJAB, Government Lahore, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

THE three State prisoners (Yahya Khan, Zakari Khan, and Wazir,) from Kabul have reached Peshawur and leave this morning for Attock, spending night there, and following nights at Rawul Pindi and Jhelum, reaching Lahore on 19th.

Enclosure 20 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 27th November 1879. (Extract.)

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

WEEKLY summary of news. Everything remains profoundly tranquil in the province. The proclamation and announcement of the government of Kandahar being entrusted to Sardar Sher Ali Khan, we read at Kelat-i-Ghilzai to an assembly of Ghilzai Chiefs of the

Hotak and Tokki classes, who afterwards presented a written paper, declaring their great pleasure at the arrangement and willingness to pay revenue. Many chiefs of the Andali and Taraki clans of Ghilzais, living between Ghazni and Shahjui, have come or sent in to Kelat, professing submission and asking for service. They have been referred to Kabul. A sufficiency of supplies for the winter has been collected at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. The Hazarahs on the northern frontier, who showed symptoms of rebellion, have quieted down on receiving assurances that Sher Ali's officials are acting under orders of British Government. From the Herat side there is nothing new. The *Idi-i-Kurban* occurred on the 25th. As on a former similar occasion, the usual procession outside the city was dispensed with by the Sirdar, who, however, gave an entertainment at his house to the principal people of the town, at which he delivered an address on the justice, moderation, and religious toleration of the British Government, as exhibited both in India, and by their present treatment of the Durani nation. Weather colder, thermometer falling to 15 or lower at night. Health of troops excellent.

Enclosure 21 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 6th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

EVERYTHING quiet throughout Kandahar district. Rumour is current in city that Ayub Khan is marching on Kandahar with troops, but it is not generally credited on account of his known want of money. Mir Afzul's son who attempted to raise money and men in Bakwa has been expelled by the people. Yar Muhammad Khan, chief of the Augizai clan of the Barakzais, resident on the Helmund below Girishk, has come in to pay his respects to General Stewart.

Enclosure 22 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 11th December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Viceroy's Camp.

WEEKLY summary of news. Rumours of Ayub Khan's having proclaimed a "ghaza" and moved to Wadubagh, a few miles out of Herat, with the intention of marching on Kandahar, have gained strength, and the townspeople are convinced of their truth. Some apprehension was at first caused and people began to lay in store of grain, but a counter rumour that Sirdar Sher Ali would march out to meet the Herat force has restored confidence. The cessation of the storage of wheat by the Commissariat, and the sale of small quantities by the Sirdar, have caused the price to fall 25 per cent. The district is tranquil.

Enclosure 23 in No. 48.

No. 37, dated Kabul, 7th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

It has occurred to me that the Governor-General in Council might wish to be informed in greater detail of my reasons for arresting Sirdar Yahya Khan and other leading men on the 12th October, and for keeping Yakub Khan under more strict restraint since the 28th.

2. As regards the latter point, the consequences of the Ex-Amir's escape might be very serious; and, however small the probability of his attempting flight, I think this fact would in itself have justified me in taking all necessary precautions to ensure his being safely guarded. But besides this I had some positive reasons for supposing that an attempt at flight was not altogether unlikely. Between the 12th October, when the Amir tendered his resignation, and the 28th, when he was informed that his resignation had been accepted, he was practically under no restraint. I was convinced of his desire to leave the country at once, a desire possibly strengthened by the dread of an inquiry into the circumstances of the outbreak and the opposition afterwards offered to our advance. After my interview with Yakub Khan on the 28th October, I no longer felt sure of his wishes and intentions. Certain evidence had lately been brought before the Inquiry Commission which tended to prove him guilty of culpable weakness and neglect during the attack on the Residency, and to show that he was using his influence against us while the force was advancing to Char Asiah. I

thought it most probable that he knew something of the charges brought against him ; and at the same time I was confidently assured by Sirdar Wulli Muhammad Khan that an escape would be shortly attempted. Nevertheless, my first idea was to entrust the safe custody of the Ex-Amir to Nawab Sir Ghulam Hassan Khan, refraining from any measures of actual restraint ; and arrangements were accordingly made for the Nawab's residence close to Yakub Khan's tent. This plan, however, I found impossible to carry out. The Nawab expressed his utter inability to guarantee the Ex-Amir's safety unless further precautions were taken ; and earnestly begged that I would increase the number of sentries over Yakub Khan's quarters. Under these circumstances, I felt that any further attempt to spare the Ex-Amir's feelings in the matter would amount to neglect of the orders of Government ; and effectual means were therefore taken to prevent any possibility of escape on his part.

3. As regards the arrests made on the 12th October, I had several reasons for not leaving Yahya Khan and the Amir's ministers at large. From all sides I had long been assured that they were the Amir's most trusted advisers, and possessed of great power ; and that this power was being steadily used against British interests. During the advance of the force from Khushi it became clear, from the small amount of aid which reached me in the way of supplies, and from the opposition offered to our advance, that these men either were acting against us, or were generally credited with an amount of influence which they did not possess. The latter explanation I could not accept. All my information went to show that they were in fact the most influential men in the country. Yahya Khan had been Governor of Kabul, and the others had held very high posts both under Sher Ali and Yakub Khan. The Wazir Shah Muhammad had been selected to go to Tashkend on the part of Sher Ali, and was holding the office of Foreign Minister. The Mustaufi had for years been the most trusted and powerful statesman in Afghanistan. The only conclusion I could draw was that all three were against us, and I therefore thought it necessary to check at once and effectually their power of doing mischief. After their arrest, I found that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hassan Khan and others who had special opportunities of ascertaining the truth, strongly approved of the step I had taken and were of opinion that every one of the three if left at large would have proved a resolute and dangerous enemy.

4. Zakaria Khan I caused to be arrested because, although not a man of special influence, he was reported to have joined with the ladies of Yakub Khan's and Yahya Khan's families in distributing bread to the city people immediately before the Char Asiah fight, and in stirring them up to a holy war.

5. Some surprise has I believe been felt here, and perhaps elsewhere, at my having omitted to arrest General Daud Shah Khan at the same time as the ministers. In case his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council should have noted this point, I would explain that I heard nothing of importance against Daud Shah Khan ; and I consider that his attempt to assist Major Cavagnari on the 3rd September entitled him to be treated with less suspicion than the others. Since their arrest he has lived close to my camp, and has been of great use to me in supplying information regarding the Afghan army, and other matters. I anticipate nothing but advantage from his remaining at large.

6. I am not aware whether any such explanation as I have given will be considered necessary. But I have thought it desirable that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council should be very fully informed of my reasons for putting the Ex-Amir and his advisers under restraint ; and I hope those reasons may be regarded as sufficient to justify the measures I have adopted.

7. I would take this opportunity of expressing my confident opinion, formed after careful thought, that the explosions in the Bala Hissar on the 16th October were not premeditated. At first I was inclined to believe that they might have been due to treachery. From the time at which they occurred, their partial nature, and other circumstances, I am now fully convinced that they were in fact due to accident alone ; and this conviction is, I believe, universally held.

Enclosure 24 in No. 48.

No. 28 C.P., dated Governor-General's Camp, 30th November 1879.

From A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter No. 37, dated 7th November 1879, reporting in greater detail your reasons for arresting Sirdar Yahya Khan and other leading Afghan

Sirdars on the 12th October, and for keeping Yakub Khan, Ex-Amir, under more strict restraint since the 28th of that month.

2. In reply, I am to say that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General approves your proceedings in putting the Ex-Amir and his Ministers under restraint.

Enclosure 25 in No. 48.

No. 42, dated Kabul, 14th November 1879.

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Two letters from Muhammad Said Agha, Governor of Ghazni, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.
 One from Abdul Kadir Khan, one of the Chiefs of the Ghazni district, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.
 One from Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan, Governor of Jelalabad, to the address of General Sir F. Roberts.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted, with abstract translations.

Enclosure 26 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from MUHAMMUD SAID AGHA, dated 17th Zi KADA=3rd November 1879.

I HAVE received your order (letter) sent to me through the Nawab. You ordered me to come to you after making arrangements for this place, and I am ready to obey your order. You are perfectly aware of the faithlessness of the Afghans, especially of the people of Ghazni. I am not like these men, and shall not be faithless, especially to the British Government. When the British troops arrived at Khushi, three infantry regiments and a battery of artillery came to me and said they had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. After two days I managed to disperse them with great difficulty. A few days later I received orders to send Government grain to Kabul. I loaded 84 Government camels with wheat, and was about to send them off, when the son of Mullah Mushki Alam and other Mullahs and influential men came and said they would not let the Government grain go, and that they had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. The second day I pacified these men and sent them to their homes. I then sent the wheat to Kabul. When they were informed of this, Mullah Mushki Alam assembled some of the influential men and Chiefs, and they decided to select me as their leader. They have not come to me yet. Hence my delay. I am trying my best to calm the people. Let us see what will happen. Afterwards I will come to pay my respects to you. On account of this disturbance I have not yet published the proclamation. If you want me to leave the people as they are and come to you, please inform me, and as soon as your order reaches me I will start.

Enclosure 27 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from MUHAMMUD SAID AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, to the Address of the GENERAL, dated 19th Zi Kada=5th November 1879.

THREE days ago I sent a letter by the hand of the servant of the Nawab to you, in which I gave an account of affairs here. You will have read and understood it. The following are the news:—

The same mutineers assembled and came yesterday to a place one koh from here. They said they wanted to read the Khutba in my name and had selected me as their leader for the Ghaza. As I knew these ignorant people well, I privately won over some of their leaders. The men who had collected them went home, and the leaders themselves came to me in the town. I have also sent letters of advice to the people of Wardak, and have won over some of the influential men by money presents. Yesterday I read and published your proclamation. The mutineers who remained here are discussing matters with me. As the people of Afghanistan are all ignorant and faithless, no trust can be placed in them. Nevertheless, I hope I shall be able to disperse them, either by means of money or otherwise. I stated before that you would not hear a single false word from me. Everything else will be explained to you verbally. Please send an order in easy and clear words which may be understood by the ignorant people

of this place, to the effect that any man of Ghazni who disobeys the order of Government, or of the Governor, or commits any misdeeds will be very severely punished.

With regard to my being summoned, I beg to say, as I said before, that I have been waiting here only for the sake of these mutineers. If you order me to come to you leaving these men in this state, I am ready to obey. I will come with my own followers only if you like; or if you wish it, I will, after quieting the people, come to you with some of the influential men.

Enclosure 28 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Petition from ABDUL KADIR KHAN, of Ghazni, to GENERAL ROBERTS.

I HAVE received your letter sent by the hand of Mirza Muhammad Yusuf. As regards Khushdil Khan, I beg to state that he and his brother never entered Ghazni. He came from Wardak and passed at a distance of 10 kos from the city and going on to Karabagh which is 18 kos from here. He then sent his man to Muhammad Said, and said he had no money. The latter sent Rupees 500 for his expenses, and told him to stay where he was for some days. He did so. It is said that Muhammad Said afterwards sent him with a servant of his own to the son of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, Hazara, and asked the Sirdar to send him *via* Jaghari to Herat. As soon as I received your order I sent two men to find out where he was. They have not returned yet. As soon as I find where he is I will go after him and arrest him.

Two or three days ago Muhammad Said sent for Akhundzada Mushki Alam and informed him that he wanted to wage jihad and asked him to collect men. The Akhundzada has collected some Mullahs and vagabonds for this purpose and brought them to Ghazni. Muhammad Said now pays his expenses. First the expenses were being realised from the people, who were ordered to supply cooked food. When I was informed of this I assembled the Tajik Maliks and went to the city to Muhammad Said Agha and Akhundzada Mushk-i-Alam, and after a long discussion stopped them from taking the expenses from the people. I have told the people not to give a single pie to them. I have also told them (Muhammad Said and Mushki Alam) that if they did anything I would oppose them, as, I said, we were subjects to the British Government. I await your orders, and if you allow me I will settle with them. Muhammad Said has altogether wasted the Government grain. He issues Barats every day in the name of Khasadars, and also sells it.

What do you want done about the Government camels and horses which are here? Shall they be sent to Kabul or remain here?

Enclosure 29 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of Letter from SIRDAR MUHAMMUD HASSAN KHAN, Governor of Jelalabad, to GENERAL ROBERTS, received on 10th November 1879.

I HAVE received the proclamation which you sent by the hand of Abdul Ghafur, and have understood its contents. You wrote that the Amir had abdicated, and that I was Governor as before, and that I must try my best to serve Government.

From the time that the British troops moved from Lundikotal, and the Amir sent orders to me, up till now, I have rendered service to the utmost of my power, and I am ready to do so henceforward in any way you please—at Jelalabad or elsewhere.

Enclosure 30 in No. 48.

No. 44, dated Kabul, 15th November 1879.

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Expeditionary Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq. C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the letters marginally noted, in original, with abstract translations.

Letter from Sultan Murad Khan, Mir of Kadaghan.

Letter from Mahomed Said Agha, Governor of Ghazni.

Letter from Abdul Kadir Khan, one of the Chiefs of Ghazni.

2. I also enclose with translations copies of my replies to Sultan Murad Khan and Mahomed Said Agha.

Enclosure 31 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from SULTAN MURAD KHAN, Mir of Kadaghan, to the Address of GENERAL ROBERTS.

I HAVE heard that you have occupied Kabul. All India has benefited by the British rule, and I also have now become a servant of the British Government. This country of Kadaghan has from one end to the other been in the possession of my family for several generations. It is now yours. So long as I live I will serve you. In former days when the great Lord Sahib came to Kabul, my grandfather made friends with him. Afterwards when the kingdom fell into the hands of Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and his sons, they became a barrier between us and India. We were reduced to submission, and our communication with the Indian Government was stopped. Now you have returned, and the road which was closed is re-opened.

The state of affairs in this part of the country is as follows:—

One Mahomed Karim Beg, my uncle, had for a long time been an exile at Aibak. Lately he went to Kabul to make arrangements about his allowance, and returning from there to Andarab joined the Andarabis, and began to do mischief. He raided the people as far as Nahrain and plundered their property. Considering the punishment of this tribe to be necessary, I arrived at Andarab on the 25th October and occupied the country. General Najm-ud-deen Khan, Colonel Ghulam Hassan Khan, five troops of cavalry, and one infantry regiment were with me. If God please, after settling the country I will return to Kunduz.

Andarab, Ghor, Khost, and other hilly tracts belong to Kadaghan. As the Amir increased the taxes on these countries and the people were unable to pay them, they were constantly raising disturbances. The Amir several times offered me the (government) of these hills, but as I saw that the taxes on the tribes were very heavy, I refused it, because I knew I should get a bad name. He (the Amir) then gave (me?) back the Uzbek country, but taking my hills, appointed his own officials to them. Nevertheless I served him and did not give up my loyalty.

When the late Amir entered Turkestan and died there, the whole country was disturbed. The Mirs of Badakshan, who were exiles at Mazar-i-Sharif, returned to their country and occupied it.

Although they (the Afghans) had occupied our hilly tracts, and the people also came and said that it was time they should be set free, and (asked me) why I would not take them over, yet I told them to wait as the Afghans might return the hills to me. The exiles of all countries have gone and occupied their native countries. I could have raised disturbances also, but I did not do so as it would have given me a bad name. Now, if the British treat me kindly, I will serve them as long as I live. I have served even those who did not show favour to me according to my services. I will serve the British to the utmost.

I have received a letter from Sayid Guhar to the effect that Nek Mahomed Khan with six or seven sowars came from Kabul to Doshi *via* Khinjan, and that he sent him with his brother to Mazar-i-Sharif. You should know this.

Enclosure 32 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS, to SULTAN MAHOMED KHAN, Mir of Kadaghan, dated 7th November 1879.

My desire is that remaining a friend and well-wisher of the British Government, you may enjoy comfort and ease, and occupy yourself in keeping your country quiet and safe. It would be well if you sent one of your trusted agents to me, so that I might communicate my friendly sentiments to you through him.

You should devote your attention to the government and protection of your country.

Enclosure 33 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from MAHOMED SAID AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, to GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., received on 10th November 1879.

I HAVE before informed you that the ignorant rebels came to a distance of one mile from here, and that they wanted to enter into a discussion with me. I discussed the matter with them. It was decided that I should go alone to you and make arrangements with you about the rebels and bring reassuring letters for them. Mullah Mushk-i-Alam, Ahmad Khan, and Amin Andari agreed to this. I sent the people who had assembled to the Ghazni villages with letters, but I brought some of their leaders whom I had won over to the city, and kept all whom I considered mischievous outside. At night Abdul Kadir Khan, Ahmad Khan, and Amin Andari broke the above agreement, and early in the morning they sent a man to me and asked me to come out of the city as they had something to say to me. When I went to their place I saw that their attitude had changed. They said that they wanted to wage a ghaza; I was hiding. These ignorant faithless men tried to fire three shots at me, but the guns did not go off. When I came to the city Abdul Kadir took Mullah Mushk-i-Alam and other Mullahs to his fort. The next day Ahmad Khan, Amin Andari, and Abdul Kadir collected some 7,000 men and besieged the city. I then sent letters to some of my friends among the Sayids, the Hazaras, and the Wardaks. By the afternoon I had filled the Bala Hissar with my men. I passed the night there, and in the morning I left six Andaris as my lieutenants in the Bala Hissar, and leaving the fort I went to Siah Sang, where lives the son of Akor Shah Ali Akbar Sayid, who is a relative of mine. If God please, I will leave for your camp to-morrow, and will explain the matter to you verbally. Let us see how the rebels will treat my deputies.

P.S.—After I left the rebels were ashamed of what they had done and dispersed to their homes. When I come to you I will make good arrangements for the affairs of this country.

Enclosure 34 in No. 48.

Translation of a Letter from GENERAL ROBERTS to the address of MAHOMED AGHA, Governor of Ghazni, dated 10th November 1879.

I HAVE received your letter and understood its contents. As you have now come out of Ghazni you had better come to me and explain everything verbally. When I have heard everything I will give suitable orders.

Enclosure 35 in No. 48.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from ABDUL KADIR KHAN, one of the Chiefs of Ghazni, to the Address of GENERAL ROBERTS, dated 22nd Zil Kuda=9th November 1879.

WITH regard to the sons of Shahghassi Sherdil Khan I wrote to you that men had been sent after them to Kara Bagh and Jaghori to find out all about them. To-day my servant returned and said that Mahomed Said Agha had detained them at Kara Bagh, as he wanted to send his family also with them. A few days ago, with the help of Abdulla Khan, Hakim of Kara Bagh, and a servant of Mahomed Said, they went to Mukar. The two sons of the Shahghassi, leaving their families at Mukar, have now gone on.

I mentioned in my former letter that Mahomed Said had collected some Mullahs, Maliks, Chiefs, and vagabonds at Ghazni, and had given them barats on the Tajiks. I stopped the barats by force. As their expenses were not paid, and my force was also strong, Mahomed Said ordered that government grain and camels might be given to them. I protected the stores and appointed my men over them. I have also kept the government camels safe and did not give them up. On this account Mahomed Said, with General Mahomed Jan Khan and some Mullahs went towards Jagatu in Wardak. Some other Mullahs and the Andaris dispersed to their homes. I hope Mahomed Said and Mahomed Jan Khan's party will also disperse.

Baz Ali Khan will explain some matters verbally to you.

No. 49.

Telegram from SECRETARY OF STATE to VICEROY, 19th December 1879. (Extract.)

WE think that you should retain regiments which have not left India, and for which reliefs are on their way, and a good regiment from the Cape will come to India instead of home.

No. 50.

Telegram from VICEROY to SECRETARY OF STATE, 20th December 1879. (Extract.)

I SHALL be glad to retain relief regiments, and have regiment from Cape, but do not consider present needs justify application for reinforcements from England.

No. 51.

No. 254 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honorable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, December 31, 1879.

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the Kabul Diary* from the 30th of November to the 6th of December, both days inclusive.

* Received with letter from Sir F. Roberts, No. 66, dated 7th December 1879.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 51.

No. 66, dated Kabul, 7th December 1879.

FROM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honor to submit a diary for the week ending 6th December 1879.

Kabul Diary, November 30th to December 6th, 1879. (Extract.)

30th November.—A report received to-day to the effect that Usman Khan of Tagao had advanced with his followers to Deh-i-Sabz. He is said to be concerting with the Kohistanis and General Muhammad Jan, Wardak, a plan for attacking cantonments.

Sirdar Abdulla Khan writes from Logar under date the 29th, that some insurgents from Zurmat and Kharwar had arrived at Charkh and were threatening Logar. The Logar people had promised to stand by him, and to have nothing to do with the insurgents.

At the suggestion of General Daud Shah I have sent a letter to Mir Bacha Khan, the reputed leader of the malcontent party in Kohistan. I have called upon him to come in and assured him of honourable treatment if he does so.

Yakub Khan was informed this evening that his departure was fixed for to-morrow, 1st December.—At daybreak this morning the Ex-Amir left Kabul for Peshawur. He seemed in good spirits.

Brigadier-General Baker came in from Maidan.

It is said that the Kohistanis and Tagao men have fixed upon to-night for a combined attack upon our position.

2nd December.—Sirdar Shahbaz Khan writes from Charikar, under date the 1st of December, that he has assembled the Khans of Kohistan, and that they have now abandoned all intention of raising a disturbance. Mir Bacha has not obeyed his summons, but all the rest have consented to come in and pay their respects. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan writes from Balab in Kohdaman that he has distributed to the headmen the letters sent by me. Mir Bacha Khan has come in to him, and expressed his willingness to present himself at Kabul after quieting the people. Mir Bacha himself writes to me to the same effect. He says the people are much alarmed, and that they require to be reassured before he can leave them. This of course is only an excuse.

Sirdar Abdulla Khan reports that the people of Kharwar and Zurmat are assembling and threaten a disturbance. Daud Shah appears to anticipate a general outbreak of disorder in Kohistan, Wardak, Logar, and Maidan. According to his information Usman Khan, Mir Bacha, and General Faiz Muhammad have promised to throw in their lot with the insurgents.

Captain Burton heliographs from Seh Baba that Usman Khan has received letters from Mulla Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni, inciting him to attack Lataband and Seh Baba.

I held a Durbar this afternoon for the reception of any one who wished to be presented to me or to present any petition.

Sirdar Fakir Muhammad of Khodaman attended and requested permission to return to his home, which I granted. The Bokhara Shahzada was also present, and a number of Barakzai Sirdars and city merchants. None had any special request to make. For the future I propose to hold a Durbar twice a week.

A small amount of bhoosa was brought in to-day from Kohistan.

3rd December.—Sirdar Abdulla Khan writes* that the insurgents from Zurmat and Kharwar advanced on the 1st from Charkh towards Logar, and that he went out to meet them with some Logaris. On the approach of the insurgents nearly all the Logaris deserted him, and he was forced to take refuge in a fort at the foot of the hills, where he was besieged at the time of writing.

Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan reports from Maidan that two companies of Ardal Sepoys have entered the district under the leadership of the Mullas. He says the people of Maidan are disaffected, and that he is himself helpless, having with him only twenty unarmed men.

Sirdar Ibrahim Khan came in this afternoon with some of the Kohistani headmen. Mir Bacha Khan was not of the number.

It is rumoured that General Ghulam Haidar Khan has come down from Turkistan to Charikar with eight guns.

4th December.—Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan has been murdered in Maidan. It is said that a body of insurgents entered his fort suddenly while he was writing, and cut him down.

I wrote to Sirdar Abdullah Khan to-day, telling him that if he found himself in serious danger he was to come in. If too hard pressed to make his escape he was to let me know, and measures would be taken to send him aid.

I also sent a letter to Sharbaz Khan, urging him to send in Mir Bacha and other Kohistani headmen if possible.

5th December.—This morning I rode out to Charasiah with Sir Michael Kennedy, who has come up here for a few days, and went over the scene of the late engagement.

A Hindu servant who came in from Maidan yesterday, reports that on the evening of the 3rd two or three hundred men, adherents of Mulla Mushk-i-Alam, arrived at Muhammad Azam Khan's fort, where Sirdar Muhammad Hassan Khan was staying, and forced their way in after firing the gate. The Sirdar told his men, about 50 in number, not to resist, as he would settle the business himself. When the insurgents got in, they called upon him to come down from the tower in which he had taken refuge. He did so, and was beginning to loose his horse when he was cut down by an Ardal Sepoy and two Ghazis. The fort was then looted, and the Sirdar's property carried off.

Shahbaz Khan writes that he has succeeded in dispersing a body of insurgents who had assembled near Charikar.

6th December.—I held a Durbar to-day, at which Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Hashim Khan, and many others were present. No special requests were preferred.

Sirdar Shahbaz Khan writes that a number of Kohistanis have assembled and marched towards Kabul, proclaiming a Ghaza. The factions of Sher Ali and Sarwar Khan are

fighting among themselves. The Sirdar thinks that the rising in Kohistan is likely to become serious if not speedily checked. He forwards some letters from the insurgents, calling upon him to place himself at their head. I have sent word to him that he had better come in to Kabul for a day or two.

In the afternoon I had an interview with Sirdar Wali Muhammad and Sirdar Hashim Khan, and informed them that I proposed to make some change in existing arrangements, Wali Muhammad remaining here for the present to help me in settling the country round Kabul, and Hashim Khan taking his place as Governor of Turkistan. I gave them both clearly to understand that this was only a temporary measure, and that it had not yet received the sanction of Government. Both expressed themselves satisfied. Afterwards I called in all the Kohistani headmen in camp, and warned them that unless the insurgents returned at once to their homes, or come in here and submitted, I should march a force into the district and destroy their villages. The headmen promised to do what they could to restore order.

No. 52.

No. 255 of 1879.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honorable VISCOUNT CRANBROOK, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Fort William, December 31, 1879.

WE have the honor to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LETTERS from Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni have reached Mohmands. Mulla Khalil is in correspondence with Moghal Khan of Goshta. Gandoo and Pandili quiet, but it is possible that Khawaizai, Baizai, Kandahari, and Safi Mohmands may rise under Mulla Khalil; and Fakir Mizan Khan of Lalpura requires careful management. He has been moved to summon and deal with all Mohmand Jirgas. Nearly all Afridis are down in their winter settlement. Afridis and Shinwaris all perfectly quiet. Every hope of their remaining so.

Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM just received from Colonel Acton, Pezwan, thus:—*Telegram begins.* Communicated with Gough's force to-day. Convoy, four companies 24th, going to Jagdallak to-morrow. No serious opposition. Gough goes on as soon as gets supplies. Will hold Jagdallak. Convoys will go daily. *Telegram ends.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 18th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to His Excellency the VICEROY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM come Pezwan to-day as follows:—*Here begins.* Gough went out from Jagdallak yesterday. No details of operations received. Colonel Norman left this mid-day yesterday to support Gough, taking two Hazara guns, detachment 24th, 2nd Goorkhas, detachment Sappers, and forty men 72nd, to co-operate. Colonel Acton, with two companies 51st, left this morning in further support. This leaves Gandamak held by details aggregating only one hundred and eighty-six men. *Telegram ends.* No news from Kabul. I shall keep Your Excellency fully informed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 19th December 1879.

FROM COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM received last night from Colonel Acton, Pezwan:—*Here begins.* Last night Colonel Norman bivouacked, but was fired on. Two men slightly wounded. Returned to Pezwan to-night all well. Yesterday Macnaughten dispersed, with loss, body of Ghilzais. Macnaughten's casualties, two men wounded. Jagdallak fired on last night. One man severely wounded. Numbers of Ghilzais out, but seem only rabble; attack so far contemptible. *Telegram ends.* Khugiani tribes between Rozabad and Surkub seem still on our side. All depends on our display of strength.

Enclosure 5 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 20th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL GOUGH, Jagdallak, to PRIVATE SECRETARY TO VICEROY.

I WAS reinforced yesterday by 24th Punjab Native Infantry, and obtained some supplies. I expect convoy to-day with more. I heard to-day from Latabund, with message from General Roberts ordering me to advance on Kabul. I purpose carrying out his orders and march to-morrow with following force: 9th Foot with details; 72nd 500; 2nd and 4th Goorkhas 800; 10th Bengal Lancers 20; one company Sappers 80; H. M. Battery 4 guns: total, 1,400. To Seh Baba on 21st, Latabund 22nd, Butkbak 23rd, Kabul 24th. I purpose holding post as follows: under Colonel Norman, 24th Punjab Native Infantry; Pezwan, 45th Sikhs about 600; one company Sappers 80; 10th Bengal Lancers 50; two guns I. A.; R.H.A.; Jagdallak Kotal; two companies Sappers 200; one company 24th Punjab Native Infantry, about 80; 10th Bengal Lancers 12; Jagdallak Fort, 24th Punjab Native Infantry, 7 companies, about 520; 10th Bengal Lancers 180; two guns H. M. Battery. I shall pick up Colonel Hudson with about 700 men and two guns at Latabund, and take him on towards Kabul.

Enclosure 6 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

FROM COLONEL TWEEDIE, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

GENERAL GOUGH telegraphs to-day from Jagdallak that Asmatulla's followers appear to be deserting. I myself have intelligence that Asmatulla was wounded other day during attack on one of Gough's posts.

Enclosure 7 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta,

MOGHUL KHAN of Goshta fled to hills, will combine with Mulla Khalil. Also brother of Mahmud Shah, formerly Khan of Lalpura, said to have gone towards Gandol. Dakka

fort and Lundikhana should be kept sufficiently strong to send out troops to keep open road and communications between the two places, if Mohmands should cross the river and threaten them. Meanwhile Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, all absolutely quiet. Khan of Lalpura expressing himself as answerable for safety of road; no cause for anxiety as yet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879. (Extract.)

FROM GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 16th December.—We have been employed the last 48 hours in completing the defences of Sherpur. Enemy still occupy the hills overlooking city, but have not yet ventured into the plains. Our cavalry is constantly employed reconnoitring, and yesterday afternoon a small column of infantry cleared the close country which intervened between Sherpur and the city. Gough's brigade should be here on the 20th instant. Communication with India should then be restored, as the troops now at Latabund will remain there, and Butkhak will be re-occupied. I am waiting only for an opportunity to strike a blow. If none offers before Gough arrives I will attack the following day, as I shall be strong enough then to hold the Bala Hissar and other important positions, and also I hope to disperse the enemy. Though I was aware the excitement was widespread, I had no reason to suppose such a gathering would take place, nor apparently did any of the Sirdars, or those on whom I have been mainly depending for information. Wali Muhammad and all the influential people who joined me on first reaching Kabul are with me in Sherpur, and it is not in their interests to conceal matters from me. It is evident that a strong religious feeling is at the bottom of the movement. The Mulla Mushk-i-Alam was joined by large numbers as he came along, and no one probably could have foretold that his following would have been anything like as great as it is at the last. The city and large villages in the neighbourhood of Kabul each furnished their quota, and our force on the 14th found itself opposed to such overwhelming numbers that it was necessary to concentrate it to prevent small parties being cut off. This I was enabled to do before dark. Your Excellency must not suppose that we cannot move out of Sherpur, or that I have any anxiety about the safety of my force, and, collected as we now are, I am quite confident of being able to maintain our position, and to beat the enemy whenever I get a chance. We are fairly off for ammunition, on an average about 350 rounds per rifle, and strict orders have been issued to economise expenditure, but it is desirable that more ammunition, both for rifles and guns, should be sent up without delay. The troops are well and in good health. Our losses on 14th were more than reported in my message of that day. We had 28 killed and 99 wounded, of whom 8 have since died of their wounds.

Enclosure 9 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

FROM GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 17th December.—All quiet since my telegram of yesterday. Weather unfortunately cloudy, thus preventing communication by heliograph with Latabund. I have no news of Gough's brigade, but expect it here not later than 20th. There will then be no delay in clearing the enemy out of the neighbourhood of Kabul. Further reports agree as to heavy loss suffered by enemy on 13th and 14th. Asman Khan, of Tagao, and some other influential were killed. Large numbers of killed and wounded have been taken away, and, from what I hear, the total number of the enemy is less than it was. At the same time I think it better to wait for reinforcements before attacking again, and do the work thoroughly. Majority of the wounded are doing well, but some of the knife and sword wounds are very severe. There was a good deal of fighting at close quarters. All well.

Enclosure 10 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, Kabul, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 18th December.—All quiet since my telegram of yesterday. Enemy appeared shortly before noon on Siah Sang range and heights to west of Sherpur; they were quickly dislodged with some loss. Our casualties, one Sepoy, 5th Punjab Infantry, slightly wounded, and a Goorkha accidentally shot on picquet. Weather still cloudy. No heliographic communication possible with Latabund. Latest dates from India by telegraph 13th and by letter 6th December. Wounded doing well, except Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas. The majority of the Ghilzais do not seem at present to have taken a very active part in the combination against us; and, as Gough's brigade doubtless advancing, the eastern Ghilzais will probably keep quiet until they see the result of more troops reaching Kabul. Asmatulla Khan has sent word to the enemy that he will soon join them with 5,000 men. His neighbour Osman Khan of Tagao having been killed and good many of his followers dispersed, Asmatulla may hesitate to come so far from his own country. He will, I think, if Gandamak and Jagdallak are strongly held. Of this I have no information. No news having been received from the Khyber line since 13th instant, when I got short telegram from General Gough, saying that he would advance rapidly on Kabul. I am doing all I can to break up combination against us, but nothing short of driving off the enemy by force from the neighbourhood of Kabul will have any real effect. Mahomed Jan, the Wardak General and practical leader of the enemy, has proclaimed Musa Khan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, Amir. It is reported that Yakub Khan's wife has distributed large sums of money to the enemy, and that the houses and property of Wali Muhammad and other Sirdars with me have been plundered. All well.

Enclosure 11 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879. (Extract.)

From GENERAL ROBERTS to VICEROY.

KABUL, 19th December.—Slight skirmishes with enemy yesterday. One or two of their principal men were killed. Our loss, Lieutenant Sunderland, 72nd; a private 67th Foot, slightly wounded; one Sepoy, 5th Punjab Infantry, killed. Snow fell during the night, but it is disappearing off southern slopes of hills. Heliographic communication with Latabund for some hours to-day. Garrison there has rations up to and for 23rd. I have sent Gough peremptory orders to move on Kabul without delay. The longer city is occupied by the enemy, the more our prestige suffers. When joined by Gough's and Hudson's forces, I hope to have no difficulty in re-asserting our supremacy. Troops are hard-worked, but continue well and in famous spirits.

Enclosure 12 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 20th December.—Colonel Hudson heliographs from Latabund that letters and telegrams despatched from this on 18th and 19th instant have reached. I hope, therefore, that you are now in possession of all that has occurred here to date, as I sent copies of all former telegrams by the messengers of yesterday and day before. I also hope General Gough will advance without further delay. Sixty Yaboos laden with grain travelled safely last night from this to Latabund, showing that the road so far is open.

Position here is unchanged. The enemy lost several men yesterday. Our casualties were Lieutenant Montanaro, R.A., dangerously wounded, six of 67th, one 9th Lancers, one 12th Bengal Cavalry, six 3rd Sikhs, and two camp-followers, all wounded. Major Cook, 5th Goorkhas, I deeply regret to report, died yesterday of his wounds.

I hope officers will be sent to replace casualties. Four are required for artillery, two for I.-A., and one for each mountain battery. Bailward having been invalided, 9th Lancers are very short of officers, 12th and 14th Cavalry, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 5th Goorkhas, each require two officers. Captain Connellan and

Lieutenant Tuite, 67th, and Captain Frome, 72nd, are laid up with small-pox. No assistance can be afforded by British to Native regiments. Lieutenant Liddell has been attached temporarily to Horse Artillery battery, and Sir Charles Wolseley of the Yeomanry Cavalry to 9th Lancers. For the 12th and 14th Cavalry, trained cavalry officers should, if possible, be sent.

There are only 4 per cent. British troops sick, and including wounded a little over 6 per cent. Pneumonia is on the increase, owing to great cold and exposure; but considering everything, the force is very healthy, and the sick and wounded are well cared for. All well.

Enclosure 13 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to VICEROY, Calcutta.

HUNDRED and fifty men, 8th N. I. reached Dakka to-day, setting free detachment 22nd, which came on to Basawal escorting ammunition. Head-quarters 3rd B. C. reached Barikab to-day, head-quarters, 22nd P. I., and remainder, 45th Sikhs, reached Gandamak. I have no news of Gough, and it is now cloudy, so I shall probably get none till to-morrow. I hear that the Khugianis are just awaiting the turn of events, but are quiet at present. Colonel Acton reported all quiet at Pezwan yesterday, and a convoy went on from there to Jagdallak to-day.

Enclosure 14 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879. (Extract).

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

CUNNINGHAM reports from Khyber that Mulla Khalil has failed to raise the Baizai, who demand that Bajouris should move first. No armed gathering of Mohmands likely for some time. Khan of Lalpura will hold the river bank. No reason to apprehend trouble in the Khyber.

Enclosure 15 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

24TH December 1879.—The political situation to the south of this amongst the Shinwaris, and to the north and eastwards continues good. Rumours of Mohmund gathering under Mulla Khalil are still heard, but they have not as yet committed any overt act of hostilities.

Colonel Tweedie left yesterday for Gandamak, and will inform me of the state of affairs there and the feelings of the Khugianis. General Gough has passed Latabund in safety, and should be in Kabul to-day. Report just received that the Jagdallak post, which is very strongly fortified, was being attacked by the Hisarak Ghilzais in force. Reinforcements are being rapidly pushed up. Little cause for anxiety.

Enclosure 16 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM just in from Pezwan reporting that attack on Jagdallak had ceased, and enemy dispersed.

Enclosure 17 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

COLONEL NORMAN, P.N.I., commands at Jagdallak, and reports, further, that the attack on his post, when Major Thackeray was badly hit yesterday, was made in force, but enemy was repulsed with loss. Only one sepoy killed and one wounded. Norman says sapper carbines are of little use. He adds that there is no cause for alarm, and that the Ghilzais will keep quiet now for some time. General Arbuthnot has ordered up reinforcements from Pezwan to Jagdallak, distance of only eight miles; shall stay here two days.

Enclosure 18 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LAST night the Dalangai post in Choragalli near Ali Boghan was attacked by a strong band of raiders, supposed to be Mandezai Shinwaris. Some cartmen, contrary to all orders, had taken shelter there for the night, instead of going on to Barikab camping ground, and would not return to Ali Boghan, although warned by the post men. Of these cartmen 15 were killed and six wounded, of whom two were post-men. The same band moved against another station at the Ziarat, close to Ali Boghan, but were driven away by the guard, assisted by the villagers who turned out on the alarm. No other disturbance reported.

Enclosure 19 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

YOUR telegram yesterday. Not certain where Sirdar Musa Khan is. All natives here and Jellalabad believe him to be in Kabul city with the enemy. But no one believes Mushk-i-Alam will at present proclaim a new Amir.

Enclosure 20 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

ATTACK on Jagdallak Kotal happened thus:—Major Thackeray had been ordered out to burn small villages two miles from post; village proved empty and was burned. As he returned, he was followed by about 3,000 Ghilzais, who attacked post from three afternoon to midnight; left no wounded behind. Asmatulla supposed to have commanded them. Thackeray's wound, bullet in elbow. Khugianis still uncertain. Ghilzais seem up in arms very generally. Our strength lies not in maintaining small posts, but in concentration of our troops until decisive movements feasible. At guerilla warfare Afghans have many advantages. Daily small convoys most harassing to our troops while inviting attack. Communications when only nominally maintained, and that at great cost, are of questionable value in country like this.

Enclosure 21 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MUHAMMUD HASSAN KHAN, accompanied by Fez Muhammad Khan and a gathering, has proceeded towards Jagdallak with the intention of joining Asmatulla; and in all probability the two met yesterday. Asmatulla is said to have followed General Gough's force for a short way, and then turned back to his old post. Our positions in front have been well strengthened, and no attack on them yesterday reported.

Mohmands have kept quiet up to date.

Strong parties of cavalry sent out yesterday and this morning to trace the raiders who attacked the Dalangai Chowkie already reported. The wounded sufferers have been brought in here for medical treatment.

Enclosure 22 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From COLONEL TWEEDIE, Gandamak, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

NORMAN signals to-day from Jagdallak that, as he yesterday returned from Pezwan, Asmatulla with 300 men tried to intercept, but beaten off with loss. Norman had three wounded. Snow fell last night Jagdallak. Norman says his men overworked and infantry reinforcement required. Norman had no news up to this morning from Gough or Kabul. Two mountain guns leave this to-morrow for Pezwan and Jagdallak, and Pezwan will send on with them to Jagdallak two companies 51st Foot. Am trying to open communication with Gough's rear through Kuch camelmen.

Enclosure 23 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

NEWS received from Pezwan says, that in the attack of 23rd Ghilzais suffered very severely, and they are said to be getting disheartened in consequence of their want of success. News from Laghman shows that Asmutulla and Muhammad Hassan's gatherings are beginning to desert already, and are returning secretly to their homes. The raid on Dalangai post was committed by the Hassan Khels section of the Mandezai Shinwaris. The Mohmands still keep quiet, but the Khans of Goshta and Giadah are constantly fitting up to the hills, where they have sent up their families, and their attitude is unfriendly. All well.

Enclosure 24 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

From COMMISSIONER, Peshawur, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TRIBES all quiet, although Mullas are agitating among Mohmands and Shinwaris.

Enclosure 25 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

From GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpore.

KABUL, 21st Decmber.—I received report to-day, heliograph, from Latabund that Gough's brigade was to be at Seh Baba to-day, Latabund to-morrow, and here on 24th. Enemy are still very numerous, but with troops Gough is bringing I hope to be able to clear them out of Kabul. To assist in this I shall withdraw the Latabund post, if troops sufficient to hold it and Seh Baba cannot be pushed up from the rear. Communication between Kabul and Jagdallak will, I fear, be uncertain, until I can send back a couple of regiments from this. One casualty yesterday, man of 92nd wounded; Lieutenant Montanaro died yesterday of his wound. Total casualties to last night, 77 killed, including eight officers and one follower; 220 wounded, including 15 officers and four followers, and two missing; two officers and ten men have since died of their wounds. Native troops have four per cent. sick, and including wounded, between five and six per cent. Officer commanding 72nd Highlanders, asks that Lieutenants Drummond, Gore-Langton, and Campbell may be ordered to rejoin the regiment. Captain Guinness has returned temporarily from staff regimental duty. Situation unchanged. All well.

Enclosure 26 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpore.

KABUL, 23rd December.—Desultory attacks all yesterday, one casualty, a private, 67th Foot, wounded. During the day information was received that a general attack would be made at day-break to-day, the signal being a fire lighted on Asmi heights. Large numbers of the enemy were seen occupying the more distant villages during the day and coming into the near ones as it got dark. At 6 a.m. the light appeared, and immediately afterwards attack commenced on three sides. We were all prepared. On the south and west sides, the enemy did not show much determination, but on the north-east corner of Bemaru heights some thousands collected, and evidently contemplated assaulting the position. General Hugh Gough commanded. He, with the able assistance of Colonel Jenkins, made an admirable disposition. As soon as the intention of the enemy was fully developed, I determined on a counter attack with cavalry and artillery; these issued by the gorge between the Bemaru heights, and opening fire on the enemy's flank, speedily dislodged them from the place they had taken up on the north-east corner. The cavalry pursued and cut up numbers of the enemy, who, retiring from all points, beat a hasty retreat into the city. We have now occupied some of the advanced villages, more particularly those on the Butkhak road, so as to ensure the advance of General Charles Gough's brigade to-morrow unmolested; his camp is visible about six miles to the east. I shall take the initiative either to-morrow afternoon or the following morning, and hope soon to report that Her Majesty's troops have again got possession of the Bala Hissar and city of Kabul. Our casualties to-day have been few. Numbers will be telegraphed to-morrow. I grieve to report the death of two gallant officers, Captain Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, Royal Engineers, caused by an untimely explosion while engaged in blowing up the towers of a neighbouring village.

Enclosure 27 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 24th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL ROBERTS, Kabul, through Pezwan, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

KABUL, 24th December.—Our success yesterday was more complete and the enemy's loss more severe than I was aware of when despatching my telegram last evening. The Kohistanis and Logaris, also people living near Kabul, went straight to their houses after being defeated. The remainder went to the city for a few hours, but during the night they all fled. Mulla Mushk-i-Alam and General Muhammad Jan, the two leaders, went off early. Tahir Khan, son of Muhammad Sharif Khan, who has been very active against us, has, it is reported, taken away Musa Khan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, and escaped towards Wardak. Cavalry have gone in pursuit. The Bala Hissar and city will be taken possession of this afternoon, and the former will be occupied, if I can be satisfied that there is no danger to the troops from gunpowder. Yakub Khan's wife and mother, and Yahia Khan's wife, who is a daughter of the celebrated Sirdar Akbar Khan, will be brought into Sherpur to-day. They have done all in their power to keep up the excitement, and it is reported that they contemplate flight. Our losses yesterday were (not?) great, five killed, including the two Royal Engineer officers accidentally blown up, and 33 wounded, including Lieutenant Gambier, 5th Punjab Cavalry, severely, and Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, R.E., slightly wounded.

I have telegraphed to General Bright to occupy Sch Baba by detachment of Native Infantry from Jagdallak, and to send a regiment of Native Infantry to Latabund; it is very important this should be done without delay. Butkhak will be occupied by troops from this to-morrow; in this way communication with India will be rapidly restored.

Her Majesty's gracious message has been received and published to the troops, who are much gratified.

The majority of the wounded are doing well.

General Charles Gough's brigade arrived this morning. Slight snow last night. All well.

Enclosure 28 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

FROM COMMISSIONER, Peshawur to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

KHYBER tribes perfectly quiet; every prospect of their remaining so. Mulla Khalil's efforts to raise Mohmands and Bajouris are ineffectual. Reconciliation effected between Khan of Lalpura and his brother Akbar.

Enclosure 29 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL BRIGHT, Jellalabad, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

YESTERDAY the Daronta gorge was reconnoitred by a strong party from here under Colonel Limond, with a view to ascertaining the feasibility of making a road along it into the Lughman valley should the route be taken in hand later on; the party returned to camp the same evening unmolested. Asmatulla forts and villages in Lughman were reported to be denuded of men; the gathering with him consists mainly of Jubbar Khel Ghilzais, few of the Tajik population of that valley having joined as yet against us. The Governor of Lughman, who is son of Sirdar Yahia Khan, is stated to have kept aloof from them up to date. Mohmands and Khugianis continue quiet. General Robert's victory at Kabul, the flight of Mushk-i-Alam and Muhammad Jan, and the dispersion of Kohistanis and others, have been widely circulated here by our present Governor, Sirdar Maddad Khan, amongst surrounding tribes, and will have good effect.

Enclosure 30 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 27th December 1879.

FROM CAPTAIN A. CONOLLY, Peiwar Kotal, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

LETTER just in from Mirak Shah Ali Khel, to say reliable news from Dobundi that, on the 24th, 6,000 men, having prepared scaling ladders, assaulted the Sherpur entrenchments in a most determined manner; that Padshah Khan, who was supposed to be acting under secret orders from us, first desisted and fled, on which he was followed by the rest. Our troops, issuing from the entrenchment, pursued, inflicting frightful slaughter. The ground round Sherpur lay thick with corpses. Those who escaped spread consternation far and wide. This message has been sent to General Watson, and is also repeated to you direct, as the General is at Shinak to-day, where there is no telegraph office, and considerable delay might ensue in the further transmission of this news, which is most important, if true, as I believe it to be.

Enclosure 31 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 28th December 1879.

FROM GENERAL WATSON, Balsh Khel, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Barrackpoor.

Two inches of snow fell at Kuram yesterday, heavy on Peiwar Kotal. No movements of tribes reported.

Enclosure 32 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 19th December 1879.

FROM MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

THERE is nothing to relate this week. No further details regarding affairs at Herat have reached Kandahar. Mir Afzul is meeting with increased opposition from Duranis

of Farah district. His family is at Lash Juwain. That of Ghulam Muhaiuddin has crossed into Persia, where both Sirdars are preparing to follow. The news of Ayub's imprisonment has excited much grief among certain of the Barakzai ladies, who were predicting his triumphal march to Kandahar. Captain Molloy reports all quiet in Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Mukur districts. The Andari and Taraki Chiefs continue to make unasked-for professions of friendship. It has been found necessary to despatch a body of Afghan troops to the Hazara frontier beyond Tirin, where the people have refused to pay their revenues. All quiet here. Health of Europeans excellent: natives not quite so good. Weather colder, sky cloudy, and threatening rain or snow.

Enclosure 33 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 21st December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MOLLOY writes, on 19th, that all is quiet as far as Kukur, but chiefs of Tokhi and Hotak Ghilzais have left Kelat without permission. Rumours of approaching abandonment of country by us appear to have unsettled them more than news of actual events at Kabul.

Enclosure 34 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SYUD MUHAMMUD SHAH, son of late Sirdar Azam, has arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzai from Kabul, after being twice robbed on road. He reports fighting to have taken place between Hazaras and Ali Khel Ghilzais, in which latter were worsted. No other sign of disturbance among Southern Ghilzais.

Enclosure 35 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 25th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

WEEKLY summary of news. Christmas day. The events at Kabul have not as yet had any effect in disturbing the tranquillity of the Durani country, though the Ghilzais of Kelat are somewhat uneasy, but no open outbreak has taken place, or is expected. The events at Herat, on the contrary, have produced some excitement, but more curiosity to know what the English Government intends to do (with?) Abu Bekr, the Alizai, who murdered Colonel Morris. Mirza has been committing robberies, and orders were sent to Sahib Khan, another Alizai Chief, to arrest him. He fled, but his fort has been destroyed. The messenger from the Taimuni Char Aimak Chiefs has been sent back with letters and presents to them.

Syud Muhammad Shah, formerly collector of revenue here, returned from Kabul yesterday, having been robbed on the road. He reports country beyond Mukur in a state of complete anarchy. The Ali Khel Ghilzais are fighting with the Hazaras, and have been defeated in one action. Rain fell on the 24th, but weather has now cleared again.

Enclosure 36 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

MIR AHMAD KHAN, a Popalzai of good family, with three attendants, attempted to run a muck through the cantonment this morning. The leader and two followers were cut down, the fourth escaped, but is being pursued: none of our people hurt. Two of Mir Ahmad's uncles have been conspicuous on our side from the time of our entry, and a third is the trusted adviser of Sirdar Sher Ali.

Enclosure 37 in No. 52.

Telegram, dated 26th December 1879.

From MAJOR ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN SECRETARY, Calcutta.

SIRDAR ABEL-ES-SALAM KHAN has just returned from Herat, which he left 12 days ago. He has letters from Muhammad Ayub not yet delivered. His account of the disturbance there is as follows:—There were three Herati regiments quartered at Maimena under command of Faizullah Khan, Ishakzai, when Ayub camped outside with the intention of marching on Kandahar. He sent for Faizullah and his three regiments and left them in the city, making over civil charge to Abdullah Khan, Nasiri. A few days afterwards Faizullah declared himself governor, shut the gates, and mutilated some 50 soldiers of the Kabuli regiments, who had returned to the city. The next day Ayub having sworn the regiments and tribal horsemen with him on the Koran, sent two Kabuli and the Kandahar regiments to attack Herat. The three Herati regiments came out to meet them, and were completely worsted with the loss of 300 men. In the fight that ensued Faizullah and the rest fled the city, was then plundered by the Kabulis, and Ayub returned to it with the rest of the troops. He has now given up his intention of moving on Kandahar, and wishes to treat with us.

Enclosure 38 in No. 52.

No. 62, dated Kabul, 3rd December 1879.

From LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the following report regarding Mulla Mushk-i-Alam of Ghazni.

2. The Mulla's movements first attracted my attention some weeks ago, when it was reported that he had collected a force in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and was busily inciting the Wardak people to a holy war. I was not at first disposed to attach any great importance to the news, for Mushk-i-Alam was generally spoken of as a very old man, disabled by bodily infirmity from taking an active part against us, and possessing little power over the chiefs and people. But there can be no doubt, from all that has lately come to my knowledge, that the Mulla's reputation as a religious teacher has gained for him some influence in various parts of the country, and the course of events during the last few months has enabled him, in spite of his age and reputed infirmities, to bring this influence to bear with considerable effect. By coming forward as the champion of a holy war, he has succeeded in collecting bodies of armed men in Wardak and the neighbourhood, and the preaching of his emissaries has caused some uneasiness in Kohistan, Tagao, and Logar. For some days past it has been confidently reported in Kabul that Usman Khan, a leading Malik of Tagao, was concerting with the Kohistanis an attack upon the British position at Sherpur. Of course any such attempt could only end in the discomfiture of the attacking force, but the fact of its being generally spoken of as possible, and even probable, shows the Mulla's exhortations, coming at a time when the natural reaction of feeling against us as foreigners was setting in, have done harm in this part of the country. Further, it is almost certain that the continued reluctance of Asmatulla Khan to leave the hills has been due in great measure to Mushk-i-Alam, who is his peer or spiritual guide.

3. The excitement seems at present to be subsiding. The Wardak insurgents are said to have completely dispersed. On the 27th November a number of them tried to surprise a small party of General Baker's cavalry at the village of Beni Badam, but were repulsed with the loss of their leader, after exchanging a few shots, and this seems to have thoroughly disheartened the rest.

An attempt made to intimidate the Logaris into refusing supplies has wholly failed, and they are bringing in bhoosa freely. The Tagao men have not assembled or have assembled at a distance in insignificant numbers.

Finally, it is evident that the Kohistanis are shrinking from any open act of aggression.

Their leading Maliks have been in communication with Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, whom I sent out to reassure the people, and I have reason to believe that the

most influential among them will come in to pay their respects before many days are over.

4. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that a certain amount of uneasiness and latent discontent, due in great measure to the intrigues of Mushk-i-Alam, prevails in the country round Kabul; and I shall watch most carefully for any symptoms of its increase. The Mulla himself I shall do my best to secure. This will of course be difficult, but it is possible that during the winter I may be able to effect his capture and surrender.

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1880.

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Correspondence relating to the Estimates for the War in Afghanistan.

No. 1.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, dated July 17, 1879, No. 261 (Financial).

i.e., 1879.

52. The low state to which your balances had been reduced at the beginning of March* compelled your Excellency to request that the amount of bills offered for sale weekly might not exceed 25 lacs, and it was not until the 16th of May that you were able to intimate your ability to meet larger drawings. The result is that up to the 9th of July bills have only been sold to the extent of Rs. 4,20,00,000, and, assuming that an average of 30 lacs can be disposed of weekly to the end of November, the total amount allotted would then be Rs. 10,20,00,000, which at 1s. 7½*d.* the rupee would give 8,287,500*l.* The requirements of the year were estimated at 17,290,000*l.* but have since been reduced to 15,000,000*l.*, of which, perhaps, 500,000*l.* may be obtained by the purchase of gold in India. This leaves about 6¼ millions sterling to be obtained in the last four months of the year, which, even taking the exchange as high as 1s. 9*d.* the rupee, would imply an average drawing of 42 lacs a week. Experience does not warrant the belief that the market will bear so heavy a drain, except in the height of the export season; and I am anxious, therefore, to impress on your Government the necessity of making such arrangements in future years as will admit of the largest drawings at the time when your treasuries are at the fullest, if the rate of exchange should then be favourable.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, September 9, 1879.

Although it is of course impossible now to estimate future military expenditure in Afghanistan, it is desirable that Her Majesty's Government should know that in all other respects our financial prospects seem to us very favourable.

As regards present year, the condition of our cash balance is such that there is no room for anxiety, all branches of revenue are satisfactory, the rainy season has been highly favourable through India, and we may reasonably anticipate for next year general internal prosperity.

Following estimate assumes exchange value of rupee at one shilling and sevenpence. By arrangements already settled, with complete approval of Local Governments, we can reckon on reducing provincial grants next year by more than 700,000*l.*, but we shall be able to make equally large reductions after 1880-81. These measures, together with savings on Public Works and otherwise, would, if peace had been maintained, have secured for next year a probable surplus of at least two millions. This estimate supposes not only that no fresh taxation will be imposed, but that large exemptions will be made in favour of poorer classes now liable to license tax. It also takes credit for no reduction in military charges consequent on Commission now sitting, although we hope that this will ultimately be large, nor for any reduction in Home military charges, to which we again earnestly beg your attention. By extending license tax to official and other classes, as already sanctioned by you on 21st November last, and by other measures, which will be reported hereafter, we think it probable that we shall be able to raise our surplus next year, apart from fresh military charges, to three millions. We hope this will more than suffice to meet all probable additional expenditure in Afghanistan, although it may be necessary to suspend operations of famine surplus.

No. 3.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, October 3, 1879.

Yours 9th September. Taking rupee at $19\frac{3}{4}d.$, we ought to draw weekly in October 35 lacs, November and December 40, January and February 45, March 40. This is within estimate of rupee drawings, but will give us half million more sterling, which must be drawn, if possible, considering fresh heavy demands for railway stores.

Referring to Afghanistan, have you any doubt as to ability to meet such drafts? Having to deal with Five per cent. Stock, any material reduction of drawings may be very embarrassing.

No. 4.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, October 6, 1879.

Remittance proposals 3rd., accepted meanwhile. Despatch follows.

No. 5.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, October 16, 1879, No. 335 (Financial).

MY LORD,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Lordship, dated 3rd instant, of the following telegram:—

“Yours dated 9th September. Taking (the) Rupee (at) $1s. 7\frac{3}{4}d.$, we ought to draw, weekly, in October 35 lakhs, (in) November and December 40, (in) January and February 45, (and in) March 40. This is within the estimate of rupee drawings, but will give us half a million more sterling, which must be drawn if possible, considering (your) fresh heavy demands for railway stores. Referring to Afghanistan, have you any doubt as to (your) ability of meeting such drafts? Having to deal with Five Per Cent. Stock, any material reduction of drawings may be very embarrassing.”

2. We replied on the 6th instant as follows:—

“(Your) remittance proposals (of the) third, accepted meanwhile. Despatch follows.”

3. Provision was made in our Estimates for the remittance of £15,000,000 at a cost of Rs. 18,95,20,000: but we did not expect to cover the whole net current expenditure proper from the Home Treasury, which was estimated at £15,738,900, exclusive of Debt and Railway Capital transactions, and is now, we apprehend, likely largely to exceed this sum. Including our shipments of gold, we have remitted to the Home Treasury during the first six months of the year, that is to say, to the end of September, £6,548,598, at a cost of Rs. 7,99,52,059. Your Lordship now proposes to sell bills on us, during the latter half of the year, for Rs. 10,95,00,000, by which you estimate that you will raise, at $1s. 7\frac{3}{4}d.$ the rupee, £9,010,937. If this programme is realised, we shall have remitted, during 1879-80, in all, £15,559,535, at a cost of Rs. 18,94,52,059.

4. We fully concur with Your Lordship as to the extreme importance of our remitting, yearly, a sum at least equal to the net expenditure proper from the Home Treasury. We explicitly and unreservedly recognize our obligation in this respect, and we should have been glad not only to meet the demands which Your Lordship now proposes to make upon us, but even to remit one or two crores of rupees more than you intimate your intention of drawing. The revenues of the current year are, so far, prosperous; and, but for the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, we should have had no difficulty in meeting Your Lordship's drafts to any extent to which you are likely to be able to dispose of them.

5. The war will, however, necessarily, be costly. We have been obliged to undertake the construction of railways towards our North-Western Frontier, which are estimated to cost between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 crores of rupees before the close of the year, and our military operations must, inevitably, involve the free expenditure of money in other respects.

6. It will be our anxious desire to avoid placing any check on your drafts upon us: but your Lordship will understand that it is not, at the present time, possible for us to say confidently that we shall be able to meet your Lordship's bills to the full extent proposed in your message. We shall not fail to communicate to your Lordship without delay any further conclusions which we may be able later on to form.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

No. 6.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, December 19, 1879,
No. 405 (Financial).

Para. 1. In continuation of our Despatch No. 87A, dated 13th March last, we have the honour to present abstract revised estimates of our revenue and expenditure in 1879-80, which show a net improvement of £359,000 as follows:—

	Original Estimates.	Present Estimates.	Better.	Worse.
Revenue - - -	64,562,000	67,056,000	2,494,000	—
Expenditure - - -	65,957,000	68,092,000	—	2,135,000
Deficit - - -	1,395,000	1,036,000	359,000	—

2. The revised estimates include a special additional expenditure of £3,500,000 to be incurred, during the year, in consequence of the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, namely:—

	£
Railways to Kandahar, Khushalgarh, and Peshawar - - -	2,500,000
Under the head of "The Army," in addition to the £2,000,000 originally provided - - -	1,000,000
Total	£3,500,000

3. Notwithstanding the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatches, Nos. 161 and 162, dated 23rd October, we have, for the present, entered the first of these items under No. 34, State Railways, and, unless we hear from you to the contrary, we shall persevere in this course. We submit that, in view of our hereafter working these lines, like the rest of our lines, as commercial undertakings, it is not convenient that their capital cost should now appear under the head of "The Army"; also, that, in any case, it seems scarcely justifiable to connect the cost of great permanent works of this kind exclusively with the recent and present operations in Afghanistan. Even if these lines be treated, exclusively, as military works, their value will be permanent. We shall therefore be glad to be informed by telegraph of your Lordship's assent to our recording the cost of these lines under State Railways, and, in that case, of any needful corrections in the forthcoming estimates of the transactions at the Home Treasury.

4. The extra 1,000,000% which we have entered under "Army" is, as yet, only a very rough forecast. Until the situation in Afghanistan is more settled than at present, and until we are in a position to determine our future policy in regard to that country, it is impossible to say, with any approach to accuracy, even what the whole cost of the military operations there will be, much less how much will be brought to account during the current year.

5. All that we can say at present is, that we estimate the whole cost of all the military operations in Afghanistan, original and renewed, to the end of the current year 1879-80, at 3,600,000%, of which about 600,000% is recorded in

the Accounts of 1878-9. The whole cost of the Frontier Railways is now estimated at 3,500,000*l.*, of which we expect to spend 2,500,000*l.* this year, and 1,000,000*l.* next year.

6. It thus appears that, but for the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, we might now be hoping for an improvement of the finances of the year of no less than 3,859,000*l.*, that is to say, for a surplus of 2,464,000*l.* instead of the deficit of 1,395,000*l.* originally estimated; and that this large estimated surplus of two and a half millions sterling would have remained, notwithstanding a special provision of 2,000,000*l.* for the operations in Afghanistan, which in March last we hoped were drawing to a close.

No. 7.

EXTRACT of a TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, December 24, 1879.

Revised estimate * of figures in even thousand pounds sterling. Revenue 67,056,000*l.*; expenditure 68,092,000*l.*; deficit 1,036,000*l.*; being 359,000*l.* better than Budget. 2,500,000*l.* provided for frontier railways, and under army 1,000,000*l.* more than Budget for Afghanistan.

No. 8.

EXTRACTS of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, dated the 7th January, 1880, No. 9, (Financial).

Para. 9. . . . We earnestly trust that your Lordship may see fit to reduce your demands upon us next year to 16,000,000*l.*,* contenting yourself with a closing balance of 1,058,500*l.* Should circumstances admit of your raising more than 16,000,000*l.* on reasonable terms, we shall, if the year proves financially prosperous, be prepared to meet your drafts for the purpose; but we are not sanguine that this contingency will occur.

* * * * *

Para. 15. We are not yet able to say how much money it will be necessary for us to borrow in 1880-81. The exact amount will depend, amongst other things, upon your Lordship's decision upon the request made in the 9th paragraph of this despatch. Meanwhile, we may perhaps assume that, so long as we do not propose to raise more than 2½ crores of rupees in one year, and see our way to borrowing in India all that we want, we need not communicate specially with your Lordship before settling the loan arrangements of the year. We shall probably raise as part of the Four and a half per cent. Transfer Loan 1879, whatever money we resolve to borrow in 1880-81.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, January 30, 1880.

Your Financial 9, Remittances. Send directly roughly estimated surplus of 1880-81, and cash balance in India on 31st March 1881, assuming Home Estimates remain; and state what outlay on famine insurance during year is intended.

No. 10.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 3rd, 1880.

Gazette, January 3rd*, Trades and Professions Tax: Have you sent letter with explanation of reasons for complete change in Bill?

No. 11.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 6, 1880.

License Tax: I regret that we inadvertently omitted to send covering despatch with Finance Member of Council's explanation published in Gazette, 3rd January.

* Debate in the Legislative Council on the proposal to refer the Trades and Professions Tax Bill to a Select Committee, published in the Supplement to the Gazette of India of the 3rd of January 1880.

Separate report appeared unnecessary, because change proposed would restore measure to the identical form in which it was proposed by us, 22nd July 1878, and sanctioned by your Despatch 21st November, same year. Sole difference is the exemption from tax of all trades with income under 500 rupees, which we felt sure you would approve. The great and unexpected improvement in our financial position may, however, make it expedient to reconsider the question of extending tax to the official and professional classes. We shall telegraph our conclusion shortly.

No. 12.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 13, 1880.

Before settling loan, inform me of reason for preferring $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and await reply.

No. 13.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 14, 1880.

Your Lordship's telegrams, 30th January and yesterday. Surplus next year about 40 lacs of rupees. Balance in India, 31st March 1881, 1,225 lacs, after borrowing 150 lacs of rupees. If you can reduce your bills upon us to 16,000,000*l.*, we shall estimate to borrow nothing unless Exchange collapses, or the war costs more than is now expected. We earnestly advocate this solution. Surplus would then exceed 60 lacs of rupees, notwithstanding our abandonment of the proposed extension of License Tax. Famine Tax will be thus about one crore, half License Tax, half cesses. No expenditure estimated on famine insurance and only 50,000 rupees on famine relief, 436 lacs of rupees provided for Afghanistan including frontier railways, all in the ordinary expenditure. If the year prosper, we could meet your bills for the extra 900,000*l.* also. If we borrow, we should not willingly borrow at 4 per cent., because of the heavy discount, and because $4\frac{1}{2}$ loan is at present proportionately dearer. Please answer as quickly as possible.

No. 14.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 16, 1880.

Yours 14th. Arguments insufficient to justify borrowing here, even temporarily, which would be necessary if drawings reduced, since, through East Indian Railway arrangements and conversion of stock, payments in first days of April 1881 estimated at 1,900,000*l.* In your announcement, state that less than 16,900,000*l.* could not be put into Estimate, but you may add that drawings may be reduced, if demand for bills prove insufficient. I think you should borrow in India as much, not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores, as necessary for sufficient balances. Avoid stating in Budget rate of interest on new loan.

No. 15.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 16, 1880.

With present condition and prospect of finances, we cannot justify extension of taxation to official and professional classes, and have resolved to drop proposal. Sole change in existing law will be exemption of all incomes under 500 rupees.

No. 16.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, February 17, 1880.

Yours yesterday, License Tax. Policy of abandoning extension much questioned here, for reasons stated in my Despatch 402 of 1878.* How do you justify suspending operation of Famine Insurance another year?

* "I might have felt some doubt as to the expediency of a measure imposing fresh taxation of which the receipts were likely to be so small, if I did not consider that there was some ground for the feeling that the operation of the Licensing Acts was partial, and that, while the proposed measures would be beneficial to the revenue, they would remove from the minds of the classes taxed under those Acts a sense of having been subjected to somewhat unequal treatment." Despatch to India, Nov. 21, 1878, No. 402, paragraph 5.

No. 17.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 18, 1880.

YOUR telegram yesterday, License Tax Extension. Whatever view be taken of policy, it is impossible now to carry measure. Neither I nor any member of Executive Government can support it, and Legislative Council would probably not accept it. Your doubt regarding Famine Insurance not understood. In my telegram of 14th, for "famine" read "protective works." We suspend nothing, and have fulfilled all financial plans and conditions made in 1878. Our explanation regarding Famine Insurance will be complete and unanswerable.

No. 18.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, February 24, 1880.

Sir John Strachey will present the financial statement for 1880-81 in the Legislative Council; results are highly favourable. In 1873-79, surplus 2,044,000*l.*; in 1879-80, surplus 119,000*l.*; Budget estimate 1880-81, surplus 417,000*l.*; foregoing figures in each case are after paying from ordinary revenue all charges for famine, Afghan war, and frontier railways.

War charges, 1878-79, 676,000*l.*; 1879-80, 3,216,000*l.*; 1880-81, 2,090,000*l.*; setting off increase railways and telegraphs revenues, total net expenditure on war to end of 1880-81, 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions; frontier railways, present year 1,670,000*l.*; next year 2,270,000*l.*; total 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions.

Expenditure on productive works in 1878-79, 4,381,000*l.*; 1879-80, 3,700,000*l.*; 1880-81, 2,500,000*l.*, besides outlay on East Indian Railway.

Secretary of State's bills, present year 15,750,000*l.*; next year 16,900,000*l.* No loan to be raised in coming year according to present intentions, unless events not now foreseen occur, but power to borrow in case of need reserved.

Closing balances in India, 1879-80, 14,193,000*l.*; 1880-81, 11,444,000*l.* Exchange estimate for next year 1*s.* 8*d.*

Extension of taxation to official and professional classes abandoned for the present, fresh taxation not being desirable under existing financial circumstances. License tax remains unaltered, except that all incomes below Rs. 500 are exempted, causing remission of 340,000*l.* taxation. Export duties on indigo and lac abolished, causing loss of 54,000*l.* No export duty now remains except on rice. No present change in cotton duties, but prolonged maintenance of remaining duties declared impossible. Loss of revenue next year from previous remissions of cotton duties estimated at 250,000*l.*

Notwithstanding reduction of salt duties in greater part of India, salt shows large increase of revenue and consumption.

Principal improvements in 1879-80, compared with estimates:—Opium, 1,900,000*l.*; exchange, 1,010,000*l.*; public works savings, 661,000*l.*; land revenue, 450,000*l.*; salt, 362,000*l.*; interest, 389,000*l.*

Army Commission recommends important measures for increasing efficiency of army, with estimated annual saving of 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ million. No credit taken for this in Budget.

Sir John Strachey stated that former plans regarding famine insurance had been completely successful, and declared objects thoroughly fulfilled. Restriction of Productive Public Works expenditure to 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions has, however, checked efforts of Government of India to protect country from famine by construction of cheap railways and canals. War estimates have hitherto proved very accurate, and are believed to be ample for all contingencies now contemplated. Comparison between present total net ordinary expenditure with that of 12 years back shows, apart from loss by exchange, only trifling increase either in civil or military charges. Including loss by exchange, total net expenditure shows no increase, owing to improvement in railways and canals.

No. 19.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT for 1880-81.

SPEECH in the LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL of His Excellency the GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA, by the Honble. Sir JOHN STRACHEY, G.C.S.I. February 24th, 1880.

1. My Lord, I have now to lay before the Council the Financial Statement for the coming year 1880-81. It takes what has become the somewhat unusual

Preliminary.

form of a speech by myself, instead of a Resolution published in the Gazette. I shall state to the best of my ability all facts necessary to enable the Council and the public fully to understand the present condition and apparent prospects of our finances.

I propose in the first place to give a summary of the main facts and figures for the year 1878-79, for the year 1879-80, now about to close, and for the coming year 1880-81, and to reserve for a later part of my statement the observations which I may wish to make upon some of the more important questions of our financial policy.

2. The Council will see, from the Abstract Statements which have been laid on the table, that a few changes have been made in the forms of the accounts.

New major heads have been opened to show separately the revenue from *Registration* and the expenditure on that department of the administration.

The *Guaranteed* and *State Railways* are now shown together under the single head *Railways*. The purchase of the East Indian Railway by the State, involving its transfer from the category of guaranteed to that of state railways, has made comparisons of the current estimates with the past accounts in each separate category impossible; and a like disturbance will ensue on the acquisition of other lines constructed by private capitalists under a guarantee of interest from the public revenues. Moreover, negotiations are already in progress for the working of the Indus Valley State Railway by the Sindh, Punjab, and Delhi Railway Company. It would be difficult to distinguish between the transactions of the two railways under one management. Similar arrangements for the management of other state railways are likely in the future.

For like reasons, the transactions with the *Madras Canal and Irrigation Company* will henceforth be entered under the major head, *Irrigation and Navigation*, under which head the cost of agricultural works (drainage and embankments) will also, hereafter, be shown.

Thus the public works heads of account will now be *Railways, Irrigation and Navigation, and Other Public Works*.

3. In March last the Regular Estimate for 1878-79 showed a probable surplus, on the ordinary Account, of £1,300,000; the actual surplus was £2,044,391, or £744,391 better than the estimate. The differences between the Accounts and the Regular Estimates are for the most part unimportant, and there are not many of them which now call for remark.

The net cost of the war in Afghanistan in 1878-79 was £676,381, a close approximation to the estimate of £670,000 made last year. Against this must be set the gain, the amount of which cannot be exactly stated, under the heads of *Railways* and *Telegraphs*. We estimate at £575,000 the ultimate net total cost of the operations in Afghanistan recorded in the Accounts of 1878-79. The sum of £313,420 was spent on *Famine Relief*.

4. Compared with 1877-78, the Revenues of 1878-79 show an improvement of £6,238,393, of which, however, £2,400,331, under the head of *Provincial Rates*, for the first time incorporated in these accounts, is nominal. The largest increase was under *Land Revenue*, £2,460,919; the loss under this head in 1877-78, in consequence of famine, had been very large. There was a saving of £5,032,355 in *Famine Relief*; there was an increase of expenditure of £1,705,767 under *Loss by Exchange*, and £1,339,281 under *Public Works*. The apparent increase under *Public Works* is explained by the transfer of charges in the earlier year from this head to that of *Famine Relief*, and does not represent a real fluctuation of Public Works expenditure. Altogether the expenditure of the year exceeded that of the previous year by £650,915. The net result is £5,587,478 better than the result of 1877-78.

5. Thus the financial out-turn of 1878-79 was very satisfactory; with the help of the additional taxation imposed in that and in the previous year, amounting to £1,227,891, of which £313,420 was spent on Famine Relief, the true surplus of the year exceeded the amount of £2,000,000, decided to be necessary to meet our obligations on account of famine, and to leave a margin for other contingencies; and this result was obtained, notwithstanding the expenditure on the war, and the remission of the Inland Sugar Duties and some of the

Changes in the
forms of the
accounts.
Registration.
Railways.

Irrigation and
Navigation.

Accounts, 1878-79.

War in Afghanis-
tan.

Famine Relief.
Comparison with
1877-78.

General result
favourable.

Customs Duties on cotton goods and other articles. The standard at which, for ordinary times, the Government aims, namely, a surplus of £2,000,000, less any expenditure on Famine Relief and exclusive of extraordinary charges such as those for great military operations, would have been attained if the accounts had shown a surplus of only £1,010,199, or £1,034,192 less than the actual surplus. Accounts, 1878—

6. I see only one drawback to entire satisfaction with these results; some of the capital expenditure under productive public works, as, for example, that on the Indus Valley and Punjab Northern Railways, cannot at present be regarded as directly reproductive. The works themselves possess the highest value; and for the future, as the Council is aware, no expenditure which is not really and directly reproductive is to be excluded from the comparison upon which the Surplus or Deficit of the revenue is ascertained. It will be seen later on that we are acting strictly on this principle in the present and coming years. Doubtful Productive Public Works.

7. I come now to the Regular Estimates for the present year, 1879–80.

It is now expected that the Revenue will amount to £67,583,000, or £3,021,000 more than the original estimate, and that the ordinary expenditure will be £67,464,000, or £1,507,000 more than was estimated. Thus, instead of a deficit of £1,395,000, with which, when our budget estimates were framed, we expected that the present year would close, our estimates now show a surplus of £119,000. Regular Estimates, 1879–80.
Comparison with original estimate

8. The original estimates provided for an additional military expenditure of £2,000,000 for the war in Afghanistan. If the war had ended with the treaty of Gundamak, I believe that this estimate would not have been exceeded; but, in consequence of the renewal of hostilities, the estimated additional charge has risen to £3,216,000. In addition to this amount, we have had to undertake the construction of railways on our frontier. I shall have to speak of them further on; but in the present year they are estimated to cost £1,670,000. Thus the total provision on account of the war has now been increased to £4,886,000. With the exception of £230,000 on account of the Railway from Jhelum to Rawal Pindi, which is included under the head of *Railways*, the whole of this sum, under orders from the Secretary of State, is charged against *Army*. It was a question whether they ought not to have been included under the head of *State Railways*, and as they will undoubtedly, quite independently of their present military importance, possess great and permanent value to the country, much was to be said in favour of this view. But, as their construction was primarily due to the war, it was decided to include their cost in the war expenses. The result will be to exaggerate the apparent amount of our military expenditure. War in Afghanistan.

An expenditure of £10,000 upon *Famine Relief* was estimated; this, on account of distress in parts of the Bombay Presidency, has been raised to £99,000. On the other hand, the Railway and Telegraph receipts are better, by reason of the war, to the extent of about £300,000. Railways charged as War Expenditure.

9. Thus, but for war and famine, the Regular Estimates of the present year would have shown a surplus revenue of about $4\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling. The taxes imposed in 1877 and 1878, to enable us to discharge our obligations in time of famine, will, it is estimated, yield £1,184,000; and, if we deduct the sum of £99,000, actually spent on famine relief, there will remain of this revenue £1,085,000. To this extent, the new taxes have had the effect of preventing debt. Making allowance for other abnormal items on both sides of the account, the true surplus of the year for comparison with the standard surplus of £2,000,000, at which we aim, will be about £4,160,000. This surplus, if it had been actually obtained, would have been much in excess of the whole expenditure on productive public works, which is estimated at £3,700,000. Famine Relief.
Surplus compared with standard.

If present prospects are fulfilled, the financial out-turn of the present year 1879–80 will leave nothing to be desired.

10. The most important variations from the original estimates are the following:— Detail of variations.

Land Revenue.—Improvement, £450,000; more than half of this has been collected on account of arrears of former years, and the increase is due to the increased prosperity of the country. Land Revenue.

Salt.—Net improvement, £362,000; this also is highly satisfactory, as showing a general increase of consumption. Salt.

Opium.—Net improvement, £1,900,000. In September last the duty on Malwa Opium was raised by Rs. 50 a chest; the revenue from Opium this year has been unprecedentedly large. Opium.

Regular
Estimates,
1879-80.
Assessed Taxes.
Stamps.

Assessed Taxes.—Decrease, £93,000. This is the result of the orders given during the year for the exemption of the smaller incomes from taxation.

Stamps have improved by £114,000. The stamp revenue has been constantly increasing; during the last seven years it has risen from £2,516,400 in 1872-73 to £3,090,000 in 1879-80, or by £573,600.

Under no head of the revenue has there been any serious decrease.

Interest on debt.

11. On the expenditure side of the account, the following are the chief variations from the original estimates:—

Interest on Debt.—Decrease £389,000; the chief saving is in the discount on the loan of March 1879.

There has been a satisfactory increase in the Savings Bank Deposits, which now exceed £2,000,000; in December last new rules were issued increasing the rate of interest from $3\frac{3}{4}$ to $4\frac{1}{8}$ per cent., and for preventing trouble to depositors.

Post Office.

Post Office.—Increase £63,000. The new contract with the Peninsular and Oriental Company came into force in February 1880. The yearly subsidy has been reduced from £430,000 to £360,000; the efficiency of the service has been increased, and the rates of postage to Great Britain have been reduced. Post cards costing $\frac{1}{4}$ anna each were introduced in April 1879, and are already so popular that it is difficult to supply the demand.

Telegraphs.

In *Telegraphs*, the excess of expenditure over receipts will, this year, be only £6,000; there has been a satisfactory growth of revenue, amounting to £145,000, of which, however, £50,000 is attributed to the war.

Stationery and Printing.

Stationery and Printing.—Decrease of expenditure £99,000; this is to some extent nominal. Supplies will, in future, be largely bought in India, instead of in England.

Superannuation.

Superannuations.—Increase of net expenditure, £168,000; this is owing to the reduction of Public Works establishments, to which I shall have again to refer.

Railways.

Including an expenditure of £230,000 on the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi line, *Railways* are worse by £204,000, of which, however, £150,000 appears as a transfer under *Gain by Exchange*. If these adjustments are made, the Railways show an improvement of £176,000. But the Railways, and especially the Great Indian Peninsular and the Oudh and Rohilkund lines, have not been as prosperous as, at one time, we hoped they would be.

Public Works.

Public Works.—There has been a saving of £747,000, to which I shall refer again.

Provincial and Local Surpluses, and Balances.

Provincial and Local Surpluses.—Net surplus, £265,000. Improvement, 456,000*l.*

There was a like improvement of £469,000 in the accounts of 1878-79, as compared with the regular estimates. The provincial and local balances at the end of 1879-80 are now expected to exceed the sums last estimated as follows:—

	Provincial. £	Local. £	Total. £
Now estimated - - - -	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500
Estimated last year - - - -	837,000	716,900	1,553,900
Better - - - -	494,800	619,800	1,114,600

This result is the more remarkable and satisfactory in that, during the year, the Local Governments agreed to contribute from their balances in special aid of the imperial treasury the sum of £670,000, half of which, £335,000, is charged in the accounts of the current year. The other half will be charged in 1880-81. The reduction of their expenditure on public works and the general improvement of their provincial resources has enabled the Local Governments to afford this timely help to the general finances with little apparent difficulty.

Army.

The *Army* shows an increase of £2,768,000; which I have already noticed. Apart from the war, the regular estimate is for a net expenditure of £15,487,000; the excess of £112,000 over the original estimate being due to high prices.

Exchange.

Exchange shows an improvement of £1,010,000; the original estimate was for the remittance to the Home Treasury of £15,000,000 at an exchange of 1*s.* 7*d.*; it is now hoped that £15,750,000 will be remitted at an average rate of 1*s.* 8*d.*

Productive Public Works.
Railways.

Productive Public Works, on which £3,700,000 was spent, show a small increase; 511 miles of railways have been opened for traffic during the year. At the end of the year there will be 8,724 miles in use and 1,462 under con-

struction. I shall speak again of the frontier railways. Great progress has been made during the year with the Rajputana Line. The Lines in Bengal have been completed, and fair progress has been made on the Line from Nágpúr to Raípúr.

*Regular
Estimates,
1879-80.*

Irrigation Works show an expenditure of £797,000. In Madras, much progress was made with the Godaveri and Kistna Delta and other works. In Bengal, the Orissa project, so far as the works have been sanctioned, approaches completion. In the North-Western Provinces and Punjab, much useful work has been done on the Upper and Lower Ganges Canals, and on the Western Jumna and Sirhind Canals.

Irrigation.

Satisfactory progress has been made with the Madras Harbour Works.

Revenue and Working expenses of Productive Public Works show an improvement of £638,000, due mainly to the inclusion, so long desired, of the land revenue in the Madras Presidency attributable to these works.

12. The details of the Loan operations of the year are as follows:—

Debt incurred.—Net £5,131,000. More than estimate £804,500, of which £540,700 was in India, where less was paid off than was expected, and £263,800 in England, where 270,016 less than was estimated in March last was raised at the close of 1878-79.

Loan operations.

The loan of £5,000,000, which was notified on the 13th March 1879, was subscribed at an average of 95-0-6 per cent. The discount upon it charged in the accounts of 1879-80 was £247,239. Of the outstanding portion of the 5½ per cent. Loan of 1859-60, £1,123,900 will be paid off during the year, leaving £105,600 still due. Other outstanding notes, amounting to £2,400, have been discharged. The net sum borrowed is thus £3,850,000.

13. A Local Debenture Loan of £45,020 was raised for the Cawnpore-Farakhábad Light Railway at 4 per cent. interest with share of profits.

Local Debenture
Loans.

A Local Debenture Loan of £50,000 was offered at Nágpúr in November at par at 4½ per cent. interest, with half the percentage of surplus profits on the Nagpur-Raípúr Railway. The subscriptions amounted to £42,700, of which £17,300 is payable this year and £25,400 next year.

The Secretary of State received £2,000,000 without interest from Her Majesty's Imperial Government under the Indian Advance Act, 1879: but on the other hand he repaid sterling debt amounting to £736,200.

14. Thus the net debt incurred amounted to £5,131,000, or, excluding the loan from Her Majesty's Government, £3,131,000. Including railway capital transactions, savings bank deposits, service funds, loans to native states, &c., and the repayment of such loans, the net amount borrowed in 1879-80 was apart from the £2,000,000 advanced as aforesaid under the Indian Advance Act, £3,523,000.

Net debt incurred

The equation of the year 1879-80 may accordingly be stated thus—

	£		£
Borrowed	5,523,000	Net expenditure	3,581,000
Net other receipts ..	148,000	Balances decreased ..	2,090,000
	5,671,000		5,671,000

15. The price of public securities has risen rapidly during the year. The price of 4½ per cent. paper has for some time been more than 101, and that of 4 per cents. now exceeds 94.

Public securities.

16. I come now to the Budget Estimates for the coming year 1880-81.

*Budg et estimates,
1880-81.*

The revenues are estimated at £66,746,000. The ordinary expenditure is estimated at £66,329,000; we expect therefore a surplus of £417,000.

General.

17. The estimated expenditure includes excess military charges, amounting to £4,360,000, of which £2,090,000 is for military operations proper, and £2,270,000 for the frontier railways; against this, there will be a set-off on account of improvement in the Railway and Telegraph revenues, estimated to £300,000, leaving the net charge for the war on the estimates of 1880-81 at £4,060,000.

Effect of war on
estimates.

Budget
Estimates,
1880-81.

But for the war expenditure, the true surplus of the year, to compare, as before, with the standard surplus of £2,000,000, would not have been less than £4,000,000.

The estimated revenue includes £982,000 obtained from the taxes imposed in 1877 and 1878, to enable the Government to meet its famine obligations.

satisfactory result.

18. The estimates for 1880-81 thus show an extraordinarily satisfactory result, far surpassing the standard at which two years ago the Government of India aimed. The result is the more satisfactory, because the total estimated expenditure on the productive public works of a doubtful character, to which I have before referred, is only £398,000.

revenue.

19. I will notice a few only of the heads in which the Budget Estimate differs from the Regular Estimate of the present year.

Assessed Taxes
and Customs.

20. *Assessed Taxes and Customs* show a decrease of revenue, to which I shall refer later on. I may, however, notice here that, in February 1879, the Hon'ble Mr. Hope and Mr. J. D. Maclean were appointed Commissioners to report, *inter alia*, whether it was desirable to revise the tariff valuations yearly, and, if so, how such revision should be made. The Commissioners recommended a yearly revision of the tariff values, and advised that the materials for such revision should be systematically collected throughout the year at the ports of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, and Kurrachee, and collated in Calcutta, in February of each year, by a Committee of three persons to be appointed by the Government of India, one of them being *ex-officio* the Collector of Customs at Calcutta. The first committee of revision was accordingly appointed in January last; the Hon'ble Mr. Hope, and, on the nomination of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Mr. J. W. O'Keefe, a member of the firm of Messrs. Kettlewell, Bullen, and Company, consented to serve upon it, with Mr. J. D. Maclean, Collector of Customs, Calcutta. The Committee has just completed its revision, which is estimated to produce an increase of £15,000 to the Customs revenue.

ult.

21. *Salt* shows an increase, of which also I shall speak separately.

Opium.

22. The net revenue from *Opium* is estimated at £7,250,000; this estimate, although £1,150,000 less than the amount we expect to receive in 1879-80, is largely in excess of any estimate made in any previous year. Although the actual net revenue of the last two years has been more, it is not thought prudent to take the estimate for the coming year at a larger amount than that which I have stated.

The Bengal crop of 1878-79 yielded 29,876 chests 75% consistence and 20,175 chests 70% consistence. Thus the stock in hand on the 1st January 1880 was 38,179 chests 75% consistence, and 43,404 chests 70% consistence, total 81,583 chests. The provision for sale during 1880 is 28,200 chests of each consistence, so that the reserve on the 1st January 1881 will be 9,979 chests 75% consistence, and 15,204 chests 70% consistence, total 25,183 chests.

Telegraphs.

23. Under *Telegraphs* we estimate for the first time that the revenue will exceed the expenditure.

Railways.

24. *Railways*.—Net revenue £794,000, of which £250,000 is attributed to the military operations in Afghánistán. Improvement £1,080,000.

Of this large amount £268,337 is nominal, owing to only three-quarters of the East Indian Railway annuity falling due in the financial year 1880-81, against which, however, may be set a payment of £235,000 due to the Company under the old contract for the second half of 1879. The purchase of the East Indian Railway is expected, upon the estimates of 1880-81, to produce a net revenue of £300,000 in excess of what it would have yielded under the old system. The guaranteed Railways will, it is hoped, in the prosperous season which we anticipate, yield £405,000 more than this year.

From the State Railways an improvement of £231,000 is expected from increased mileage open and from development of traffic.

There is no doubt always an element of speculation in the estimates of Railway revenues; but an increasing return may fairly be expected from the constantly increasing capital expenditure on the construction of these works, which by the end of 1880-81 will amount to £130,000,000, or 144 crores of rupces.

The chief event of the year is the purchase of the East Indian Railway for the State with effect from the 1st January 1880. The price paid was £37,200,000. I need not repeat the details of the new arrangements under which the line has been purchased, and under which it is to be worked.

On the expenditure side of the account an improvement is expected of £242,000 under *Interest*; this partly arises from the proposed conversion of the 5 per cent. sterling loan, and is partly nominal.

25. Under *Administration* there is a decrease of £30,000, in consequence of various reductions in Imperial Establishments.

26. The grants for 1880-81 for *Ordinary Public Works* are less than those for 1879-80 by £597,000; the grants for *Productive Public Works* have been reduced by £1,000,000. There is thus a total gross reduction in Public Works expenditure of £1,597,000, of which the saving in establishments is estimated at £247,000. Against this, however, must be set the special grant of £230,000 under *Railways* on the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi line.

The reduction in the ordinary expenditure on Public Works, apart from establishments, is more apparent than real; for the actual expenditure in past years has never exceeded the amount granted for 1880-81. I shall again refer to the question of expenditure on Public Works.

27. I have already spoken of the *Army* expenditure. Apart from the war, the estimate stands at £15,330,000. According to our present accounts and estimates, the net cost of the war from 1878-79 to the end of 1880-81 will be about 9¼ millions, of which about 3¾ millions is for the railways, and 5½ millions for military operations. The estimates of the cost of the war must of course be to a great extent speculative; but they have been prepared with much care; and their accuracy up to the present time is highly creditable to Major Newmarch and the Military Department. There is no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low.

To what extent it will be found hereafter that stores, chiefly camp equipage, have been expended and wasted and lost, we cannot possibly know accurately until the war is over; but every thing bought for the war is included in the estimates, and the reserves in our arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost being charged, for the present, as current expenditure.

28. Our estimates show under *Loss by Exchange* a net loss of £3,174,000, being an increase on the regular estimate for the present year of £310,000; in 1880-81 it is proposed to remit £16,900,000; the expenditure of the Home Treasury will be largely increased by the payments for stores for the frontier railways. We assume that the average rate of exchange will be the same as that of the present year, or 1s. 8d.

29. The rate of exchange for the adjustment of the public accounts between the English Treasury and India has been fixed at 1s. 8½d.

30. *Productive Public Works (Capital expenditure)*.—Grant £3,312,000. Decrease £388,000. The grant is thus distributed:—

Irrigation and Navigation	£ 630,000
Madras Harbour (besides £50,000 granted under 34, <i>Other Public Works</i>)	70,000
East Indian Railway	630,000
Other State Railways	1,982,000
TOTAL	3,312,000

This grant is made in strict accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of State as follows:—

Fixed grant...	£ 2,500,000
Saving in 1879-80 re-granted	182,000
Capital expenditure on the East Indian Railway	630,000
TOTAL	3,312,000

*Budget
Estimates,
1880-81.*

Purchase of East
Indian Railway.

Expenditure.

Interest.

Administration.

Public Works.

Army.

Loss by Exchange

Adjusting Rate,
1880-81.

Productive Pub
Works.

*Budget
Estimates.*
1880-81.
—
Expenditure.
—
Railways and irrigation.

It is hoped that 988 miles of railway will be opened for traffic in 1880-81. This will complete the communication between Bombay and the North-Western Provinces through Rajputana. Good progress will be made towards the completion of railways and works of irrigation already begun, but the funds at our disposal for productive works are now so small that we cannot commence in the coming year any new works of magnitude. In Madras the chief outlay on irrigation works will be in the Godaveri Delta. In Bombay and Bengal the sanctioned works will be nearly all completed. In the North-Western Provinces the principal work will be on the Lower Ganges Canal. In the Punjab the weir at the head of the Shirhind Canal and the remaining large masonry work will be nearly finished; the new main line of the Western Jumna Canal will probably be opened, and the new Delhi branch will be well advanced.

Madras Harbour.

It is hoped that the Madras Harbour works will be finished in 1880-81. It was not possible to grant on this account more than £70,000 under the head of *Productive Public Works*, but the completion of the work being very important, this amount has been supplemented by a grant of £50,000 under the ordinary head.

Net revenue from Productive Public Works.

31. *Revenue and Working expenses, Public Works.*—Net revenue £318,000. The improvement is under Railways.

Ways and Means.
1880-81.

32. I now come to the important subject of the provision of the Ways and Means for the service of the ensuing year.

Home Remittances

33. In this respect the responsibility of the Government of India is confined chiefly to the requirements of the public service in India. Its direct concern with the provision of Ways and Means to meet the demands of the Home Treasury is limited to the remittance of the amount for which the Secretary of State intimates his intention of drawing bills during the year. The Secretary of State has resolved to raise, in this way, during 1880-81, the sum of £16,900,000. Owing to the heavy estimated expenditure at home for the frontier railways (£360,000 in 1879-80, and £1,070,000 in 1880-81), this large sum will not much exceed the current requirements of the Home Treasury. The Secretary of State could not therefore frame his requisition upon us for less than £16,900,000; but he has authorised the Government of India to state that his drawings may be reduced if the demand for his bills upon India proves insufficient.

Assets and Liabilities.

34. According to present prospects, the balances in the treasuries in India on the 31st March 1880 are expected to amount to Rs. 14,19,00,000. The surplus of Imperial revenue in India during 1880-1 is estimated at Rs. 12,88,68,000, or, deducting from the expenditure the loss by exchange on the Secretary of State's bills, Rs. 16,26,68,000. We expect to receive in India the sum of Rs. 1,01,38,000 for remittance to England, and, in the shape of Savings Banks and Service Funds Deposits and recoveries of Railway Capital, Rs. 56,15,000. Besides the Secretary of State's bills, provision must be made for the estimated deficit in the Provincial and Local revenues of Rs. 11,60,000 and for the net disbursement of Rs. 19,50,000 on the Remittance and Deposit Accounts. Thus, including Rs. 20,28,00,000 for the Secretary of State's bills, we have to contemplate a liability of net Rs. 20,59,10,000, against which we have net assets amounting to Rs. 17,84,21,000, showing a deficiency of Rs. 2,74,89,000.

No Loan.

35. The Government of India has had to consider whether the whole or any part of this sum should be provided from the balances, or whether it shall raise the whole or any part of it by loan. After due deliberation we have resolved to adopt the former alternative, and to endeavour to meet all the expected demands in India, during the coming year, without recourse to the money market for a loan.

Reduction of balances.

36. In consequence of this resolution the balances in the treasuries in India on the 31st March 1881 are expected to fall somewhat below 11½ crores of rupees, a sum considerably less than the minimum sum which the Government of India usually estimates.

Free power to borrow reserved.

37. The estimates of the Home remittance and Loan Transactions are habitually presented with expressed reserve; and this reserve must be understood to be this year greater than usual. But while thus emphatically reserving to our-

selves the freest discretion to raise, during the year, any loan which actual events may render necessary, we consider the prospects of our being able to dispense with a loan during the year sufficiently substantial to make it unnecessary for us to enter any loan upon the estimates. We shall not in any case hesitate to raise any small Local Debenture Loans which may seem expedient during the year.

Ways and Means

38. The year 1878-79 was one of restricted and depressed trade as compared with the trade of the year immediately preceding it, though the value of the merchandize imported and exported (excluding gold and silver) was hardly below the average of the four years ending with 1877-78. When it is considered that famine still afflicted extensive provinces, that the war with Afghanistan was in progress, interfering with ordinary traffic on railway lines, causing a scarcity of carriage, and increasing the effects of drought and floods on the prices of food, and that trade generally in Europe and America was passing through a prolonged period of depression, it is a matter for congratulation that the industry of the country was able to bear up so well against adverse influences.

Trade, 1878-79.

The value of the exports of raw cotton, oilseeds, hides and skins, indigo, silk, wheat, saltpetre, lac, teakwood, and sugar, exhibited a sensible decline, most strongly marked in cotton, seeds, indigo, wheat, and sugar. The fall in cotton followed on a continuous decline of some years; the crops of seeds failed extensively, and at the same time the European and American demand for them fell off; the wheat trade was for the time almost annihilated, the low range of prices and enormous supplies from America forbidding the competition of Indian wheat; and sugar, after a large trade in the two previous years, suffered from the increase of prices caused by exhaustion of stocks and a failure of the sugarcane crop in the North-Western Provinces. Large quantities in excess of the imports of the previous year were imported to supply the deficiency.

Exports and imports.

But while the trade in these articles diminished, owing to what we may hope were in most cases temporary causes, the exports of cotton twist and piece goods, rice, jute and jute manufactures, tea, coffee, and wool, afforded indications of prosperity in some of our chief staples.

The value of the cotton manufactures imported was smaller than it had been for many years. Metals, railway materials, liquors, coal, and apparel all declined, and there was an increase in silk, sugar, provisions, woollen goods, machinery, and spices.

The net imports of silver were nearly £10 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions less than those of 1877-78, and gold was sent out of the country to the value of nearly £900,000.

Import of silver.

The trade of the ten months of the current year for which figures are available shows a marked recovery from the depression of 1878-79, a recovery which, with abundant harvests, a decline in the prices of food stuffs, and renewed vitality in European and American trade, may reasonably be expected to continue.

Recovery of trade.

Even raw cotton has shared in the recovery, both quantities and values having, for the first time for years, increased instead of diminished. Twist, rice, jute, hides, and skins, tea, indigo, wheat, and saltpetre, have all increased, in some cases remarkably. The recovery of the rice trade, with the fall of prices and the reduced demand for consumption in India, is very satisfactory. So also is the increase in the trade in tea, although it is said that the planting interest has not been a gainer by the increased exports.

The imports of merchandise also, like the exports, are much larger than in 1878-79. A large and active trade is being done in cotton goods, in the development of which there is reason to believe that the remission of duty on the coarser kinds of grey goods has aided. On the whole, the prospects of trade are satisfactory.

39. I have now, my Lord, stated the general facts and figures for the past and present years, and for the year that is about to commence. The result must be considered highly satisfactory. The aggregate actual and estimated surpluses of the three years amount to £2,580,000. Let it be remembered that this will be arrived at after spending, out of our ordinary revenue, 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions on the war, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions on frontier railways, and £400,000 on

General satisfactory result.

Afghan War.

famine relief; let it be remembered that the amount charged in these three years under the head *Loss by Exchange* has been nearly 10 millions; let it also be remembered that we have given up £340,000 from the License tax; £150,000 from Salt; £150,000 from the Inland sugar duties; £300,000 on cotton goods, and a multitude of other articles; and that the sum raised by taxation is thus less than the sum raised at the beginning of 1878, by more than £900,000.

War in Afghanis-
tan.

40. I shall now, My Lord, proceed to notice some of the more important questions of policy which the Government has had to consider. And first I may refer to that question which, at the present time, chiefly occupies our thoughts, the war in Afghanistan.

Its policy does
not affect
financial aspect.

My Lord, I do not now propose to discuss the reasons which led the Govern- ment to undertake this war. The discussion by me of such questions on the present occasion would be irrelevant to the matter before me. Whether the war has been just and necessary, or iniquitous and foolish, it has now to be carried on and paid for, and my present duty is confined to showing how the Government proposes to meet the obligations which, whether rightly or wrongly incurred, cannot now be avoided.

Cost to be borne
by India or
England.

41. There is, however, one question to which I must refer. It has been main- tained by many persons that England, and not India, ought to bear the cost of the war in Afghanistan. I must explain why I consider this opinion incorrect.

Circumstances may be imagined under which it would be just that England should bear the whole cost of military operations carried on by the Government of India, even though the finances of India might be so prosperous that they could without difficulty dispense with such assistance. It is conceivable that a war might be undertaken for the maintenance or defence of purely English interests, real or imaginary does not matter, and that India might be called upon by England to co-operate in such a war, although no Indian interests could be possibly served by it. In such a case the liability of England could not justly be denied.

It will be said by those who are opposed to the policy which the Govern- ment has followed, that the war in Afghanistan falls precisely within this category, and that this war has been entered upon in defence of no Indian interest whatever, but in furtherance of the so-called Imperial policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government. Persons who hold this opinion may reason- ably object to throwing any part of the cost of this war upon India; but this is not the opinion of the Government.

Indian interests
involved.

42. Her Majesty's Government, and the Government of India, and, I will make bold to say, the intelligent loyalty of the people of India itself, hold that the war in Afghanistan was undertaken for the protection of India from the menaces of foreign aggression, and for the maintenance within her borders of permanent domestic tranquillity. The Government believed that this war could not be avoided, unless we were prepared to acquiesce in the establishment on our North-West Frontier of new conditions, which would infallibly lead to a great increase of military expenditure, to intolerable financial burdens and difficulties, and to the disturbance throughout India of the very foundations of our power. Great as is the interest of England in preventing such conse- quences, the questions at issue were primarily and essentially Indian questions.

Believing that the true interests of India are indissolubly bound up with the peaceful maintenance of our own dominion, we say that this war was undertaken with the conviction that justice to India herself rendered it unavoid- able. If it be right to expend the revenues of India in maintaining the armies by which British supremacy is ordinarily secured, in giving to her internal peace and good administration, in the development of her wealth and civiliza- tion, and on the thousand other beneficial objects which we desire to promote, it is right to spend those revenues in rendering it impossible that any hostile influence should grow up on her borders, to threaten the existence of everything which the duty of England to India makes us most desirous to develop.

Necessity of
financial inde-
pendence of India.

43. I can imagine few greater misfortunes to India than the loss of her finan- cial independence, and the acceptance by England of financial responsibility for

her Indian Empire. It would signify to India the loss of control over her own affairs in every department of her administration, the possible subordination of her interests to those of a foreign country, and the substitution of ignorance for knowledge in her Government. Although some rare instances may be quoted in which, when there seemed to be a conflict between English and Indian interests, it may perhaps be doubted whether India has been treated with perfect fairness, there can be no question that, on the whole, the government of India has been carried on with as honest and thorough a regard for Indian interests as could have happened if India had a separate national existence of her own. England may rightly be proud of the way in which she has treated her great dependency. These fortunate results have, however, been due not only to her justice, but also to the wisdom with which she has left to India a separate financial responsibility. England has felt that it would be no kindness to take upon herself burdens which India now bears, to guarantee Indian debts, pay for Indian wars, and relieve Indian famines. England has also felt that it was wise in her own true interest, to refuse to take into her own hands the control of the £67,000,000 which now constitute the revenue of India. England does not choose that there should be grounds for even a suspicion in regard to the purity of her motives. I say this in the belief that India has before her a future of increasing wealth and prosperity; but if this anticipation should not be verified, and her future should be one of financial embarrassment, the loss of her financial independence would bring with it other misfortunes. I trust that the people of England may never find cause for believing that the maintenance of their Indian Empire means the imposition of heavy burdens on themselves.

44. If, my Lord, India is ever to have a separate national existence, she must have self-respect and self-reliance, and I am sure that Indian patriots, who, with perfect loyalty to British rule, may nevertheless have, as they may rightly have, visions and aspirations of a distant future of another kind, ought to be the first to declare that their magnificent country shall bear its own burdens. India expects justice from England, but does not ask for charity. She feels that, with her ample and splendid resources, her two hundred millions of people, her revenue, which is surpassed by that of two only of the greatest European nations, she is a source of strength, not of weakness, to the British Empire. Whether we look to the extent of her territory, or to the numbers and character of her population, her military strength and capabilities, her public revenue and credit, India is one of the great powers of the world, ready at all times to stand side by side with England, and to fulfil every obligation which she owes to the common interest. If England be wise, she will not suffer either her own people, or her friends, and still less will she suffer her enemies, to be ignorant of the fact that her Indian Empire possesses almost inexhaustible resources. I repudiate, as unworthy of India and of England, the notion that India requires help to protect herself against the hostility of an Afghan Chieftain, encouraged though he may have been by a great power beyond. Nor does the fact that English as well as Indian interests are at stake, afford any reason for asking England to help us with her money. Everything which conduces to the safety and prosperity and progress of India, is a matter of concern to England; but there is no more reason that England should help us to pay for a local war, necessary for the protection of the interests of India, than that she should help us in the relief of our famines, or in meeting the ordinary charges of our administration.

45. Holding, my Lord, these views, it was, I confess, with some regret that I saw India, a year ago, accepting from England even the small amount of assistance which was given to us in the shape of a loan of £2,000,000, to be repaid without interest in seven years. But the circumstances of the time were peculiar. India had been suffering from a succession of famines and other unavoidable misfortunes, which had thrown enormous burdens on her finances, and there was a strong feeling in England, shared by men of all classes and parties, that, when the new calamity of war was added to the calamities which had gone before, England should help India in her difficulties. Although the course prompted by this generous feeling may not have been

Resources of India

Loan from England to India.

Afghan War.

politically wise, its motives were so honourable to the people of England that I cannot cavil at it.

Cost to be borne
by India.

46. But, whatever may be thought of the action taken in the past, when we were in a position of temporary embarrassment, no reasons exist at the present time for asking England to help us to meet the charges of the war. The figures which I have stated to the Council show that we have in our possession ample means of defraying all expenditure which it is likely we shall have to incur. We have obtained these means not only without the imposition of fresh burdens on the people, but at a time when we are reducing their burdens by £900,000 a year, when we are relieving important industries, and freeing from taxation a vast number of persons, who, if not actually, are still relatively poor. To say that when we are reducing the pressure of taxation, when the general condition of the people of India is one of great prosperity, when every branch of our revenue is flourishing, and when we have actually got all the money that we want, we ought nevertheless to ask England to tax herself, and relieve us from a burden which we are perfectly able to bear, does not seem to me reasonable.

Cost of war to be
met out of current
income.

47. But it will be said that, even if India must bear the cost of the Afghan war, and must pay for the frontier railways, the construction of which the war has made inevitable, all these charges ought not to be thrown on the present generation of taxpayers; that this expenditure is undertaken for the future, rather than for the present protection of India; that posterity should pay its share of burdens imposed for its benefit; and that these charges should be met by loans, not out of the income of the year.

The question thus raised is an old one; but I think I may be allowed, without disrespect to those who think differently, to say that, in England at least, statesmen of all parties have agreed about the principles on which such questions are to be decided. Those principles are, that, especially in a country with a heavy public debt, and not able to reckon confidently on a large and consequently recurring surplus, by means of which new debt can certainly and speedily be cleared off, the wise course is undoubtedly to provide for war expenditure out of the revenue of the year, so far, but so far only, as this is possible without throwing excessive burdens on the taxpayers, and overloading (to use Sir Stafford Northcote's words) the springs of industry and commerce; and that, if the expenditure cannot thus be covered, the deficiency may properly be made good by loans or other temporary resources not included within the regular revenue of the year. This is the doctrine which I understand to be held by that great authority in matters of finance, Mr. Gladstone, and I have partly stated it in his own words, although at one time he went further in his advocacy of meeting such expenditure without recourse to loans. In India there may undoubtedly be special reasons for charging heavy war expenditure against loans, in preference to placing new burdens on the country. Not only is it difficult to make a very large and sudden addition to our existing taxation, but it may be politically unwise to do so. There would therefore be no cause for surprise if, in the case of having to meet a large expenditure on war, we were unable to contribute from current revenue as large a proportion of the cost as in England would be thought right. Nevertheless, the general principle is as true in India as in England,—that, to the utmost of our ability, we ought to provide for the expenses of every year out of the year's income, and to allow no borrowing that is not really unavoidable. As the late Prince Consort, contrasting these two plans of meeting war charges, observed:—"The former course is manly, statesmanlike, honest; the latter is convenient, cowardly, perhaps popular."

No need for in-
creased taxation.

48. For the reasons which I have given, it is improbable that the Government would, if our finances had been less prosperous, have thought it right to propose the imposition of fresh taxation to meet the expenses of the present war; but it is fortunate that no such question now arises. We can carry out the wise principles which I have quoted, not only without any fresh demand upon the resources of the country, but while we are giving relief from present taxation. I can hardly conceive that it can seriously be maintained that, having in our possession all the money that we are likely to require for the prosecution of the war, we should not spend it on that object, that we should abandon existing income, and then borrow to supply the loss.

49. The reasons for which it is right to provide for the charges of the war out of current income apply equally, and indeed with greater force, to the charges for the frontier railways. Although they will permanently benefit the country, it is plain that we could not construct them with borrowed money on the grounds on which we borrow for productive public works, and that their cost must be included among our ordinary charges. If, however, we could not have paid for them out of our ordinary revenue, it would have been quite right to borrow for their construction. I should have said this because the works are absolutely necessary, and because the political and financial evils of borrowing would be less serious than those involved by fresh taxation. I should not have defended borrowing for these railways on the ground that they will benefit posterity as well as the present generation. That is a matter about which I know nothing; but I know that posterity will have quite enough to do in bearing its own burdens.

Frontier Railway

Cost of frontier Railways similar treated.

50. I may add, with reference to these railways, that the urgent necessity for pushing on their construction is not likely to be denied even by those who have opposed the policy under which the war in Afghanistan was undertaken. The estimates show a probable expenditure on this account of £1,440,000* in the present year, and of £2,270,000 next year. The council is aware of the great and unprecedented speed with which the Railway from the Indus to the foot of the Biluchistan hills, on the line towards Kandahar, has been pushed on. The extension of the Punjab Northern Railway from Jhelam to Rawalpindi and Peshawar, and to Khushalgarh, is making rapid progress. In less than four months from the commencement of operations, trains were running for 140 miles towards Kandahar; while on the Peshawar line, where the rails have to be carried over viaducts 100 feet high and through cuttings of rocks 60 feet deep, the engines are expected to reach the banks of the Indus before the end of 1880. Independently of military considerations, which, possess, of course, at the present time, extreme importance, the completion of these lines, within the shortest practicable time, has become very urgent. As the Government of India has written on this subject, "it is obvious that immediate outlay upon the early and effectual improvement of our means of transport would be amply repaid by reduction in the excessive, and, to a great extent, wasteful expenditure which must otherwise be prolonged throughout the course of our present military operations, with the certainty of its recurrence on the first occasion of their renewal. The financial and economical interests affected by the inadequacy of our present Frontier communications are far-reaching, and the injury they sustain can scarcely be exaggerated."

Urgent necessity for improved frontier communications.

51. I have now, my Lord, to state to the Council the course which the Government proposes to take in regard to the Bill for amending the Licence Acts. It will be remembered that, when this measure last came before us, I announced, on behalf of the Government, that it was not proposed to take any further steps in the matter, until after the publication of the Financial Statement.

License Acts Amendment Bill.

The changes proposed in the existing law, when the Bill was introduced in November last, would, if they had been adopted, have had no appreciable effect upon the revenues, the amount surrendered by the exemption from taxation of the lower classes of traders being just made good by the extension of taxation to the official and professional classes. The effect of the further modifications subsequently proposed, and of the additional exemptions in favour of the poorer traders, would have been a loss on the one hand of £340,000 a year, and a gain on the other hand of £240,000, thus leaving us, as the general result, with £100,000 less revenue than we get now. The measure was essentially one which had for its object the equitable re-adjustment of taxation, and it had no financial importance.

Proposed changes

52. Before going further, I wish to ask the Council to recall the circumstances under which fresh taxation was imposed two years ago.

Original intention of increased taxation.

The object of the new taxes was described in the preamble of the License Act passed by this Council; and nearly the same words were used in the other similar Acts passed for the various provinces of the Empire. It was stated that—"in order to provide means for defraying the public expenditure from time to time incurred, and to be incurred, for the relief and prevention of famine in British India, it is necessary to effect a permanent increase of the revenue."

* Note.—The amount should apparently be £1,670,000, including £230,000 entered under Railways.

License Tax.

In making this quotation, I do not attach any exaggerated importance to the declaration that these taxes were intended to give a "permanent increase" to the revenues. It is, of course, competent to the Legislature to alter its policy in regard to this, as to any other matter. The declaration, nevertheless, has this value, that it shows the intention of the Legislature, when these measures were enacted two years ago; and since the object for which they were enacted—the protection of the country against famine—is undoubtedly as important now as it was then, and as earnestly desired by the Government, it is reasonable to say that very good cause ought to be shown, before we consent to give up taxes avowedly imposed to make a "permanent increase" to the revenues.

Total amount of
Famine Insurance
Taxation.

53. I may remind the Council what this increase really was. Taking together the measures adopted in the two years 1877 and 1878, the first new taxation was the Public Works cess, imposed on the land in Bengal: this yielded in 1878-79 £355,590. In 1878, new cesses were also imposed on the land in the North-Western Provinces, Oudh, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces, yielding about £170,000. The total amount of new taxation on the land was therefore about £525,000: the actual receipts during the last two years have however not been so large, because it was thought right to postpone for a time the collection of the cess in parts of Northern India which had suffered from drought. Similar taxation was not imposed on the land in Madras and Bombay: the principal reason for this exemption was, that the salt duties had just been increased in those presidencies, and it was held to be inexpedient to impose cesses on the land at a time when the effects of the famine were still being felt, and when the salt duties were being increased. A license-tax on traders was first imposed in 1877 in the North-Western Provinces, and, in the following year, the present License Acts were applied throughout India. They yielded at their maximum, about £820,000 net.

The total amount of what has been called the Famine Insurance taxation was therefore about £1,345,000.

Local Rates and
License Taxation
and on same
basis.

54. Considering that precisely the same reasons were given by the Government, and accepted by the Legislature, for imposing fresh taxation on the trading and on the agricultural classes, with the object of protecting the country against the financial consequences of famine, and that special stress was laid upon our desire to make the burden fall with approximate equality on each of these classes, it would be difficult, for the present Government at least, to accept any proposition for treating them differently now. In fact, it would be hardly possible to maintain the cesses on the land, if the tax on trades were abolished. It might be more possible to defend the abolition of the cesses on the land and the maintenance of the tax on trades. But it is needless to discuss such questions. Practically, so far as we are now concerned, these taxes on the agricultural and trading classes stand on the same basis.

They cannot be
abandoned.

I need hardly say, after what has been said on former occasions, that the Government can entertain no idea of giving these taxes up, and of sacrificing a million a year of revenue. Even if these taxes were as bad as some think them, a time like the present, when we have to meet the heavy obligations entailed by a serious war, would not be opportune for abandoning them; still less could such a course be approved by those who believe with me, that these taxes are far less objectionable than others that could be named, and that when the time comes for remitting taxes, it is not with these that we ought to begin.

Exemption of
small traders from
taxation.

55. At the same time, the Government desires to make all practicable improvements in the assessment and the administration of the License Acts. It was this desire which led the Government to the conclusion, explained by me to the Council, when the Bill for amending those Acts last came forward, that it was desirable to exempt from liability all persons whose annual earnings are less than Rs. 500 a year. As I formerly said, we expect by this change to exempt from taxation about a million and three quarters of the smaller traders, and to lose £340,000. The Government still adheres to these conclusions.

Extension of tax-
ation to profes-
sional and official
incomes recon-
sidered.

56. Although, when this Bill was last before the Council, I was able to state that there had been great improvement in the financial position of the Government, I did not then venture to anticipate that the improvement would, when

we came to make our estimates for next year, be so considerable as it is now shown to be. It has necessarily obliged the Government to reconsider the question of the propriety of extending taxation to the official and professional classes, and thus making good the greater part of the loss incurred by the exemption of the smaller traders from the License Acts. *Famine Finance.*

Although the main object of the Government in this part of its proposals was a more equitable adjustment of taxation, we felt that it was hardly prudent to give up £340,000 of income without any compensation, and this was one of the reasons assigned for the proposal to tax the officials and professional men. The Government has now had to consider this question:—admitting—as we must do, in the present state of the finances—that we do not absolutely require the £240,000 which the contemplated taxation of these classes would yield, is it now desirable to impose it merely for the purpose of making our system of taxation more theoretically equal, and removing to some extent the reproach, which undoubtedly is true, that certain classes do not at present bear their full share of the public burdens? Original reasons therefor.

If it had now been possible to attempt the removal of the numerous inequalities and anomalies which are inseparable from any such partial system of taxation as that which now exists, this would have been an object of high importance; but the mere extension of taxation to the official and professional classes would clearly be no complete solution of such a problem, although it might be a step towards it. On the whole, the Government thinks it better, for the present at any rate, not to press this part of its proposals. We have given up £340,000 from our existing taxes, and we do not ask that any fresh taxation shall be imposed. The amendment of the present law is desirable to carry out the exemption of the lower classes of traders, and for the removal of one or two difficulties which I shall explain later on; but with these exceptions no change is proposed in the License Acts now in force. Extension abandoned.

57. I do not intend, my Lord, on this occasion to discuss afresh the vexed question of the Famine Insurance Fund or Surplus. There has been much misunderstanding between the Government and some of its critics as to what was said and as to what, though unsaid, we are presumed to have meant when the taxes to which I have referred were first imposed in 1877 and 1878: for this misunderstanding, so far as it has been due to want of precision in the explanations of our policy, I am prepared to accept my full share of responsibility, but for my part, I do not intend to refer to it again. I shall only say further that there has been, in regard to this matter, no change in the financial policy of the Government, nor is any change proposed now. In the following remarks, I shall endeavour to avoid controversy, and to refer only to actions and to facts which, whatever their motives and origin, can hardly be misconstrued. Famine Insurance Fund or Surplus.

58. When the serious character of the financial obligations of the State in times of famine had been recognised, it became the duty of the Government of India to make sure that the public resources were adequate to meet the fresh strain imposed upon them. Upon careful inquiry we came to the conclusion that we must contemplate a liability from famine amounting, in loss of revenue and actual expenditure, to, on an average, £15,000,000 in ten years. It was clear that this liability must be included among our ordinary obligations, and that it would have been a fatal error to go on increasing the public debt to meet charges which must periodically occur. To enable us to discharge the liability thus estimated, we determined to aim constantly at a surplus of £1,500,000, supplemented by a further surplus of £500,000 to provide for extraordinary and abnormal demands, other than famine, as, for example, to name the most serious of such demands, for war. Standard Surplus how fixed.

This standard surplus of £2,000,000 was to be ascertained on a comparison of the revenues with the expenditure, exclusive of:—First, Productive Public Works, which, to whatever extent might be necessary, it was assumed might be provided for by loan; Secondly, Famine Relief, and loss of revenue due to famine; Thirdly, Protective works, *i.e.*, works not strictly fulfilling the definition of Productive Public Works, but constructed specially for the pro-

Famine Finance.
Standard Surplus.

tection of the country against famine; and Fourthly, Abnormal expenditure, other than for famine, as, for example, on war.

I do not stay to inquire afresh how far the standard thus adopted was adequate to the object in view, namely, the solvency of the State, although I believe it to have been so; I only recite facts.

Measures for securing the same.

59. In order to secure this standard average surplus of £2,000,000 the Government next resolved that it was necessary to increase the revenues of the country. The occasion for such increase was the recognition of the increased obligations of the State in times of famine, and the measures of taxation adopted were framed in the belief that there were certain classes upon which this particular burden ought primarily to fall. As I have already explained that taxation amounted originally to £1,345,000. It has now been reduced to £1,000,000.

Prevention of Debt by increased Famine Taxation.

60. Whether the public accounts show surplus, equilibrium or deficit, it is indisputable that these taxes must prevent debt by the exact amount which they yield, and that, when famine occurs, our resources for meeting it will be increased by an amount exactly equal to the amount obtained from these taxes, with compound interest upon them. This part of the subject needs no further remarks.

I have shown to-day that the precise burden borne by the country during these three years for this purpose has been or is estimated to be—

				£
in 1878-79	1,227,891
in 1879-80	1,184,000
in 1880-81	982,000
				3,393,891

The actual expenditure on famine relief has been or is estimated to be :—

				£
in 1878-79	313,420
in 1879-80	99,000
in 1880-81	5,000
				417,420

Therefore, the taxation thus levied in these three years, has enabled us to defray the expenditure on famine relief, and, moreover, to prevent debt to the amount of £2,976,471, with interest upon this sum. That this result has been achieved is self-evident, and, being independent of the surplus or deficit of the revenue as a whole, requires no further demonstration.

Standard Surplus surpassed.

61. I have perhaps already said enough upon the other part of this subject. The standard which we accepted was £2,000,000 revenue in excess of the expenditure on the ordinary account, excluding the expenditure upon famine, and other abnormal obligations. In my opinion this standard has been, in each of the three years of which I am speaking to-day, greatly surpassed.

It will doubtless be always right to scrutinise rigidly and jealously the validity of the grounds upon which any part of the public expenditure is excluded from the account upon which the surplus for comparison with our standard surplus of £2,000,000, is ascertained; but I believe that, if the accounts and estimates of the three years before us are subjected to the most severe criticism, it will be found that the actual and estimated surplus of revenue during this period does truly far exceed the £6,000,000 which, according to the standard which we have prescribed for ourselves, should be attained in three years, if the solvency of the State is to be ensured.

Illustration from ten years' accounts.

62. I find an apt illustration of our policy in this matter, ready to my hand, which I quote the more willingly, because it is, in other respects, of much interest. According to present prospects, in the ten years ending with 1880-81 we shall have spent, all told, including productive public works, war, and

famine, £36,848,000 more than our whole revenue. The items included in this expenditure, which should be excluded before applying our standard, are—

*Famine Finance.
Public Works.*

	£
Productive Public Works* - - -	35,881,000
War in Afghanistan - - -	9,250,000
Famine - - -	14,607,000
Total - - -	59,738,000

Our revenue will have exceeded the rest of our expenditure by £22,890,000 ; and, but for loss of revenue from famine, this surplus would have been £25,890,000, or, on an average, £2,589,000 a year.

Thus, during these ten years, with an average surplus of £2,589,000 to compare with our standard of £2,000,000, we expect to have defrayed the whole cost of our famines and our wars, from our revenues, excepting only the trifling deficiency of £967,000. Considering the magnitude of our expenditure on famine and war during this period and the immense increase of charge under Loss by Exchange, this retrospect appears to me highly satisfactory.

Retrospect satisfactory.

63. I wish I could say that our plans for the construction of works for the actual prevention and relief of famine had been as successful as our financial arrangements have been. And this brings me, My Lord, to another part of my subject.

Original programme of works for prevention and relief of famine.

Financial safety was by no means our sole object. We felt not only that we had financially to provide the means of relieving famine when it occurred, but that the equally important duty devolved upon us of doing everything which it was possible for a Government to do, towards preventing these most terrible of all natural calamities, and furnishing the country with the machinery by which, when they occurred, the largest practicable amount of relief could be, most speedily and effectually distributed. The new taxation and the other measures by which our finances were improved, would give us, we believed, the means of carrying out these objects with a certainty and rapidity which would otherwise have been difficult.

The investment of our surplus in Productive Public Works was, from a merely financial point of view, in no sense essential to our scheme, and it will be seen, from what has been said elsewhere, that this part of our plans was modified by the orders of the Secretary of State in a manner to which, on financial grounds, we could take no exception. But we certainly contemplated the extensive construction of works for the protection of the country against famine; and it was to these projects that public attention was mainly directed, and in them the public naturally and rightly felt a deeper interest than it could take in any merely financial arrangements.

Subsequently modified.

64. A nobler programme was, in my opinion, never put forth by any Government than that put forth by Your Excellency ; a more beneficial scheme was, in my judgment, never formed for the material improvement of any country, than the scheme which Your Excellency explained to this Council on the 27th December 1877, in your Minute of March 1878, and on other occasions. I desire to remind the Council and the public of what the plans of the Government of India were, and to explain why they have not been carried into effect as completely as we desired.

Its benefits.

65. I wish, My Lord, it were possible for me to read to the Council, and incorporate in this Financial Statement, Your Excellency's speech of the 27th December 1877. As I cannot do this, but am anxious to place the whole case in the clearest light, I must ask Your Excellency's permission to string together some passages from that speech, for I could not describe the programme of the Government in any words so good as those which Your Excellency used—

Viceroy's programme of December 1877.

"The measures now before the Council have for their principal object, the provision of that increase of the public income which experience has proved to be the first condition of any practical insurance against famine ; and, therefore, it is only proper that the Council should know how we intend to employ the resources which its adoption of these measures will place at our disposal for that purpose. * * *

* Including £11,076,000 spent on what I have called doubtful works.

"Of the countless suggestions made from time to time, and more especially during the present year, for rendering less bitterly ironical than it still seems, that famous inscription on the huge granary built at Patna, for 'the perpetual prevention of famine in these provinces,' there are only three which merit serious consideration. These are firstly, Emigration; secondly, Railways; and, thirdly, Irrigation Works. Unfortunately for India, the first of these three material factors in the practical solution of problems similar to those we are now dealing with, is inapplicable, or only very imperfectly applicable, to the actual conditions of this country; * * * though emigration unquestionably claims our fostering encouragement, I fear that, for many years to come, we must practically exclude this expedient from the list of those on which we mainly rely as a means of insuring the population of India against the calamities of periodical famine. The conclusion thus arrived at forcibly confines our immediate efforts to the most rapid development, by the cheapest methods, combined with the most appropriate and efficient application, of the only two remaining instruments for increasing the produce of the soil, facilitating its circulation, and thereby improving the general social condition, and augmenting the collective wealth, of the whole community. Those instruments are railroads and irrigation works.

"Now the incalculable value to India of her present railways has been unmistakeably demonstrated during the past year; and the Government is unquestionably bound to stimulate the extension of this class of works to the greatest extent and with the greatest rapidity, consistent with the requirements of financial prudence.

"* * * It is an unquestionable fact, that the railways, and the railways alone, were the salvation of the situation in Northern Behar during the famine of 1874; and that they have again been the salvation of the situation in Madras during the famine of the present year.

"* * * Had there been no railway within reach of these districts, the people, where they have now died by hundreds, must have assuredly succumbed by thousands.

"I am satisfied that the development of a network of subsidiary lines of railway giving the means of transport through every district of British India, has become a matter of vital necessity for the attainment of the great object now before us. Our present object is to render available within the shortest possible time a maximum length of line, especially constructed for a slow goods traffic, rather than to provide those more ample conveniences for passengers and goods, which have commonly been deemed necessary for all Indian railways hitherto constructed. * * *

"The early conclusion of such an undertaking must necessarily depend upon its financial practicability; and, for this reason, all minor considerations must be subordinated to the most rigid economy in construction, and the most severe limitation of the works to what is indispensable for the efficient exercise of their special function. But, if these conditions be duly complied with, I have confidence that, at a comparatively early period, we shall, without any strain upon our financial resources, have extended to all parts and provinces of our empire the most efficacious protection, not indeed from dearth (for that is impossible), but from those terrible effects of dearth which now generally terminate in famine.

"These, then, are the principles on which we are prepared to apply at once to the extension of our railway system, as a means of insurance against famine, an adequate proportion of the resources at our command for that purpose. * * *

"We propose to apply to the extension of irrigation works precisely the same principle and policy. * * *

"I am not now speaking of what we ought to do, or would do, to ensure this country against the worst effects of future famine, had we only the means of doing it; but of what we can do, and will do, with the means already provided for in the measures now before the Council. I do not mean to say that the construction of such an extensive system of local railroads and irrigation works as we propose to undertake, will not be the gradual task of many years. But I do mean to say that, in the manner and on the principles already explained, we are now providing for the prompt commencement, and uninterrupted continuation of this great and necessary task. We are systematising a policy, the principles of which have been repeatedly proclaimed and approved by our predecessors. We are associating with it the interests, the powers, and the duties of our local administrations. We are providing them with the means of permanently prosecuting and developing it, not without reference to our financial control, but exempt from the distressing uncertainty which has hitherto been inseparable from the practical execution of this policy, in consequence of the obligation, which has till now rested upon the Government of India, with the very limited funds at its disposal for the prosecution of public works, to choose, from year to year, between the conflicting claims upon its purse of the various and dissimilar localities of this spacious Empire."

66. My Lord, I am convinced that the policy, which Your Excellency thus proclaimed your resolution to carry out, was not only wise and humane, because it provided the only possible means by which the Government could protect the country against the future calamities of famine, but that, financially,

it was sound and prudent. Notwithstanding many mistakes which, in transactions of such magnitude, were inevitable, the policy by which, for many years past, we have been constructing railways and canals in India was, in my belief, sound and statesmanlike in its conception, and its practical results have been triumphantly successful. The wealth of the country, and the prosperity and happiness of its people, have been increased by it to an incalculable extent; the consequent gain to the country and the public finances has been immense, and is not to be measured by figures showing only the direct returns from the works which have been constructed. For my part, I see no drawbacks, no dangers, and no disadvantages, which deserve to be weighed for one moment against the benefits which have been derived. The Government of Your Excellency desired to extend and develop this policy, and hoped, by the construction of a network of cheap railways and of carefully planned works of irrigation, to do all that it was in the power of a Government to do, to prevent the frightful calamities of famine to which the country is now periodically exposed. We believed, and I believe still, that we could do this not only without financial risk, but with certain financial advantage.

*Productive
Public Works.*

67. The Local Governments shared our convictions and our expectations. Sir Ashley Eden, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was prepared to undertake, from the resources already assigned to him, a system of railway communications which, without costing the imperial revenues a shilling, would, he believed, have added millions to the wealth of his great province. Sir George Couper sent us up a scheme, carefully prepared by my friend General Fraser, for constructing a complete system, some twelve or thirteen hundred miles in length, of light railways, which, in combination with works of irrigation, would have gone far, if not to make future famines in the North-Western Provinces improbable, at least to render the relief of such famines a comparatively easy and a certainly successful operation.

And supported by
Local Govern-
ments.

68. My Lord, these visions have for the present, but I hope only for the present, faded. The plans which Your Excellency described to the Council two years ago, and which I have repeated to-day, have not yet been carried out; we have had to defer the hope of protecting the country against famine by the rapid development of railways and works of irrigation; and not only this, but we have even been compelled largely to reduce the expenditure which, for many years past, we have been incurring on works of this description.

But deferred
owing to recom-
mendations of
Committee as to
reduction of expend-
ture on Productive
Works.

My Lord, I shall not call in question the sufficiency of the reasons which led Her Majesty's Government, and a Committee of the House of Commons, to think that a very large reduction should be made in the expenditure of the Government of India on Productive Public Works; nor is it necessary that I should now repeat those reasons, because they have been fully explained in the Report of the Committee, which was published during the last Session of Parliament. Nor do I wish it to be supposed that I am insensible to the advantages which we derive from this temporary restriction of expenditure. It has enabled us to carry out in a way which might otherwise have been hardly practicable, important reforms in the Public Works Department, and to get rid of hugely overgrown establishments.

69. The limit of £2,500,000 which has been placed on our annual expenditure on productive public works has avowedly no sort of finality. "The amount to be annually expended" (I am quoting from the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons) "should mainly depend upon the financial condition of India, and should, therefore, for the present be limited to an amount of £2,500,000, as recently fixed by the Secretary of State for India in Council." Considering what our financial condition already is, and what we hope it will be in the future, I predict with confidence that the check, which has been placed upon our expenditure on useful works essential to the progress of the country and to its protection against famine, will be only temporary, and that the execution of the plans described by Your Excellency two years ago has been only temporarily deferred. But at the same time I wish to make it clear that, if the Government of India has failed for the present fully to carry out its programme for the construction of material works for protecting the country against famine, no responsibility

Present limit of
such expenditure.

*Productive
Public Works.*

for that failure rests upon us. While I say this, I must again ask the Council to remember that, however much we may regret this disappointment, it in no way affects the financial efficacy of the measures taken to enable us to discharge our obligations in times of famine without fear of insolvency. Nothing can prevent the success of those measures, which have been subjected to this modification only, that, owing to the improvement of our general financial position, we have ventured to dispense with about a quarter of the additional taxation (amounting at its maximum to £1,345,000 a year), which was their main feature.

Policy as to ex-
penditure on Pro-
ductive Public
Works defined.

70. I may here notice, with regard to the policy of the construction of productive public works, that, although the correspondence on the subject between the Government of India and the Secretary of State is not concluded, it is understood that the following points have been settled for the present:—

- i. That any money which it may be necessary to borrow for the construction of such works shall be borrowed in India in rupees, and not in London in sterling money.
- ii. That not more than £2,500,000 a year, on an average, shall be thus borrowed, in addition, however, to any capital expended upon the East Indian Railway or any other undertaking which may be hereafter acquired by the State in like manner; in addition also to any money which may be lent to the Government of India by Native States for the construction of productive public works.
- iii. That the yearly grant for the construction of productive public works shall not exceed £2,500,000 in addition to the capital expended upon the East Indian Railway or any undertaking similarly acquired hereafter, and to the expenditure upon any works the funds for the construction of which are lent to the Government of India by Native States.
- iv. That the unexpended portion of the grant of the past year may be re-granted for expenditure in the following year. The object of this provision is to prevent the waste and inconvenience incident to the lapse of unspent grants for the construction of public works.

As already explained, the grant for the construction of productive public works in 1880–81 has been regulated strictly by these principles.

Customs tariff duty
on cotton goods
not further re-
duced at present.

71. There are, My Lord, various questions connected with the customs tariff to which I must now refer.

Beginning with the import duties, there is first the duty on cotton goods, and this is a subject of which I cannot speak without some reserve, because there has been in past times, as everybody knows, no unanimity of opinion regarding it among the members of the Government. Speaking, as I now am, on behalf of the Government generally, I desire to say nothing to which any of my colleagues might take exception, and, although it will not be possible for me altogether to avoid the expression of my own opinions on questions of past and future policy, I hope it will be understood that I shall, in giving such opinions, be stating only what I myself think.

The Government does not at present propose to make any alteration in the duties actually levied on cotton goods. There are, however, obvious and serious defects in the existing system, and no one can say that it can long be maintained.

No longer pro-
ductive but admit-
tedly anomalous.

72. The measures taken during the last two years, whatever other results may have followed, have at least effected the particular object for which they were declared necessary. They have, for the present, removed all grounds for the complaint, that we were levying protective duties in favour of the Indian mills in their competition with English manufacturers. Some classes of English goods may be unduly favoured in comparison with other classes of English goods; but no protection remains for the special benefit of goods produced in India.

When, last year, Your Excellency decided that it was impossible to defend the maintenance of the duty on certain classes of cotton goods, because it had a distinctly protective character, it was thought right to make a considerable sacrifice of revenue for its immediate removal. Whether the course adopted was right, as I then thought and think still, or whether it was wrong, is a question which I will not now discuss, but the Government feels that it

cannot at the present moment go further, or submit to loss of revenue beyond that which the measures of the last two years have rendered unavoidable.

Cotton Duties.

73. I must say something of the effect which those measures have actually produced. Mr. Hope's Commission stated in its report last year that the remission of duty on all goods made of thirties and under "would probably soon effect a complete revolution in the piece goods trade," and it quoted, in support of its own conclusions, a report by Mr. Pritchard, the Commissioner of Customs in Bombay, who, with reference to this remission, wrote as follows :—

Effect of abolition of duty on coarser cotton goods.

"It will operate to create a new class of shirtings made of yarns 28 by 29 or 30, instead of the present standard quality of 32 by 36. This will pass free of duty, and, if it finds favour in the market, will take the place to a large extent either of the long cloths or of the shirtings now used, or of both."

The Commission also quoted the following opinion of a large mercantile firm :—

"There can be no doubt that a trade in cloth made of yarn just within the limit of exemption of duty would be fostered, and which might gradually become of considerable importance. Such cloth would probably be appreciated by consumers for its intrinsic value, as well as for its comparative cheapness, owing to there being no duty upon it ; and, if this should be the case, it might do away with the importation of cloth made of yarns varying from 32s upwards."

74. I quote these passages, because the actual results have closely corresponded with the anticipations thus formed by the Commission and adopted by the Government. The chief difference has been that those results have followed more rapidly than either the Commission or the Government expected.

Anticipated.

The immediate consequence of the exemption from duty of goods containing no yarn of a higher number than 30s, was the rapid development of the manufacture and import of a new class of goods made of 30s and lower counts. In consequence of their superior cheapness these duty-free goods have rapidly become popular ; and the experiment having thus proved successful, the tendency is now to make of the coarser yarns all cloth for which they can be used, and to substitute the coarser for the finer fabrics formerly made of yarns ranging from 30s to 40s. This process has already reached such a point, that last month the duty-free shirtings and longcloths constituted more than 74 per cent. of those kinds of imported goods, and the dutiable qualities of some other classes of goods have almost disappeared from the market. We estimated last year that we might lose in the first year revenue to the amount of £150,000, and in subsequent years more. It is now probable that the loss in the first year, now about to close, will be nearly £230,000, and for the coming year it is estimated at £20,000 more.

75. Now, clearly, the present state of things is not satisfactory. We are holding out to English manufacturers a strong inducement to supplant finer by coarser classes of goods, and it has been forcibly represented that these and other anomalies ought not to be left uncorrected. I may refer in particular to a letter addressed to us by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber points out that the declaration made last year by the Government, that "it is not reasonable that certain goods should be admitted free, while large quantities of goods of almost precisely the same character in every thing but name remain liable to duty," is still true, with this difference, that the hardship is now "not caused by the competition between Lancashire and our local mills, but by competition amongst Lancashire manufacturers themselves, to secure the full benefit of the Government of India's last act. They do not, however, carry less weight on that account." The letter of the Chamber has been seen by the Council ; I need not repeat the forcible illustrations which it contains of the anomalies which now exist, but I fully admit the accuracy of its statements.

But anomalous and objectionable.

The Chamber says that "to all appearance, these duties are dying a natural death, and as that process involves serious anomalies and hardships, it is a question whether the present is not a fitting moment to abolish them *in toto*. To the Committee there does not appear any other course open, consistent with the declarations of Government, to which they have referred."

Cotton Duties.

Present anomalies
cannot be imme-
diately remedied.

76. If I could now put aside financial considerations, I should say that this conclusion of the Chamber is perfectly right. I may add that the alternative course which it has suggested as possible, namely, the recall of last year's exemptions, and the re-imposition of a uniform duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all imported cotton goods, would not only be, in my opinion, objectionable in itself, but seems impracticable, because it would be opposed to the policy laid down for our guidance by Parliament, and by Her Majesty's Government. That policy was declared on the 4th April 1879, by the House of Commons, in the following Resolution :—

“ That the Indian import duty on cotton goods, being unjust alike to the Indian consumer and the English producer, ought to be abolished, and this House accepts the recent reduction in these duties as a step towards their total abolition, to which Her Majesty's Government are pledged.”

I need not pursue this subject further. It is impossible to deny that the present state of things is anomalous and objectionable. The Government will give to this question in the future that constant attention which its importance demands, but it cannot, at the present moment, make the large sacrifice of revenue which its complete solution would involve, and, as a provisional arrangement, meanwhile, it does not seem possible to draw any line better than that drawn last year. The abolition of the remaining duties on cotton goods would cost us £615,000, in addition to the £250,000 which we have given up already.

I may remind the Council that the measures of last year were not hastily taken, and that they were in precise accordance with the specific recommendations of the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester, of Bengal, and of Bombay. I may add that, although I cannot doubt that the objections to which I have referred must have been felt as strongly in Lancashire as anywhere else, the Government has not received from the English manufacturers any complaints regarding them.

Personal explana-
tion.

77. Although, my Lord, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of the course that has been followed in regard to the removal of the duty on cotton goods, I must ask Your Excellency's permission to say a few words on what is, in some respects, a personal matter. We are constantly told that these measures have been adopted in disregard of the interests of the people of India, and in obedience to the selfish demands of the Manchester manufacturers. If, my Lord, we had, indeed, manipulated, in the interests of England or of any political party in England, the taxes paid by the people of India, our conduct would have been not only shameful and odious, but absolutely criminal, and I, as Your Excellency's chief constitutional adviser in the financial measures of the last two years, must have borne my share of the responsibility. But for myself, who have taken part in these measures, I wish to say that I hardly remember the time when I did not argue, in the interests of India, for the removal of these and all other restrictions on her commerce. I advocated the abolition of these duties before, to the best of my belief, Manchester had herself discovered that she was injured by them, and long before Lord Salisbury had proved in his despatches, in a manner which seems to me unanswerable, the serious injury which they were inflicting upon this country. As I said in my first Financial Statement three years ago, I would not have accepted my present office, if I had not hoped that I should have an opportunity of co-operating with Your Excellency in carrying out what, I may say without exaggeration, have been the convictions of a life-time. I have had that opportunity. The cotton duties are, in my opinion, virtually dead.

Approaching pro-
bable abolition of
all customs duties
in India.

78. Before leaving this subject, I think it right once more to point out that we ought not to shut our eyes to the consequences which, as it seems to me, must inevitably follow from the loss of the cotton duties. Whether those consequences ought, as I believe, to be welcomed as fraught with a great development of wealth and prosperity to India, or ought, as others think, to be looked on as disastrous, we cannot wisely shut our eyes to the fact that the abolition of the duty on cotton goods will involve in all probability the loss of a great

part of our revenue from sea customs. In the Financial Statements for 1877-78 and 1878-79 this was clearly pointed out. In the former of these, I said that I looked forward with confidence to the almost total abolition of customs duties in India, and I used these words:—"I do not know how long a period may elapse before such a consummation is reached, but, whether we see it or not, the time is not hopelessly distant, when the ports of India will be thrown open freely to the commerce of the world."

My Lord, the fulfilment of this vision seems to me now not far off. It was shown in the Financial Statement for 1878-79 that, putting aside the duties levied on salt and alcoholic liquors, which stand on special grounds, and on which internal excise duties corresponding with the customs duties are imposed, there would remain, apart from the cotton duties, a very small amount of import duties. Taking the estimates for the coming year, the net sum which we expect to receive from the sea customs duties, exclusive of salt, alcoholic liquors, and arms, is £1,115,000. The cotton duties will yield say £615,000, and, if I am right in believing that they must ultimately be altogether given up, our whole import duties would then yield only about £500,000. The truth is that cotton goods are the sole article of foreign production, which the people of India now largely consume, and there is no present possibility of a large customs revenue from anything else. Will it be possible, when cotton goods have been freed from duty, still to tax woollen goods and many other articles? And can it be believed that we should long maintain our customs establishments for the sake of obtaining the insignificant revenue that would remain?

79. I know only one suggestion which seems to deserve discussion, for saving a considerable portion of our customs revenue. I do not remember by whom it was first made, but I have heard of it for a good many years past. I believe that it really had its origin in a plan which at one time Mr. Gladstone thought of for England. My hon'ble friend, Mr. Hope, has lately given it his attention.

Substitution of registration fees for customs duties.

Starting with the assumption that our customs tariff on its present footing cannot be maintained, this suggestion is that, instead of customs duties properly so called, we should, with certain exceptions, levy on all articles imported into India, and possibly, also, on those exported, a registration fee at a very low rate. In this way, it is urged, we might obtain a considerable revenue in an unobjectionable way. I give no opinion of my own, much less do I give any opinion on behalf of the Government, in favour of this scheme, and all I say of it is that it deserves to be considered.

80. Another solution of these difficulties has lately been suggested, but it seems to me unsound in theory, and impossible in practice. It is that a sort of treaty of commerce should be entered into between England and India, on the principle that India will admit all English merchandise free, on condition that England gives up the duties which she now levies on Indian tea and coffee; if, it is added, England, in order to maintain her duty on China tea, prefers to continue to levy duty on tea and coffee from India, she might pay the proceeds amounting to a million a year, into the Indian Treasury.

Suggested reciprocity between England and India condemned.

Of course we should be glad to see the English or any other duties on Indian tea and coffee or on anything else removed; but, if free trade be good for India, it is good for her whether other countries maintain duties on Indian products or not, and the fact that England (for, as it seems to me, excellent reasons) taxes our tea and coffee, is no reason for our taxing her cotton manufactures, and almost everything else that we get from her. To maintain the contrary is, to maintain the old delusion of reciprocity. In regard to the suggestion that England should pay to India the million which she levies on Indian tea and coffee, this is clear, that, whoever else might profit from such an arrangement, it would not be our tea and coffee interests. They would have to pay as much as before, nor would they be reconciled to the new arrangement by the reflection, that it was almost equivalent to the imposition upon them of an export duty for the purpose of saving the English treasury from loss, and for the benefit of the general revenues of India.

Not beneficial to tea and coffee interests.

Customs Reforms.

Equally applicable to tobacco, it impracticable.

Duties on exports.

Exemption of indigo from export duty

Duty on lac.

Export duty on retained.

81. I must add that I do not know why tea and coffee have alone been mentioned, as if they were the only articles of Indian production on which England levies any duty. There is tobacco, from which England derives a revenue of between eight and nine millions; I hope and believe that Indian tobacco has before it a great future; I should be delighted to see every legitimate encouragement given to its production; but I cannot conceive how it can be admitted into England free of duty. As, however, the adoption of the proposals, to which I have alluded, would practically lead to the surrender by England of the greater part of her customs revenue, I need hardly say more on this subject.

82. Leaving the import tariff, I come now to questions connected with the duties on exports. Since 1875, the only export duties have been those on indigo, lac, and rice.

83. It is surprising that the duties on the two first of these articles should have survived so long. Nobody has ever defended them, and the only reason assigned for keeping them has been that the Government could not give up the revenue yielded by them, though this has never been great. The average amount derived annually from the export duty on indigo is £42,000. The duty is levied at a fixed rate on quantity, so that the revenue does not fluctuate with the fluctuation of prices. On the finer qualities the incidence of the duty is not much over one per cent.; on the lower qualities it may be as much as four per cent. The cultivation of indigo by natives of the country has, in Northern India, been somewhat rapidly increasing, and the duty falls much more heavily on the qualities made by them, than on the better qualities turned out by the factories managed by Europeans. Indigo from Central America competes with ours in the European markets, but not very actively; and a more serious future danger to this industry is probably to be found in the competition of chemically prepared substitutes. The danger is not the less real because no efficient substitute has yet been found. The progress of scientific discovery is now so rapid, that we might hear almost any day that this highly important Indian industry was seriously threatened, and we should then be exposed to the deserved reproach that this competition had been stimulated by the suicidal folly of our fiscal legislation. Export duties enjoy the credit of having ruined the Indian trade in saltpetre; they were taken off when it was too late to repair the mischief; the Government does not wish to run any similar risk with indigo. A notification, will, therefore, be issued to-day under the powers conferred on the Governor General in Council by the Sea Customs Act, 1878, exempting indigo from liability to export duty.

84. The same notification will abolish the equally indefensible export duty on lac. The trade in lac has been in a depressed condition, and during the last two years the average amount of revenue yielded by the duty has been only about £9,000.

85. I do not think that any one will question the propriety of these exemptions. Taking them both together, they involve a loss of about £54,000 a year.

86. The only export duty, which will now remain, is that on rice. It yielded, in 1878-79, a net revenue of £556,000. As it is an export duty, it is often assumed that its effect must be more mischievous than that of any import duty. No one can be more alive than I am to the economical objections to export duties; but this duty on rice is, in my opinion, at the present moment less open to objection than some of our other customs duties. I have before me a valuable note by Mr. O'Connor on the Indian rice trade. It is shown that more than half of our exports of rice goes to Europe. Of the remainder, the greater part is consumed in the countries near India, such as Arabia, Persia, Ceylon, the Straits, &c., or is sent to various colonies, of which Mauritius is the most important, for the supply of the cooly population. The rice exported from Bengal to Europe, "table rice," as it is called, is used as food; the rice from Burmah, a thick coarse grain, is chiefly used for distillation, or for conversion into starch.

87. There is practically, at the present time, no competition with India on the part of other countries in Asia or America in the rice trade. Great apprehensions were expressed some years ago of the competition of Saigon. Similar apprehensions have been felt in regard to Siam. As yet these apprehensions have not been justified; but I must observe that there has been this year a large increase in the export of rice from Saigon to Europe. Northern Italy produces a good deal of rice, and sends large quantities to France; other countries furnish smaller supplies. Rice cultivation, which was formerly very extensive in North Carolina, has ceased to be important, and little rice now goes from the United States to Europe. Thus, although it would not be correct to say that India has a monopoly of the trade in rice, she has something approaching to it, and so long as this remains true, it cannot be said that the export duty has a seriously injurious effect on Indian interests. At the same time, it is impossible to say how long this may continue true; the Government cannot keep too watchful an eye on the rice trade, and must be prepared, if it should become necessary, to take immediate action. While, therefore, I am not prepared to say that our export duty on rice is at the present moment especially objectionable, I feel that we cannot count upon it as a permanent source of revenue, and if we could afford the loss, I should be very glad to get rid of it. The exports of rice from India, during the last seven years, have not very greatly varied in quantity. In 1873, the year before the Bengal famine, they were 1,164,697 tons; in 1875, in consequence of the famine, they fell to 869,646 tons, and this was the lowest amount reached; in 1879 they had again risen to 1,061,861 tons, and the trade is now again increasing.

Customs Duties.

And by reason of India's practical monopoly of rice trade, not specially objectionable.

88. Considering that, between 1874 and 1878, the country was passing, with hardly any intermission, through a period of drought and famine, and that vast quantities of rice were absorbed in feeding the famine-stricken population, it is satisfactory to find that exports to other countries should have shown little diminution, and that the enormous increase in prices should not have interfered materially with the foreign demand. In 1878-79, although prices still ruled high and an active demand continued for internal consumption, the exports nearly attained the level of the trade previous to the famine period. This year the exports will, it is thought, exceed those of last year, and, if harvests continue good, next year will probably be a time of great activity in the rice trade.

Prospects of rice trade.

89. In leaving this part of my subject, I will only add, that I am as sure as ever that there is no country in the world in which the fullest application of the principles of free trade is more desirable than it is in India. India (to repeat what was said in the Financial Statement for 1878-79) "is a country which, from its poverty, the primitive and monotonous condition of its industrial life, and the peculiar character of its political condition, seems to require from its Government, before all things, the most economical treatment of its resources, and, therefore, the greatest possible freedom in its foreign exchanges." I confidently believe that the time is not far off, when the truth of this will be generally recognised.

Fullest application of principles of free trade desirable in India.

90. The re-adjustment of the salt duties, to which I must next refer, has proved a very successful measure. It will be in the recollection of the Council that, at the end of 1877, a step was taken towards equalizing the rate throughout India, by raising it, in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, from 1 Rupee 13 annas to 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund, and by lowering it, in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, from 3 Rupees 4 annas to 3 Rupees, and, in the Upper Provinces, from 3 Rupees to 2 Rupees 12 annas per maund. In the following August, a further reduction was made of 2 annas in Lower Bengal, and of 4 annas in the Upper Provinces. By these means a uniform rate of 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund has been established throughout India, except in Bengal, where the duty is 6 annas higher, and in Burma and part of the Punjab trans-Indus, where it is nominal.

Measures for equalisation of salt duties successful.

On the 1st October 1878, the salt sources which the British Government had, under recently negotiated agreements, obtained on lease from the Native States in Rajputana, were taken over, and at these, as well as at the Sambhar Lake already in our possession, the duty of 2 Rupees 8 annas per maund was then levied on all salt, excepting that exempted under the agreements just mentioned, the details of which were fully described in the Financial State-

Equalisation of
Salt Duties.

ment of last year. Considering that this result has been obtained not only without any general increase in the rate of duty on salt, but with a large reduction of that rate throughout by far the greater part of India, and simultaneously with a reduction of price to the vast majority of the population, I think we may congratulate ourselves on the success of our policy.

It was formerly shown that, by the re-adjustment of the rates of duty, we hoped to lower the price of salt to 130,000,000 of people, while only 47,000,000 were affected adversely. Rajputana and Central India are now liable to the salt tax, but a portion of the population still obtains its salt free of duty, and another portion pays only half the usual rate. Throughout the greater part of these States the price of salt, independent of the duty, has been greatly diminished, not only directly, but by the extension of railways. The people have further been relieved by the abolition of local transit duties, and by the abolition of the British duty on sugar taken across the now defunct Inland Customs Line, which yielded £150,000 a year. The Government is now endeavouring to redeem all remaining transit duties on salt in Rajputana and Central India, so that the transport of salt may everywhere be free from restriction.

Inland customs line
finally abolished.

91. The Inland Customs Line, on the enormities of which I have so often dilated, finally disappeared at the commencement of the present official year. When I think of this abominable barrier, which was likened to the Great Wall of China, stretching 2,000 miles across the whole of India, so that, if it had been put down in Europe, would have reached from London to Constantinople, with the countless evils that it entailed, I find it difficult not to begin again my old expressions of indignation. However, it is now dead, and I congratulate Your Excellency and the country on the fact. By its disappearance we have saved about £100,000 a year.

Results of policy
as regards con-
sumption of salt
and salt revenue
and expenditure.

92. I will state to the Council the principal facts in my possession, illustrating the effect produced by our measures on the consumption of salt and on the public revenues.

We have complete returns for the first ten months of the present year. Comparing these with the returns for the same period in 1877-78, the last year in which the old rates of duty were in force, there has been an increase of consumption, throughout India, amounting to about 2,400,000 maunds; the total consumption in the former period was 20,373,000, and in the latter period 22,776,000 maunds. More than 537,000 maunds of this increase is the increase in Lower Bengal, and nearly 1,900,000 maunds in Northern India. About a third part of the latter is attributed to the consumption in the Native States of Rajputana and Central India. In Madras and Bombay there was a small falling off in the consumption, which fell from 8,850,000 to about 8,654,000 maunds, or by 196,000 maunds. The reduction in Madras is believed to be more apparent than real, because a large number of the population consume untaxed salt. The law relating to salt in the Madras Presidency is as yet very leniently enforced, or is, perhaps, not sufficiently stringent.

In making the above comparison, I have taken the most unfavourable figures for my own argument that I could find; 1877-78 was the great famine year, but nevertheless for some reason, which I have failed to understand, the amount of salt taxed in Madras in that year was, as I noticed in the last Financial Statement, extraordinarily large.

If we compare the returns for the first ten months of the present year with those of 1876-77 (and, if I went further back, my case would be still stronger), we find that, taking the whole of India, there has been an increase in the total consumption of 2,718,000 maunds, or from 20,058,000 to more than 22,776,000 maunds; and this increase has been spread over the whole country. In Lower Bengal the consumption has risen from 6,822,000 to 7,682,000 maunds, and notwithstanding the reduction of duty, the revenue has only fallen off by £30,000, or from £2,220,000 to £2,190,000.

In Northern India the consumption has risen from 3,775,000 to 5,442,000 maunds, and, in spite of the reduction of duty, the revenue has increased from £1,142,000 to £1,348,000. Even in Madras and Bombay, where the duty was

increased, and where the revenue has risen from £1,662,000 to £2,155,000, the consumption has increased from 8,641,000 to 8,654,000 maunds.

The figures I have just quoted refer to revenue derived from the duty on salt. There are, besides this, large receipts from other heads, such as the sale price of Government salt.

In 1877-78 the gross salt revenue of the whole year was under 6½ millions sterling; in 1878-79 it had risen to 7 millions; the Regular Estimates for the current year exceed 7½ millions, while, for next year, our estimate of salt revenue is 7½ millions. Thus the improvement is expected to be more than one million in four years.

While the revenue has thus increased, the salt expenditure has diminished from £508,000 in 1875-76 to £404,000 in 1878-79, and is estimated at £368,000 in 1880-81. Against this saving in expenditure, however, must be put £253,000 on account of the annual compensations paid to the Native States and to Portuguese India; this, with £70,000 for the Sambhar Lake, is charged in the public accounts under *Allowances and Assignments*.

93. I think, my Lord, I may now say confidently that the wisdom of the policy followed in regard to the equalization of the salt duties has been proved by experience. To what extent the increased consumption and lower price of salt throughout the greater part of India have been the consequence of the reduction of the duty, and to what extent they have been attributable to the extension of railways, to the general improvement of communications, the opening out of new markets, and the increase of the population, it is not possible to say; these various influences have, doubtless, all contributed to the result; but it was with the knowledge, and indeed with the certainty, that all the conditions with which we had to deal were highly favourable to the success of our policy, that we were induced to adopt it.

Wisdom of policy vindicated by experience.

94. I must add that we received a few weeks ago a representation from the President of the Salt Chamber of Commerce, Cheshire and Worcestershire, to the effect that one of the results of our late measures has been an increase of the former difference between the rates of duty on Liverpool salt and that produced in Northern India, which places the former at a greater disadvantage than heretofore, and has driven it back from markets in Behar formerly supplied by it. Although, as I have already shown, there has lately been a great increase in the consumption of Liverpool salt in Bengal, careful inquiry is now being made into this subject. But, whatever may be the result of that inquiry, I may say at once that, although the Government cannot, at the present moment, make any further reduction in the Salt Duty in Bengal, it fully recognises the necessity of completing, as soon as possible, the actual equalization of the duty throughout India. It is an essential part of our policy to do so, and I feel sure that the measures which have still to be taken will prove as satisfactory to the country, and as beneficial to the revenue, as those of which I have been describing the result.

Necessity for further extension of policy recognised.

95. When, my Lord, the Financial Statement for 1879-80 was published a year ago, we were far from foreseeing the extraordinary improvement which was about to take place in our financial position, and which we now perceive had even then commenced. The loss caused by the great disturbance in the relative value of gold and silver had reached alarming proportions, and there was nothing to re-assure us regarding the future. We were engaged in war; the surplus which we considered necessary to protect the country against the financial consequences of famine had disappeared; our estimates, apart from the war, showed a surplus of only £605,000. We decided, however (to quote the words of the last Financial Statement), that it was "wise to abstain from imposing any fresh burdens on the country, and to accept the temporary loss of the surplus by which it was hoped that an insurance against famine had been provided."

Improvement in financial position not foreseen.

96. I see nothing to be ashamed of in our want of foresight. I do not see how we were to know that there would be a great improvement in the exchange, which would last through nearly the whole year, and which, in spite of an increase in our remittances, would better our position by £760,000; that our

Explanation.

*Improvement in
Financial
Position.*

opium estimate, which we had taken at a higher amount than, with one exception, it had ever been taken at before, would prove, taking both sides of the Account, to be too low by £1,900,000; that in consequence of the most favourable season which India has known for many years, the increased prosperity of the people, and other causes, every great branch of the public income would show an increase; that we should get £450,000 more from Land Revenue, £335,000 more from salt, and so on.

Beneficial reduction of expenditure.

97. Although, as I need hardly say, it was not a pleasant task, which I had last year to perform, in laying before the Government and the public so unpromising a budget, there are now good reasons for not expressing much regret that we were not gifted with greater powers of foresight. For the result was to make us undertake a most searching examination into every branch of the public expenditure, with the firm resolution that everything superfluous should be ruthlessly sacrificed. The reductions which we have made already, and which we hope still to make, are not the least satisfactory part of the year's history.

The Local Governments throughout India loyally responded to our invitation to co-operate in the task which we had undertaken. We left it entirely to their discretion to decide where they could reduce their expenditure, and exercised no kind of interference in their proceedings. The result of our communications with them was, that, with their full consent in every case, the assignments made to them from the Imperial treasury in the present year have been reduced by £335,000, and a similar reduction will be made in the coming year.

*Especially on
Public works.*

98. Besides less important savings, which I need not now detail, there has been in the present year a reduction in the Public Works expenditure of £661,000. I hope that £400,000 to £500,000 a year will eventually be permanently saved by getting rid of superfluous establishments. Some explanation is necessary on this subject.

*Reduction of
Public works
establishments
necessary.*

99. Before any orders to reduce the expenditure on Productive Public Works had been issued by the Secretary of State, or the question of reducing the Ordinary Public Works expenditure had been taken up afresh by the Government of India, it was an acknowledged fact that the strength of our Public Works establishments was enormously in excess of what was necessary. When the Secretary of State ordered, subject to certain conditions, the reduction of our annual expenditure on Productive Public Works to the sum of £2,500,000, this excess became, of course, a still more serious evil. I will not now go into the question of the causes which led to the growth of these needlessly large establishments. It is easy to be wise after the event; they were, for the most part, the result of errors of system which were only discovered to be errors by experience. However, this may have been, we found ourselves, at the beginning of the present financial year, in this position, that our Public Works establishments were declared by the highest authorities in the Public Works Department to be costing not less than £500,000 a year more than was necessary for the expenditure on Ordinary and on Productive Works which had to be carried on. We therefore resolved that these superfluous establishments must be at once reduced.

*and carried out
efficiently.*

100. The Local Governments and the authorities in the Public Works Department deserve the thanks of the Government of India for the efficient manner in which the serious task of making this great reduction has been performed. I think it will be admitted that the measures of the Government were carried out with the greatest possible consideration to individuals, and that the engineers, with whose services we have unwillingly been compelled to dispense, have been treated liberally. The reductions actually made will save us £250,000 a year. In the present year there will, of course, be a large set-off on account of pensions and gratuities; it amounts, indeed, to about £280,000; but the greater part of the cost of reduction will be incurred once for all in the shape of gratuities.

Although these great changes in the constitution of the Public Works Department could not be made without some temporary inconvenience, there can be no doubt, I hope, that they will lead to a permanent increase

of efficiency. Our difficulties, however, are not over; our Public Works establishments are still larger than they ought to be, and the constant supply of young engineers that pours in from Cooper's Hill will, if it be not speedily stopped, prove a cause of renewed embarrassment, and of useless and serious expense.

Reduction of Expenditure, 1879-80

101. Before leaving this subject, there is one important point that I must notice. It will be plain from what I have said, or have still to say to-day, that the Government of India looks with regret on the reduction of expenditure on Productive Public Works, and that it hopes to see that expenditure again increased hereafter. How, it may be asked, holding these opinions and expectations, can you justify this reduction of Public Works establishments? If, hereafter, your expenditure is increased as you hope it will be, you will have deprived yourself of the machinery necessary for the execution of your works.

No difficulty in increasing expenditure on Productive Public Works in future.

102. If, my Lord, this were true, I should, for my own part, have thought our proceedings very foolish; but I am satisfied that we need be under no apprehensions of the kind. I think that I cannot better explain the views of the Government on this subject, than by reading to the Council the following extract from a despatch addressed by the Government of India to the Secretary of State in September last:—

The Public Works Department being re-organized to meet this difficulty

“Our present difficulties have not disturbed our belief in the great importance of the most rapid possible development of the means of communication and other material improvements in India. * * * * *

With these convictions, we should not have acquiesced, without remonstrance, in the absolute permanent restriction to £2,500,000 a year, of our expenditure on the construction of Productive Public Works, if we had understood this to be Your Lordship's intention. * * * Accordingly, we have been careful so to frame our proposals for the re-organisation of our establishments, that we shall have no difficulty in hereafter increasing our expenditure on Productive Public Works to any extent which is likely to be considered expedient. We could not have undertaken any reductions not compatible with this condition.

The ordinary difficulty of organising an efficient and economical service has been aggravated, in the case of the Public Works Department, by the fluctuations of public policy which have manifested themselves in large variations of the grants made for expenditure in this Department. We need not now inquire into the causes of these fluctuations, and we do not wish to criticise the policy either of the school which advocates a lavish public expenditure on such works, or of that which regards with distrust any such expenditure which can be avoided. It only concerns us now to recognise the fact that we have no reason for expecting, hereafter, more immunity from such alternations of conflicting influences than we have enjoyed heretofore. Our duty, therefore, is to anticipate their recurrence, and frame our measures accordingly.

Hitherto, our establishments have been organised on a plan which demands, for successful and economical results, a steady and unbroken prosecution of works; engineers having been brought into the service on engagements which have been understood as ensuring to them continuous employment. But such employment is incompatible with the conditions on which we can provide funds for the construction of Productive Public Works; and, clearly, we must now so organise our establishments that their strength may be, at any time, readily reduced or increased. In other words, the cause of our present difficulties being that we have, on the whole, been burdened with establishments in excess of what, with the funds at our disposal, we could constantly and profitably employ, we must, for the future, take care to engage no establishments in excess of the greatest strength for which we can confidently expect to provide constant and full employment, whatever policy as to the material improvement of the country may be in the ascendant.

We have resolved therefore, to organise our permanent establishment, rather upon the model of the staff of a great contractor, supplementing it, as occasion requires, by temporary establishments engaged for particular works only, with no claim to absentee allowances, pensions, employment upon any other work, or any of the rights and privileges of a regular establishment. Moreover, we desire to look, more and more, to the employment, upon considerable undertakings, of contractors with large capital, and to the development of the existing system of petty contracts for petty works. In this way we expect to avoid a recurrence of the inconvenience from which we are now suffering.

We anticipate no difficulty in carrying out the policy thus designed; on the contrary, we believe that, while guarding us against a return of our present embarrassment, this policy will, by encouraging persons to adopt the profession of Civil Engineer, and otherwise, promote the general interests, and be favourable to the extended employment of Natives of India in this department of our service, an object which we have much at heart.”

103. Before leaving the subject of reduction of expenditure, I have still to mention what I hope may prove hereafter to have been the most important

Proposals of Army Commission for reduction of expenditure.

*Reduction of
Expenditure.*

measure of the year. I refer to the appointment of the Special Commission, presided over by Sir Ashley Eden, to inquire into the organisation and expenditure of the army in India. The Report of the Commission is now under the consideration of the Government, and I should be going altogether beyond my own proper business, if I were to attempt in any way to discuss the recommendations which the Commission has made, or to give any opinion as to the extent to which those recommendations may be carried out. But there are some facts to which I may refer without impropriety, and which seem to me highly encouraging. This Commission, presided over by one of the most eminent of Indian statesmen, and including among its members some of our greatest Indian soldiers, has arrived at unanimous conclusions on almost every one of the questions submitted to it. These high authorities believe that the adoption of their proposals would greatly increase the efficiency of the army in peace and war; that it would add to the military strength of the British portion of our forces; that the strength and efficiency of the Native army, as a fighting body, and the popularity of the service, would be increased; that the medical service would be placed in harmony with the true principles of army organisation; that in the departments of the army greater uniformity and power of administration would be obtained; that the great lines of military communication would be improved and made permanently secure; that, under a more scientific system, the troops could be more rapidly and easily mobilised; and that (to quote the words of the Commission) "with improved transport arrangements, with a more thorough knowledge of the vast resources of the country in supply and transport, and with a decentralized military system, the Government of India will be able, provided the details are thoroughly worked out beforehand, to place in the field a force which will be a powerful weapon of offence or defence, while the troops remaining in garrison will be ample to supply a reserve if needed, and to maintain the peace of the country undisturbed." The Commission believes that these great results, by which the efficiency of the army would be immensely increased, could be attained, not only without additional expense, but with a positive saving to the State of 1,250,000*l.* a year.

I have not been able to take credit for any part of such savings in the coming year; but I sincerely trust that this most important matter will not be allowed to sleep, and that no feeling that the improvement in our finances has rendered military economy less urgently necessary, will be permitted to cause delay in settling the questions which have been raised. As the Commission, quoting the principles strongly enunciated by Lord Mayo, and reiterated by his successors, has observed, "the people of India ought not to be called upon to support or pay for one unnecessary soldier."

Financial prospects
rough favourable
all somewhat
uncertain.

104. The warning which I have now given, that we ought not to be induced by the improved state of our finances to relax our efforts in the direction of economy, is not true in regard to military expenditure alone. It would be a dangerous mistake to conclude that our prospects are not still uncertain.

In the Financial Statement for last year prominent attention was called to the consequences entailed upon India by the violent disturbance of the long standing equilibrium between gold and silver. It was then stated that the Government of India had submitted its views on this subject to the Secretary of State, and, as the Council is aware, Her Majesty's Government did not think it possible to accept our recommendations.

Although the exchange has, during the present year, been less unfavourable to India than we anticipated, it would be a great error to suppose that our anxiety on this account has been removed or even seriously diminished. The gravity of the subject can hardly be better illustrated than by this fact, that, even in the present year, which has been comparatively favourable, the charge for Loss by Exchange amounts to £3,188,000, while for the coming year it is estimated at £3,411,000. Ten years ago, in 1869-70, the charge was £142,555. Although the relations between the two metals have, of late, been comparatively steady, yet, as this stability does not rest upon any known foundation, it does not afford ground for confidence in the future relations of the two metals, which, under the existing conditions, cannot be predicted for a single month.

Obviously we cannot depend on the maintenance of our Opium revenue at its present unprecedentedly high amount. Other causes for a prudent anxiety are not wanting. It is, for example, plainly impossible to say what may be the actual cost, and the future obligations entailed upon us by the war in Afghanistan; although, so far as can now be foreseen, ample provision on this account seems to have been made. Altogether, while our financial prospects look, on the whole, far brighter than they were a year ago, we cannot say that there are not many causes for anxiety remaining. The prudent view to take is this, that we ought to take advantage of the breathing time that has now been obtained, and set our house in order.

105. I think, my Lord, that there is only one remaining subject to which I need refer. Attempts have recently been made in England to compare the financial condition of India as it is now with what it was in past periods, and it seems to have been assumed by many persons that, because difficulties are found in making such comparison without more information than is given in the published abstracts of our accounts, therefore there is something wrong in the structure of our accounts themselves. The fact is that, for many years past, we have been steadily striving to make such improvements in our published abstracts as were called for by changes in financial circumstances, and in order to give fuller information. In this view, heads of accounts which used to be lumped up together have been separated, while others have been consolidated, and, instead of entries showing merely the net result of the differences between revenue and expenditure, the actual revenue and expenditure have been entered on each side of the account respectively.

106. For example, in Mr. Wilson's Budget Statement in 1860, there were only six revenue heads. The first was "Land Revenue, Sayer and Abkaree," and it included Land, Forest, and Excise revenue, all lumped together; then came, separately, "Customs," "Salt," and "Opium"; then "Miscellaneous," a large item of over 4 millions; and lastly, "Receipts from Railway Companies," which at that time were only £330,000. On the expenditure side the charges on account of collecting the revenue on account of Land, Forest, Excise, Customs, Salt, Opium, Post Office, and Stamps, together with Political Pensions, Allowances, Assignments, and Charitable Grants, were all included under one head; the remaining heads were "Interest on Debt in India;" "Military Charges;" "Marine;" "Civil Charges," which included all Political, Judicial, and Police Establishments, and all Public Works, except Military and Marine; "Miscellaneous;" and "Guaranteed Interest on Railway Capital." The charges incurred in England were not classified at all. In the next year, 1861, the heads of Revenue and Expenditure were re-arranged and somewhat increased in number. The net charges in England were also shown separately.

From that time the abstract has been, from year to year, improved in the manner I have indicated. In the last few years these changes have been considerable, involving the entry of large amounts on each side of the Account, which were previously shown net on one side only. For instance, until quite recently, the excess of the Guaranteed Interest on Railway Capital over the net earnings of the Railways was shown in one entry on the expenditure side, instead of the net earnings being entered on the revenue side and the full Guaranteed Interest on the expenditure side; this obvious improvement has caused an addition to each side of the account of some five millions sterling. So again, the Provincial Revenue and Expenditure is now entered in the gross, under the appropriate heads, instead of net on one side only of the account. This has added about a million to both sides. Finally, local revenue and expenditure which, although as much public transactions as any other, used to be excluded altogether from the Financial Statements, have now been included, adding more than 2½ millions to each side of the account.

Thus, under these three heads alone, the totals of our revenue and expenditure have been increased by about 8½ millions, without any addition whatever to our revenue or expenditure. I will not say that our form of abstract is even now perfect; but it gives detailed information which it was impossible to obtain from the abstracts as formerly framed. The improvement of late years has been great, and it is certain that few countries now publish such full and accurate accounts as India. It can hardly be contended that the difficulties which such changes

*Financial
Prospects.*

Complaints of difficulty of comparison of financial condition with past periods owing to changes in form of Abstracts.

Accuracy and completeness of Abstracts now published compared with those of past years.

Present Expenditure compared with 2 years ago.

throw in the way of persons who wish to make minor comparisons, ought to have deterred us, or should in future deter us, from rendering our published accounts as perfect and comprehensive in form as possible, or that because our published statements were incomplete ten or twenty years ago they ought to have remained incomplete for ever.

General comparison of Accounts for 1868-69 & 1869-70 with accounts of 1878-79 and estimates of 1880-81.

107. I cannot now take up the time of the Council with any elaborate comparison between our present financial position and that of ten or twenty years ago. As, however, there seems to be an impression that there has been a great increase in the public expenditure, I will briefly compare the accounts of our net expenditure in 1868-69 and 1869-70 with the accounts of 1878-79 and the estimates of 1880-81. That this comparison may be effective, I have eliminated the expenditure from Local Funds, recently incorporated with the rest of the public expenditure, and also the expenditure on the war in Afghanistan. In like manner I have removed, throughout, the credits from the extinct Military Funds. I have, then, divided the net expenditure thus ascertained into four groups, as follows:

First.—Land Revenue (except Charges of collection, Surveys and Settlements), Post Office, Administration, Minor Departments, Jails and Penal Settlements, Law and Justice, Police, Marine, Education, Ecclesiastical, Medical, Stationery, Printing, Political, and Miscellaneous.

Second.—Interest, Loss by Exchange, Furlough Allowances, Pensions, and Famine.

Third.—Public Works, Telegraphs, Railways, and Canals.

Fourth.—The Army.

The whole net expenditure thus classified is as follows:—

	1868-69	1869-70	1878-79	1880-81
	£	£	£	£
Group I.—Effective civil administration	10,084,000	10,566,000	10,901,000	11,166,000
Group II.—Non-effective civil expenditure	7,054,000	6,543,000	11,177,000	10,536,000
Group III.—Public Works	8,195,000	6,235,000	3,399,000	1,882,000
Group IV.—The Army	15,137,000	15,251,000	15,442,000	15,330,000
Total	40,470,000	38,596,000	40,918,000	38,915,000

108. *Group I.*—The effective civil charges proper have increased in the twelve years by about one million sterling, of which £500,000, under the Head of Law and Justice, is due to the development of backward provinces, such as Assam, Burmah, and Oudh, and to improved administration; and £250,000, under Education and Medical Services, is to be attributed to the constant demands for more schools and dispensaries. It does not seem to me that either the fact that the whole active civil administration of this great country costs only a fraction over net 11 millions a year, or the increase of its cost in twelve years by one million sterling, is indicative of any laxity of financial control or any disregard of the interests of the tax-payers.

109. *Group II.*—The non-effective civil charges, many of which are not subject to control, show an increase of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions, caused mainly by the disturbance of the relative values of gold and silver, but also notably by the growth of the pension list. Notwithstanding the addition of $37\frac{1}{4}$ millions (net) to our debt, the charge for interest shows little or no increase, the rate of interest having been, by successive operations, involving labour and forethought, constantly reduced. The average rate of interest upon the whole debt is now 4.40 per cent.

110. *Group III.*—The growth of the revenue from Railways, Telegraphs, and Canals, and the reduction of the expenditure on Public Works Ordinary has produced a diminution of the net expenditure in this group of more than six and a quarter millions a year, which therefore largely exceeds the increase in Group II.

Effective Civil charges.

Non-effective Civil charges.

Public Works.

During this period we have spent $65\frac{1}{4}$ millions sterling upon Railways, including the Guaranteed Railways, Canals, and Telegraphs. The result shown in the figures here given is remarkable evidence of the manner in which India responds to outlay of this character.

We have seen that in the coming year, the revenue derived from productive public works is likely to exceed the interest on the capital expended in their construction, together with the working expenses. I have read criticisms, in which the policy of constructing these works has been condemned on the ground that they had not yielded, and in many cases were not likely to yield, any extra profit after fully paying their expenses. But if the Government has succeeded in making these magnificent works for nothing, that is, without throwing any permanent charge for them on the people of India, surely it may well be contented.

111. *Group IV.*—Although there was an intermediate reduction of the cost of the Army, the net military expenditure here shown is little larger in the later than it was in the earlier years. The Army.

112. Owing to the rapid improvement in the financial results of our Railways, Canals, and Telegraphs, and to economy in the expenditure on public works ordinary, the whole net expenditure shows no increase, but a positive reduction. Whole net expenditure.

113. Considering that, during this period, the charge for loss by exchange has increased by $3\frac{1}{4}$ millions, and that, including the guaranteed railways, we have invested no less than $65\frac{1}{4}$ millions in productive public works, this, My Lord, is a result of which the Government of India need not be ashamed, and which I earnestly commend to the study of those statesmen who, from motives worthy of all respect, but which appear to me to be founded upon a dangerous misapprehension of facts, would withhold from India those material benefits which are to be obtained only by the expenditure of capital upon the development of her vast resources. Comparison satisfactory.

114. It now, My Lord, only remains for me to make the motion standing against my name. If it be adopted by the Council, it will be equivalent to a resolution that the Trades and Professions Bill shall be dropped altogether, and I shall afterwards ask permission to introduce a new Bill for the amendment of the present law. It will be understood, from what I have said to-day, that it will be a very short and simple measure, and its principal effect will be to relieve the poorer classes of traders from the taxation to which they are now liable.

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Estimates.

REVENUES.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-9.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—LAND REVENUE	22,450,803	21,939,000	22,389,000	450,000	—	22,062,000	—	327,000
II.—TRIBUTES	703,660	703,000	714,000	11,000	—	698,000	—	16,000
III.—FOREST	605,433	672,000	662,000	—	10,000	690,000	28,000	—
IV.—EXCISE	2,619,349	2,742,000	2,765,000	23,000	—	2,782,000	17,000	—
V.—ASSESSED TAXES	900,920	896,000	797,000	—	99,000	535,000	—	262,000
VI.—PROVINCIAL RATES	2,638,835	2,740,000	2,706,000	—	34,000	2,764,000	58,000	—
VII.—CUSTOMS	2,326,561	2,248,000	2,231,000	—	17,000	2,175,000	—	56,000
VIII.—SALT	6,941,120	7,000,000	7,335,000	335,000	—	7,541,000	206,000	—
IX.—OPIUM	9,399,401	9,000,000	10,459,000	1,459,000	—	9,410,000	—	1,049,000
X.—STAMPS	3,110,540	3,087,000	3,203,000	116,000	—	3,194,000	—	9,000
XI.—REGISTRATION	266,360	267,000	262,000	—	5,000	265,000	3,000	—
XII.—MINT	172,335	180,000	254,000	74,000	—	196,000	—	58,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE	911,806	983,000	968,000	—	15,000	1,008,000	40,000	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH	426,694	380,000	486,000	106,000	—	486,000	—	—
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	84,968	58,000	98,000	40,000	—	81,000	—	17,000
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE	647,130	649,000	663,000	14,000	—	680,000	17,000	—
XVII.—POLICE	211,108	233,000	221,000	—	12,000	232,000	11,000	—
XVIII.—MARINE	250,595	206,000	206,000	—	—	226,000	20,000	—
XIX.—EDUCATION	147,425	139,000	137,000	—	2,000	137,000	—	—
XX.—MEDICAL	44,332	39,000	54,000	15,000	—	40,000	—	14,000
XXI.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING	47,096	46,000	52,000	6,000	—	45,000	—	7,000
XXII.—INTEREST	628,367	634,000	709,000	75,000	—	651,000	—	58,000
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATIONS	675,258	526,000	529,000	3,000	—	386,000	—	143,000
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS	348,554	310,000	324,000	14,000	—	268,000	—	56,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	6,178,134	6,454,000	6,701,000	247,000	—	7,545,000	844,000	—
XXVI.—IRRIGATN. & NAVIGATN.	790,775	788,000	871,000	83,000	—	861,000	—	10,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	571,076	477,000	480,000	3,000	—	471,000	—	9,000
XXVIII.—PROVL. & LOCAL DEFICITS	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
XXIX.—ARMY	974,773	880,000	924,000	44,000	—	833,000	—	91,000
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE	133,313	78,000	324,000	246,000	—	237,000	—	87,000
GRAND TOTAL	65,207,694	64,562,000	67,583,000	3,021,000	—	66,746,000	—	—
DEFICIT	—	1,395,000	—	—	—	—	—	—

MENTS.

OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.

1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
CIVIL.								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - -	5,982,993	6,353,000	6,039,000	—	314,000	5,739,000	—	300,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	378,703	386,000	382,000	—	4,000	400,000	18,000	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS -	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE - -	2,960,010	3,028,000	2,945,000	—	83,000	2,995,000	50,000	—
5.—FOREST - - -	454,934	510,000	521,000	11,000	—	532,000	11,000	—
6.—EXCISE - - -	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES - -	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES - -	64,431	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS - - -	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT - - -	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIUM - - -	1,698,730	2,500,000	2,059,000	—	441,000	2,160,000	101,000	—
12.—STAMPS - - -	115,452	111,000	113,000	2,000	—	105,000	—	8,000
13.—REGISTRATION - -	160,801	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT - - -	103,991	113,000	104,000	—	9,000	111,000	7,000	—
15.—POST OFFICE - -	1,033,327	1,083,000	1,131,000	48,000	—	1,142,000	11,000	—
16.—TELEGRAPH - - -	470,790	531,000	492,000	—	39,000	467,000	—	25,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION - -	1,487,665	1,498,000	1,485,000	—	13,000	1,466,000	—	19,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS - -	355,325	375,000	367,000	—	8,000	437,000	70,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE - -	3,297,063	3,236,000	3,292,000	56,000	—	3,353,000	61,000	—
20.—POLICE - - -	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE - - -	548,703	546,000	558,000	12,000	—	568,000	10,000	—
22.—EDUCATION - - -	978,254	1,025,000	972,000	—	53,000	1,016,000	44,000	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL - -	155,200	161,000	156,000	—	5,000	159,000	3,000	—
24.—MEDICAL - - -	669,059	679,000	673,000	—	6,000	709,000	36,000	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	471,470	536,000	443,000	—	93,000	482,000	39,000	—
26.—POLITICAL - - -	448,793	426,000	471,000	45,000	—	436,000	—	35,000
27.—ALLOWANCES, & ASSIGNMENTS -	1,826,484	1,909,000	1,900,000	—	9,000	1,846,000	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLCES. -	231,561	232,000	220,000	—	12,000	233,000	13,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS - -	1,995,520	1,923,000	2,094,000	171,000	—	1,982,000	—	112,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS - -	293,368	277,000	314,000	37,000	—	264,000	—	50,000
31.—FAMINE RELIEF - -	313,420	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	6,561,827	6,536,000	6,987,000	451,000	—	6,751,000	—	236,000
33.—IRRIGATION & NAVIGATION -	1,063,037	1,085,000	1,173,000	88,000	—	1,077,000	—	96,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS -	4,318,247	4,895,000	4,146,000	—	749,000	4,306,000	160,000	—
35.—PROVL. & LOCAL SURPLUSES -	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY - - -	17,092,426	18,255,000	21,067,000	2,812,000	—	20,293,000	—	774,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE - -	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
TOTAL ORDINARY -	63,163,303	65,957,000	67,464,000	1,507,000	—	66,329,000	—	1,135,000
SURPLUS - - -	2,044,391	—	119,000	1,514,000	—	417,000	298,000	—
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS -	4,381,898	3,500,000	3,700,000	200,000	—	3,312,000	—	388,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

Q 1468.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.
(of Productive Public Works.)
1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
CIVIL.								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - -	4,575,069	4,758,000	4,452,000	—	306,000	4,014,000	—	438,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	378,703	386,000	382,000	—	4,000	400,000	18,000	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS -	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE - -	2,964,288	3,028,000	2,945,000	—	83,000	2,995,000	50,000	—
5.—FOREST - - -	454,934	510,000	521,000	11,000	—	532,000	11,000	—
6.—EXCISE - - -	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES - -	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES - -	64,431	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS - - -	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT - - -	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIMUM - - -	1,698,730	2,500,000	2,059,000	—	441,000	2,160,000	101,000	—
12.—STAMPS - - -	115,452	111,000	113,000	2,000	—	105,000	—	8,000
13.—REGISTRATION - -	156,523	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT - - -	103,991	113,000	104,000	—	9,000	111,000	7,000	—
15.—POST OFFICE - - -	1,033,327	1,083,000	1,131,000	48,000	—	1,142,000	11,000	—
16.—TELEGRAPH - - -	470,790	531,000	492,000	—	39,000	467,000	—	25,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION - -	1,487,665	1,498,000	1,485,000	—	13,000	1,466,000	—	19,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS -	355,325	375,000	367,000	—	8,000	437,000	70,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE - -	3,297,063	3,236,000	3,292,000	56,000	—	3,353,000	61,000	—
20.—POLICE - - -	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE - - -	548,703	546,000	558,000	12,000	—	568,000	10,000	—
22.—EDUCATION - - -	978,254	1,025,000	972,000	—	53,000	1,016,000	44,000	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL - -	155,200	161,000	156,000	—	5,000	159,000	3,000	—
24.—MEDICAL - - -	669,059	679,000	673,000	—	6,000	709,000	36,000	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	471,470	536,000	443,000	—	93,000	482,000	39,000	—
26.—POLITICAL - - -	448,793	426,000	471,000	45,000	—	436,000	—	35,000
27.—ALLOWANCES & ASSIGNMENTS	1,826,484	1,909,000	1,900,000	—	9,000	1,846,000	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLOWANCES	231,561	232,000	220,000	—	12,000	233,000	13,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS - -	1,995,520	1,923,000	2,094,000	171,000	—	1,982,000	—	112,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS - - -	293,368	277,000	314,000	37,000	—	264,000	—	50,000
31.—FAMINE RELIEF - - -	313,420	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	226,846	94,000	360,000	266,000	—	304,000	—	56,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	630,919	644,000	711,000	67,000	—	634,000	—	77,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS -	4,318,247	4,895,000	4,146,000	—	749,000	4,306,000	160,000	—
35.—PROVL. & LOCAL SURPLUSES	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY - - -	17,092,426	18,255,000	21,067,000	2,812,000	—	20,293,000	—	774,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE - -	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
EXPENDITURE ORDINARY -	54,988,380	57,479,000	58,788,000	1,309,000	—	57,714,000	—	1,074,000
<i>Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Working Expenses and Interest).</i>								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - -	1,407,824	1,595,000	1,587,000	—	8,000	1,725,000	138,000	—
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	6,334,981	6,442,000	6,627,000	185,000	—	6,447,000	—	180,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	432,118	441,000	462,000	21,000	—	443,000	—	19,000
TOTAL - - -	8,174,923	8,478,000	8,676,000	198,000	—	8,615,000	—	61,000
GRAND TOTAL - - -	63,163,303	65,957,000	67,464,000	1,507,000	—	66,329,000	—	1,135,000
SURPLUS - - -	2,044,391	—	119,000	1,514,000	—	417,000	298,000	—
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS	4,381,898	3,500,000	3,700,000	200,000	—	3,312,000	—	388,000

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA AND

III.

REVENUE.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.				BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
OPENING BALANCE - - - -	—	1,323,500	1,092,700	2,416,200	—	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500
I.—LAND REVENUE - - - -	21,236,200	1,027,300	125,500	22,389,000	20,911,300	1,025,800	124,900	22,062,000
II.—TRIBUTES - - - -	714,000	—	—	714,000	698,000	—	—	698,000
III.—FOREST - - - -	619,700	18,300	24,000	662,000	650,300	16,800	22,900	689,000
IV.—EXCISE - - - -	644,400	2,119,400	1,200	2,765,000	661,500	2,119,400	1,100	2,782,000
V.—ASSESSED TAXES - - - -	600,300	196,700	—	797,000	351,700	183,300	—	535,000
VI.—PROVINCIAL RATES - - - -	148,200	376,200	2,181,600	2,706,000	169,600	404,600	2,189,800	2,764,000
VII.—CUSTOMS - - - -	2,016,500	214,500	—	2,231,000	1,962,000	213,000	—	2,175,000
VIII.—SALT - - - -	7,318,800	16,200	—	7,335,000	7,522,500	18,500	—	7,541,000
IX.—OPIUM - - - -	10,459,000	—	—	10,459,000	9,410,000	—	—	9,410,000
X.—STAMPS - - - -	566,800	2,636,200	—	3,203,000	566,800	2,627,200	—	3,194,000
XI.—REGISTRATION - - - -	600	261,400	—	262,000	900	264,100	—	265,000
XII.—MINT - - - -	254,000	—	—	254,000	196,000	—	—	196,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE - - - -	965,300	2,300	400	968,000	1,005,500	2,100	400	1,008,000
XIV.—TELEGRAPH - - - -	486,000	—	—	486,000	486,000	—	—	486,000
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS - - - -	51,300	31,000	15,700	98,000	30,300	35,700	15,000	81,000
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE - - - -	77,300	577,400	8,300	663,000	77,100	594,800	8,100	680,000
XVII.—POLICE - - - -	100	181,600	39,300	221,000	100	192,900	39,000	232,000
XVIII.—MARINE - - - -	78,300	127,700	—	206,000	90,800	135,200	—	226,000
XIX.—EDUCATION - - - -	1,000	110,800	25,200	137,000	1,500	110,300	25,200	137,000
XX.—MEDICAL - - - -	2,200	49,500	2,300	54,000	1,900	35,200	2,900	40,000
XXI.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING - - - -	13,000	39,000	—	52,000	11,200	33,800	—	45,000
XXII.—INTEREST - - - -	687,900	13,400	7,700	709,000	628,900	15,500	6,600	651,000
XXIII.—PENSIONS - - - -	511,400	12,600	5,000	529,000	368,400	12,600	5,000	386,000
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS - - - -	67,900	144,100	112,000	324,000	49,900	131,000	87,100	268,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS - - - -	6,348,500	352,500	—	6,701,000	7,115,000	430,000	—	7,545,000
XVI.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION - - - -	322,500	547,600	900	871,000	306,400	553,700	900	861,000
XVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS - - - -	70,400	311,400	98,200	480,000	69,300	300,500	101,200	471,000
XVIII.—PROVL. AND LOCAL DEFICITS - - - -	59,000	—	—	59,000	247,000	—	—	247,000
XXIX.—ARMY - - - -	924,000	—	—	924,000	833,000	—	—	833,000
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE - - - -	320,100	3,900	—	324,000	231,400	2,600	—	234,000
	55,564,700	9,371,000	2,647,300	67,583,000	54,657,300	9,458,600	2,630,100	64,746,000
Notments - - - -	—	4,197,100	—	—	—	4,126,700	—	—
Contributions - - - -	400	52,700	93,000	—	400	37,700	115,700	—
Debt - - - -	—	—	6,400	—	—	—	100	—
Total	—	13,920,800	2,748,700	—	—	13,923,000	2,745,900	—
GRAND TOTAL	—	15,244,300	3,841,400	—	—	15,254,800	4,082,600	—
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICIT	—	—	—	—	—	160,300	—	—

IN ENGLAND IN THE THREE DIVISIONS, IMPERIAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL

EXPENDITURE.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.				BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOTAL.	Imperial.	Provincial.	Local.	TOT.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT	5,352,200	686,800	—	6,039,000	5,010,100	728,900	—	5,739,000
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS	373,700	500	2,800	382,000	396,600	600	2,800	400,000
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS	193,200	150,900	5,900	350,000	190,700	121,200	6,100	318,000
4.—LAND REVENUE	872,000	1,586,900	486,100	2,945,000	862,600	1,628,400	504,000	2,995,000
5.—FOREST	488,200	15,300	17,500	521,000	498,300	13,200	20,500	532,000
6.—EXCISE	21,900	87,400	700	110,000	22,700	87,400	900	111,000
7.—ASSESSED TAXES	8,100	26,900	—	35,000	5,000	15,000	—	20,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES	—	4,400	45,600	50,000	—	5,100	47,900	53,000
9.—CUSTOMS	23,000	178,000	—	201,000	22,600	181,400	—	204,000
10.—SALT	300,700	55,300	—	356,000	302,700	65,300	—	368,000
11.—OPIMUM	2,059,000	—	—	2,059,000	2,160,000	—	—	2,160,000
12.—STAMPS	51,600	61,400	—	113,000	42,800	62,200	—	105,000
13.—REGISTRATION	600	161,400	—	162,000	800	165,200	—	166,000
14.—MINT	104,000	—	—	104,000	111,000	—	—	111,000
15.—POST OFFICE	1,044,000	31,600	55,400	1,131,000	1,050,800	31,600	59,600	1,142,000
16.—TELEGRAPH	492,000	—	—	492,000	467,000	—	—	467,000
17.—ADMINISTRATION	911,700	563,100	10,200	1,485,000	881,200	572,800	12,000	1,466,000
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	250,400	83,000	33,600	367,000	312,700	90,200	34,100	437,000
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE	583,400	2,708,500	100	3,292,000	583,700	2,769,200	100	3,353,000
20.—POLICE	61,400	2,174,700	248,900	2,485,000	72,800	2,166,600	273,600	2,513,000
21.—MARINE	423,700	134,300	—	558,000	409,200	158,800	—	568,000
22.—EDUCATION	11,400	701,300	259,300	972,000	11,300	720,100	284,600	1,016,000
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL	115,700	40,300	—	156,000	119,400	39,600	—	159,000
24.—MEDICAL	166,500	421,500	85,000	673,000	171,800	435,300	101,900	709,000
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING	86,700	355,100	1,200	443,000	122,600	358,100	1,300	482,000
26.—POLITICAL	470,500	400	100	471,000	435,500	400	100	436,000
27.—ALLOWANCES	1,237,100	662,900	—	1,900,000	1,193,400	652,600	—	1,846,000
28.—C. F. & A. ALLOWANCES	219,500	500	—	220,000	232,500	500	—	233,000
29.—SUPERANNUATION	1,944,500	148,800	700	2,094,000	1,835,700	146,000	300	1,982,000
30.—MISCELLANEOUS	104,600	134,400	75,000	314,000	71,000	112,800	80,200	264,000
31.—FAMINE RELIEF	98,900	100	—	99,000	5,000	—	—	5,000
32.—RAILWAYS	6,694,500	292,500	—	6,987,000	6,465,100	285,900	—	6,751,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	761,100	407,500	4,400	1,173,000	645,800	421,200	10,000	1,077,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	1,478,900	1,573,200	1,093,900	4,146,000	1,475,800	1,613,000	1,217,200	4,306,000
35.—P. & L. SURPLUSES	324,000	—	—	324,000	131,000	—	—	131,000
36.—ARMY	21,067,000	—	—	21,067,000	20,293,000	—	—	20,293,000
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE	3,188,000	—	—	3,188,000	3,411,000	—	—	3,411,000
	51,588,700	13,448,900	2,426,400	67,464,000	50,023,200	13,648,600	2,657,200	66,329,000
Special Contributions to Imperial Treasury -	—	335,000	—	—	—	335,000	—	—
Contributions	—	128,600	59,400	—	—	99,700	44,400	—
Debt	—	—	15,900	—	—	—	31,100	—
TOTAL	—	13,912,500	2,501,700	—	—	14,083,300	2,732,400	—
CLOSING BALANCE	—	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500	—	1,171,500	1,350,200	2,521,700
GRAND TOTAL	—	15,244,300	3,841,400	—	—	15,254,800	4,082,600	—
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL SURPLUS	—	8,300	256,500	—	—	—	44,500	—

W. WATERFIELD.
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

IV.

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE TREASURIES OF

RECEIPTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—BALANCE - - -	15,574,959	14,200,000	13,910,078	—	289,922	16,000,000	2,089,922	—
II.—IMPERIAL REVENUE -	65,207,694	64,562,000	67,583,000	3,021,000	—	66,746,000	—	837,000
III.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL SURPLUS.	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
IV.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	616,401	603,000	591,000	—	12,000	603,000	12,000	—
V.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
VI.—LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS, AND IN- DIVIDUALS REPAID -	228,361	216,000	1,078,000	862,000	—	213,000	—	865,000
VII.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	677,946	730,000	765,000	35,000	—	793,000	28,000	—
VIII.—OTHER DEPOSITS RECEIVED & ADVANCES RECOVERED	16,853,867	12,433,000	12,701,000	268,000	—	12,606,000	—	95,000
IX.—LOCAL REMITTANCES -	167,330	456,000	178,000	—	278,000	86,000	—	92,000
X.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TRANSACTIONS -	17,967,362	25,000,000	25,663,000	663,000	—	26,019,000	356,000	—
XI.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME TREASURY -	1,891,108	1,196,000	1,486,000	290,000	—	1,183,000	—	303,000
XII.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA SOLD*	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
XIII.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS -	267,380	384,000	74,000	—	310,000	83,000	9,000	—
XIV.—PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED*	8,070,758	8,009,500	13,138,000	5,128,500	—	2,833,000	—	10,305,000
XV.—TREASURY NOTES -	262,636	218,000	195,000	—	23,000	308,000	113,000	—
XVI.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED -	3,184,677	3,073,000	2,842,000	—	231,000	1,709,000	—	1,133,000
TOTAL - - -	147,151,615	146,097,500	156,278,078	10,180,578	—	146,213,000	—	10,065,078

The Estimates in this Statements of the amounts to be borrowed and to be supplied to the Home Treasury by Bills in 1880-81 are the pledge itself that the Secretary of State will raise by Bills the exact amount stated.

Abstract of the above showing how the

ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.			REGULAR ESTI		
	£		£		£
SURPLUS OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE -	715,405	DEFICIT OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	2,337,507	SURPLUS OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE -	265,000
SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	96,375	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	349,940	SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	170,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS -	6,924	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	1,048,705	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS -	117,000
PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED -	4,199,268	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITHDRAWN -	12,934	DEPOSITS -	264,000
TREASURY NOTES -	122,750	DEPOSITS REPAID -	1,630,876	PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED -	3,131,000
BALANCE REDUCED -	1,664,881	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS DISCHARGED -	1,271,110	TREASURY NOTES -	150,000
		GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN -	154,531	GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL RECEIVED -	182,000
TOTAL -	6,805,603	TOTAL -	6,805,603	TOTAL -	6,285,000

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA AND IN ENGLAND.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—IMPERIAL EXPENDITURE -	67,545,201	69,457,000	71,164,000	1,707,000	—	69,641,000	—	1,523,000
2.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICITS -	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
3.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	520,026	453,000	421,000	—	32,000	451,000	30,000	—
4.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	349,940	214,000	220,000	6,000	—	32,000	—	188,000
5.—LOANS ADVANCED TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS -	1,277,066	416,000	1,251,000	835,000	—	232,000	—	1,019,000
6.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITHDRAWN -	690,880	700,000	648,000	—	52,000	669,000	21,000	—
7.—OTHER DEPOSITS REPAID AND ADVANCES MADE -	18,484,743	12,247,000	12,437,000	190,000	—	12,170,000	—	267,000
8.—LOCAL REMITTANCES -	42,079	837,000	—	—	837,000	—	—	—
9.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND IN- TER-DEPARTMENTAL TRANS- ACTIONS -	19,566,018	24,525,000	25,539,078	1,014,078	—	26,667,000	1,127,922	—
10.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME TREASURY -	1,688,813	1,290,000	1,949,000	659,000	—	1,252,000	—	697,000
11.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS OF INDIA PAID -	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
12.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	260,456	368,000	134,000	—	234,000	151,000	17,000	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED -	3,871,490	3,683,000	8,007,000	4,324,000	—	2,127,000	—	5,880,000
14.—TREASURY NOTES -	139,886	126,500	39,000	—	87,500	33,000	—	6,000
15.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN -	3,339,208	3,073,000	2,660,000	—	413,000	2,391,000	—	269,000
16.—BALANCE -	13,910,078	13,500,000	16,000,000	2,500,000	—	13,250,000	—	2,750,000
TOTAL -	147,151,615	146,097,500	156,278,078	10,180,578	—	146,213,000	—	10,065,078

best that can now be made; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on; the Government must not be understood to or that the exact amount stated will be borrowed during the year.

Ways and Means are provided.

MATES, 1879-80.		BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81,			
	£		£		£
DEFICIT OF IMPERIAL REVENUE -	3,581,000	SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	152,000	DEFICIT OF IMPERIAL REVENUE -	2,895,000
SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	220,000	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSIT -	124,000	DEFICIT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE -	116,000
LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	173,000	DEPOSITS -	436,000	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	32,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	60,000	PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED -	706,000	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS	19,000
REMITTANCES -	161,078	TREASURY NOTES -	275,000	REMITTANCES -	631,000
BALANCE INCREASED -	2,089,922	BALANCE REDUCED -	2,750,000	POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	68,000
				GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPI- TAL WITHDRAWN -	682,000
TOTAL -	6,285,000	TOTAL -	4,443,000	TOTAL -	4,443,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India

V.
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE

Estimates.

REVENUE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.								
I.—LAND REVENUE	£ 22,323,869	£ 21,778,000	£ 21,679,000	£ —	£ 99,000	£ 21,359,000	£ —	£ 320,000
II.—TRIBUTES	703,660	703,000	714,000	11,000	—	698,000	—	16,000
III.—FOREST	603,939	670,400	660,600	—	9,800	688,400	27,800	—
IV.—EXCISE	2,619,349	2,742,000	2,765,000	23,000	—	2,782,000	17,000	—
V.—ASSESSED TAXES	900,920	896,000	797,000	—	99,000	535,000	—	262,000
V.—PROVINCIAL RATES	2,638,835	2,740,000	2,706,000	—	34,000	2,764,000	58,000	—
VII.—CUSTOMS	2,326,561	2,248,000	2,231,000	—	17,000	2,175,000	—	56,000
VIII.—SALT	6,941,120	7,000,000	7,335,000	335,000	—	7,541,000	206,000	—
IX.—OPIMUM	9,399,401	9,000,000	10,459,000	1,459,000	—	9,410,000	—	1,049,000
X.—STAMPS	3,110,540	3,087,000	3,203,000	116,000	—	3,194,000	—	9,000
XI.—REGISTRATION	263,362	267,000	262,000	—	5,000	265,000	3,000	—
XII.—MINT	172,283	180,000	254,000	74,000	—	196,000	—	58,000
XIII.—POST OFFICE	911,806	983,000	968,000	—	15,000	1,008,000	40,000	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH	403,627	357,000	460,300	103,300	—	463,100	2,800	—
XV.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	60,142	32,400	59,500	27,100	—	61,700	2,200	—
XVI.—LAW AND JUSTICE	647,130	649,000	663,000	14,000	—	680,000	17,000	—
XVII.—POLICE	211,108	233,000	221,000	—	12,000	232,000	11,000	—
XVIII.—MARINE	250,595	206,000	203,000	—	3,000	226,000	23,000	—
XIX.—EDUCATION	147,425	139,000	137,000	—	2,000	137,000	—	—
XX.—MEDICAL	42,419	37,500	52,000	14,500	—	38,200	—	13,500
XXI.—STATIONERY & PRINTING	47,096	46,000	52,000	6,000	—	45,000	—	7,000
XXII.—INTEREST	612,934	624,000	701,500	77,500	—	641,000	—	60,500
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS	571,871	430,500	430,500	—	—	291,700	—	138,800
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS	337,691	306,100	315,000	8,900	—	262,000	—	53,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	10,822	10,000	—	—	10,000	—	—	—
XXVI.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	168,619	184,000	192,000	8,000	—	181,000	—	11,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS	554,295	461,000	464,600	3,600	—	456,700	—	7,900
XXVIII.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DEFICIT	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
XXIX.—ARMY	926,962	844,500	858,300	13,800	—	800,200	—	58,100
XXX.—GAIN BY EXCHANGE	133,313	78,000	324,000	246,000	—	237,000	—	87,000
TOTAL	58,042,667	57,140,400	59,226,300	2,085,900	—	57,615,000	—	1,611,300
<i>Revenue from Productive Public Works.</i>								
I.—LAND REVENUE	126,934	161,000	710,000	549,000	—	703,000	—	7,000
XXV.—RAILWAYS	6,167,312	6,444,000	6,701,000	257,000	—	7,545,000	844,000	—
XXVI.—IRRIGN. & NAVIGATION	621,604	603,500	678,000	74,500	—	679,200	1,200	—
TOTAL	6,915,850	7,208,500	8,089,000	880,500	—	8,927,200	838,200	—
GRAND TOTAL	64,958,517	64,348,900	67,315,300	2,966,400	—	66,542,200	—	723,000

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA.
1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81 COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
CIVIL.								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	£ 1,981,957	£ 2,089,500	£ 1,862,600	—	£ 226,900	£ 1,644,100	—	£ 218,500
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	377,827	385,000	380,600	—	4,400	398,400	17,800	—
3.—REFUNDS AND DRAWBACKS -	406,562	356,000	350,000	—	6,000	318,000	—	32,000
4.—LAND REVENUE -	2,962,494	3,025,300	2,944,100	—	81,200	2,994,400	50,300	—
5.—FORESTS -	451,106	505,900	516,200	10,300	—	527,600	11,400	—
6.—EXCISE -	87,839	118,000	110,000	—	8,000	111,000	1,000	—
7.—ASSESSED TAXES -	37,617	29,000	35,000	6,000	—	20,000	—	15,000
8.—PROVINCIAL RATES	64,431	53,000	50,000	—	3,000	53,000	3,000	—
9.—CUSTOMS -	200,417	203,000	201,000	—	2,000	204,000	3,000	—
10.—SALT -	404,743	383,000	356,000	—	27,000	368,000	12,000	—
11.—OPIMUM -	1,697,792	2,499,100	2,058,700	—	440,400	2,159,500	100,800	—
12.—STAMPS -	73,807	74,900	76,900	2,000	—	77,500	600	—
13.—REGISTRATION	156,523	155,000	162,000	7,000	—	166,000	4,000	—
14.—MINT -	94,607	87,300	83,300	—	4,000	91,500	8,200	—
15.—POST OFFICE -	941,971	983,300	1,005,600	22,300	—	1,043,800	38,200	—
16.—TELEGRAPH -	388,313	392,200	385,200	—	7,000	380,900	—	4,300
17.—ADMINISTRATION -	1,269,500	1,279,600	1,271,900	—	7,700	1,245,500	—	26,400
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS	328,265	346,600	336,100	—	10,500	415,100	79,000	—
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE -	3,295,968	3,234,500	3,290,100	55,600	—	3,350,900	60,800	—
20.—POLICE -	2,419,119	2,472,000	2,485,000	13,000	—	2,513,000	28,000	—
21.—MARINE -	404,700	396,900	385,800	—	11,100	419,000	33,200	—
22.—EDUCATION -	977,100	1,024,500	971,600	—	52,900	1,015,800	44,200	—
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL -	153,562	159,900	154,700	—	5,200	158,600	3,900	—
24.—MEDICAL -	661,851	679,000	665,000	—	14,000	701,400	36,400	—
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	283,446	345,900	328,700	—	17,200	415,700	87,000	—
26.—POLITICAL -	435,858	375,700	428,200	52,500	—	393,000	—	35,200
27.—ALLOWANCES AND ASSIGNS -	1,792,419	1,887,900	1,878,900	—	9,000	1,824,900	—	54,000
28.—CIVIL PUNLO. ALLOWANCES -	4,482	2,000	4,000	2,000	—	3,000	—	1,000
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS -	683,269	634,000	764,200	130,200	—	646,300	—	117,900
30.—MISCELLANEOUS -	266,220	245,000	294,000	49,000	—	243,300	—	50,700
31.—FAMINE RELIEF -	312,823	10,000	99,000	89,000	—	5,000	—	94,000
32.—RAILWAYS -	226,846	94,000	360,000	266,000	—	304,000	—	56,000
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	629,308	643,800	710,800	67,000	—	633,800	—	77,000
34.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS -	4,220,707	4,752,200	4,006,400	—	745,800	4,216,500	210,100	—
35.—PROVINCIAL & LOCAL SURPLUS	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	193,000
36.—ARMY -	13,109,553	14,135,300	16,448,600	2,313,300	—	15,171,900	—	1,276,700
37.—LOSS BY EXCHANGE -	3,359,144	3,952,000	3,188,000	—	764,000	3,411,000	223,000	—
TOTAL -	45,878,524	48,027,300	48,972,200	944,900	—	47,776,400	—	1,195,800
<i>Expenditure on Productive Public Works (Working Expenses and Interest).</i>								
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT -	1,407,824	1,595,000	1,587,000	—	8,000	1,725,000	138,000	—
32.—RAILWAYS -	1,645,705	1,697,500	1,890,200	192,700	—	1,855,000	—	35,200
33.—IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION	382,007	391,000	412,000	21,000	—	393,000	—	19,000
TOTAL -	3,435,536	3,683,500	3,889,200	205,700	—	3,973,000	83,800	—
GRAND TOTAL -	49,314,060	51,710,800	52,861,400	1,150,600	—	51,749,400	—	1,112,000
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS	3,689,029	2,720,700	3,066,700	346,000	—	1,906,000	—	1,160,700

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.
Q 1468.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

VI.
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE HOME
Estimates.

REVENUE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
III.—FOREST - -	1,494	1,600	1,400	—	200	1,600	200	—
XII.—MINT - -	52	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
XIV.—TELEGRAPH -	23,067	23,000	25,700	2,700	—	22,900	—	280
XV.—MINOR DEPART- MENTS	24,826	25,600	38,500	12,900	—	19,300	—	19,200
XVII.—MARINE - -	—	—	3,000	3,000	—	—	—	3,000
XX.—MEDICAL - -	1,913	1,500	2,000	500	—	1,800	—	200
XXII.—INTEREST -	15,433	10,000	7,500	—	2,500	10,000	2,500	—
XXIII.—SUPERANNUATION CONTRIBUTIONS -	103,387	95,500	98,500	3,000	—	94,300	—	1,200
XXIV.—MISCELLANEOUS -	13,861	3,900	9,000	5,100	—	6,000	—	3,000
XXVII.—OTHER PUBLIC WORKS - -	16,781	16,000	15,400	—	600	14,300	—	1,400
XXIX.—ARMY - -	47,811	35,500	65,700	30,200	—	32,800	—	32,900
TOTAL -	248,625	212,600	266,700	54,100	—	203,000	—	63,700
<i>Revenue from Productive Public Works.</i>								
XXVI.—IRRIGATION -	552	500	1,000	500	—	800	—	300
TOTAL -	249,177	213,100	267,700	54,600	—	203,800	—	64,000

TREASURY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1880-81.

EXPENDITURE.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81 COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—INTEREST ON DEBT - -	2,593,112	2,668,500	2,589,400	—	79,100	2,369,900	—	219,500
2.—INTEREST, OTHER ACCOUNTS -	876	1,000	1,400	400	—	1,600	200	—
4.—LAND REVENUE - -	1,794	2,700	900	—	1,800	600	—	300
5.—FOREST - - -	3,828	4,100	4,800	700	—	4,400	—	400
11.—OPHIUM - - -	938	900	300	—	600	500	200	—
12.—STAMPS - - -	41,646	36,100	36,100	—	—	27,500	—	8,600
14.—MINT - - -	9,384	25,700	20,700	—	5,000	19,500	—	1,200
15.—POST OFFICE - - -	91,356	99,700	125,400	25,700	—	98,200	—	27,200
16.—TELEGRAPH - - -	82,477	138,800	106,800	—	32,000	86,100	—	20,700
17.—ADMINISTRATION - - -	218,164	218,400	213,100	—	5,300	220,500	7,400	—
18.—MINOR DEPARTMENTS - -	27,061	28,400	30,900	2,500	—	21,900	—	9,000
19.—LAW AND JUSTICE - - -	1,095	1,500	1,900	400	—	2,100	200	—
21.—MARINE - - -	144,003	149,100	172,200	23,100	—	149,000	—	23,200
22.—EDUCATION - - -	1,154	500	400	—	100	200	—	200
23.—ECCLESIASTICAL - - -	1,638	1,100	1,300	200	—	400	—	900
24.—MEDICAL - - -	7,208	—	8,000	8,000	—	7,600	—	400
25.—STATIONERY AND PRINTING -	188,024	190,100	114,300	—	75,800	66,300	—	48,000
26.—POLITICAL - - -	12,935	50,300	42,800	—	7,500	43,000	200	—
27.—ALLOWANCES AND ASSIGN- MENTS - - -	34,065	21,100	21,100	—	—	21,100	—	—
28.—CIVIL FURLOUGH ALLOWANCES	227,079	230,000	216,000	—	14,000	230,000	14,000	—
29.—SUPERANNUATIONS - - -	1,312,251	1,289,000	1,329,800	40,800	—	1,335,700	5,900	—
30.—MISCELLANEOUS - - -	27,148	32,000	20,000	—	12,000	20,700	700	—
31.—FAMINE RELIEF - - -	597	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33.—IRRIGATION - - -	1,611	200	200	—	—	200	—	—
34.—OTHER WORKS - - -	97,540	142,800	139,600	—	3,200	89,500	—	50,100
36.—ARMY - - -	3,982,872	4,119,700	4,618,400	498,700	—	5,121,100	502,700	—
TOTAL - - -	9,109,856	9,451,700	9,815,800	364,100	—	9,937,600	121,800	—
<i>Expenditure on Productive Public Works.</i>								
32.—RAILWAYS - - -	4,689,276	4,744,500	4,736,800	—	7,700	4,592,000	—	144,800
33.—IRRIGATION - - -	50,111	50,000	50,000	—	—	50,000	—	—
TOTAL - - -	4,739,387	4,794,500	4,786,800	—	7,700	4,642,000	—	144,800
TOTAL - - -	13,849,243	14,246,200	14,602,600	356,400	—	14,579,600	—	23,000
38.—PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS -	692,869	779,300	633,300	—	146,000	1,406,000	772,700	—

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

VII.

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE TREASURIES

RECEIPTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
I.—BALANCE	£ 14,498,302	£ 12,988,800	£ 12,792,153	—	£ 196,647	£ 14,193,075	£ 1,400,922	—
II.—IMPERIAL REVENUE	64,958,517	64,348,900	67,315,300	2,966,400	—	66,542,200	—	773,100
III.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL SURPLUS	716,378	17,000	324,000	307,000	—	131,000	—	189,000
IV.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	616,401	603,000	591,000	—	12,000	603,000	12,000	—
V.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
VI.—LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND IN- DIVIDUALS REPAID	228,361	216,000	1,078,000	862,000	—	213,000	—	865,000
VII.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	677,946	730,000	765,000	35,000	—	793,000	28,000	—
VIII.—OTHER DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND ADVANCES RE- COVERED	16,825,797	12,429,000	12,670,900	241,900	—	12,602,500	—	68,400
IX.—LOCAL REMITTANCES	167,330	456,000	178,000	—	278,000	86,000	—	92,000
X.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TRANSACTIONS	17,967,362	25,000,000	25,663,000	663,000	—	26,019,000	356,000	—
XI.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME TREASURY	1,389,859	1,089,000	1,335,600	246,600	—	1,054,000	—	281,600
XIII.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	267,380	384,000	74,000	—	310,000	83,000	9,000	—
XIV.—PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED*	4,344,174	5,000,000	9,264,500	4,264,500	—	819,700	—	8,444,800
XV.—TREASURY NOTES	262,636	218,000	195,000	—	23,000	308,000	113,000	—
XVI.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	2,310,878	2,149,700	2,022,600	—	127,100	1,459,000	—	568,600
TOTAL	125,231,321	125,629,400	134,269,053	8,639,653	—	124,906,475	—	9,362,578

* The Estimates in this Statement of the amounts to be borrowed and to be supplied to the Home Treasury by Bills in 1880-81 are that the Secretary of State will raise by Bills the exact amount stated; or that the exact amount stated.

Abstract of the above showing how the

ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.		REGULAR EST.	
SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	£ 11,955,428	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY	£ 349,940
SURPLUS OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL REVENUE	715,405	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS	1,048,705
SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	96,375	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITH- DRAWN	12,934
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	6,924	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID	15,464,758
PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED	3,847,184	DEPOSITS REPAID	1,649,656
TREASURY NOTES	122,750	REMITTANCES	695,236
GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	771,014		
BALANCE REDUCED	1,706,149		
TOTAL	19,221,229	TOTAL	19,221,229
		SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	£ 11,367,200
		DO. OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL	265,000
		SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL	170,000
		SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	117,000
		DEPOSITS	228,000
		REMITTANCES	729,000
		PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED	3,867,000
		TREASURY NOTES	158,000
		GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	671,000
		TOTAL	17,600,200

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN INDIA.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
1.—IMPERIAL EXPENDITURE -	£ 53,003,089	£ 54,431,500	£ 55,928,100	£ 1,496,600	£ —	£ 53,655,400	£ —	£ 2,272,700
2.—PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL DE- FICITS -	973	208,000	59,000	—	149,000	247,000	188,000	—
3.—SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	520,026	453,000	421,000	—	32,000	451,000	30,000	—
4.—SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	349,940	214,000	220,000	6,000	—	32,000	—	188,000
5.—LOANS ADVANCED TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS -	1,277,066	416,000	1,251,000	835,000	—	232,000	—	1,019,000
6.—SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS WITHDRAWN -	690,880	700,000	648,000	—	52,000	669,000	21,000	—
7.—OTHER DEPOSITS REPAID AND ADVANCES MADE -	18,475,453	12,243,000	12,432,000	189,500	—	12,166,500	—	266,000
8.—LOCAL REMITTANCES -	42,079	837,000	—	—	837,000	—	—	—
9.—INTER-PROVINCIAL AND INTER- DEPARTMENTAL TRANS- ACTIONS -	19,566,018	24,525,000	25,539,078	1,014,078	—	26,667,000	1,127,922	—
10.—REMITTANCE ACCOUNT WITH THE HOME SECRETARY -	611,690	256,500	908,500	652,000	—	109,200	—	799,300
11.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA PAID * -	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
12.—POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS	260,456	368,000	134,000	—	234,000	151,000	17,000	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED -	496,990	1,673,500	5,397,300	3,723,800	—	836,700	—	4,560,600
14.—TREASURY NOTES -	139,886	126,500	39,000	—	87,500	33,000	—	6,000
15.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAP- ITAL WITHDRAWN -	1,539,864	1,608,900	1,348,500	—	260,400	1,312,500	—	36,000
16.—BALANCE -	12,792,153	12,568,500	14,193,075	1,624,575	—	11,444,175	—	2,748,900
TOTAL -	125,231,321	125,629,400	134,269,053	8,639,653	—	124,906,475	—	9,362,578

best that can now be made; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on; the Government must not be understood to pledge itself will be borrowed during the year; or that it will be borrowed in India or in England as the case may be.

Ways and Means are provided.

MATES, 1879-80.		BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.			
SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	£ 220,000	SURPLUS OF IMPERIAL REVENUE	£ 12,886,800	DEFICIT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL EXPENDITURE -	£ 116,000
LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, COR- PORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS -	173,000	SERVICE FUNDS, CIVIL -	152,000	SERVICE FUNDS, MILITARY -	32,000
POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS -	60,000	SAVINGS BANKS' DEPOSITS	124,000	LOANS TO NATIVE STATES, CORPORA- TIONS AND INDIVIDUALS -	19,000
SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID -	15,750,000	DEPOSITS -	436,000	POLITICAL AND TRUST FUNDS -	68,000
BALANCE INCREASED -	1,400,922	REMITTANCES -	382,800	DEBT DISCHARGED -	17,000
		TREASURY NOTES -	275,000	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS PAID	16,900,000
		GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED -	146,500		
		BALANCE REDUCED -	2,748,900		
TOTAL -	17,603,922	TOTAL -	17,152,000	TOTAL -	17,152,000

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India

VIII.
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS AT THE HOME

RECEIPTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DE- CREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH THE REGU- LAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
I.—BALANCE	1,076,657	1,211,200	1,117,925	—	93,275	1,806,925	689,000	—
II.—PUBLIC REVENUE	249,177	213,100	267,700	54,600	—	203,800	—	63,900
VII.—DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND ADVANCES RECOVERED	28,070	4,000	30,100	26,100	—	3,500	—	26,600
XI.—SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS ON INDIA AND BILLS BOUGHT IN INDIA	15,464,758	15,000,000	15,750,000	750,000	—	16,900,000	1,150,000	—
II.—OTHER MISCELLANEOUS REMITTANCES FROM INDIA	501,249	107,000	150,400	43,400	—	129,000	—	21,400
IV.—PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED *	3,726,584	3,009,500	3,873,500	864,000	—	2,013,300	—	1,860,200
V.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL RECEIVED	873,799	923,300	819,400	—	103,900	250,000	—	569,400
TOTAL	21,920,294	20,468,100	22,009,025	1,540,925	—	21,306,525	—	702,500

* The Estimates in this Statement of the amount to be supplied to the Home Treasury by Bills in 1880-81 and of the Debt transactions are the amount which the Secretary of State will raise by Bills the exact amount stated, or the

Abstract of the above showing how the

ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.		REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
£		£	
NET DEPOSITS RECEIVED AND AD- VANCES RECOVERED	18,780	DEFICIT OF REVENUE	14,292,935
SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS	15,464,758	NET MISCELLANEOUS REMIT- TANCES	575,874
NET PUBLIC DEBT INCURRED	352,084	NET GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	925,545
		BALANCE INCREASED	41,268
TOTAL	15,835,622	TOTAL	15,835,622
			TOTAL
			17,039,400

TREASURY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

DISBURSEMENTS.	ACCOUNTS, 1878-79.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	REGULAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81, COMPARED WITH THE REGU- LAR ESTIMATES, 1879-80.	
							Increase.	Decrease.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1.—PUBLIC EXPENDITURE	14,542,112	15,025,500	15,235,900	210,400	—	15,985,600	749,700	—
7.—DEPOSITS REPaid AND ADVANCES MADE	9,290	4,000	4,500	500	—	3,500	—	1,000
10.—MISCELLANEOUS REMITTANCES TO INDIA	1,077,123	1,033,500	1,040,500	7,000	—	1,142,800	102,300	—
13.—PUBLIC DEBT DISCHARGED	3,374,500	2,009,500	2,609,700	600,200	—	1,290,300	—	1,319,400
14.—GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	1,799,344	1,464,100	1,311,500	—	152,600	1,078,500	—	233,000
15.—BALANCE	1,117,925	931,500	1,806,925	875,425	—	1,805,825	—	1,100
TOTAL	21,920,294	20,468,100	22,009,025	1,540,925	—	21,306,525	—	702,500

that can now be made; but they are subject to modification as the year goes on; the Government must not be understood to pledge itself that Debt transactions will be carried out as estimated.

ays and Means are provided.

TES, 1879-80.		BUDGET ESTIMATES, 1880-81.	
	£		£
AMOUNT OF REVENUE	14,968,200	SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS	16,900,000
7 MISCELLANEOUS REMIT- TANCES TO INDIA	890,100	NET DEBT INCURRED	723,000
7 GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	492,100	BALANCE REDUCED	1,100
ANCES INCREASED	689,000		
TOTAL	17,039,400	TOTAL	17,624,100
		DEFICIT OF REVENUE	15,781,800
		NET MISCELLANEOUS REMIT- TANCES TO INDIA	1,013,800
		NET GUARANTEED RAILWAY CAPITAL WITHDRAWN	828,500
		TOTAL	17,624,100

W. WATERFIELD,
Comptroller General.

R. B. CHAPMAN,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

IX. CLOSING BALANCES OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

	REGULAR ESTIMATE, 1879-80.			BUDGET ESTIMATE, 1880-81.		
	Provincial.	Local.	Total.	Provincial.	Local.	Total.
INDIA -	£ -	4,900	4,900	£ -	3,000	3,000
CENTRAL PROVINCES -	64,500	40,700	105,200	59,400	34,100	93,500
BRITISH BURMAH -	166,900	49,800	216,700	122,300	47,800	170,100
ASSAM -	16,300	2,600	18,900	25,800	4,300	30,100
BENGAL -	524,900	356,500	781,400	561,700	324,400	886,100
NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH -	337,200	430,700	767,900	195,600	474,200	669,800
PUNJAB -	86,700	54,400	141,100	98,100	58,500	156,600
MADRAS -	44,100	372,500	416,600	76,200	306,600	382,800
BOMBAY -	91,200	124,600	215,800	32,400	97,300	129,700
TOTAL	1,331,800	1,336,700	2,668,500	1,171,500	1,350,200	2,521,700

Deficit of recorded Revenue compared with whole recorded Expenditure	£	3,930,374	5,992,062	8,334,139	2,337,507	3,581,000	2,895,000
Productive Public Works, Capital Expenditure	£	4,270,629	3,609,284	4,791,052	4,381,898	3,700,000	3,312,000
Recorded Revenue compared with the recorded Expenditure, excluding Expenditure on Productive Public Works—							
SURPLUS	£	319,197	—	—	2,044,391	119,000	417,000
DEFICIT	£	8,398,168	4,109,522	7,345,416	4,199,268	5,131,000	706,000
Net Public Debt incurred	£	4,383,300	2,878,300	6,496,200	3,209,100	5,523,300	488,000
Net Public Debt incurred, including Capital transactions with Guaranteed Railway and other companies and Native States, &c.	£	56,359,000	61,014,000	65,222,000	60,937,000	57,800,000	—
Value of Commodities exported, excluding Gold and Silver	£	36,222,000	37,428,000	41,464,000	37,800,000	37,800,000	—
Value of commodities imported, excluding Gold and Silver	£	20,137,000	23,586,000	23,758,000	23,137,000	23,137,000	—
EXCESS OF EXPORTS OVER IMPORTS, excluding Gold and Silver	£	1,874,000	1,545,000	468,000	468,000	468,000	—
Net imports of Gold	£	4,642,000	7,199,000	14,676,000	3,970,000	3,970,000	—
Net imports of Silver	£	6,516,000	7,406,000	15,144,000	3,074,000	3,074,000	—
TOTAL NET IMPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER	£	13,621,000	16,106,000	8,614,000	20,063,000	20,063,000	—
Excess of Exports over Imports, including Gold and Silver	£	102,348,000	104,480,000	113,908,000	109,777,000	109,777,000	—
Grand total value of Imports and Exports of all kinds	Rs.	11,74,37,000	13,75,00,000	14,85,70,000	16,91,24,000	16,91,24,000	—
SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILLS sold (Rupees)	£	10,841,600	12,890,000	12,696,000	10,134,000	13,949,000	18,90,00,000
Sterling Equivalent received	£	4,897,000	12,850,000	6,271,000	7,210,770	15,750,000	16,900,000
SILVER coined at the Indian Mints	£	—	12,756,000	2,873,000	7,112,000	5,475,340	8,421,902
Gold coined in Germany	£	—	6,602,000	9,523,000	1,669,000	86,498	1,509,877
Silver coined in Germany	£	59½d. (25th April)	57¾d. (27th April)	56½d. (18th Jan.)	54½d. (2nd April)	53½ (Nov.)	53½ (Nov.)
Maximum PRICE OF AN OZ. TROY STANDARD SILVER IN LONDON	£	57d. (6th March)	52½d. (22nd March)	47d. (7th July)	48¾d. (21st Dec.)	45½ (April)	45½ (April)
Minimum ditto	Rs.	10 12 0	11 12 0	13 (7th July)	12 11 (March)	12 11 (May)	12 11 (May)
Maximum price of a sovereign in Calcutta	Rs.	10 9 0	11	11Rs. 3as. (6th Feb.)	11 11 (11th June)	11 15 (Jan.)	1s. 8d.
Minimum ditto	£	1s. 10-22d.	1s. 9-6½d.	1s. 8-49d.	1s. 7-76½d.	1s. 8d.	1s. 8d.
AVERAGE EXCHANGE upon Secretary of State's Bills sold per rupee	£	1s. 10d.	1s. 10½d.	1s. 9¾d.	1s. 9¾d.	1s. 7½d.	1s. 8½d.
FIXED RATE OF EXCHANGE for the ADJUSTMENT of transactions between the Indian and Imperial Treasuries	£	11 (11th April)	9 (May)	11 (April)	12 (May)	9 (April)	9 (April)
Maximum RATE OF DISCOUNT ON LOANS ON DEMAND at the BANK OF ENGLAND, Calcutta	£	3½ (July to Nov.)	4 (Nov. and Dec.)	5 (Aug. and Sept.)	5 (Dec. and Jan.)	3 (Jan.)	3 (Jan.)
Minimum ditto	£	6 (Dec.)	4 (Oct. and Jan.)	2 throughout the year.	5 (Oct. and Nov.)	6 (April to Oct.)	6 (April to Oct.)
Maximum RATE OF DISCOUNT at the BANK OF ENGLAND	£	2½ (July)	2 (Aug.)	2 (Aug.)	2 (subsequently)	2½ (30th May)	2 (Nov. to Feb.)
Minimum ditto	£	6,927,800 (July)	7,041,800 (July)	6,382,700 (July)	7,574,900 (Jan.)	6,978,500 (July)	7,703,600 (Feb.)
Maximum MONEY BALANCES of the three PRESIDENCY BANKS	£	4,359,200 (May)	4,762,300 (May)	4,132,500 (Oct.)	3,672,200 (April)	4,589,300 (Jan.)	4,150,400 (April)
Minimum ditto	£	104½ (15th July)	102½ (3rd June)	102½ (25th July)	98½ (27th June)	97 (July and Aug.)	95½ (July)
Maximum price in Calcutta of GOVT. FOUR PER CENT. ROPEE SECURITIES	£	101½ (23th March)	99 (21st March)	96½ (13th Jan.)	92 (8th Sept.)	91½ (March)	91½ (May)
Minimum ditto	£	14,214,617 (Nov.)	14,407,861 (Oct.)	14,125,982 (April)	14,588,744	15,950,002 (Feb.)	19,210,709 (Jan.)
Maximum amount outstanding on London Register, of ROPEE SECURITIES	£	13,098,988 (May)	14,111,441 (April)	12,655,322 (Dec.)	13,037,964	13,826,493 (Oct.)	15,208,182 (May)
ESKAPED FOR INTEREST DRAFTS	£	98	93½ (7th April)	92 (13th Dec.)	84½ (5th April)	81½ (1st April)	80½ (Oct.)
Minimum ditto	£	92½	82 (4th March)	77 (6th July)	81½ (23rd Jan.)	72 (23rd Oct.)	71½ (May)
Maximum price in London of such securities (in Gold)	£	104½ (Feb.)	106½ (5th Aug.)	104½ (22nd Feb.)	104½ (30th Aug.)	104½ (July and Aug.)	105½
Minimum ditto	£	100½ (April)	102½ (3rd June)	101 (26th Oct.)	100½ (21st March)	97 (Oct.)	100½
Maximum price in London of Secretary of State's FOUR PER CENT. STEELING BONDS	£	11,327,607 (7th Feb.)	12,151,185 (7th Feb.)	12,551,185 (7th Feb.)	15,757,790 (15th Jan.)	14,584,900 (Sept.)	14,329,700 (Jan.)
Minimum ditto	£	9,221,438 (7th April)	10,668,628 (7th May)	10,532,294 (16th May)	11,130,528 (30th April)	11,423,600 (March)	11,113,800 (June)
Maximum GOVERNMENT PAPER CURRENCY outstanding	£	326	330	340	343	338	339
Minimum ditto	£	67,316	73,401	80,004	83,518	84,508	90,084
Number of Depositors in Savings Banks	£	1,746,793	1,895,432	1,936,193	1,925,335	1,912,401	2,057,639
Amount deposited in Savings Banks	£	25	25	24	23	22	22
Average of each Deposit	£	9,936	148,659	40,741	10,858 (Decrease.)	12,934 (Decrease.)	145,238
Net addition to Deposits	£	1,325,300	1,679,300	2,169,000	2,042,500	2,041,700	1,679,000
Cash Reserve at the BANK OF FRANCE in December of each year—in 000's of francs	£	—	—	—	—	—	—

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE II.—Sea-borne Trade for the Year (Principal Articles arranged in order of their declared value.)

No.	EX-PORTS.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	
1	OPIMUM—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Chests.	94,746	88,350	96,870	92,820	91,306
	Value - - - - -	- £	11,956,972	11,148,426	12,404,748	12,374,355	12,933,679
	Average declared value per chest, in Rupees	- Rs.	1,262	1,261	1,281	1,333	1,415
2	COTTON—						
	Raw—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwt.	5,600,086	5,009,788	4,557,914	3,459,077	2,966,060
	Value - - - - -	- £	15,257,342	13,278,964	11,746,184	9,383,534	7,919,046
	Average declared value per lb.—	{ Annas Pence, at average exchange	As. 3 11 5·40	As. 3 9 5·13	As. 3 8 4·71	As. 3 10 4·98	As. 3 10 4·73
	Twist and Yarn—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Lbs.	2,834,725	6,228,511	7,926,713	15,600,291	21,332,966
	Value - - - - -	- £	147,562	266,951	367,303	682,059	886,491
	Average declared value per lb. - - - - -	- Annas.	As. 8 4	As. 6 10	As. 7 5	As. 7 0	As. 6 7
	Other manufactures—Value	- £	364,812	396,472	445,079	460,674	311,466
	Average declared value per yard—	{ Grey or unbleached Coloured, printed, or dyed	- Annas. —	As. 2 6 As. 4 9	As. 2 6 As. 5 3	As. 2 3 As. 4 10	As. 2 1 As. 4 1
	Percentage of manufactures on whole value exported	- "	3·25	4·76	6·47	10·85	15·11
3	RICE AND PADDY—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwt.	17,392,938	20,416,032	19,914,334	18,428,386	21,537,320
	Value - - - - -	- £	4,765,334	5,311,095	5,815,221	6,950,276	8,973,720
	Average declared value of husked rice per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	2 0 10 5·11	2 2 3 4·70	2 15 1 5·02	3 12 6 6·55	4 4 1 7·5
4	JUTE—						
	Raw and manufactured—Value	- £	3,485,522	3,294,521	3,356,124	4,289,241	4,898,552
	Average declared value of raw jute per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	5 14 7 10·94	5 6 2 9·72	5 13 1 9·94	6 7 3 11·18	6 5 3 10·9
	Percentage of manufactures on whole value exported	- "	6·85	14·85	21·43	17·97	22·6
5	SEEDS—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwt.	6,074,756	10,506,822	9,582,865	12,187,020	7,000,000
	Value - - - - -	- £	3,235,950	5,461,982	5,319,124	7,360,284	4,675,056
	Average declared value of linseed per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	5 0 0 9·27	5 4 6 9·52	5 5 11 9·17	5 13 10 10·16	6 3 1 10·1
6	TEA—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Lbs.	21,137,087	24,361,599	27,784,124	33,459,075	34,431,371
	Value - - - - -	- £	1,937,429	2,166,417	2,607,425	3,044,571	3,195,880
	Average declared value per lb.—	{ Annas Shillings, at average exchange	As. 14 8 1·70	As. 14 3 1·60	As. 15 0 1·60	As. 14 6 1·57	As. 14 1 1·5
7	HIDES AND SKINS—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- No.	18,162,851	19,433,332	19,792,877	22,916,317	21,238,444
	Value - - - - -	- £	2,677,767	2,943,575	2,998,684	3,756,888	3,096,940
	Percentage of dressed or manufactured to whole value	- "	18·87	40·44	49·77	48·29	49·4
8	INDIGO—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwts.	81,466	110,392	100,384	120,605	106,631
	Value - - - - -	- £	2,576,302	2,875,062	3,962,785	3,494,334	2,969,820
	Average declared value per cwt.—	{ Rupees Sterling, at average exchange	316 3 10 29·27	260 7 0 23·48	295 2 4 25·19	289 11 9 25·09	281 11 7 20·5
9	COFFEE—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwts.	311,831	371,986	302,489	297,327	311,500
	Value - - - - -	- £	1,305,335	1,627,027	1,345,822	1,338,439	1,545,560
	Average declared value per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	41 13 9 77·51	43 11 10 78·88	44 7 10 75·97	45 0 9 77·98	45 12 7 74·9
10	WOOL—						
	Raw and manufactured—Value	- £	1,159,086	1,295,193	1,293,490	1,151,518	1,243,571
	Average declared value of raw wool per lb.—	{ Annas Pence, at average exchange	As. 7 2 9·99	As. 7 4 9·95	As. 7 2 9·22	As. 6 6 8·44	As. 6 7 7·8
11	SILK—						
	Raw and manufactured—Value	- £	998,450	656,728	1,000,566	854,629	746,631
	Average declared value of raw silk per lb.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	4 10 1 8·57	3 2 9 5·72	5 7 8 9·25	4 10 5 8·06	4 1 1 7·4
12	WHEAT—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwts.	1,069,076	2,498,185	5,583,336	6,340,150	1,041,000
	Value - - - - -	- £	490,435	901,026	1,956,332	2,856,990	515,000
	Average declared value per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	4 9 5 8·50	3 9 8 6·51	3 8 0 5·93	4 8 1 7·80	4 11 1 7·5
13	SALTPETRE—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cwts.	553,330	415,080	466,218	389,002	359,000
	Value - - - - -	- £	501,468	348,949	381,706	379,002	367,000
	Average declared value per cwt.—	{ Rupees Shillings, at average exchange	9 1 0 16·78	8 6 7 15·16	8 3 0 13·96	9 1 11 16·88	9 7 11 15·5
14	LAC—						
	Value - - - - -	- £	254,011	755,747	536,976	362,048	258,700
15	TEAK WOOD—						
	Quantity - - - - -	- Cubic Tons.	42,868	60,612	45,108	56,939	37,000
	Value - - - - -	- £	328,564	440,618	332,764	406,652	271,000
	Average declared value per cubic ton—	{ Rupees Sterling, at average exchange	76 10 4 7·09	72 11 1 6·83	73 12 4 6·29	71 6 8 6·19	71 11 1 6·1
16	SUGAR—						
	Value - - - - -	- £	319,238	253,937	925,190	745,851	201,000

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

Sea-borne Trade for the Year, &c.—continued.

No.	IMPORTS.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.
1	COTTON—					
	Twist and Yarn—					
	Quantity - - - - - Lbs.	37,097,260	31,927,340	33,270,208	36,196,661	33,145,651
	Value - - - - - £	3,157,780	2,794,769	2,733,535	2,850,616	2,779,774
	Average declared value	—	14·00	13·14	12·60	13·42
	per lb. - - - - - { Pence at average exchange		1s. 6·93d.	1s. 4·83d.	1s. 4·37d.	1s. 4·57d.
	Other manufactures—					
	Value - - - - - £	16,263,560	16,463,875	16,012,932	17,332,639	14,137,694
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS.—Gross Imports - - - £	19,421,340	19,258,644	18,746,467	20,183,255	16,917,468
	Re-exports—					
	Twist and Yarn—					
	Quantity - - - - - Lbs.	781,220	792,668	539,539	934,437	754,648
	Value - - - - - £	56,249	57,424	58,423	62,733	51,217
	Other manufactures—					
	Value - - - - - £	1,061,727	984,105	1,064,392	1,089,614	1,132,627
	Total Re-exports - - - - - £	1,117,976	1,041,529	1,122,815	1,152,347	1,183,844
	TOTAL COTTON GOODS.—Net Imports - - - £	18,303,364	18,217,115	17,623,652	19,030,908	15,733,624
2	METALS - - - - - Value £	2,607,122	3,310,452	3,721,007	3,736,958	3,372,903
3	SILK (Raw and Manufactured) - - - - - " "	1,583,405	1,404,235	1,037,957	1,485,550	1,496,487
4	RAILWAY PLANT AND ROLLING STOCK - - - - - " "	780,867	1,079,105	1,194,145	1,727,560	1,491,831
5	SUGAR - - - - - " "	516,564	895,929	403,607	798,036	1,480,880
6	LIQUORS - - - - - " "	1,636,568	1,702,197	1,585,345	1,683,655	1,372,487
7	PROVISIONS - - - - - " "	363,727	717,234	664,938	861,116	990,530
8	WOOLLEN MANUFACTURES - - - - - " "	557,585	1,119,274	911,890	955,142	961,666
9	MACHINERY AND MILL-WORK - - - - - " "	1,185,943	1,439,921	963,504	873,960	893,875
10	COAL (excluding coke and patent fuel)—					
	Quantity - - - - - Tons	360,252	388,480	523,384	603,731	473,027
	Value - - - - - £	685,720	647,562	918,309	1,004,942	881,444
	Average declared value	—	19·03	16·67	17·54	18·64
	per ton— { Rupees		34·94	31·01	30·34	28·83
	Shillings, at average exchange					
11	SALT —					
	Quantity - - - - - Tons	277,085	365,254	298,776	254,231	274,182
	Value - - - - - £	755,771	601,146	430,895	401,366	593,621
	Average declared value	—	27·28	16·45	14·42	15·78
	per ton— { Rupees		50·51	29·66	24·62	27·35
	Shillings, at average exchange					
12	APPAREL - - - - - Value £	620,456	634,256	542,860	579,106	546,089
13	SPICES - - - - - " "	179,126	395,988	432,991	488,884	509,043

TABLE III.—Sea-borne Trade for the first Ten Months (Principal Articles arranged in order of their Declared Value).

	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.
	£	£	£	£	£
Value of commodities exported, excluding gold and silver - - -	46,309,370	48,265,519	52,210,342	47,821,206	51,522,819
Value of commodities imported, excluding gold and silver - - -	30,830,219	30,408,746	34,457,474	32,426,305	33,557,095
Excess Exports - - - - -	15,479,151	17,856,773	17,752,868	15,394,901	17,965,724
Net imports of silver - - - - -	966,336	5,628,814	13,117,467	2,187,577	6,680,763
Net imports of gold - - - - -	1,486,222	— 410,234	278,765	— 482,078	1,388,535
TOTAL NET IMPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER - - -	2,452,558	5,218,580	13,396,232	1,705,499	8,069,298
GRAND TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF ALL KINDS - - -	83,124,766	91,365,735	104,112,057	88,090,522	96,544,010

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE III.—Sea-borne Trade for the first Ten Months, &c.—continued.

No.	EXPORTS.	TEN MONTHS, 1ST APRIL TO 31ST JANUARY.					
		1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.	
1	OPIUM -	Quantity - - - - Chests	73,095	81,613	77,387	76,165	91,081
		Value - - - - £	9,186,788	10,490,687	10,264,066	10,917,614	12,299,001
		Average value per chest - Rs.	1,256-13-3	1,285-6-8	1,326-5-3	1,433-6-8	1,350-5-5
2	COTTON, RAW	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	4,295,871	3,561,477	2,585,377	2,281,507	2,895,909
		Value - - - - £	11,476,987	8,968,014	6,949,554	6,149,132	7,992,393
		Average value per lb. - Rs.	0-3-9	0-3-7	0-3-10	0-3-10	0-3-11
	MANUFACTURES—						
	Twist and Yarn	Quantity - - - - lbs.	4,587,225	6,817,270	12,779,989	18,306,631	20,445,445
		Value - - - - £	196,768	316,636	558,913	767,575	854,667
		Average value per lb. - Rs.	0-6-10	0-7-5	0-6-11	0-6-8	0-6-8
	Other manufactures—Value - - - £	326,201	375,860	392,895	431,844	420,624	
	TOTAL COTTON (RAW AND MANUFACTURED) - £	11,999,956	9,660,510	7,901,362	7,348,651	9,267,684	
3	RICE AND PADDY.	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	13,045,994	11,658,224	10,186,650	12,420,606	12,507,197
		Value - - - - £	3,549,719	3,397,812	4,017,310	5,699,274	5,149,989
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	2-11-6	2-14-8	3-15-1	4-9-5	4-1-11
4	JUTE (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - £	2,639,630	2,895,432	3,679,332	4,076,573	4,539,642	
5	SEEDS -	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	8,514,379	8,559,142	11,239,493	6,357,845	5,767,116
		Value - - - - £	4,414,548	4,688,529	6,758,930	4,089,485	3,764,394
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	5-2-11	5-7-8	6-0-2	6-6-11	6-8-5
6	HIDES AND SKINS.	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	534,504	495,367	709,852	630,278	709,755
		Value - - - - £	2,378,801	2,309,783	2,990,696	2,455,043	2,786,059
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	44-8-1	46-10-0	42-2-1	38-15-2	39-4-1
7	TEA -	Quantity - - - - lbs.	21,254,915	25,186,248	30,306,610	30,692,313	34,243,539
		Value - - - - £	1,899,961	2,361,799	2,770,735	2,808,432	2,746,782
		Average value per lb. - Rs.	0-14-4	0-15-0	0-14-7	0-14-8	0-12-10
8	INDIGO -	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	78,004	83,443	90,577	64,514	78,339
		Value - - - - £	2,037,990	2,450,385	2,632,728	1,767,026	2,256,421
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	261-4-3	293-10-7	290-10-7	273-15-0	287-6-11
9	WOOL (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - £	1,061,452	1,079,667	939,198	1,049,930	1,007,621	
10	WHEAT -	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	2,155,626	4,839,290	6,206,669	1,035,857	1,814,566
		Value - - - - £	775,554	1,673,400	2,790,304	508,125	918,918
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	3-9-6	3-7-4	4-7-11	4-14-6	5-1-0
11	COFFEE -	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	164,692	168,552	191,693	201,626	188,080
		Value - - - - £	662,275	722,544	846,358	885,939	883,670
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	40-3-5	42-13-11	44-2-5	43-15-0	44-5-2
12	SILK (Raw and Manufactured)—Value - £	531,870	801,388	766,098	607,139	584,575	
13	SALTPETRE -	Quantity - - - - Cwts.	300,501	369,887	311,682	311,091	421,268
		Value - - - - £	254,955	302,734	304,068	296,222	366,482
		Average value per cwt. - Rs.	8-7-9	8-2-11	9-12-1	9-8-4	9-2-9
14	TEAK -	Quantity - - - - C. tons.	48,776	35,771	44,153	34,115	30,810
		Value - - - - £	356,332	263,504	311,678	247,752	222,878
		Average value per ton - Rs.	73-0-11	73-10-8	70-2-9	72-9-11	72-5-5
15	LAC - - - - - £	593,588	425,327	299,599	234,712	220,105	
16	SUGAR - - - - - £	94,465	425,940	447,616	184,724	156,533	

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE V.—Actual CAPITAL EXPENDITURE on RAILWAYS in 1878-79, and estimated Expenditure on such works in 1879-80 and 1880-81, and to the end of 1880-81.

	1878-79, Accounts.	1879-80, Regular Estimate.	1880-81, Budget Estimate.	To end of 1880-81.	Sanctioned Estimate.	Balance remaining to be spent.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
East Indian - - - - -	297,314	58,700	630,000	(a) 38,266,981	—	—
Rajputana - - - - -	359,296	248,000	172,000	3,545,000	3,267,000	—278,000
Western Rajputana - - - - -	344,633	681,000	385,000	1,649,000	1,604,000	—45,000
Sindia - - - - -	241,264	130,000	100,000	893,000	904,000	11,000
Holkar - - - - -	—73,865	36,000	19,000	1,260,000	1,246,000	—14,000
Neemuch - - - - -	226,255	278,000	339,000	1,786,000	2,202,000	416,000
Wurdah Coal - - - - -	11,027	15,000	—	501,000	541,000	40,000
Nagpur and Chattisgarh - - - - -	106,300	250,000	217,000	593,000	837,000	244,000
Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley - - - - -	121,375	40,000	10,000	1,262,000	1,261,000	—1,000
Northern Bengal - - - - -	386,180	129,000	60,000	2,139,000	1,945,000	—194,000
Tirhoot - - - - -	20,850	27,000	15,000	565,000	600,000	35,000
Patna and Gya - - - - -	250,105	73,000	25,000	350,000	404,000	54,000
Nalhati - - - - -	6,968	—1,000	—1,000	32,000	36,000	4,000
Calcutta and South-Eastern - - - - -	14,069	—1,000	—2,000	672,000	739,000	67,000
Cawnpore and Furruckabad - - - - -	59,715	154,000	68,000	282,000	322,000	40,000
Ghazipur and Dildarnaggar - - - - -	2,653	44,000	5,000	55,000	65,000	10,000
Muttra-Hatras - - - - -	3,740	1,000	—	110,000	125,000	15,000
Muttra-Achneyra - - - - -	5,311	—	55,000	60,000	90,000	30,000
Dhond and Manmad - - - - -	359,469	112,000	100,000	1,124,000	1,350,000	226,000
Indus Valley - - - - -	816,105	304,000	200,000	6,295,000	7,180,000	885,000
Punjab Northern - - - - -	369,905	663,000	303,000	4,053,000	3,808,000	—245,000
Fluctuations in Store Balances - - - - -	—166,725	—243,000	—80,000	155,000	—	—155,000
Reserve - - - - -	—	—	242,000	242,000	—	—242,000
	3,464,630	2,940,000	2,232,000	27,623,000	28,526,000	903,000
Deduct PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS OUTLAY in- cluded in the above - - - - -	3,327,888	2,608,000	1,982,000	26,533,000	—	—
Balance ORDINARY OUTLAY - - - - -	136,742	332,000	250,000	1,090,000	—	—
Railways constructed wholly from Ordinary Funds—						
Patri Salt Railway - - - - -	—	—	—	81,000	90,000	9,000
Frontier Railways chargeable to Army - - - - -	—	1,440,000	2,040,000	3,480,000	—	—
Total ORDINARY - - - - -	136,742	1,772,000	2,290,000	4,651,000	—	—
GRAND TOTAL - - - - -	3,464,630	4,380,000	4,272,000	31,184,000	—	—

(a)—£6,550,000 added on account of premium added to the Capital of the East Indian Railway on the purchase being effected.

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE VI.—Actual Capital Expenditure on works of Irrigation, &c., for which Capital and Revenue Accounts are kept, in 1878-79, and estimated expenditure on such works in 1879-80, 1880-81, and to the end of 1880-81, &c.

	1878-79 Actuals.	1879-80 Regular Estimates.	1880-81 Budget- Estimates.	TO END OF 1880-81.			Estimated cost (current sanctions.)	Balance of current sanctions remaining to be spent.
				Outlay against current sanctions.	Outlay against sanctions that have expired.	Total.		
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS.								
Orissa Canals - - - - -	56,266	78,000	44,000	1,953,300	—	1,953,300	1,931,000	—
Midnapore Canal - - - - -	27,817	7,300	15,500	755,800	—	755,800	708,000	12,200
Tidal Canal - - - - -	—	—	—	177,300	—	177,300	177,000	—
Sone Canals - - - - -	171,768	139,700	80,500	2,298,500	—	2,298,500	2,736,000	437,500
Ganges Canal - - - - -	61,708	30,000	69,500	743,825	2,343,275	3,087,100	1,021,000	277,175
Agra " - - - - -	6,587	5,000	7,500	786,800	—	786,800	801,000	14,200
Lower Ganges Canal - - - - -	157,693	151,100	133,000	1,688,100	—	1,688,100	2,473,000	784,900
Western Jumna " - - - - -	79,438	58,100	65,000	462,000	312,000	774,000	722,000	260,000
Bari Doab " - - - - -	11,376	10,000	5,000	1,509,600	—	1,509,600	1,652,000	142,400
Other projects - - - - -	233,945	318,200	220,000	—	—	4,955,600	—	—
TOTAL -	806,693	797,400	630,000	—	—	17,086,100	—	—
Deduct Ordinary outlay on Productive Public Works included above.	11,984	—	—	—	—	5,306,300	—	—
NET TOTAL -	794,654	797,400	630,000	—	—	12,679,800	—	—
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION WORKS.								
<i>(Not classed as Productive Public Works.)</i>								
Eastern Jumna Canal - - - - -	1,511	9,700	10,000	69,000	204,000	273,000	139,000	70,000
Other projects - - - - -	105,653	134,600	95,800	—	—	2,294,900	—	—
Ordinary outlay on Productive Public Works - - - - -	11,984	—	—	—	—	5,306,300	—	—
TOTAL -	119,148	144,300	105,800	—	—	7,874,200	—	—
Deduct Outlay against the grant for Productive Public Works or works not admitted to the category of Productive Public Works - - - - -	—3	—	—	—	—	255,200	—	—
NET TOTAL -	119,151	144,300	105,800	—	—	7,619,000	—	—
GRAND TOTAL -	913,805	941,700	735,800	—	—	20,298,800	—	—

APPENDIX.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

TABLE VIII.—Gross earnings, working expenses and net earnings of works of Irrigation, &c., for which Capital and Revenue Accounts are kept, to end of 1878-79, with Regular Estimates for 1879-80 and Budget Estimates for 1880-81.

	ACTUALS.					Regular Estimates, 1879-80.	Budget Estimates, 1880-81.
	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.		
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC WORKS.							
GROSS DIRECT REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	4,848	4,549	7,456	16,110	18,200	27,000	28,500
Midnapore Canal	11,622	11,111	13,689	17,009	17,071	22,100	26,000
Tidal Canal	5,280	2,293	4,503	6,228	6,079	6,100	6,100
Sone Canals	—	5,900	7,319	10,130	43,793	51,500	56,000
Ganges Canal	201,089	212,882	220,154	256,453	261,114	271,500	245,000
Agra	55	3,709	8,952	21,467	42,633	35,900	43,500
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	—	9,100	18,000
Western Jumna	91,290	100,872	87,813	89,210	118,056	117,400	114,000
Bari Doab	64,668	77,189	59,270	56,903	80,606	98,400	108,400
Other projects	10,462	11,984	10,036	25,372	25,748	27,900	35,100
TOTAL	390,222	429,670	425,201	602,882	613,270	606,900	680,600
INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Ganges Canal	41,915	62,580	64,279	72,290	67,181	66,900	66,900
Agra	—	—	—	4,509	—	—	—
Western Jumna Canal	37,256	40,128	38,593	37,376	10,937	21,700	11,700
Bari Doab	14,825	16,653	4,879	4,879	17,738	14,700	10,000
Other projects	24,201	20,345	25,966	27,789	31,078	606,200	614,000
TOTAL	118,087	139,706	133,517	163,867	128,934	709,500	702,000
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	4,848	4,549	7,456	10,110	18,200	27,000	28,500
Midnapore Canal	11,622	11,111	13,689	17,009	17,071	22,100	26,000
Tidal Canal	5,280	2,293	4,503	6,228	6,079	6,100	6,100
Sone Canals	—	5,900	7,319	10,130	43,793	51,500	56,000
Ganges Canal	243,003	275,462	284,433	322,743	328,295	338,400	311,000
Agra	55	3,709	8,952	25,976	42,633	35,900	43,500
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	—	9,100	18,000
Western Jumna	128,546	141,000	126,406	130,586	128,993	139,100	125,700
Bari Doab	79,298	93,842	63,949	68,806	98,344	118,100	118,400
Other projects	34,763	32,329	42,002	53,101	56,926	634,100	649,100
TOTAL	608,300	660,385	658,719	656,749	740,204	1,376,400	1,388,200
WORKING EXPENSES.							
Orissa Canals	10,643	20,702	21,466	21,607	23,909	25,100	29,700
Midnapore Canal	13,043	16,740	17,128	20,382	17,283	12,900	12,000
Tidal Canal	3,453	3,904	1,243	3,056	2,318	2,700	2,400
Sone Canals	—	11,543	19,559	25,241	37,651	41,300	32,800
Ganges Canal	97,323	105,462	105,040	97,870	96,991	102,100	94,600
Agra	4,576	8,319	11,613	15,792	18,859	19,700	20,100
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	450	9,100	21,100
Western Jumna	33,374	37,516	38,937	41,873	51,436	46,100	40,100
Bari Doab	33,746	48,094	55,305	62,398	41,543	40,500	46,700
Other projects	41,837	98,418	92,605	86,239	91,710	106,300	92,600
TOTAL	247,495	360,758	363,356	364,458	391,550	411,800	398,000
NET REVENUE.							
Orissa Canals	-14,795	-16,213	-14,010	-5,497	-5,709	1,900	-1,200
Midnapore Canal	-1,421	-5,429	-3,429	-3,373	-212	9,200	13,100
Tidal Canal	1,836	-1,011	3,260	3,172	3,761	3,400	3,700
Sone Canals	—	-6,453	-12,041	-15,111	6,712	10,200	23,200
Ganges Canal	146,680	170,000	179,393	224,873	231,304	236,300	217,300
Agra Canal	-4,621	-4,610	-2,061	10,184	23,774	16,200	23,400
Lower Ganges Canal	—	—	—	—	-450	—	-3,100
Western Jumna Canal	94,072	103,484	87,469	94,713	77,557	93,000	85,600
Bari Doab Canal	45,547	45,748	8,784	16,408	60,801	60,600	71,700
Other projects	-7,084	-66,089	-50,003	-35,078	-31,884	527,800	556,500
TOTAL	260,814	218,627	105,363	202,201	368,654	964,600	990,200
IRRIGATION AND NAVIGATION WORKS. (Not classed as Productive Public Works.)							
GROSS DIRECT REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	61,111	59,249	56,541	57,563	63,108	72,300	60,800
Other projects	22,741	20,053	29,596	10,353	23,908	29,800	30,200
TOTAL	83,852	79,302	86,137	76,016	87,106	102,200	90,600
INDIRECT REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	16,980	22,152	22,163	22,680	22,153	22,200	22,200
Other projects	65,825	131,608	123,480	125,987	194,131	187,000	222,000
TOTAL	112,814	163,760	145,633	148,667	156,284	209,200	246,100
(TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT REVENUE.)							
Eastern Jumna Canal	78,100	81,401	78,694	80,243	85,261	95,100	82,500
Other projects	118,290	151,601	153,076	145,340	168,039	216,900	253,100
TOTAL	196,396	233,062	231,770	225,583	243,300	311,400	335,600
WORKING EXPENSES.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	20,171	23,027	21,474	20,357	20,415	18,700	19,600
Other projects	95,433	108,447	108,489	108,822	95,925	91,500	94,500
TOTAL	116,104	131,074	129,963	130,179	116,340	110,200	113,800
NET REVENUE.							
Eastern Jumna Canal	57,929	58,374	57,220	59,886	64,846	76,400	62,900
Other projects	22,863	42,714	44,587	45,518	35,514	124,800	158,800
TOTAL	80,292	101,088	101,807	105,404	127,050	201,200	221,700

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE.

NOTIFICATION.

Fort William, the 24th February 1880.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 23 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Governor General in Council has exempted the following articles from the duties of Customs to which they are liable under Schedule B of the Indian Tariff Act, 1875 :—

INDIGO, all sorts.

LAC, all sorts.

This Notification shall take effect on and after the 25th February 1880.

R. B. CHAPMAN,

Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 20.

EXTRACTS FROM A RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, February 24th, 1880, No. 985 (Financial).

Para. 121. The net cost of the military operations in Afghanistan recorded in the accounts of 1878-79 is 676,381*l.*, a close approximation to the estimate (670,000*l.*) made in paragraph 142 of the last financial statement. Against this must be set the gains which may be attributed to these operations under the heads of *Railways* and *Telegraphs*. It is not possible to estimate with precision either these gains, or, on the other hand, the extra expenditure in the general administration, both military and civil, in consequence of the rise of prices in Upper India attendant upon these operations. But the ultimate net total cost of the operations in Afghanistan recorded in the accounts of 1878-79 may be fairly estimated at 575,000*l.*

130. The original estimates provided for an abnormal military expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* for the war in Afghanistan (*see* para. 262 of the last statement). In consequence of the renewal of hostilities, that provision has now been increased to 4,886,000*l.*, as follows :—

					£
Military expenditure proper	-	-	-	-	3,137,000
Frontier railways	-	-	-	-	1,670,000
Post office †	-	-	-	-	37,000
Telegraphs	-	-	-	-	42,000
					<hr/>
Total	-	-	-	-	4,886,000

Of which 4,656,000*l.* is provided under 36, *Army*, and 230,000*l.* under 32, *Railways*.

Moreover, instead of 10,000*l.*, as granted, a famine expenditure of 99,000*l.* is now estimated. So that the regular estimates provide for an abnormal expenditure amounting to 4,985,000*l.*, as follows :—

					£
War	-	-	-	-	4,886,000
Famine	-	-	-	-	99,000
					<hr/>
Total	-	-	-	-	4,985,000

On the other hand, it is estimated that the railway and telegraph revenues are net better by reason of the war than they would otherwise have been by about 300,000*l.* Then, but for war and famine, the regular estimates would have shown a surplus revenue, as compared with ordinary expenditure, amounting to 4,769,000*l.* or about 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling.

† Besides expenditure on military train.

171. 36 & XXIX. *Army*.—Net expenditure, 20,143,000*l.*; increase, 2,768,000*l.*

This is in consequence of the renewal of hostilities in Afghanistan, and, in particular, to provide for the construction of the railways to Kandahar and Peshawar. The original grant included 2,000,000*l.* for the operations in Afghanistan. The regular estimate contains the following provisions:—

	£
Military expenditure proper	3,137,000
Frontier railways	1,440,000
Construction of telegraphs	42,000
Post office	37,000
Total	4,656,000

Apart from these operations, the regular estimate is for a net expenditure of 15,487,000*l.*, being in excess of the estimate by 112,000*l.*, which is due to high prices.

187. The estimated expenditure in 1880–81 includes grants for 4,360,000*l.* for the military operations in Afghanistan, as follows:—

	£
Military operations proper	1,978,000
Frontier railways	2,270,000
Telegraphs	72,000
Post office †	40,000
Total	4,360,000

Of which 4,130,000*l.* is shown under 36, *Army*, and 230,000*l.* under 32, *Railways*.

Against this must be set an improvement in the railway and telegraph revenues, estimated at 300,000*l.*, leaving the net charge for the war upon the estimates of 1880–81 at 4,060,000*l.* It may be safely said that, but for the war expenditure, the true surplus upon the estimates, to compare with the standard surplus of 2,000,000*l.* (less famine and other abnormal expenditure), would not have been less than 4,000,000*l.*

236. 36 & XXIX. *Army*.—Net expenditure, 19,460,000*l.*; decrease, 683,000*l.* Apart from the war in Afghanistan, the estimate is for 15,330,000*l.*; decrease, 157,000*l.*, which is based upon the expectation that prices will fall. Provision is made here for the operations in Afghanistan as follows:—

	£
Military expenditure proper	1,978,000
Frontier railways	2,040,000
Telegraphs	72,000
Post office	40,000
Total	4,130,000

Besides 230,000*l.* under 32 railways.

Thus the whole cost of the military operations in Afghanistan are now estimated as follows:—

	£
In 1878–79	676,381
1879–80	4,886,000
1880–81	4,360,000
Total	9,922,381

Of which—

	£
For the frontier railways	3,940,000
For the military operations proper, including telegraphs and post office	5,982,381

† Besides the military transport train worked by the post office for the military authorities.

The net improved revenues attributed to the war amount to 701,381*l.*, as follows :—

	<i>£</i>
1878-79 - - - -	101,381
1879-80 - - - -	300,000
1880-81 - - - -	300,000
	701,381 to the end of 1880-81.

So that the net cost of the war is now estimated at 9,221,000*l.*, or say 9¼ millions, of which about 3¾ millions (net) may be set down for the railways, and 5½ millions (net) for the military operations proper.

All stores bought expressly for the war are included in these estimates, but not the wear and tear of equipments or the expenditure and waste of stores in excess of the normal amounts. It has been found impossible to obtain any estimate of the money equivalent of such expenditure and waste. It occurs not so much in the article of ammunition, of which the expenditure is never large, as in camp equipage, and cannot be ascertained till the campaign is over. Meanwhile the reserve stores in the arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost of replenishment being, as usual, charged as current expenditure.

No. 21.

EXTRACTS of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, February 25th, 1880,
No. 81 (Financial).

Paragraph 9. Our decision to endeavour to carry on the public service during 1880/81 without a loan may entail upon us some inconvenience in the course of the year, by reason of the depletion of our balances. But we deliberately determined to face this inconvenience, in order that we might announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of our finances. We anticipate no difficulty in obtaining temporary assistance during the year, in case of need; and we shall not hesitate to propose a loan, if, despite our present anticipations to the contrary, events show that we ought to increase our funded debt.

* * * * *

Paragraph 11. We have no further objection to make to your Lordship's requisition upon us for 16,900,000*l.*, to be remitted by bills in 1880/81. In the press of business, we had overlooked the fact that the remittance of even this large sum will hardly more than suffice for the current requirements of the Home Treasury. We consider that we should never willingly, or only to support the exchange, allow our remittances to fall below this standard. It may be proper that we should use discretion in going beyond this standard, and choose our opportunity for a reduction of our sterling debt with discrimination; but it must in our opinion seldom, if ever, be proper for us to seek temporary relief, whether from the drain upon our treasuries or the losses of an unfavourable exchange, by remitting less than the current requirements of the Home Treasury, and thus increasing our sterling debt.

* * * * *

Paragraph 14. Your Lordship will observe that, in obedience to your instructions, we have entered under the head of the Army, instead of under their appropriate heads, all the charges which can be traced to the war. Doubtless this method is, in some respects, convenient; nevertheless, we deem it inconsistent with the principles upon which our accounts are classified, and destructive of the integrity of the heads under which the transferred charges would, but for your Lordship's instructions, have appeared. Accordingly, as already intimated, we should have preferred to follow the course taken in the case of famine, namely, to leave all charges to fall naturally under their appropriate heads of record without regard to their origin, and then, without interference with the Finance and Revenue Accounts, to extract the revenues and charges belonging to the war into a separate account or statement. We shall still be glad to be authorised to dispose of these charges in this manner, in the Accounts of 1879/80 and in future Estimates.

No. 22.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 13, 1880.

We were not prepared for your drawing more than eight weeks at 45 lacs, and earnestly hope that you will now reduce as much as possible. We shall not be able to meet continued drawings at 45 or even 40 lacs without borrowing, which we are extremely anxious to avoid as long as possible.

No. 23.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 15, 1880.

Total drawings 1880/81, for which you prepared in Budget, require 39 lacs weekly. If we reduce now, we cannot make up deficiency later. With 14 millions cash balance, why cannot you meet 45 now?

No. 24.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 17, 1880.

Your Lordship's telegram 15th. Opening balance 14 crores estimate only; remains to be seen whether it will be realized. Estimated closing balance only 11½ crores, which means only 8 crores in October, November. We have to meet constant military drain, ultimate aggregate amount of which quite uncertain. We cannot therefore too strongly deprecate your drawing at outset more than average 39 lacs, and earnestly trust you may be able substantially to reduce more. Securely, in our present circumstances, we cannot drain our Treasury here, in order to remit in advance. Can you not increase your bills from November as easily as now?

No. 25.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 20, 1880.

Experience shows large demand in November cannot be reckoned on. Important to draw when market is good; and, for interest of India, must continue 45 while present large demand lasts. Apparently nothing new in situation since Budget was published.

No. 26.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, March 23, 1880.

Your telegram 20th. (1.) We made no provision for any advance. (2.) Since estimate was framed, we have sent to form reserves, and to accumulate immediately six months' supplies for troops in field. (3.) Abnormally large opium crops expected. All phenomena indicating correctness of my telegram 13th. Cost of war still quite uncertain. We cannot possibly acquiesce in a continued accumulation of 45 allotments.

No. 27.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, March 24, 1880.

Yours yesterday. Most anxious to meet all reasonable wishes, but 16,900,000*l.* essential, and agreed to in your Letter 81 of 25th February, and adopted in your Budget. In forecasting drawings necessary to obtain that sum, I feel reduction at this period would prevent our obtaining whole amount, as average cannot be drawn throughout summer. Nor can I borrow here without violating pledges given to Parliament. Refer to concluding passage of para. 52 of my Despatch 17th July last, and to para 9 of your Letter 81 of 25th February. You must obtain temporary assistance until you can raise a loan in India for Productive Works, which seems, from what you say, almost inevitable. If terms good to-day, I must continue drawing 45.

No. 28.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 8, 1880.

Outgoing from our treasury for the war very alarming, far exceeding estimate. Immediate loan highly objectionable; indeed, as we cannot now estimate amount necessary to carry us through year, essential to postpone loan till we can see our way more clearly. Our Budget arrangements were made on the confident assumption that weekly allotments of 45 lacs would not exceed 8. If you now continue such allotments we cannot answer for the consequences. Inconvenience may result hereafter. We consider it essential that you should reduce temporarily to at most 30 lacs. We feel no confidence that even this will give us sufficient relief. We shall ask you to enlarge again as soon as we can safely do so.

No. 29.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 8, 1880.
Telegraph immediately present state of your balances.

No. 30.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 9, 1880.

Yours 8th. Much surprised by contents. What has caused unexpected and excessive war demand? I reduce to 40 lacs in notice next week, but further sudden drop, in middle of busy season, to 30 lacs would excite much adverse criticism, and probably cause Indian securities to fall in value. Obtain temporary assistance to meet present pressure.

No. 31.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 10, 1880.

Balance end of February 13,103 lacs;* estimated balance end of March 1,260; April 1,075; May only 897 lacs; but such estimates are usually too unfavourable. Excessive military drain chiefly explains deficiency from the regular Estimate.

No. 32.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 13, 1880.

From yours 10th it appears there is an unexpected deficiency by end of May, when balances should be about same as at end of March, of $5\frac{1}{4}$ crores. Allowing 1 crore for excess bills and opium, there remains $4\frac{1}{4}$ crores. How is this accounted for? What is your present estimate of war expenditure, excluding railways, for 1879/80 and 1880/81, and what for each month from February to June 1880 inclusive? Please explain why estimated deficiency of $1\frac{1}{2}$ crores in March, and change in situation, were not reported sooner. As you evidently must have a loan, it is most important not to damage your credit by suddenly reducing drawings. Bills will, therefore, be advertised for 40 lacs for at least next two weeks. Surely this small addition of 10 lacs weekly over your proposed 30, and payable in May, cannot materially affect your position.

No. 33.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, April 15, 1880, No. 119 (Financial).†

MY LORD,

Para. 1. It is with much regret that I have found myself unable to accede to the request contained in your telegrams of the 13th, 17th and 23rd of March, for a reduction of the amount of bills which is now being weekly offered for sale; and I desire to draw the attention of your Government to the following considerations.

2. At the time of the pressure on your Treasury arising from the famine in Southern India, your difficulties were greatly relieved by the reduction of the drawings of the Secretary of State in Council. The balances of the Home Treasury were thereby brought down to an unusually low point; but the strain caused by the war last year prevented the remittance by you of the sum needed to replenish them. The arrangements made with regard to the payment of the East Indian Railway annuity and the dividend on the India 4 per cent. stock issued in exchange for that at 5 per cent. will, however, throw on the Home Treasury an additional expenditure of 920,000*l.* in April 1881, which, together with the other liabilities, will involve a payment of upwards of 1,900,000*l.* between the 1st and 5th of April in that and future years. In view of this state of affairs, it became evident that, considering the improved condition of your finances, it would not be prudent longer to delay the remittance from India of the amount required to bring the cash balances in the Home Treasury on the 31st of March 1881 up to a sum of about 2,000,000*l.*

3. Accordingly, in the estimate forwarded with my Despatch of the 11th of December last, No. 484, the cash balance on the 31st of March 1881 was taken at 1,958,525*l.* (which was altered to 1,985,825*l.* by my telegram of the 7th of

* Sic. ? Rs. 13,10,30,000.

† Approved by the Secretary of State in Council, April 13th.

February), and, for this purpose, it was calculated that 16,900,000*l.* must be remitted from India in the year 1880–81, at an *average* of 39 lacs a week.

4. On receiving that Despatch, your Excellency, in a Letter, dated the 7th of January, No. 9, requested me to reduce the demand to 16,000,000*l.*, and, in order to judge whether it was absolutely necessary that I should accede to the request, at the risk of great inconvenience in this country, I inquired at what amount you estimated your surplus in 1880–81, and your cash balance at the close of that year.

5. In reply, you telegraphed on the 14th of February that the surplus was estimated at about 40 lacs, and the balance in India on the 31st of March 1881 at 1,225 lacs, after borrowing 150 lacs. As I could see no reason why you should abstain from borrowing the full amount of 2½ crores which has been authorised for outlay on Productive Public Works, if it was needed to give you the requisite balance, I informed you, by a telegram of the 17th of February, that, holding that view, I considered your arguments not sufficient to justify me in borrowing here, even temporarily, which would be necessary if the drawings were reduced.

6. On receiving this decision, your Government determined to announce the Financial Estimate for the coming year, as reported in your Excellency's telegram of the 24th of February, as showing a surplus of 417,000*l.*, the drawings of the Home Government being taken at 16,900,000*l.*; and you added that "no loan" was "to be raised in coming year according to present intentions, unless events "not now foreseen occur, but power to borrow in case of need reserved." The closing balances would, however, be reduced to 11,444,000*l.*

7. In the 9th paragraph of your Letter of the 25th of February, No. 81, it is stated that this "decision to endeavour to carry on the public service during "1880–81 without a loan may entail upon us some inconvenience in the course "of the year, by reason of the depletion of our balances. But," you add, "we deliberately determined to face this inconvenience in order that we might "announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of our finances."

8. I find it difficult to reconcile with these words the request made in your telegram of the 13th of March, that I would reduce my drawings as much as possible, because you would "not be able to meet continued drawings at 45 or "even 40 lacs without borrowing."

9. In the 52nd paragraph of my Despatch of the 17th of July 1879, No. 261, I pointed out the importance of your "making such arrangements in future years "as will admit of the largest drawings at the time when your treasuries are at "the fullest, if the rate of exchange should then be favourable," as drawings on a large scale in the summer can never be relied on, and it is necessary that the heavier portion of the demand should be placed on the market in the height of the export season, if the average required throughout the year is to be preserved. In 1878 an allotment of 50 lacs was made each week, from the 6th of March to the 8th of May; and, similarly, in this year, having taken care that the total drawings in 1879–80 should not put a greater strain on your treasury than you were prepared to meet,* I deemed it essential that, with the prospect of a large trade and a rising rate of exchange, the opportunity of receiving in the month of April some considerable portion of the remittances required during the year should not be thrown away. Your available balances, moreover, as estimated for the 31st of March 1880, were at a higher point than they had been in recent years,†

* Drawings in 1879–80.

Original estimate	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	18,95,20,000
Revised estimate of 16th October 1879	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,94,52,059
Actual drawings :						Rs.	
Bills	-	-	-	-	-	18,35,00,000	
Gold	-	-	-	-	-	60,71,681	
Total	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	18,95,71,681

† Balances in India 31st March.

1877	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	12,75,06,980
1878	-	-	-	-	-	Rs.	14,49,83,020
Less Cash Subscriptions to Transfer Loan	-	-	-	-	-	1,40,94,800	
	-	-	-	-	-		13,08,88,220
1879	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,79,21,530
1880 (estimate)	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,19,30,750

and there seemed no reason why my demands should not be met for the time, your balances being subsequently replenished either by a loan for productive works, or by temporary assistance, which you state that you anticipate no difficulty in obtaining.

10. Your Excellency inquires whether it would not be possible to increase the bills from November as easily as now, but at that time of year the demand on account of the ensuing export season has scarcely commenced, and, as a matter of fact, it has been found impossible to be sure of obtaining even a moderate amount at that time, regardless of the rate at which tenders may be made.

11. I am thus forced to the conclusion that, unless the drawings are continued so long as there is a good demand for bills, there would be no alternative but to raise money by borrowing in England at a later period of the year. Such a step would, in my opinion, be far more damaging to the credit of the Government than the raising of a loan in India; and as, moreover, the necessity for it would manifestly have been caused by your refraining from strengthening your balances by the usual loan in India, while proceeding to incur an outlay of more than three millions sterling during the year on Productive Public Works, it would be alleged that it was the expenditure on such works which made the occasion for borrowing in this country, and hence the recommendations of the Select Committee of the House of Commons would have been disregarded, and the pledges given by Her Majesty's Government to Parliament would have been violated.

12. Independently, too, of these considerations, there are grave objections to any addition to the sterling debt. Many measures have been adopted in recent years which, though reducing the Military and Civil expenditure in India, have added considerably to the non-effective charges in this country; and the policy of constructing public works through the agency of the State, while greatly increasing the payments for stores purchased in England, has led to a discontinuance of the raising and deposit in the Home Treasury of railway capital which for many years aided the Government in meeting the demands. On extraordinary emergencies, such as the famine in Southern India, it may become impossible to avoid resorting to a loan in England, again increasing the expenditure for which remittances must be made from India. From these and similar causes, it has happened that the amount of bills which it has been necessary to offer for sale has risen from 6,789,473*l.* in 1864-65 to 13,939,095*l.* in 1872-73 (in neither of which years was any money raised by loan in this country), and is now further increased to 17,000,000*l.* (reduced to 15,000,000*l.* by the loan from the British Government) in 1879-80, and 16,900,000*l.* for 1880-81. Borrowing in England merely to reduce the amount of the Secretary of State's drawings, can only purchase temporary relief at the expense of greater embarrassment hereafter, and it must be obvious that, unless some reduction of the debt in England be made in seasons of financial prosperity, the time may come when it will be impossible to meet the increasing requirements of the Home Government by drafts on India.

13. I trust that you will find no serious difficulty in surmounting the present inconvenience caused by my decision, and that on another occasion your financial arrangements will be so made that no doubt may exist as to your power of meeting drawings of even 50 lacs a week at this period of the year, if the necessities of the Home Treasury and the condition of the market make it desirable to offer so large an amount.

14. I have only further to observe that it is, in my opinion, better that a moderate sum should be borrowed each year for productive works, than that the cash balances should be dangerously reduced at one season and be refilled by an unusually large loan in the following year.

15. Since this Despatch was written, I have received your Excellency's further telegram of the 8th instant, stating that the outgoing from your Treasury for the war is very alarming, far exceeding the estimate, and that it is, in your opinion, essential that the drawings should be temporarily reduced to at most 30 lacs a week, though you feel no confidence that even this will give you sufficient relief. Your telegram gave no information regarding the state of your balances, and I therefore inquired on the same day what is the present amount.

16. In the discussion which took place in the Legislative Council on the 2nd of March, your Excellency referred to the remarkable accuracy of your estimates of the expenditure on the war, so far as it had yet been possible to verify them; and I am not aware of any development of the military operations which was not foreseen, and should not have been provided for, two months ago, when the net cost

was estimated at 4,060,000*l.* during the year 1880–81, including the frontier railways, or about 2,000,000*l.* for the military operations proper.

17. Assuming, however, that, in addition to this outlay of 2,000,000*l.* during the whole year, you now find it probable that further expenditure to even the extent of another 2,000,000*l.* will be needed during the next six months, your balances can in July, if not earlier, be replenished by a loan of 2½ millions for Productive Public Works, and they will then, if in other respects your estimates prove correct, be higher than they were taken when Sir John Strachey made his Financial Statement.

18. Moreover, I am apprehensive that the sudden reduction of the drawings which you urge would impress the public with the belief that your estimates were untrustworthy, and that some emergency was anticipated which made it necessary for the Home Government to come to your assistance. I have, accordingly, not thought it right to invite tenders on the 21st instant for less than 40 lacs, but a further reduction will be made as soon as the position of the market and the requirements of the Home Treasury justify such a step.

19. The following telegram was sent to your Excellency on the 9th instant :—
 “ Yours 8th. Much surprised by contents. What has caused unexpected
 “ and excessive war demand? I reduce to 40 lacs in notice next week,
 “ but further sudden drop in middle of busy season to 30 lacs would excite
 “ much adverse criticism, and probably cause Indian securities to fall in value.
 “ Obtain temporary assistance to meet present pressure.”

I have, &c.

CRANBROOK.

No. 34.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 15th 1880.

Your Lordship's telegram 13th. Some mistake must have occurred in the transmission of my message of the 10th. Balances then telegraphed were, March 1,260 ; May 897 ; difference 363, not 525 lacs. Bills paid intermediately are a principal factor in the relation between March and May balances. In 1878 we paid 363, and balances fell 21 lacs. This year we expected, on the assumption that the 45 allotments would continue, to pay 405 lacs, besides which we estimated our war expenditure 125 lacs. We are carefully revising war estimate by our present information, and telegraph result soon. Balances telegraphed on your requisition on 10th were usual monthly estimate, compiled by the Comptroller from the returns of the Accountant General, which had been received only on the 9th. As already said, such estimates are ordinarily too low, and are useful only as general indication of the prospect of our resources. We will telegraph actual March balances in a fortnight. We will not object further to your drawing 40 lacs twice, and then reducing to 35, leaving for future consideration whether we can dispense with further reduction. We have ascertained that, in case of need meantime, Bengal Bank can give us temporary assistance. We must probably issue loan early in May for the full amount of our productive expenditure. Whether even this will suffice for the service of the year will depend on actual cost of the war.

No. 35.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 19th 1880.

Your explanation by no means accounts for whole anticipated reduction of balances from Budget estimate 1,419 lacs on 31st March. Send as soon as possible detailed letter, explaining wide deviation from original Budget. Telegraph proposals regarding loan, before announcing.

No. 36.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 20th 1880.

Until clearer idea can be formed of the probable course of events in Afghanistan, and probable date of our withdrawal from the country, which we are

most anxious to complete as quickly as possible, it is impossible to frame with any confidence revised estimate of the future and total cost of the war. The following statement of our present anticipation must be, therefore, taken with great reserve, and may hereafter require much correction :—

War expenditure in February and March estimated at 75 lacs monthly. Nevertheless, regular estimate of expenditure recorded in the account of last year may not be much exceeded, although we shall have adjusted as much as possible in the account of that year.

With regard to this year, it was hoped, when the Budget estimates were made, that the war expenditure would be more rapidly reduced by the withdrawal of our troops than has been since found possible. On the contrary, the number of troops has been greatly increased, in order to meet new combinations and probability of attack in various directions; and it is clear that troops cannot be withdrawn as soon as had been hoped.

Expenditure on carriage and supplies of all kinds has greatly increased. Prices have become enormous. Famine rates rule at Peshawur and Rawul Pindee. Probable result will be a large increase of expenditure over Budget estimate.

From April inclusive, monthly expenditure is now estimated at 50 lacs. If the war continues for six months on something like present scale, estimate of two crores may have to be increased to $5\frac{1}{2}$ or 6 crores, of which one crore may possibly not be recorded till next year. If the regular estimate of the expenditure to be recorded in the account of last year be exceeded, preceding estimate for two later years may be proportionately reduced; on the other hand, if the expenditure recorded in the account of last year is less than regular estimate, it may be increased.

We shall telegraph immediately about proposed loan.

No. 37.

MINUTE by MR. STANHOPE, Under Secretary of State for India, April 21, 1880,
on the Expenditure for the Afghan War.

LORD CRANBROOK,

ALTHOUGH our information is at present much too meagre to enable us to form any confident opinion, yet the recent financial telegrams from India appear to disclose a state of things which is disheartening, and comes upon the India Office as a complete surprise. It may be well at this juncture to place on record the information we possessed as to the expenditure for the Afghan War.

The Budget of 1879–80 had estimated the war expenditure in Afghanistan for 1878–79 at 670,000*l.*, and for 1879–80 at two millions. On the 9th of September 1879, after the commencement of renewed hostilities, a telegram from the Viceroy informed us that, “although it is of course impossible now to estimate future military expenditure in Afghanistan, it is desirable that Her Majesty’s Government should know that in all other respects our financial prospects seem to us very favourable.” And, after giving certain details of improvement, which were expected to result in a surplus of three millions, it is added, “We hope this will more than suffice to meet all probable additional expenditure in Afghanistan” in the year 1880–81.

On 24th December 1879 another telegram from the Viceroy informed us that the revised estimates for 1879–80 showed an improvement on the Budget estimate (apart from war) of no less than 3,819,000*l.*, so that, after allowing $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions for frontier railways, and one million for the war, in addition to the amount estimated in the Budget, the estimated deficit upon the year 1879–80 would be reduced from 1,395,000*l.* to 1,036,000*l.*

The estimates themselves, received on the 12th of January 1880, fully bore out these statements. But the letter enclosing them added :—

“4. The extra one million which we have entered under ‘Army,’ is, as yet, only a very rough forecast. Until the situation in Afghanistan is more settled than at present, and until we are in a position to determine our future policy in regard to that country, it is impossible to say, with any approach to accuracy, even what

the whole cost of the military operations there will be, much less how much will be brought to account during the current year.

"5. All that we can say at present is, that we estimate the whole cost of all the military operations in Afghanistan, original and renewed, to the end of the current year, 1879-80, at 3,600,000*l.*, of which about 600,000*l.* is recorded in the accounts of 1878-79."

In a private letter from Sir J. Strachey, dated 19th December 1879, and received in the middle of January, he adds, "Considering the nature of the data which have been at our disposal, the estimates of the cost of the military operations have hitherto been singularly near the truth, and they have erred rather on the side of being too high than too low."

Speaking at Hackney, on the 19th January 1880, I said of the estimates for the war that they "are made in India by gentlemen of undoubted integrity and financial reputation. . . Their statements have hitherto been singularly accurate, and I have no reason to suppose they will be otherwise than accurate for the future." And then I added, "We shall approach the Budget of next year (1880-81) without any apprehension whatever. And as regards the current year (1879-80), I believe that we shall be able to meet, not only the largely increased cost of operations of the Afghan war, but also all the charges for the frontier railways we are pushing on, which is no less than 2½ millions for the current year, and we shall be able to meet it, I say, out of surplus revenue."

On the 19th of February 1880, the Secretary of State in Council, in acknowledging the receipt of the revised estimates, stated that they "give, on the whole, a highly satisfactory view of your finances."

On the 24th of February a telegram from the Viceroy gave the details of the annual budget, as follows:—

"Results are highly favourable. In 1878-79, surplus 2,044,000*l.*; in 1879-80, surplus 119,000*l.*; budget estimate 1880-81, surplus 417,000*l.* Foregoing figures in each case are after paying from ordinary revenue all charges for famine, Afghan war, and frontier railways.

"War charges, 1878-79, 676,000*l.*; 1879-80, 3,216,000*l.*; 1880-81, 2,090,000*l.* Setting off increase railways and telegraph revenues, total net expenditure on war to end of 1880-81, 5¾ millions. Frontier railways, present year 1,670,000*l.*, next year 2,270,000*l.*; total, 3½ millions. . . . War estimates have hitherto proved very accurate, and are believed to be ample for all contingencies now contemplated."

The Financial Statement itself (received in London on March 12th) states:—

"8. The original estimates provided for an additional military expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* for the war in Afghanistan. If the war had ended with the treaty of Gundamak, I believe that this estimate would not have been exceeded. . . ."

"27. The estimates of the cost of the war must, of course, be to a great extent speculative; but they have been prepared with much care, and their accuracy up to the present time is highly creditable to Major Newmarch and the Military Department. There is no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low. To what extent it will be found hereafter that stores, chiefly camp equipage, have been expended and wasted and lost, we cannot possibly know accurately until the war is over; but everything bought for the war is included in the estimates, and the reserves in our arsenals are being maintained at their proper standard, the cost being charged for the present as current expenditure."

It will be seen that, whereas the revised estimates in December had shown that (apart from war) the prospects of 1879-80 had improved by no less than 3,819,000*l.*, the circumstances had so far changed in February that the improvement was estimated at 4,400,000*l.*, while the war expenditure payable in the financial year 1879-80 was expected to exceed the December estimate only by 216,000*l.* The estimate of war expenditure in 1880-81, including, as it did, the charge for further military operations, was, of course, of a more uncertain character. Upon this estimate, of course, various opinions have been expressed at the India Office; but as regards that for the year 1879-80 I never heard any doubt expressed there, and indeed it was in India alone that any data existed for framing either of them.

So satisfied did the Government of India appear to be with their estimates, that they not only remitted certain export duties, and unanimously resolved to abandon the proposed extension of the License Tax, but they also refused to

borrow anything at all, even in aid of the capital expenditure upon productive Public Works, and they pressed forward, as a charge upon the revenue of the year, an extensive system of frontier railways.

In the "Times" of Monday, 8th March, a long telegram described the debate on the budget which had taken place in Calcutta on the previous Tuesday, and the Viceroy in the course of his speech was reported to have said, "He now came to Mr. Gladstone's last allegation.* It was that the Indian Government had deliberately falsified its military accounts to conceal the real cost of the Afghan war." After expressing his indignation at the charge, he went on to add: "So far from seeking to conceal the true cost of the war, they had charged against it all stores and material, as well as the cost of frontier railways, telegraphs, and postal communication."

The text of the Viceroy's speech, since received, confirms this account, and he goes on to say: "Our estimates, so far as it has hitherto been possible to verify them, have proved to be remarkably accurate."

On the 12th of March there was a debate in the House of Commons on the cost of the Afghan war, when I took occasion in answer to Mr. Gladstone to deny the statement that the full cost of the war had not been put forward, and said that I believed that the Government of India "had put forward as honestly as any Government could, every item of expenditure that could possibly be included" in the cost.

Up to that time no information, either public or private, had reached us, which tended to show that the estimates for the war would be exceeded, and it was only on the 17th of March that the first note of alarm was sounded, in a telegram from the Viceroy which stated, "Opening balance, 14 crores, estimate only; remains to be seen whether it will be realized. . . . We have to meet constant military drain, ultimate aggregate amount of which quite uncertain." Even this telegram, as it referred only to an increase in our drawings from 40 to 45 lacs, did not seem to be very serious. At this time the annual migration to Simla was commencing, and Sir John Strachey had already left Calcutta.

On the 23rd of March we heard further, "cost of war still quite uncertain," and on the 8th of April, "outgoing from our Treasury for the war very alarming, far exceeding estimate." All these telegrams, with the answers to them, were, according to the usual course, submitted to the Finance Committee and your Council.

It is no part of my present purpose to make any comment on these recent telegrams, which may, I hope, prove to be exaggerated, but as to which much further information is required.

EDWARD STANHOPE.

No. 38.

[TELEGRAM FROM THE VICEROY, April 21, 1880.]

With reference to my telegram of yesterday, we consider it essential to raise as quickly as possible loan of 330 lacs of rupees, being full estimated expenditure on productive works. For the reason given in our Budget Despatch we propose $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loan. Draft notification will reach Financial Secretary 6th May, which we propose publishing 7th. Please publish simultaneously, substituting amount herein telegraphed, leaving all dates unchanged.

We hope Her Majesty's Government will borrow in London anything that may be necessary additional during the year, if, in consequence of prolongation of the war, further help becomes unavoidable. May we promise that nothing more will be borrowed in India?

* This, Mr. Gladstone, on 12th March 1880, explains to have never been "his allegation. It was the allegation of others, given to him with such an appearance of truth that he thought it right to mention it publicly, in order that if inaccurate it might be contradicted."

No. 39.

DESPATCH to the Government of India, April 22, 1880, No. 133 (Financial).

MY LORD,

Para. 1. IN the 16th paragraph of my Despatch of the 15th instant, No. 119, I mentioned that I had found it necessary to telegraph, on the 8th of April, for information regarding the present amount of your cash balances, and in the last paragraph I referred to the telegram which I addressed to your Excellency on the following day, inquiring the cause of the unexpected and excessive war demand, and explaining that, in view of the importance of taking no step which should adversely affect Indian securities, I could not reduce the weekly drawings below 40 lacs at present.

2. On the 10th of April your Excellency telegraphed the balance at the end of February as "13,103 lacs," which I understand to mean Rs. 13,10,30,000. The estimate of your balances at the end of March was 1,260 lacs; at the end of April 1,075 lacs, and at the end of May only 897 lacs; but you added that "such estimates are usually too unfavourable." The excessive military drain would, you stated, chiefly explain the deficiency from the regular estimate.

3. According to the estimate formed towards the close of February you anticipated a balance on the 31st of March of Rs. 14,19,30,000, and as, in normal years, the balance at the end of May is not lower than two months previously, there would have been reason to expect that the balance on the 31st of May would be as high as Rs. 14,19,30,000. Your present estimate of Rs. 8,97,00,000, therefore, shows a deficiency of Rs. 5,22,30,000, which can be only attributed to a falling off in the receipts (which has not been suggested), or to expenditure not foreseen at the time that the Budget was prepared.

4. In your telegram of the 23rd of March three reasons were assigned as having brought about a change in the situation. The first of these was the fact that, notwithstanding the explicit instructions in my Despatch of the 17th of July 1879, No. 261, para. 52, you had "made no provision for any advance," by which I understand you to mean that you had made no provision in the early part of the official year for any increase in the amount of my bills during that period above the weekly average of 39 lacs. Thus, it would seem that, although you were aware that it was necessary to draw *on the average* 39 lacs of rupees a week throughout the year, and had told me that you had arranged your Budget on that understanding, you had made preparation for meeting no more than that amount of bills during the latter part of April and May, to be drawn while the export season was at its height, notwithstanding the well known impossibility of maintaining such an average throughout the summer. In my Despatch of the 15th instant, I impressed upon your Excellency the necessity of meeting more than the average at such a time; and, therefore, I need now only observe that, on the assumption that you have to pay in April and May nine drawings of 45 lacs instead of two of 40 and seven of 39 lacs, for which it would appear that you estimated, the reduction of your balances attributable to this cause is only 52 lacs.

5. Another reason assigned as affecting your position is the expectation of an abnormally large opium crop. The estimated charge under the head of Opium was entered in the Budget as 2,160,000*l.*; I have no information as to the amount which you now expect to pay, but I find that the heaviest charge defrayed in any year was 2,842,000*l.*, so that the excess can scarcely be expected to exceed 682,000*l.*, of which it is improbable that the whole will be incurred by the end of May. I may observe, moreover, that this charge is of such a character that the amount should have been foreseen when your Financial Statement was made.

6. The third ground assigned for anticipating decreased balances is that, since your estimate was framed, you have "sent to form reserves and to accumulate immediately six months' supplies for troops in field." When the Budget Statement was prepared, some portion of the sum of 3,216,000*l.* inserted in your Regular Estimate for 1879-80 must have been in hand to meet the expenditure during the five weeks which remained of the year; and you were satisfied with the provision, in addition thereto, of an amount of 2,090,000*l.* for the whole of the year 1880-81. At the very least, one sixth of the latter sum, or 350,000*l.*, must have been expected to be spent in the first two months of the official year. From your telegram of the 15th of April, I gather that you now estimate the

outlay during those two months at 1,250,000*l.*, or 900,000*l.* in excess, in addition to which the difference of 1,593,000*l.* between your estimates of 24th February and 10th April, as to the amount of the closing balance on the 31st of March, is said to be chiefly due to "excessive military drain."

7. Adding together these unanticipated advances on account of Military expenditure, charges for opium, and payment of bills, I arrive at an amount of 3,693,000*l.*,* which might possibly have to be met from your balances by the 31st of May; but this falls short by 1,530,000*l.* of the deficiency between your Budget estimate for the 31st of March and your present estimate for the end of May.†

8. Finding that, after allowing 1,000,000*l.* for the probable excess under the heads of Bills and Opium advances to the end of May, there was a difference between these two estimates of 4,223,000*l.*, I telegraphed on the 13th instant to know how this was to be accounted for, and I asked for more detailed estimates regarding the outgoings on account of war. In your reply of the 15th you observe that some mistake must have occurred, as your balances at the end of March were estimated at 1,260 lacs; but in saying this you overlook the necessity for an explanation of the discrepancy between that estimate and the former one giving 1,419 lacs. You further state that the "bills paid intermediately are a principal factor in the relation between March and May balances;" but, as the anticipated weekly drawings of 45 lacs would not in the nine weeks be more than 52 or 54 lacs above the average of 39 lacs weekly which you seem to have taken in the estimate, it cannot be admitted that such a reduction is a "principal factor" in a deficiency of either 363 or 525 lacs.‡

9. It seems evident that your difficulties must mainly have arisen from an underestimate of your liabilities in regard to the war; and I am desirous of drawing your attention to the manner in which this question has been placed before Her Majesty's Government. On the 24th of February your Financial Statement was published, showing an anticipated expenditure on account of military operations in 1880-81, amounting to 2,090,000*l.*, subject to reduction by railway and telegraph receipts. So sanguine were you of the adequacy of this estimate, that you determined not to proceed with the revision of the License Taxes which had been proposed to me as tending to remove certain inequalities felt to be injurious, and had received my cordial sanction, and you abandoned the measure, notwithstanding some urgency on my part, because you stated that in the flourishing state of your finances neither your Excellency nor any member of your Government was prepared to proceed with that part of it which involved fresh taxation. You further determined to remit the export duties on certain articles, and you resolved on the unusual step of meeting, during a time of war, an expenditure of 3,312,000*l.* for Productive Public Works, without resorting to the money market for a loan. At the same time, you informed me that you had deliberately determined to face any inconvenience resulting from the depletion of your balances, in order that you might announce so satisfactory an evidence of the sound state of your finances.

10. In reliance on these assurances, statements were made in Parliament on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in the full belief that the expectation of a surplus rested on a sure basis. Yet on the 13th of March, or less than three weeks from the time when your statement had been laid before the public with so much confidence, your Government found itself unable to meet the usual drawings at this time of year; on the 17th of March you telegraphed regarding the "constant military drain," of which the "ultimate aggregate amount" was "quite uncertain," and on the 23rd you informed me that you had been obliged "to form reserves, and to accumulate immediately six months' supplies for troops

	£
* War in February and March - - - -	1,593,000
.. in April and May - - - -	900,000
Opium advances - - - -	680,000
Bills - - - -	520,000
	£3,693,000

† NOTE.—Since this despatch was written, it has been explained that this deficiency of 1,530,000*l.* is accounted for by the drawings of the Secretary of State during March and April having been greater than in the average of previous years, so that, apart from other causes, the balances at the end of May would have been considerably less than those at the end of March.

“ in field,” in consequence of which it was impossible to fulfil your undertaking to meet the wants of the Home Treasury. It further appears that the estimate of 2,090,000*l.* was so utterly inadequate for the War expenditure to be incurred beyond that provided for 1879–80, that by the end of May a sum of nearly 2,500,000*l.* has to be met in excess of that for which you had made provision.

11. Your Excellency will of course understand that I am not now expressing any opinion as to the necessity for this unexpected charge for military expenditure, which must be determined by other than financial considerations, but I cannot avoid the conclusion that, considering the extent of the military operations in progress, it was not prudent to reject the means of improving your revenue, and of increasing your cash balances. It is now shown by your telegrams that those balances have in your opinion been reduced to so dangerous an extent, that the transfer of even 50 lacs of the home remittance to an earlier period of the year than you had estimated imposed such pressure that you “ cannot answer for the consequences.” Even now that your difficulty has been laid before me, the information is so meagre and so inconsistent with the previous announcements, that, having in view the extreme importance of meeting the remittances required for the Home Treasury, the absolute necessity of raising in India whatever amount is needed for the purposes of your Government, so far as that can be done without imprudently straining the resources of the local money market, and the necessity for avoiding any sudden step which may cause Indian securities to be depreciated, I have not felt justified in making any but a gradual reduction of the drawings. In my telegram of the 10th of April, therefore, I stated that bills would be advertised for 40 lacs for at least two weeks. In your reply of the 15th your Excellency says, “ We will not object further to your drawing 40 lacs twice, “ and then reducing to 35, leaving for future consideration whether we can “ dispense with further reduction.” I trust that, before the time arrives for deciding this point, you will have been able to send the estimate of outgoings on account of the war called for by my telegram of the 13th of April. This, however, is insufficient without a detailed explanation of the wide deviation from the original Budget; and accordingly, in my telegram of the 19th instant, I have requested that Her Majesty’s Government may be furnished with a letter as soon as possible, giving the requisite information.

12. Since this Despatch was written I have received your Excellency’s telegram of the 20th of April, from which I learn that the expenditure on military operations in February and March is estimated to have been 1,500,000*l.*, the bulk of which, however, seems likely to fall into the present year as a matter of account; and that in April and May it is expected to amount to 1,000,000*l.* It is not stated that this outlay is in excess of that provided in your Budget; but, assuming it to be so, the total of 2,500,000*l.* to the end of May corresponds almost exactly with the sum reckoned in the calculation given in the 7th paragraph of this Despatch. The discrepancy of 1,530,000*l.* in the estimates of the cash balances is therefore still unexplained.

13. In addition to the excess of 1,500,000*l.* in February and March, you now contemplate the possibility of an excess on account of the war expenditure of 3,500,000*l.* or 4,000,000*l.* in 1880–81, of which, perhaps, 1,000,000*l.* may not be brought to account till 1881–82. In place, therefore, of an anticipated surplus of 417,000*l.*, the result of the current year may be a deficit of 3½ or 4 millions, in addition to a charge of one million deferred to the following year.

I have, &c.,
CRANBROOK.

No. 40.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 22, 1880.

Yours as to proposed loan. As only holding office until successor named, cannot deal with the matter.

No. 41.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, April 29, 1880.

Actual closing balances exceed 13 crores. Chief cause of the deficiency, military outgoings underrated 60 lacs, and London bills paid 28. Revenue returns satisfactory. Aggregate collection under all principal heads approximates closely to the regular estimate.

Will telegraph further about the war expenditure immediately.

No. 42.

EXTRACT from TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, April 30, 1880.

Amount (of loan), if announced as for Productive Works only, must not exceed 313 lacs for fixed grant and East Indian; but you may advertise larger loan if war renders it necessary. Make no promises as to further borrowing. Time must be allowed me to consider proposed notification. Telegraph necessary alterations, and await approval before any publication.

No. 43.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 3, 1880.

Summary of Despatch regarding war estimates issuing to-morrow:—

Paras. 1 and 2 report belief that cost of war will seriously exceed estimates in Financial Statement.

Paras. 3 and 4 send memorandum by Military Accountant General, detailing manner in which estimates made, with Minute by Sir Edwin Johnson showing that estimates were examined and accepted by Military Department, and, on official advice of that Department, dated 26th January, embodied by Financial Department in Budget. Military Department maintained estimate till last, and Financial Department saw no cause for distrust.

Para. 5. Early in March, uneasiness being caused by unexpected large demands on frontier treasuries, fresh inquiries showed that drafts of Military Department so much exceeded normal payment as to suggest strong doubts of accuracy of Military Department estimates.

Para. 6. Although balances in Military treasure chests very large, and other causes mentioned may reduce obligations, cannot now doubt that total war charges will much exceed estimates.

Paras. 7 and 8. Cannot yet send satisfactory new estimates, but will telegraph latest estimates before Financial Statement made to Parliament. For the present, advise addition of at least 4 crores to estimate for 1880–81. Responsible officers of Military Department still confidently expect that 10 crores will not be nearly reached, but Financial Department fears that it may rather be exceeded. Careful inquiry as to possible neglect of precautions and individual responsibility being made. Although amount of War charges outstanding from 1879–80 and adjustable in 1880–81 will be much larger than expected, not anticipated that amount brought to account in former year will seriously differ from regular estimate. Condition of finances in all other respects as satisfactory as described in Financial Statement. We still believe that, apart from war, there would have been surplus of four millions in both past and present years, and we modify no favourable anticipations of Financial Statement.

Military Member's minute assumes complete responsibility for War Estimates; states reasons for which Military Department accepted them and recommended adoption by Financial Department, and causes which were not foreseen, and which led to their insufficiency. Among these are specially noticed purchase, instead of hire, of great proportion of transport,—purchase and transport of six months' supplies to be stored at front before hot weather,—enormous increase in price of grain supplies and stores, both at base and in Afghanistan,—necessity of paying increased wages to all followers from dread of service and other causes,—necessity of works to maintain positions and protect troops consequent on prolongation of

war; local resources being exhausted, supplies and transport have to be sent from distant provinces, at constantly increasing cost. States that, when War Estimate was made, it was believed by Military Department sufficient to provide for war expenditure at rates found sufficient for preceding year. In such operations cost increases in progressive ratio with continuance.

Memorandum by Military Accountant-General shows, in detail, manner in which Estimates were prepared in usual course by the three Military Controllers, and revised by him.

We have thought it necessary to publish here greater part of Despatch and Minute to prevent mischievous misapprehensions.

No. 44.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 13, 1880.

April balance 1,150 lakhs.

No. 45.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, May 4, 1880, No. 142 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

By Viscount Cranbrook's telegram dated 19th April we were instructed to send, as soon as possible, a detailed letter explaining the wide deviation of the closing balance of 1879-80 from the "original budget," by which we understand his Lordship to have meant the closing balance brought out by the Regular Estimates published on the 24th February last.

2. In this instruction, Lord Cranbrook refers to the revised estimate of 1,260 lakhs as the closing balance of the year, which, in obedience to His Lordship's request, we telegraphed on the 10th April. In our message of that date, and again on the 15th April, we were careful to explain that intermediate estimates of the kind are usually too unfavourable, and that they are useful only as a general indication of the prospects of our resources. Being familiar with such estimates, and understanding exactly the degree of confidence which they deserve, we are able ourselves to appreciate their value more correctly than a distant authority can do, and we can hardly be surprised that Her Majesty's Government should have been startled by figures which, although the only estimates that we could supply, we should not have thought of reporting except in obedience to a special requisition.

3. As we have repeatedly explained, and as is, indeed, self-evident, the balances remaining at our disposal on any date are the final outcome of innumerable transactions at our numerous and widely-scattered treasuries and sub-treasuries. No estimate of the contents of our treasuries and our balances in the Presidency banks on any future day, with whatever care, experience and skill it may be made, can be, within a considerable margin, any better than a guess.

4. The actual balances in our treasuries and at our credit in the Presidency banks, on the 31st March 1880, are now reported to have aggregated 1,301 lakhs, which amount is still subject to correction when the remittances between treasuries shall have been adjusted by the Comptroller General.

5. Appendix VII. to the Financial Statement contains the figures which worked up to the closing balance of 1,419 lakhs expected according to the Regular Estimates. Until the accounts of 1879-80 are completed it will be impossible to say, with any completeness, how those figures will be altered in order to produce the balance of 1,301 lakhs now returned, or whatever may be the final adjusted balance.

6. But we are able at once to offer the following general explanations of the deficiency of the approximately actual balance of 1,301 lakhs, as compared with the 1,419 lakhs of the Regular Estimates:—

- (1.) Before closing our Regular Estimates we had ascertained by telegraph that our balances on the 31st January had aggregated approximately 1,358 lakhs. They eventually proved to be only 1,352 lakhs.

- (2.) We estimated at that time that we should pay, during February and March, Council bills for 355 lakhs. We actually paid 383 lakhs. Our under-estimate is due to the bills having been presented for payment with unusual promptitude, so that on the 1st April bills for only 20 lakhs were outstanding unpaid.
- (3.) The Military Accountant General calculated that the demands of the Military Department upon us would amount during the two months to 280, or, to be on the safe side, 300 lakhs, which sum we adopted. We shall not know our actual military disbursements for some little time; but they are not likely to have been less than 350 lakhs.
- (4.) The grant for the construction of the Jhelum and Rawal Pindi Section of the Punjab Northern State Railway having been exhausted early in March, we were obliged to allow a supplementary grant for this work of 10 lakhs,* in order that the progress of this important accessory to our military operations might not be impeded.
- (5.) Owing to a check in the Málwa Opium and Sámbar Lake Salt Trades, our principal heads of fluctuating Revenue—namely, I.—*Land*, IV.—*Excise*, V.—*Assessed Taxes*, VII.—*Customs*, VIII.—*Salt*, IX.—*Opium*, and X.—*Stamps*—yielded, in the aggregate, 8 lakhs less than we estimated.
7. Thus, of the 118 lakhs by which the approximately actual closing balance of 1879-80 fell short of the Regular Estimate, we can account already, roughly, for 102 lakhs, as follows:—

January balance over-estimated	-	-	-	-	-	Lakhs.
London Bills paid under-estimated	-	-	-	-	-	6
Military disbursements under-estimated	-	-	-	-	-	28
Extra grant for the Punjab Northern State Railway	-	-	-	-	-	50
Revenue known to have been over-estimated	-	-	-	-	-	10
						8
						102

8. The remaining discrepancy is unimportant: our estimate was based upon the assumption that, excepting the items which we have mentioned, the result of the aggregate transactions in February and March, at our treasuries or upon our accounts at the Presidency banks, would be the same this year as last year. A variation of 17 lakhs, on the whole, between the two years is not surprising.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
ALEX. FRASER.

No. 46.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, May 4, 1880, No. 143 (Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 81, dated 25th February, and with reference to the telegrams cited below,† we regret to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that we have grave reasons for apprehending that the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan will seriously exceed the amount entered in the Financial Statement for 1880-81.

* In our telegram dated 29th April this item was, for brevity's sake, included with item (3) as a military disbursement.

† To Secretary of State, dated 8th April.		To Secretary of State, dated 15th April.
From " " 9th "		From " " 19th "
From " " 10th "		To " " 20th "
To " " 10th "		To " " 21st "
From " " 13th "		To " " 29th "

2. The total expenditure upon those operations in India was calculated in that document at 5,512,670*l.*, as follows :—

	<i>£</i>
In 1878-79 (Account No. 57) - - - -	600,270
In 1879-80 (para. 130 of Statement, less expenditure from the Home Treasury)* - - - -	2,954,400
In 1880-81 (para. 187 of Statement, less expenditure from the Home Treasury)* - - - -	1,958,000
	5,512,670

3. The estimates for 1879-80 and 1880-81 were prepared in the Military Department by the usual methods, with careful deliberation. We forward with this Despatch a Memorandum by Major Newmarch, the Military Accountant General, detailing the procedure in ordinary use, describing how it was actually employed on the present occasion, and explaining, in particular, his estimates of the cost of the war. Major Newmarch submitted his estimates to the Military Department with a Memorandum, No. 4108, dated 19th January. It is shown in the Minute of our Honourable Colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, which accompanies this Despatch, that those estimates were carefully examined and accepted in the Military Department; they were formally transferred by that department, on the 26th January, to the Financial Department, with the recommendation that they should be adopted; and they were incorporated, in usual course, in the Budget presented with the Financial Statement.

4. The estimates were held open to revision till just before the Statement was made; but no correction was suggested in the Military Department, or considered necessary in the Financial Department. On the contrary, the unexpectedly high amount of our January balances (1,352 lakhs), coupled with the comparatively moderate amount of the military expenditure brought on record up to that date, gave rise to a doubt whether the Accountant General in the Military Department might not have entered too large an amount in his Regular Estimate; but it was ascertained specifically on the 18th February, six days before the Statement, that the Accountant General in the Military Department fully maintained that estimate, and it was not altered. There being thus, at that time, no apparent cause for distrusting the sufficiency of the Military Department's estimates, Sir John Strachey, in paragraph 27 of the Financial Statement, while pointing out that "the estimates of the cost of the war must of course be, to a great extent, speculative," said that he saw "no reason to suppose that they erred on the side of being too low."

5. Before the middle of March, however, we became uneasy at the unexpectedly large demands upon our frontier treasuries; and, not being satisfied with the result of a summary investigation of the causes, we instituted a fresh inquiry into the cost of the war, which has brought to light the fact that the aggregate net disbursements from our treasuries to the Military Department since the beginning of the operations have so much exceeded the normal payments to that department as to suggest strong doubts of the correctness of its estimates of the cost of the war.

6. No doubt, the balances in the treasure chests and with the military disbursers are much in excess of the ordinary amount. Moreover, apart from the operations in Afghanistan, the disbursements on account of the Malta Expedition, the Naga disturbances, and political events in Burma have caused exceptional military drafts upon our treasuries; and there may be other abnormal transactions which may operate, eventually, in reduction of the obligations of the Military Department. Nevertheless, and taking the most sanguine view of the prospects of the termination of the war, we cannot now doubt that its cost will largely exceed the departmental estimates.

7. There is, however, much still to be done before we can venture to estimate the cost of the war afresh with any precision. It has not yet been fully explained why the large outflow from our treasuries in excess of the military estimates did not show itself sooner in the diminution of our balances, which we are now at last witnessing. Nor is the Accountant General in the Military Department, an

* NOTE.—The "Military Expenditure proper" in 1879-80, mentioned in paragraph 130 as 3,137,000*l.*, included 182,600*l.* in England, leaving the expenditure in India (exclusive of frontier railways, post office, and telegraphs) at 2,954,400*l.* The estimate of 1,978,000*l.* for 1880-81, mentioned in paragraph 187, similarly included 20,000*l.* in England.

officer in whose prudence and ability we place the greatest confidence, as yet able to reconcile the treasury figures with the estimates which reach him from the Military Controllers.

8. Under ordinary circumstances, we should have thought it desirable to wait until we could explain the facts better than is yet possible. But we are sensible of the inconvenience which must result from the failure of our war estimate, and deem it incumbent on us to substitute for that estimate at once the most correct forecast that we can make with our present data, however imperfect such may be. We hope that, before your Lordship makes the yearly Financial Statement to Parliament, we may be in a position to telegraph more trustworthy estimates of the cost of the war than we can now make. Meanwhile, we consider that it will be necessary to add at least 4,000,000*l.* to our estimate of the cost of the war in 1880-81. We can only speak now with much reserve of the total amount which the war, apart from the Frontier Railways, will ultimately cost. The responsible officers in the Military Department still confidently expect that its cost will not be nearly so much as 10,000,000*l.*; but we are unable, at present, to reconcile this expectation with the actual outgoings from our treasuries.

9. Our Honourable Colleague, General Sir Edwin Johnson, has recorded, for our information and for that of Her Majesty's Government, a Minute, which we transmit herewith, describing the action of the Military Department throughout the whole proceedings, the manner in which the estimates for the war were made, and the circumstances under which the Military Department thought itself justified in recommending the Financial Department to accept them, and explaining, so far as this can now be done, the causes which, in our Honourable Colleague's opinion, have operated, and are still operating, to render those estimates insufficient.

10. As stated by the Military Accountant General in paragraph 14 of his Memorandum, although it cannot now be doubted that the amount of the war charges outstanding at the close of 1879-80, and which will have to be adjusted in 1880-81, will be much larger than was anticipated, there is no reason for supposing that the amount of these charges brought to account in the former year will seriously differ from the Regular Estimate presented with the Financial Statement.

11. The duty of supplying funds for the conduct of the operations in the field was entrusted to our Comptroller General, in immediate personal concert with the experienced Comptroller of Military Accounts in Bengal. We have not yet ascertained why it did not sooner occur to either of these high officers to warn us that the rate of outflow from our treasuries appeared to be greatly in excess of the estimated cost of the war. We shall use our best endeavours to discover by what neglect of precautions we have been misled, and to what degree, if at all, individual officers are responsible for such neglect.

12. It seems probable that the error may be traced mainly to the peculiarity of the procedure for the record of our Military Accounts. As a general rule, to which we attach the greatest importance, our revenue and expenditure is severally brought to account immediately from the transactions at our treasuries. We thus know the facts many weeks before we should know them if we were to wait till the Departmental Accounts were prepared and audited. In the Military Department and in some other departments, however, this procedure has been pronounced impracticable, owing to the intermixture of debt items in the treasury transactions and to other causes. We have long since endeavoured to apply in the Military Department the procedure found so convenient in other departments, but have hitherto been unable to do so. The consequence is, that the Military Accounts, though doubtless admirably correct when completed, are not usually known to us for nearly three months after the end of the month to which they refer, and, which is still worse, even then exclude many items awaiting audit or adjustment. In time of war, the discrepancy between the audited accounts and the treasury transactions becomes, as we now experience to our cost, such that the progressive accounts convey a false and inadequate impression of the facts. We shall consider afresh whether this cannot be remedied.

13. As we have been obliged to take the unusual course of revising our estimate of one important item before the Financial Statement is made to Parliament, we subjoin, for any use which your Lordship may think fit to make of it, a statement of the other variations from our Regular Estimates which are now known to us:—

	Regular Estimates.	Approximate Accounts.	Better.	Worse.
	£	£	£	£
I. Land Revenue - - - -	22,389,000	22,426,200	37,200	—
IV. Excise - - - -	2,765,000	2,792,587	27,587	—
V. Assessed Taxes - - - -	797,000	783,800	—	13,200
VII. Customs - - - -	2,231,000	2,283,352	52,352	—
VIII. Salt - - - -	7,335,000	7,256,698	—	78,302
IX. Opium - - - -	10,459,000	10,361,555	—	97,445
X. Stamps - - - -	3,203,000	3,192,811	—	10,189
TOTAL - - - -	49,179,000	49,097,003	—	81,997

14. We shall not know for some time whether the slight improvement in the land revenue belongs to the Revenue from Productive Works or not. Meanwhile it had better be shown under the general head of *Land Revenue*. The deficiency under *Salt* is due to an unexpected intermission of the deliveries from the Sámbar Lake, which will, doubtless, soon be resumed. The deficiency under *Opium* is owing to a similar temporary check in the trade in Málwa Opium.

15. On the whole, our estimates have been very satisfactorily realised. The only considerable Revenue Head of which we do not yet know the approximate result is that of *Railways*, the accounts of which cannot be quickly closed. We know no grounds for revising our estimates of Railway revenue.

16. On the expenditure side, however, 100,000*l.* must be added under Head 32—*Railways*, being the supplementary grant made for the Jhelum-Rawalpindi Section of the Punjab Northern State Railway, as explained in paragraph 6 (4) of our Despatch No. 142 of this date. This is, in truth, part of the cost of the war.

17. However disappointing it is to find that the war is likely to cost so much more than was expected, the permanent effect upon the condition of our finances will be limited to the extent to which the charge for interest on the debt may be increased. In all essential respects the condition of our finances appears to us no less sound and satisfactory now than it did when the Financial Statement was made. The improvement in our general financial position remains as unquestionable as before; there is still no reason to doubt that, but for the war, our surplus of revenue over expenditure would have hardly been less than 4,000,000*l.*, both in the year 1879-80, which has just closed, and in the year 1880-81, which has now commenced; nor do we see reason to modify any of the views regarding the past, or any of the anticipations regarding the future, which were set forth in the Financial Statement.

We have, &c.,

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
ALEX. FRASER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

MEMORANDUM by MAJOR O. R. NEWMARCH, Accountant General, Military Department No. 451, dated Simla, 30th April 1880, to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Military Department.

WITH reference to Military Department No. 6538K, of the 28th April 1880, the undersigned has the honour to explain, for the information of Government, the course followed in the preparation of the estimates of expenditure on account of the operations in Afghanistan.

2. The military estimates are prepared by the Comptrollers of Military Accounts, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, received and consolidated in this branch, and submitted by the Military Department to the Financial Department. In all

ordinary cases the figures proposed by the Comptrollers—officers of considerable experience and having the advantage of local knowledge—are accepted. But when there is reason to suppose, from a reference to past actuals, from a consideration of impending changes of organisation or other facts not known to the Comptrollers when their estimates were prepared, from the prospects of the harvests, from the progress of the accounts which are more advanced when the estimates are finally consolidated, and for other reasons, that their estimates are not correct, then they are increased or diminished to the extent thought to be necessary, in view of the foregoing considerations.

The reasons for any variation from the figures of previous years are always given in abstract and in detail in the transmitting memorandum and its appendices.

3. The first provision for the Kabul Campaign was made in the revised estimate for 1878-79.

In this estimate the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, provided 90 lakhs on this account, with the remark :—

“ This sum may cover the extra charges that will be brought forward this year, but a correct estimate seems impossible at present.” The Madras Comptroller made no provision. The Bombay Comptroller estimated the charges at 20 lakhs; total of estimates 110 lakhs. Judging from the state of the accounts when the estimate was made up, and from the known delays in their receipt from officers in the field, it appeared to the undersigned that the charges to be brought into the year would not exceed 67 lakhs, and that there would remain between 50 and 60 lakhs to be adjusted in the accounts of 1879-80.

4. In proposing these figures the following remarks were made in paragraph 5 of the transmitting memorandum :—

“ Looking at the two-fold uncertainty attending this item, the doubtful estimate of the probable expenditure, and the progress of adjustment, every allowance must be made for any want of accord hereafter between the revised estimate and the actual charges.” The amount charged in the year in India was Rs. 60,92,703, a tolerably close approximation to the estimate.

This left, according to the above calculation, about 60 lakhs outstanding from 1878-79, under the head of advances recoverable, unadjusted items, &c., which would have to be adjusted and charged in the accounts of 1879-80.

5. In the budget estimates of that year, the Bengal Controller, writing on the 17th December 1878, made no provision whatever for Kabul, remarking, “ At present it is impossible to state what amount will be charged to this head in the accounts of 1879-80; perhaps later on more definite information than now exists may be available.” The Comptrollers of Military Accounts, Madras and Bombay, made no provision for the “ Kabul operations,” having no information as to whether the war was likely to extend to the year 1879-80, or, if it did, as to how long it might be expected to continue. Allowing for the arrears to be brought forward from 1878-79, and in the anticipation of an early termination of the campaign, the extra expenditure of the year was estimated in this branch at 200 lakhs, with the following remark :—“ It is, of course, impracticable to form any trustworthy estimate of the year, but it is not considered necessary to make any larger provision on this account at present than the above sum.”

The above anticipation was realised by the signing of the Treaty of Peace on the 26th May 1879, and had the war then been finally concluded, the estimate would probably have proved to be fairly correct.

6. On the renewal of hostilities in September, it, of course, became necessary to increase the estimate.

In submitting his revised estimate for the year 1879-80, the Bengal Comptroller provided 300 lakhs under the head of “ Kabul ” in lieu of 170 lakhs, the sum allotted to Bengal in the budget estimate, with the remark—“ increased, to provide for charges on account of the second expedition.”

The Madras Comptroller reduced his allotment of 12 lakhs to 8 lakhs, with reference to the amounts compiled under this head in the accounts received by him up to date.

The Bombay Comptroller increased the 18 lakhs assigned to that Presidency to 40 lakhs, with the remark—“ provision made for second Kabul Expedition.”

The total of these estimates amounted to 348 lakhs.

7. After the most careful and anxious consideration of all the facts available, and after personal consultation with the officers in charge of the field commissariat

accounts, with the special examiner of these accounts, and with the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, the undersigned considered that about 300 lakhs would probably be charged in the year, and that something over 100 lakhs would, as in 1878-79, be outstanding under the head of advances recoverable, unadjusted items, &c., and fall into the charges of 1880-81.

8. It was, as may be easily understood, extremely difficult, if not wholly impracticable, with the scanty materials available, and in view of the uncertainty as to the progress, extent, and duration of operations, the phases of which were changing from week to week, to frame even an approximate estimate of the extra cost of the war, and the above conclusion was not arrived at without much hesitation and anxious consideration. In submitting it, the following remarks were offered for the consideration of Government :—

“ In the revised estimate it has been deemed necessary, owing to the renewal of hostilities, to increase the provision on this account to Rs. 3,00,00,000. The estimates submitted by the Comptrollers provided Rs. 3,48,00,000 on this account ; but, so far as any estimate can be made of charges so uncertain, both in their nature and as to the period within which they may be brought forward, their estimates appear susceptible of reduction by Rs. 48,00,000. There is one charge in particular which may affect the calculation very considerably—the compensation for loss of camels ; but up to date no trustworthy statistics, or even estimate, of the probable losses and consequent claims have been received. With every desire to make full provision for the war charges, the undersigned can, at present, see no reason for going beyond the above figures.”

9. These figures are exclusive of the charge for the construction of frontier railways and telegraphs, the estimate for which *in India* is Rs. 1,12,15,000 in 1879-80, and Rs. 1,04,22,000 in 1880-81.

10. In the estimate for the year 1880-81, the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bengal, provided 200 lakhs for “ Kabul ” without remark. The Madras Comptroller provided six lakhs with remark that the figure had been reduced (that is, from last year’s figures), with reference to the first four months of 1879-80. The Bombay Comptroller made no provision, with the remark—“ provision on this account was made by the Accountant General in the current year’s budget, and will, it is assumed, be similarly made for 1880-81, if necessary.”

11. Following the course pursued in preparing the estimate of 1879-80, as explained in paragraph 5, it was estimated by the undersigned that about 100 lakhs would be brought forward from 1879-80, and that, anticipating, as in 1879-80, an early termination of the campaign, 100 lakhs would be spent on the war during the year 1880-81. This rate of expenditure was based on rough estimates prepared in this branch of the cost of the war, and supported by a consideration of the expenditure incurred in 1878-79 and in the early months of 1879-80.

12. In submitting this estimate the following remarks were made in the transmitting memorandum :—

“ For the Kabul charges it has not been considered necessary to do more than repeat last year’s provision, Rs. 2,00,00,000. But for the renewal of hostilities in September last, that sum would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year. With an early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier, the same amount may suffice to wind up the accounts of the campaign ; should the operations be protracted, this figure will, no doubt, have to be increased hereafter in the revised estimate, as has been done this year.”

13. As regards the threatened inadequacy of the estimates, the undersigned proposes to defer any explanation on this head till the accounts for the year 1879-80 are completed, and the further information called for by the Military Department has been received.

14. The completed accounts for January 1880 have been received, with approximate figures for the remaining two months of the year ; and there are grounds for supposing that, apart from the charges for frontier railways and telegraphs, the recorded charges of the year will not much exceed the estimate of 300 lakhs. There is, however, reason to fear that, owing to the largely increased expenditure of the last three months of the year—January, February, and March 1880—considerably more than 100 lakhs will be outstanding at the close of the year, and have to be adjusted in the accounts of 1880-81. At the same time this increased rate of expenditure shows no signs of diminution, and the war promises to be protracted considerably beyond the anticipation of the

estimate, while the operations are more extended than they were, or than was foreseen, when that estimate was prepared. It may also be noted that from various causes, which will, no doubt, be elucidated hereafter, the war expenditure has increased, beginning from January last, and is progressing at a rate far beyond any calculation that could have been made, based on the past rate of expenditure, and on the relative number of troops in the field at various periods.

From these two causes, the expected increase in the outstandings from 1879–80 and in the cash expenditure in 1880–81, the budget estimate of the year threatens to prove very inadequate. To what extent it will actually be found to be insufficient can only be determined on the receipt of the further information lately called for, and by the progress, extent, and duration of the campaign.

On this point a further report will be submitted hereafter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 46.

MINUTE by General the Honourable SIR E. B. JOHNSON, K.C.B., C.I.E.

THE attention of the Financial Department having been directed to the large disbursements which were being made from the Civil Treasury on account of the war in Afghanistan—disbursements seriously in excess of the estimated cost of the operations—the Military Department was requested to cause inquiry to be made, and to furnish information as to the cause of this difference between the estimates and the actual expenditure.

In accordance with this request, the Military Accountant General was called on for a report on the subject; and at the same time full inquiry was ordered in other branches of the Military Department, in view to eliciting the causes of these unexpected calls on the Civil Treasury.

Pending the result of these inquiries, the Military Accountant General has furnished a statement explaining, fully and clearly, the course he has followed in the preparation of the estimates of expenditure on account of the operations in Afghanistan for 1880–81.

To Major Newmarch's statement, which I attach, I need add nothing; but, as head of the Military Department, I desire to state that the estimates which were prepared by the Military Accountant General were not submitted by me to the Financial Department until, in personal and anxious communication with him, I had satisfied myself that they were framed on just principles and on data which might fairly and reasonably be accepted in the forecast of the probable expenditure on account of the war.

Satisfied, therefore, of the correctness of the estimates, which appeared to me as accurate as any estimate of the cost of military operations can be, I accepted them, and caused them to be sent to the Financial Department, with a recommendation that they should be adopted.

It will be seen, therefore, that though the estimates were prepared by the Military Accountant General, they were submitted and explained to me before acceptance; and I desire to state, without any reserve whatever, that, as head of the Military Department, I alone am responsible for the estimates, and that I fully accept such responsibility.

That this Department has under-estimated the probable cost of the war cannot be gainsaid; but until the result of the inquiries which have been ordered to be made is received, it is not possible for this Department to state either the extent to which the estimates have been exceeded, or the causes which have led to such excess.

Without attempting to anticipate the result of the inquiry, I may be permitted, however, to touch very briefly on some of the causes which have led to such a disturbance of our calculations, and which were not, and could hardly have been, foreseen at the time the estimates were prepared.

First, the purchase of a very great proportion of the transport, instead of hiring it. This recommended itself to the Comptroller General of Transport and Supply as not only a measure of expediency and improved organisation, but one which, owing to the nature of the service and to the extreme difficulty of hiring, appeared to be an absolute necessity. The outlay under this head has been considerable.

The necessity, as a measure of precaution when it became evident that the war would not be brought to a close as early as was anticipated, for purchasing and transporting six months' supplies to be stowed at the front and on all the lines of communication before the hot weather set in.

The enormous increase in the price of grain and other supplies—famine prices in fact—owing to the unexpected scarcity which prevailed in the Peshawar and Rawalpindi districts, notwithstanding the promise of an abundant harvest, which has been fulfilled everywhere else.

A similar, and also unexpected, increase in the price of stores, such as firewood, forage, &c., purchased in Afghanistan itself.

The necessity for paying increased wages, in addition to half rations, to all followers north of Jhelum, a necessity which arose partly from the growing dread of service in Afghanistan, and partly from the extreme demand for labour, locally, by the railway authorities on the line to Rawalpindi.

In addition to what has been already stated, there is also this fact to be taken into consideration, that when it became evident that the occupation would be prolonged through the summer months, and even into autumn, the works necessary for the maintenance of our positions and protection of the troops, thus detained, necessarily far exceeded any charges which had hitherto been incurred, or would under other circumstances have been needed, both at Kabul and on the whole line of communications.

In short, in such operations as those in which we are engaged, their cost increases in a progressive ratio, week by week, with their continuance. For not only are the local resources of a poor country drawn on to a point almost of exhaustion, thereby forcing supplies to be sent from remote bases, but also the transport, which has to be continuously renewed to supply the ordinary casualties, has to be procured and drawn from far distant provinces in India at an ever-increasing cost.

It is now clear to myself that, in accepting, as the basis of the estimated cost of the war carried on in the year 1880–81, the estimates which had proved sufficient for the operations of the corresponding months of the previous year, I had not sufficiently appreciated the main fact of progressive rates of expenditure—an expenditure necessarily increasing through an expansion both of the period and scope of the operations which have since been developed.

It seemed to me that, in providing for the war expenditure up to the month of July of the present year, based on the rate which had proved sufficient for those of the preceding year, which I had no reason to believe was being materially exceeded, I was making the utmost provision which I could at the time have been justified in recommending to the Council; and I submit that the correctness of the course I then pursued is not invalidated by the facts which have since come to our knowledge.

E. B. JOHNSON.

Simla, 1st May 1880.

No. 47.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, May 20, 1880.

Failure of the war estimate. Despatch by next mail, in continuation of Despatch 4th May, with minutes by Viceroy and Finance Member of Council, gives complete information, which it was not possible to give in that letter. We trust that, pending its receipt, you will postpone orders.

L O N D O N :
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Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

ESTIMATES

FOR THE

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,



LONDON :

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 48.

LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, June 1, 1880, No. 176
(Financial). (Received June 26, 1880.)

MY LORD MARQUIS,

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 143, dated 4th May, we have the honour to forward a minute by Sir John Strachey, dated 20th May, and a minute by his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 26th May, in explanation of the principal causes of the failure to estimate more correctly the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan.

2. Our Despatch of the 4th May, although it correctly indicated those causes, was, necessarily, incomplete. The papers now transmitted will fully explain the circumstances of the case. They show how the military accounts, in themselves accurate, gave an altogether erroneous representation of the actual cost of the war, and misled the Government, not only in regard to the probable future expenditure, but in regard to the expenditure which had already been incurred.

3. The system of our military accounts was elaborated under the advice of the most

Erratum.

In the Correspondence relating to the Estimates for the War in Afghanistan, on page 46, in the Abstract of the Accounts for 1878-79, for "Secretary of State's Bills Discharged," read "Remittances."

5. We have only, now, to express our regret for the serious extent to which Her Majesty's Government has thus been misled in regard to the cost of the Afghan war. But there is no reason to suppose that the failure to estimate its cost aright has led to any increase in the actual expenditure on the war, or that that failure will cause an addition to the public burdens which a better forecast would have enabled us to avoid.

The question whether our military operations have been conducted with that regard for proper economy which we have always desired to enforce, has little connexion with the accuracy or failure of our estimates; but we concur with his Excellency the Viceroy in thinking that a careful inquiry, hereafter, into the cost of the war will be valuable for future guidance, and that it ought certainly to be undertaken.

6. Revised estimates of the cost of the war are under preparation, and will be submitted at an early date.

We have, &c.

LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
RIVERS THOMPSON.
J. GIBBS.
ALEX. FRASER.

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3. The system of our military accounts was elaborated under the advice of the most competent authorities that could be found; but it is clear that its merits must now be subjected to thorough reinvestigation. No mere defects of system could, however, account for such an error as has occurred. It is not possible that the Government could thus have been left in ignorance of facts of essential importance, if the duties imposed on the responsible officers had been in all cases discharged with proper care and intelligence. In saying this, we disclaim any desire to extenuate the responsibility of the Government itself. It is not as an apology for the Government, or for any of its members or departments, that we attribute this error to defects of system which, if they existed, ought to have been discovered and amended, or to want of due vigilance on the part of our officers. The ultimate responsibility clearly rests upon the Government; and this we completely acknowledge.

4. The inquiry now in progress will enable the Government to decide how far this error is due to defects of system, and what responsibility attaches to individual officers by whom the system has been administered. The result of this inquiry will be reported for the information of Her Majesty's Government; but, meanwhile, there is no reason for delay in submitting to your Lordship the accompanying papers, which clearly show the origin of our error.

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J. GIBBS.

ALEX. FRASER.

Enclosure 1. in No. 48.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir JOHN STRACHEY, G.C.S.I., C.I.E., on the failure of the estimates of the expenditure on the Army in 1879-80 and 1880-81 in India.

In making the following observations for the consideration of the Governor-General in Council, and, eventually, of Her Majesty's Government, on the error which has occurred in the military estimates, I thoroughly recognise the fact that, while Her Majesty's Government holds the Government of India responsible for the correctness of the yearly estimates, that responsibility obviously falls in particular on the Financial Department, and on myself as the member in charge of it. It is, therefore, my duty to give, as soon as possible, a complete statement of the nature and causes of the error which has come to light, and to show what measures have been taken to prevent the recurrence of similar errors. When our Despatch No. 143, of the 4th May, was sent to the Secretary of State, our information was, in many respects, incomplete; but we are now able, if not to clear up all points of doubt, to explain much more fully than we could do before, what has actually occurred.

2. The object of the Government of India in that Despatch was not to define the separate or relative responsibilities of its several officers or departments for the war estimates; that is a matter which mainly concerns its own internal administration. Its purpose was to make it clear, *in limine*, that those estimates had not been prepared arbitrarily, but by the usual means and in the usual way, and, especially, that there had been no irregular interference in their preparation. All this has already been done, and I do not propose to enter further into such considerations. It has been sufficiently described how the estimates were made in the Military Department, how they were accepted in the Financial Department, and how they were incorporated in the Budget.

3. In his minute of the 1st May my honourable colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, with a generosity which all who know him will feel to be characteristic, claimed for himself personally complete responsibility for the estimates which have proved so inaccurate. Now it is true that my honourable colleague is the head of the Military Department, and that the Military Department was responsible for supplying to the Financial Department the estimates of the whole military expenditure; but Sir Edwin Johnson could no more make those estimates, or supervise their details, than I could have undertaken such a duty myself. He trusted the machinery which had been provided, and which he, and all of us, believed to deserve complete confidence. An elaborate system had been carefully devised and matured by the most competent authorities that the Government could find; it had worked for many years in a manner that had given no suspicion of practical imperfection; and it was believed that, under this system, the Government would always be kept informed of everything regarding the military expenditure that it behoved it to know. We now find that this belief was incorrect; the system which we trusted has failed us, and the Government has been left in ignorance of facts of essential importance. Sir Edwin Johnson was misled, and the Financial Department also was misled, by accounts which were in themselves, as far as they went, perfectly correct, but which, nevertheless, totally failed to show the actual expenditure on the war.

4. I do not now propose to enter into further consideration of the points to which the attention of my honourable colleague Sir Edwin Johnson was chiefly directed in his minute of the 1st May, or to discuss the causes which led, in his opinion, to increased expenditure. Such points are apart from the main question now before me, which is how it happened that both the Military and the Financial Departments failed to appreciate not only what the war would cost in the future, but what it had cost in the past. For we have now not merely to show why we failed in the task of making an accurate estimate of the future cost of a war; if this had been the extent of our error, we need not have troubled ourselves about it much. Our real failure has been far more serious; we have not only been unable to foresee the expenditure of the future, but we have been deceived in regard to the expenditure of the past, and in regard to the expenditure that was actually going on. It is this that really requires explanation, and on which I shall throw the fullest light in my power.

5. In the 12th paragraph of our Despatch of the 4th May, we stated our belief that our inability to estimate aright the cost of the war was mainly due to the peculiarity of the system of our military accounts. It has become more and more clear that the principal source of our mistake was then indicated.

6. Our civil revenues and expenditure are, for the most part, recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, directly from the transactions at our treasuries, a procedure which ensures the promptest possible record of the facts, and that nothing shall be kept out of the accounts, pending inquiries and perhaps controversies, which may be interminable.

The Government knows how tenaciously the Financial Department clings to this procedure, and resists the many endeavours which are made to disturb, by interdepartmental adjustments and the like, the simple record thus provided. Secure in this record, we trouble ourselves comparatively little about the subsequent completion of the several departmental accounts, which would often be found lagging long behind.

7. To this wholesome procedure there are some exceptions, which have, hitherto, been considered unavoidable, owing to the admixture in the treasury transactions affected of items which are neither revenue nor expenditure. For example, the transactions at our treasuries with the Post Office include money-order remittances and many other debt items, and would, therefore, be no guide to the postal revenue and expenditure. In like manner the transactions with the Public Works Department include the revenue and working expenses of the railways, State and Guaranteed, the outlay upon the construction of productive public works, and so on.

In such cases it has been considered that we should lose more than we should gain by attempting to work upon the treasury figures; and it has been thought better to wait for our accounts until the departmental account officers can audit and classify the treasury transactions. It is an essential part of the duty of those officers to take care that their accounts, eventually, correspond in all particulars with the treasury transactions; but it is plain that the system is much less satisfactory than the simpler method to which we adhere whenever possible.

8. It has not hitherto been thought practicable to treat the military accounts by the simpler and safer method; the plan always adopted has been to wait until the pecuniary transactions of the Military Department could be classified and audited in the Military Account Department, upon which rests the responsibility of seeing that the accounts of the military revenue and expenditure are in true accord with the treasury transactions. The character of the military accounts will be readily understood from a paper written in 1868, by the late Colonel Arthur Broome, when Controller General of Military Expenditure,* extracts from which are printed in Appendix A. (II.). The accounts rendered by the military disbursing officers are audited, classified, and compiled in the Account Department; disbursements which cannot be sufficiently vouched by the disbursers, or which are challenged by the auditors, being entered under the suspense head "Advances Recoverable," and not recorded as expenditure. The general result is, that the audited and classified expenditure in any month is not known for about ten weeks, and that an indefinite balance, which is really expenditure, always remains unaudited and, therefore, unadjusted. In quiet times this balance is not large, and no serious inconvenience ensues; but when field operations are in progress on a large scale, the unadjusted residue may attain to such dimensions that the accounts of the audited and classified expenditure afford no indication of the real outlay. It is in consequence of disregard of these considerations that the present error has occurred.

9. The system of our military accounts was carefully remodelled by the English Commissioners of inquiry into Indian accounts, Messrs. Foster and Whiffen, as explained in their elaborate report dated 30th August 1864; but they suggested no material organic changes in the procedure previously followed. The Commissioners did not, apparently, think it practicable to follow, in respect of the military accounts, what I have called the simpler system; but they were alive to the dangers involved at several points of the procedure which they advocated. I have extracted in Appendix A. (I.) the paragraphs of their report which bear immediately upon this subject, and show the nature of the precautions which they recommended.

10. Effect was gradually given to the recommendations of the Commissioners; but the final orders of the Government on their report were not issued till the 7th July 1868. In Appendix A. (II.) will be found extracts, which now possess a special significance, from the review by Colonel Broome upon which the orders of the Government were based.

11. The Government of India in the Military Department re-echoed the spirit of Colonel Broome's remarks, as follows:—

"3. The conclusion at which Colonel Broome has arrived in paragraph 23 also appears to his Excellency in Council to be strictly correct; the new head of 'Advances Recoverable' being, in reality, nothing else than an 'Inefficient Balance' with the same inconvenience, and with no actual diminution of amount. Considering, however, the extensive and multifarious character of military charges, it is, the Governor General in Council observes, almost inconceivable that any system can be devised which can free the military accounts from some amount of unadjusted charges—in other words, an 'Inefficient Balance.'

* By a resolution in the Financial Department, No. 4474, dated 21st October 1871, the title of this officer was changed to "Accountant General, Military Department," without material change of his functions.

“4. Colonel Broome’s review of the new system appears to the Governor General in Council to be a fair and candid one; and the conclusion he arrives at, viz., that the present system should be regarded as one of a permanent nature, trusting to vigilance to mitigate the defects inherent in the system, has the cordial assent of the Government of India in the Military Department.”

12. The final resolution by the Government in the Financial Department was of a formal character, and contains no reference to the defects thus recognised. None of the authorities who took part in those discussions allude to the possibility of the elimination of these defects by the direct record, in the finance and revenue accounts, as military revenue and expenditure, of the military transactions at our civil treasuries, after a few suitable adjustments.

This preliminary discussion may appear tedious; but it is essential to the full understanding of the case.

13. I now invite attention to the two appended statements marked B and C, being returns of—

(B) the net military expenditure in India as recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts, month by month, from April 1869 to February 1880, which is the latest month for which the accounts are complete, with an estimate for March; and,

(C) the net disbursements from the civil treasuries in India to the Military Department, month by month, from April 1869 to April 1880. The entry for March is, however, only an estimate. We know that the net amount disbursed in March was 2,082,500*l.*; but we do not yet know the sets-off still to come in the shape of excess payments made, during the year, by the Military Department on account of the Civil Department, and the like, which still await adjustment in the accounts of March. Such sets-off will certainly be large. I have, therefore, entered 1,750,000*l.*

14. If these two statements be compared it will be found that—

(1) until the end of 1877–78, the recorded net military expenditure was, invariably, more or less in excess of the net disbursements to the Military Department: the explanation of this excess is that, besides the sums withdrawn from the civil treasuries, the Military Department spends some portion of the departmental receipts, including money which it receives for remittances to families in England, and so on:

(2) till the end of 1877–78, if allowance be made for the aforesaid normal difference, the two accounts corresponded closely: clearly, with a few appropriate adjustments, the treasury accounts might, till then, have been substituted for the accounts of audited and classified revenue and expenditure without substantial or ultimate inaccuracy; but, apparently, till the end of 1877–78, little would have been gained by such substitution:

(3) from the beginning of 1878–79, these normal conditions were reversed, the net disbursements having, since the beginning of 1878–79, constantly exceeded the net recorded expenditure; and

(4) from October 1878, this excess became constantly larger and larger.

Our troops crossed the frontier on the 21st November 1878; but as we all remember, expenditure in preparation for war had been going on for some time before that event.

15. Instead of the moderate excess, usual in previous years, in the net recorded expenditure as compared with the net disbursements, the net military disbursements from the civil treasuries, during the two latest years, exceeded the net recorded military expenditure by 4,214,000*l.*, as follows:—

In 1878–79	-	-	-	-	-	-	£	2,222,000
and								
In 1879–80 (by estimate as regards March, and compared with the regular estimate)	-	-	-	-	-	-		3,092,000
								5,314,000
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-		5,314,000
Deduct—								
Advances made on account of the Malta expedition, and recovered from the Imperial Government	-						£	250,000
Unspent balances in the hands of the military disbursers or held at the disposal of the Military Department	-	-	-	-	-	-	850,000	1,100,000
								1,100,000
Remains	-	-	-	-	-	-		£4,214,000

16. To this large excess some considerable addition should, probably, be made, because, as has been pointed out, the net recorded expenditure ordinarily exceeds the disbursements; so that there remains a very large sum which must be eventually adjusted, in the finance and revenue accounts, as military expenditure in India, in excess of the estimates of 1879-80 and 1880-81.

17. It would be premature to attempt to state precisely the amount by which the estimates have thus been exceeded; and it would be still more premature to inquire how much of such excess is due to the war in Afghanistan, and how much to other causes, such as the operations on the North-Eastern Frontier, the military preparations in Burma, or, even, to an under-estimate of the normal military expenditure, apart from all extraordinary operations. Moreover, it is manifest that a similar excess is still accruing as compared with the estimate for 1880-81. We are not yet, therefore, in a position to conjecture, with any approach to accuracy, by what aggregate amount, and in what particulars, the estimates of the two years 1879-80 and 1880-81 will, eventually, be found deficient.

In paragraph 8 of our Despatch of the 4th May, the opinion was expressed that at least 4,000,000*l.* must be added to the estimate of the cost of the war in 1880-81, and we said that we could only speak with much reserve of the total amount which the war would ultimately cost. "The responsible officers," it was added, "of the Military Department still confidently expect that its cost will not be nearly so much as 10,000,000*l.*; but we are unable, at present, to reconcile this expectation with the "actual outgoings from our treasuries." I feel still less able to share that expectation now. Although I will not attempt to anticipate the results which our advisers may place before us as their revised estimate of the total cost of the war, yet, considering what we already know regarding the expenditure of the past; considering, also, the present scale of our military operations, the uncertainties of the future, and, on the other hand, the certainty, under the most favourable expectations which can be entertained, that a great expenditure is still before us; considering I say, all the facts and probabilities of the case, it appears to me hardly possible to doubt that the fears expressed in our Despatch of the 4th May will be justified, and that the ultimate cost of the war will largely exceed the sum of 10,000,000*l.*, which was then named with so much hesitation. With our present knowledge, I cannot feel any confidence that, even if the war is brought to a termination as soon as we now anticipate, it will cost, independently of the frontier railways, less than 15,000,000*l.*

18. Statement C has been compiled only since the Government found reason to doubt the correctness of the military estimates. So far as I am aware, no similar comparative statement of the disbursements to the Military Department during a long succession of months has ever before been compiled. The English Commissioners of Inquiry into Indian Accounts suggested no such check, and the expediency of a precaution of this nature has not occurred, at any time, to any of the officers of the Civil or Military Account Department. Thus, this statement, which seems to me to show plainly what has happened, was not in the hands of any of the officers who took part in the preparation of the military estimates; nor was it before the Government of India in either the Military or the Financial Department, when those estimates were under consideration. When the military estimates were before the Government in the Financial Department, the latest completed military accounts were those for October 1879; they showed a net expenditure, in the first seven months of the year 1879-80, of 7,161,000*l.*, being only 724,600*l.* more than the corresponding expenditure of 1878-79, and only 1,061,000*l.* more than the least corresponding expenditure during the preceding 10 years. There was nothing in these figures to suggest any distrust of the departmental estimates.

19. From the extracts collected in Appendix A, it appears that the system of the military accounts provides for a vigilant attention to the expenditure held in suspense under the head "Advances Recoverable"; and that the English Commissioners insisted prominently upon the vital importance of a punctual interchange of the military accounts with the civil treasuries.

I will not, with the information actually before me, assert, in regard to any individual officer, among the responsible officers concerned, that the salutary warnings of the Commissioners were, in the present instance, neglected, and it is true that the most exact observance of the prescribed precautions would not have supplied the place of such a check as Statement C, the virtue of which consists in the means which it affords for the promptest possible comparison of the total current military outgoings from our treasuries with the corresponding transactions in the past, and with the contemporary estimates of the military receipts and expenditure.

Plainly, however, it was the duty of the officers of the Military Account Department, in the preparation of their estimates, to pay special regard to the large advances of which they must have been aware. They have been officially called upon to explain upon what grounds they, nevertheless, believed that their estimates of the cost of the war in Afghanistan were adequate, and it will be right to await their explanations before we impute blame to officers who have, hitherto, been distinguished for the zealous and intelligent discharge of their duties, and have enjoyed the confidence of the Government of India; but I must say, at once, that it appears inconceivable that the Government could thus have remained in ignorance of facts which it was essential it should know, if the duties imposed on the several departments concerned had been performed in a really intelligent manner.

20. It must be remembered that the elaborate recommendations of the English Commissioners concern exclusively the Offices of Account; primarily, the Military Offices of Account, and, in a secondary degree, the Civil Offices of Account in their relation to the Military Offices. Those recommendations had no reference at all to the procedure of the Government of India itself, but only to the provision of the best precautions which could be devised against such oversight or failure in the Account Offices as might cause the Government to be misled.

21. In popular apprehension, the Financial Department is regarded as one homogeneous organisation, the responsibilities of which are common to the whole body. But, in truth, the Financial Department consists of two separate sections with distinct and clearly defined functions, namely—

- (1) the Financial Department of the Government; and
- (2) the Offices of Account and Audit.

Although the Account Offices are entirely subordinate to, and at the command of, the Government, the functions and responsibilities of the Financial Department of the Government should not be confounded with those of the Account Department.

It is the duty of the Government to make intelligent use of the Finance and Revenue Accounts and Estimates laid before it, and to correct the estimates by any fresh information in its possession, or if it draws different inferences from the data furnished by the Account Department; but although the Government alone is responsible for the estimates ultimately adopted, it takes no part in their detailed preparation.

A costly trained agency is provided, whose whole time and attention is devoted to the record of the public accounts, and periodically to the preparation of the public estimates. An elaborate system and carefully considered rules are prescribed for the guidance of this agency. The Government is bound to introduce any improvement in that system which experience may suggest, and to correct any defects which may come to light; but only mischief and confusion would ensue, if the Government were to interfere with the Account Department in the discharge of its daily duties, or to test, by extraneous checks, the correctness of its work. Any such misdirected activity would, almost inevitably, result in the formation of a second and less trustworthy system of public accounts, in a weakening of the proper sense of their responsibilities on the part of the Account Officers, and in a dissipation of energy injurious to the public interests. The true policy in this matter lies in the proper division of labour, and not in the interference of one Department with the proper functions of another. The procedure of the Government of India in this respect does not, I believe, differ from that of Her Majesty's Government, or from that of the Governments of other civilised countries.

22. The preparation of a correct, intelligent, punctual and efficient record of the actual public receipts and disbursements, and of the most trustworthy possible estimates of the public receipts and disbursements, is the duty of the Account Department, upon which rests the obligation of seeing that the Government is not misled by any superficial aspects of the public accounts, or otherwise. It is of great public importance that these responsibilities of the Account Department should be in no way compromised or lost sight of; and in this view I proceed, now, to give a sketch of the duties of the principal officers concerned on the present occasion.

What follows will be better understood if it be borne in mind that the machinery for the compilation of the public accounts in India is, to all intents and purposes, divided into three independent departments. The departments which keep the accounts of the Army and of the Public Works Department are quite separate from the department which keeps the Civil Accounts, and, although their accounts eventually flow into the general books kept by the Comptroller General, in the Central Office of Account, they owe no direct allegiance to the Comptroller General. The Military

Account Department is directly subordinate to the Government of India in the Military Department; and the Public Works Account Department to the Government of India in the Public Works Department.

It was the particular duty of the Controller of Military Accounts in Bengal to watch the expenditure on the military operations in Afghanistan, as an obviously important part of that section of the public expenditure for the record of which he is responsible; to take especial care that there was no avoidable delay in the audit and classification of the war expenditure; to bring immediately to notice any obstacles or hindrances in the way of its prompt adjustment; to ascertain with particular vigilance that the accounts corresponded with the transactions of the Military Department, or on behalf of the Military Department, at the civil treasuries within his jurisdiction; to keep the Government constantly and truly informed of the progress of the war expenditure; and, at the prescribed intervals, to estimate its probable amount, after carefully collating all the data necessary for the purpose.

With this officer rested the duty of issuing assignments or letters of credit upon the civil treasuries in favour of the spending departments; so that he had in his own hands the means of knowing readily the general scope and progress of the bulk of the outlay. This remark does not include the expenditure by civil officers on behalf of the Military Department, but the Controller should have taken special precautions to acquaint himself with such expenditure as promptly as possible. It was not the specific duty of the Controller of Military Accounts to suggest the particular check the application of which has now discovered the error in the war estimates, but he might have been expected to ascertain, by some equally effective check, that his accounts and estimates of the war expenditure were consistent with the disbursements to the Military Department from the treasuries within his own jurisdiction, which constituted by far the greater part of all the war disbursements.

23. The functions of the Accountant-General, Military Department, are less exactly defined than those of the Controller of Military Accounts; but they include the whole of India, and thus extend over a wider range. His duties are twofold:—

I.—He is responsible for the scrutiny of the several presidential estimates and accounts, and for their review and consolidation into the Imperial estimates and accounts.

He is also required to collect and prepare statistics and other information on military subjects required by the Government.

II.—He is the *ex-officio* adviser of the Government of India in the Military Department in respect to military accounts, economy, and finance; in this capacity his office is a branch of the Military Secretariat.

In the first of these capacities, the Military Accountant-General deals only with the completed estimates and accounts received from the Controllers of Military Accounts, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, supplementing and correcting their estimates, reports, &c. by the light of the further information, which he may possess as to the views and intentions of the Government, probable changes of organisation, or other circumstances. He has no executive functions as regards pay, audit, and allotment of funds to the military disbursing officers.

As regards his duties under the second head, he advises the Government of India on the financial aspect of all military questions which may be referred to him, and in this respect, and in his close connexion and subordination to the Military Department, he occupies in relation to the Military Department very much the position of the Accountant-General in relation to the War Office in England. The duties, however, of the two officers are not otherwise analogous, as the Military Accountant-General in India is not an executive officer, and keeps no detailed accounts, these being kept and compiled for each Presidency by the several Controllers.

But although the functions of this officer are rather those of a Financial Deputy Secretary in the Military Department than of an Accountant-General, yet in respect to the war in Afghanistan, the Government might, I think, fairly have looked to him to watch the proceedings of the Controllers of Military Accounts, and to take care that the Government was informed of the facts of the war expenditure as punctually as possible. Indeed, I know that, although his endeavours have been unsuccessful, the Accountant-General did anxiously endeavour to discharge such duties. At all events, the sooner such duties, and perhaps other cognate duties, are definitively imposed upon the Accountant-General the better. It is one of the defects of the present system that the Accountant-General is an Accountant-General only in name; there is really no one head of the Military Account Department in the sense in which the Comptroller-General is at the head of the Civil Account Offices, and to a limited extent, of all account offices in India, and in which the Accountant-General, Public Works Department, is at the

head of all account offices in the Public Works Department. The Controllers of Military Accounts occupy this position each in his own presidency, but there is no Military Comptroller-General for all India. The Military Accountant-General, according to the present definition of his duties, does not supply this void.

24. The Comptroller-General is head of the Civil Account Department. He has nothing to do with the preparation of the military estimates, or even of the civil estimates. It is not his specific duty to take official note of the military estimates, or to ascertain that the subsequent facts are in accord with those estimates. Eventually, indeed, the military receipts and expenditure are recorded from the military books in the Comptroller-General's books, and it would be incumbent on him to bring to notice any error, or any practice or procedure likely to lead to error, of which he might at any time or in any way become cognisant. The immediate connexion of the Comptroller-General with the present war expenditure is confined to the provision of funds on the demand of the Controller of Military Accounts, the two officers having been placed in special communication for the purpose. He has been called upon to say whether he has made any comparison between the funds he has thus supplied and the war estimates, and if not, why not.

It was open to the Comptroller-General to apply the check that has now been applied, the essential figures of which were, indeed, in his own keeping; but it cannot be said that it was his recognised duty to do so.

25. Early in March last the Comptroller-General brought to the notice of the Government in the Financial Department the increasing drain from the Punjab treasuries in connexion with the war, and the Government thereupon seeing, for the first time, reason to fear that the estimates of the cost of the army prepared in the Military Account Department might be untrustworthy, lost no time in instituting inquiries which revealed the facts stated in this minute. The check now applied was not thought of in the Military or Civil Account Department, but originated in the Financial Secretariat.

26. I do not intend now to offer any opinion as to the degree of responsibility that may attach to the several officers concerned. As already said, before coming to any conclusions in this respect the Government must await the explanations which have been called for. If it be found, hereafter, that there have been shortcomings, we must be prepared to find some excuses for them in the strain to which the system of military accounts must have been subjected during the progress of field operations of the magnitude of those in which the army has been engaged. On such occasions the disbursements are on a suddenly increased scale, and the disbursing officers being actively engaged in the field or at the base, have less time to give to the punctual and orderly preparation of their accounts. Under such circumstances delays and irregularities may be almost unavoidable.

But meanwhile, without losing sight of my disclaimer of any intention to repudiate my personal responsibility, or that of the Financial Department of the Government, for the failure of the war estimates, I think it necessary to make it clear at once that for the ignorance of the war expenditure actually incurred, to which this failure is due, it is in the first instance to the Account Department rather than to the Secretariat, in either the Military or Financial Department, that we must look for an explanation. And although I am most anxious not, prematurely, to award blame to any individual officer, I think it right to state, in the plainest terms, my conviction that no mere defects of system can possibly explain away the ignorance in which the Government has been left. The Government of India cannot take refuge in generalities, or attempt to make it appear that such gross errors can occur, and, nevertheless, that nobody is to blame. There must have been extreme negligence, or extreme want of intelligence, somewhere among the responsible officers, and the Government will not shrink from the duty of calling to strict account the officers concerned, whatever may be their position, and whatever may be their previous services or high character.

Whether the Government of India itself took all the steps which it ought to have taken to acquaint itself, in some summary way, with the general progress of the cost of the chief military operations; whether the Military or Financial Department ought not, at an earlier date, to have mistrusted the military estimates; and whether we should not sooner have taken into our own hands the duty of ascertaining the facts, and testing the correctness of those estimates by exceptional and unusual methods, is another question. The confidence that misled the Government is certainly reproved by the facts now known to us, which show that the Military Department was ignorant of facts which it ought to have known, and that the Financial Department should not have taken the war estimates on trust. I in no way wish to extenuate my own responsibility or that of the Financial Department for our erroneous reliance on those estimates. We were so completely

misled by the apparent correspondence of the estimates of past expenditure with the expenditure actually brought to account, that, in spite of the doubts freely expressed on various occasions in public criticisms, we entertained no misgiving as to their soundness. At that time the Financial Department had discovered no data whatever which could have justified interference with the estimates prepared by the responsible officers.

I do not say this by way of apology. It is clear to me that it is quite impossible, and would be altogether unfair, to throw the whole fault either on the system or on the offices of account. The Military Department of the Government must accept the blame of having recommended to the Financial Department totally inadequate estimates; and the Financial Department must accept the blame of having adopted them. If the system was bad, it was the business of the Government to have found this out, and to have amended it. Our responsibility is indisputable; it cannot be extenuated; nor must it be obscured by any investigations which are made either into the system of accounts or into the conduct of individual officers.

But whatever blame may attach to the Government, or to any of its officers, for this want of precaution and foresight, this at least is clear, that the occurrence of an error of the magnitude now discovered shows, beyond the possibility of doubt, not only that there is something radically wrong in our system of accounts, but also in my opinion that this system cannot have been applied with proper care and intelligence. It is our obvious duty to probe this matter to the bottom.

27. The nature of our failure was not ascertained immediately upon our confidence in the estimates being disturbed. Inquiries were, indeed, promptly instituted and, as the result has proved, in the right direction. But although the figures in statement C were obtained from the civil account offices with a speed which is creditable to their efficiency, it took time to verify them in the Military Account Department. Thus we could not at first feel quite sure that we had discovered the true character of our error. The gradual process by which we have satisfied ourselves on this point will explain some apparent inconsistencies between this minute and our telegrams to the Secretary of State at different dates, as well as some want of harmony between Sir Edwin Johnson's minute of the 1st May and the Despatch No. 143, with which it was sent to Her Majesty's Government. In that Despatch, our principal error was plainly indicated, though not in such detail, or with such an absence of all hesitation, as in this minute.

28. My conclusion then is, that the failure of our estimate is due to our ignorance of the actual expenditure on the army, rather than to an inadequate *à priori* appreciation of the probable cost of the field operations.

In the absence of any independent investigations of their own, it is not surprising that the advisers of the Government, in either the Military or the Financial Department, should have failed to frame any approximately accurate estimate of the cost of the war, seeing that, as we now know was the case, not only were they without the assistance of accounts punctually completed, but the facts which appeared on the face of the accounts were, taken alone, wholly misleading. Personally, I never doubted that the estimates which I presented were framed upon a full and correct knowledge of our actual expenditure to a comparatively recent date. As they were not so, I do not wonder that they have proved fallacious.

29. I have at the present moment nothing more to say as to the past, except to express my great regret that so great an error should have found its way into the Budget.

30. It is more satisfactory to turn to the future. I cannot say whether our inquiries will result in the Government of India thinking it desirable to alter the record in the finance and revenue accounts, of our military receipts and expenditure, in the manner which I have indicated; or whether if the Government of India should advocate such an alteration, it will be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. I am aware that the obstacles in the way of this alternative are formidable. Among them is the impossibility of reconciling accounts based directly upon the treasury transactions with the classified and detailed record of the cost of the army, which forms an important section of the finance and revenue accounts as now presented to Parliament. These are questions which require careful consideration; and they must be treated separately. It is plainly the immediate duty of the Government to subject them to the most thorough investigation. But I may at once say that if the change in question be found practicable it will, in my opinion, be highly desirable to make it; for the existing system is essentially defective.

31. Whether, however, that system be maintained or altered, we are, I believe, now secure against being again surprised and discredited. A simple check is already in

operation which will effectually save us from such ignorance as that from which we have now suffered.

Experience shows that it is no easy matter to reconcile in detail the transactions at the civil treasuries with the military accounts. The Report of the English Commission in 1864 contains serious animadversions on the neglect of this duty in the past; and we are aware that the difficulty still continues. The work involves tiresome, detailed, and apparently unimportant correspondence, which is apt to be neglected or overlooked; and although much attention is constantly given to the subject, there are arrears of this kind now as there were in 1864. But there is nothing to prevent the Government of India, in the Military and Financial Departments, being made acquainted, soon after the end of each month, with the actual amounts disbursed to the Military Department from all the treasuries all over India. Arrangements have accordingly been made for the prompt and regular compilation of these figures, and for their communication to the Accountant-General, Military Department, upon whom will devolve in future the duty of comparing the expenditure of the Military Department with the departmental transactions at the civil treasuries throughout India.

32. It will not, indeed, be possible to ascertain by this method the exact cost of any particular military operation, or of any branch of the military service. But with such a return before itself and the proper account officers, the Government of India may, I think, be assured that any very large divergence between the estimates and the facts can never again evade prompt detection; and that the Government will be as well protected from a sudden surprise in respect to the military expenditure as I believe it to be already protected from any like surprise in respect to any of the civil revenues or expenditure. No system can ensure us absolutely against the failure of one estimate or another; but we ought to be secure against such a failure happening, as it has happened on this occasion, without our immediately discovering it; and I believe I may safely promise this degree of immunity from error in the military estimates in future.

33. To sum up the whole matter, the error in the estimate is in my judgment mainly due, not to any misapprehension as to the extent or character of the military operations, but to the fact that we were ignorant of the actual current cost of the war. I attribute this ignorance mainly to the defect which I have described in the military accounts, which although themselves perfectly correct, failed to give to the Government timely information of the expenditure which was really going on. In this respect the whole history furnishes a fresh illustration of the fact that, in regard to such matters as keeping accounts and framing estimates, it is never safe to assume that the care and intelligence of individuals will afford sufficient safeguards against the dangers of a defective system.

I admit that, if, instead of depending according to custom on the accounts alone, the Government of India had itself watched the current cost of the war, it might have, to a great extent, avoided the error into which it has fallen. But I place the defect in the system of the military accounts in the forefront, because, but for that defect, no oversight, omission, or negligence by departments or individual officers, whether in the Secretariat or in the account offices, could have prevented the earliest possible knowledge of the facts, and because such knowledge would itself have neutralised all individual and minor failures.

JOHN STRACHEY.

Simla, 20th May 1880.

APPENDIX A (I).

EXTRACTS from the REPORT of the ENGLISH COMMISSION OF INQUIRY into INDIAN ACCOUNTS, dated 30th August 1864.

31. The paymaster of each circle is furnished by the regimental paymaster or other disbursing officer with an estimate of the amount required, during the ensuing month, for the payment of the troops; this estimate is certified by the officer commanding the regiment or battery. The circle paymaster compiles these estimates into a general return, adding thereto the amount he requires for the payment of staff and other allowances, and he specifies the sum that he will require to draw upon each treasury; this document is furnished to the Military Accountant on the 1st of the month for the ensuing month's payments, in whose office the returns from the several circle paymasters and other accountants are compiled into a general statement showing the amount to be drawn, during the month, at each treasury in the several presidencies; this statement is

forwarded to the Controller, who transmits it to the Civil Department, from whence the necessary authority is issued to the treasury officers.

70. The aggregate amount of the inefficient balance was, on the 31st March 1864, as follows, viz. :—

	Rs.
Presidency Circle - - - - -	2,84,849
Allahabad - - - - -	2,82,936
Lucknow - - - - -	3,89,401
Meerut - - - - -	5,63,000
Lahore - - - - -	2,39,241
Trans-Ravi - - - - -	2,69,689
Hyderabad Contingent - - - - -	56,683
Total - - - - -	<u>20,85,799</u>

71. The amount of the inefficient balance in the Madras Presidency is 8½ lakhs, and in the Bombay Presidency it is 9 lakhs, or, in all, no less than upwards of 38 lakhs.

72. The inefficient balance is an exceedingly embarrassing item in the military accounts, and leads to great difficulties in adjusting them at the end of the year; for, whilst the Annual Account of Receipts and Disbursements made up by the Military Department exhibits the audited expenditure only, the account of military expenditure compiled by the Financial Department for the information of the Home Government shows the audited expenditure, plus the amount of inefficient balance at the end of the year, minus the amount of that item at the commencement of the year. The two accounts can never agree, and *it is always a matter of opinion and not one of fact*, as to what has been the military expenditure for any one year; moreover, the “inefficient balance” is differently treated in each presidency.

74. We are in possession of a copy of the “Preliminary Rules and Instructions for conducting the duties of the Military Finance Department,” dated 18th October 1861; it is therein stated, article VII., p. 19—“The Military Accountant will also take care that outstandings are not allowed to remain unsettled, and he will carefully scrutinise the state of all inefficient balances.”

III.—ADVANCE FROM LOCAL TREASURIES.

211. The course pursued in regard to supplying the disbursing officers with funds has already been described in paragraph 31. We would here wish to draw attention to the manner in which a settlement is effected in regard to these advances between the Military and Civil Departments.

212. The adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries for military services is a duty that appertains to the Military Accountants. They alone have the information upon which the amount drawn by disbursing officers can be checked, and they alone can certify that the sums claimed by civil treasuries on account of military advances have been duly acknowledged by the officers to whom the advances have been made.

213. Knowing the importance of a prompt settlement in regard to these transactions, we inquired very minutely into the course pursued in the office of the Military Accountant. We found it unsatisfactory in the extreme. The adjustment with the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General was considerably in arrear, and no adjustment had been effected in regard to the advances from the Bengal treasuries since April 1869.

214. It would appear, from papers referred to us, that this important part of the business of Military Accountant is in an equally unsatisfactory state in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. The papers to which we allude contained a Report from the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General, Bombay, complaining that he had not received from the Military Accountant any statement of civil charges incurred in the Military Department, nor the reports of the result of the examination of the statements furnished in regard to military remittances.

215. On the papers in question we suggested that the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-

Generals of the several presidencies and provinces should be called upon to report—

- I. The period to which the statement of advances from civil treasuries on account of military charges has been rendered to the Military Accountant.
- II. The period to which the accounts between the two departments have been adjusted.
- III. The differences, if any, that exist between the record in the military books and that in the books of the Civil Department.
- IV. What steps have been taken to reconcile the differences.

216. The replies to these inquiries are worth a careful perusal, as they plainly indicate that the system adopted in the Military Department, at least in regard to this important element, has entirely broken down.

* * * * *

342. Before we proceed to the explanation we have to submit in regard to the record of the expenditure, and the books that should be kept, we would direct attention to what we consider one of the most important elements in the military accounts.

343. The funds necessary for carrying on the military service throughout the country are, for the most part, furnished from civil treasuries. The manner in which disbursing officers draw upon these treasuries has already been described in paragraph 31. There can be no doubt that, unless the accounts between the Civil and Military Departments in regard to these transactions are promptly and regularly adjusted, inextricable confusion will take place, the whole system of accounts will be compromised, and frauds to a large extent might remain undetected.

* * * * *

351. The following arrangements are submitted with the view of obtaining a prompt settlement of the amount drawn by disbursing officers on the civil treasuries :—

352. I.—The Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General of each presidency or province should, so soon as the monthly accounts of the several treasury officers shall have been received, transmit to the Military Account Department, Bengal, Madras, or Bombay, as the case may be, an abstract list (*see* Appendix No. 22) of all advances for military services in the previous month. This list should be supported by copies of the original details furnished by the officer in charge of each treasury and by the original drafts or orders.

353. II.—The disbursing officer should debit himself in his monthly account current or pay list with the amount that he has *drawn* upon the several civil treasuries, and he should transmit a list of all the drafts or orders drawn by him on the form given in Appendix No. 20.

354. The course to be adopted in order to record these transactions in the books of the Accountant-General may be as follows :—

355. I.—The disbursing officer will be debited, in the principal books, with the amount stated by him as having been *drawn* during the month. The aggregate amount *drawn* by disbursing officers will be passed to their debit and to the credit of an account to be opened in the principal ledger, to be entitled “Advances from Civil Treasuries.”

356. II.—The monthly lists forwarded by the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-Generals of the several presidencies or provinces will be examined by the Accountant-General, Military Department, so far as Bengal is concerned, with the original orders, drafts, &c., forwarded in support of the charge. To facilitate this operation, a register, as per form Appendix No. 21, should be kept, showing the amount that has been drawn from each civil treasury.

357. III.—The differences between the amount drawn by disbursing officers and that paid by the civil treasuries should be explained in detail monthly. A copy of this explanation, which should show all drafts or outstanding orders, should be rendered to the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General of each presidency or province. (*See* Appendix No. 23.)

358. IV.—In concluding this subject, we would suggest that there should be established, under the immediate direction and control of the principal book-keeper, a section of the Accountant-General's office specially charged with the duty of regulating and adjusting the entire transactions relating to cash advances from the several treasuries.

* * * * *

II.—REGISTER OF CLAIMS, No. 2.—*Orders on Mofussil Treasuries.*
Appendix No. 13.

362. In this book would be recorded all claims, after they have been examined, which are made wholly payable by orders signed by the Accountant-General on Mofussil Treasuries. This is also a branch of the business hitherto conducted by the presidency paymaster. The course to be followed in regard to the final record is similar to that suggested in regard to Register No. 1. The account to be opened in the ledger, instead of being styled "Orders Payable," should be denominated "Advances from Civil Treasuries." It must be distinctly understood that these orders have no connexion with the drafts or orders drawn by disbursing officers on the treasuries in question. The treasury officers need, however, send to the Civil Department but one general list for all drafts or orders discharged during the month. The due appropriation of these orders to the debit of the accounts concerned would be conducted in the office of the Accountant-General.

* * * * *

X.—REGISTER FOR THE RECORD AND ADJUSTMENT OF ADVANCES FROM CIVIL TREASURIES.
Appendix No. 21.

375. In this book will be recorded the particulars of every draft drawn or order issued by the several disbursing officers upon the civil treasuries. The orders will be carefully compared with the returns furnished by the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-General, and the transactions should be adjusted monthly on the adjustment sheet prepared for that purpose.

* * * * *

408. We would again direct particular attention to the importance of adjusting every separate account now standing unclosed in the "deposit" and "advances repayable" ledger. The Military Accountant should be directed to report the total number of unsettled accounts; and a monthly return should then be forwarded by that officer to the Accountant-General, showing the number of these accounts which have been adjusted month by month.

409. The adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries on account of military services is another subject that should demand the immediate and earnest attention of the Military Accountants of the three presidencies. No time should be lost in obtaining a complete explanation in regard to every item of difference that may exist between the military and civil books, and the accounts should be adjusted to the latest date.

410. We regret that we have not had an opportunity of personally inspecting the books and accounts kept in the Military Account Offices of Madras and Bombay. It would appear that, so far as relates to the adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries, there is every reason to apprehend that the books are in an unsatisfactory state. This, however, cannot be fully ascertained, unless they are subjected to a searching investigation by an officer totally unconnected with the department. This, so soon as an opportunity should arise, we would suggest, should be done.

* * * * *

CONCLUSION.

417. We will now proceed to summarise the principal recommendations contained in this Report.

* * * * *

Disbursing officers should render monthly statements of the drafts or orders drawn by them on the civil treasuries; and the Deputy Auditor and Accountant-Generals of the several presidencies or provinces should send corresponding statements to the Accountant-General, Military Department, in Bengal, and to the controllers at Madras and Bombay, respectively.

* * * * *

The greatest importance should be attached to a prompt and careful adjustment of the advances from civil treasuries on account of military services. A separate section of the book-keeper's branch of the office should be established with the view of making these adjustments.

APPENDIX A (II).

EXTRACTS FROM THE REVIEW (No. 1367 A., dated 29th February 1868) OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT BY COLONEL ARTHUR BROOME, CONTROLLER GENERAL OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

20. The main object to which all the changes of system introduced by the English Commissioners have converged, is the *timely* rendering of the accounts in a classified and intelligible form; and as these are required to be based on deliberately audited transactions, there is, presumedly, imparted to them a reliability which was wanting in the former system. This quality of reliability, however, does not pervade all the transactions exhibited, but only extends to the *classified charges*, as set forth therein, they being merely that portion of the entire charges which on investigation has been found unobjectionable.

21. On the most favourable estimate of the present system, it cannot be said either to give the charges under the prescribed classified heads *complete* for the year, or to ensure accuracy of description or certainty in respect of amounts in the *accounts* of the transactions of the year.

This remark may need further explanation. One of the fundamental principles of the present system of accounts is, that the *annual receipts* exhibited shall be the sums which come in course of receipt during the year, and that the *annual expenditure*, that is, the charges falling against the budget grants, shall be the sums which come in course of payment during the year. But, in order to expedite the compilation of the monthly accounts, two courses are adopted—

1st. When disbursing officers are unable to produce complete vouchers for services involving cash disbursements, for instance, moneys advanced to commissariat agents for purchases, &c., they are permitted to charge such disbursements to the head "Advances Recoverable," subject to further adjustment.

2nd. When vouchers for services said to have been completed are found by the auditors to be insufficient, the amount is disallowed, and deducted from the disbursements taken credit for by the executive officer; and this sum also passes under the head "Advances Recoverable." The *classified charges*, therefore, are exclusive of these transactions, and, to that extent, incomplete. As, however, these unaudited or unauthorised disbursements under the head "Advances Recoverable" (to be afterwards adjusted) are necessarily admitted in the accounts of the year as a set-off against the cash receipts from the civil treasuries, &c., they form the *uncertain* element adverted to in the preceding paragraph.

22. By this arrangement it will be perceived that there is a certain sum disbursed within the year that is neither a charge against the budget nor a balance, not being practically treated as an asset of the Government. The effect of this arrangement on the classified and recorded charges of a year may be favourable or unfavourable. If the previous year had closed with a larger sum under the head "Advances Recoverable," and the following year with a smaller sum, the difference, which must necessarily have been adjusted in the interim, will tend to swell the classified charges of that particular year, and *vice versa*. At the close of the last official year, the amount standing to credit and

Cr. 4,51,85,312
Dr. 4,42,25,750

9,59,562

debit of this head in the three presidencies was as noted in the margin, indicating that the legitimate charges of the year were increased by a sum of Rs. 9,59,562, appertaining properly to the charges of previous years. In this instance, the per-centage of increase is small, being only .06 per cent. of the aggregate amount of charges; but, with any relaxation of audit, or during extensive field operations, the results might probably be inconvenient. It may be as well to observe also that the amount disbursed in March last, and exhibited under this head at the date of the closing of the accounts of the year 1866-67, was Rs. 46,34,416 in the three presidencies, indicating that expenditure to this extent had remained unpassed and unclassified, but which will appear as classified charges in the succeeding year's accounts.

23. Without the slightest desire to revive previous objections, or to criticise the present system in any carping spirit, the undersigned feels bound to point out that the new head of "Advances Recoverable" is, in reality, the much-abused "Inefficient Balance" under a new name, with the same inconvenience, and with no actual diminution of amount.

* * * * *

25. A perfect system is not to be hoped for; and, in noticing these drawbacks or defects, the undersigned has no desire to suggest any change or modification in that so recently adopted. The defects referred to, being inherent, could only be removed by a complete reorganisation; and of late the changes have been so many, and their effects so unsettling and embarrassing, that any further measures of the kind are greatly to be deprecated. Moreover, the present system has been introduced under special advantages. A prominence was given to the question which no previous discussion of plans of accounting was ever fortunate enough to secure; and this has been attended with energy of action, and no little expenditure of money and labour. The disruption of former modes of procedure has been radical; establishments have been re-formed and re-constituted; printed forms reducing the duties to a definite and regular routine, and prepared at considerable cost, have been prescribed; and all offices of military account have been, or are being, arranged in adaptation to the system. It is very desirable, therefore, that it should be regarded as one of a permanent nature. But while the undersigned conceives it his duty to make this recommendation in the interests of Government, and zealously to act on it, he believes it to be no less his duty to indicate the obvious but inseparable defects of the system. It has struck him that, in its arrangements, despatch has been considered of more importance than accuracy, and that a rigid check has been subordinated to the advantages anticipated from a combination of duties, or, as it is termed, "a systematic allotment of work"; and further that being a graft of the War Office system, the difference between the character and qualifications of the subordinate agency available in India and England has not been sufficiently considered in the changes made.

26. The fact, however, of being alive to the defects is, next to their removal, the best means of obviating evil results, and by care and constant watchfulness, the greater evil* may be guarded against, and the lesser one mitigated.

* NOTE.—By "the greater evil" Colonel Broome here means the evil described in paragraphs 20 to 23 above.

(B.)—Net Expenditure of the Military Department. (In thousands of Rupees.)

	1869-70.	1870-71.	1871-72.	1872-73.	1873-74.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.	1881-82.	1882-83.
IN THE MONTH.														
April	97,03	87,07	88,78	88,64	86,03	84,82	80,48	83,58	91,04	92,49	95,08			
May	93,47	92,89	90,78	88,19	89,26	86,22	92,62	88,31	87,57	89,34	1,10,82			
June	96,74	95,96	94,38	91,02	89,57	86,46	93,12	90,90	95,89	99,77	1,01,91			
July	96,58	93,99	91,09	94,85	86,45	89,13	88,07	86,15	95,75	89,74	1,02,24			
August	1,00,49	88,91	86,45	90,68	84,54	87,76	85,44	85,31	90,51	89,41	1,19,62			
September	95,70	90,46	84,16	84,79	87,23	87,23	84,37	85,94	87,73	89,10	95,23			
October	91,65	84,81	89,18	90,32	87,63	88,38	84,41	90,51	93,33	93,79	91,20			
November	1,00,91	92,00	91,53	93,25	88,27	89,21	85,25	89,93	93,78	1,00,92	1,29,66			
December	89,65	91,00	92,36	92,13	84,94	91,63	89,85	95,92	97,31	1,07,59	1,20,36			
January	1,01,71	96,64	92,74	90,21	96,36	93,80	90,58	95,91	98,84	1,08,64	1,64,27			
February	91,12	89,35	86,99	87,64	92,27	87,99	93,30	92,66	93,30	1,07,71	1,36,04			
March	1,21,78	1,57,48	1,26,24	1,17,66	1,16,47	1,06,76	1,11,19	1,11,30	1,29,80	1,49,76	1,76,75			
Total	11,76,83	11,60,56	11,14,68	11,09,38	10,89,02	10,79,39	10,78,68	10,96,42	11,54,85	12,18,26	14,43,18*	13,28,95*		
TO THE END OF THE MONTH.														
April	97,03	87,07	88,78	84,64	86,03	84,82	80,48	83,58	91,04	92,49	95,08			
May	1,90,50	1,79,96	1,79,56	1,76,83	1,75,29	1,71,04	1,73,10	1,71,89	1,78,61	1,81,83	2,05,90			
June	2,87,24	2,75,92	2,73,94	2,67,85	2,64,86	2,57,50	2,66,22	2,62,79	2,74,50	2,81,60	3,07,81			
July	3,83,82	3,69,91	3,65,03	3,62,70	3,51,31	3,46,63	3,54,29	3,48,94	3,70,25	3,71,34	4,10,05			
August	4,84,31	4,58,82	4,51,48	4,53,38	4,35,85	4,34,39	4,39,73	4,34,25	4,60,76	4,60,75	5,29,67			
September	5,80,01	5,49,28	5,35,64	5,38,17	5,23,08	5,21,62	5,20,19	5,20,19	5,48,49	5,49,85	6,24,90			
October	6,71,66	6,34,09	6,24,82	6,28,49	6,10,71	6,10,00	6,08,51	6,10,70	6,41,82	6,43,64	7,16,10			
November	7,72,57	7,26,09	7,16,35	7,21,74	6,98,98	6,99,21	6,98,76	7,00,63	7,55,60	7,44,56	8,45,76			
December	8,62,22	8,17,09	8,08,71	8,13,87	7,83,92	7,90,84	7,83,61	7,96,55	8,32,91	8,52,15	9,66,12			
January	9,63,93	9,13,73	9,01,45	9,04,08	8,80,28	8,84,64	8,74,19	8,92,46	9,31,75	9,60,79	11,30,39			
February	10,55,05	10,03,08	9,88,44	9,91,72	9,72,55	9,72,63	9,67,49	9,85,12	10,25,05	10,68,50	12,66,43			
March	11,76,83	11,60,56	11,14,68	11,09,38	10,89,02	10,79,39	10,78,68	10,96,42	11,54,85	12,18,26	14,43,18			

* Exclusive of the following :—

Frontier Railways—	1,08,00
Telegraphs	4,15
Post Office	3,70
	<u>1,15,85</u>
	97,00
	7,32
	<u>4,00</u>
	1,08,32

(C.)—Net Monthly Disbursements from the Civil Treasuries in India to the Military Department. (In thousands of Rupees, omitting 000.)

	1869-70.	1870-71.	1871-72.	1872-73.	1873-74.	1874-75.	1875-76.	1876-77.	1877-78.	1878-79.	1879-80.	1880-81.	1881-82.	1892-88.
	IN THE MONTH.													
April	1,04,40	96,51	93,70	1,02,15	94,58	92,59	92,13	89,35	96,87	1,10,78	1,70,18			
May	99,05	90,59	93,92	94,57	91,32	89,08	91,68	88,59	94,41	99,30	1,34,08	1,71,99		
June	94,93	89,84	88,17	86,88	86,58	89,86	86,81	84,76	89,48	90,05	1,18,51			
July	98,53	90,92	85,07	87,56	82,09	86,65	86,28	80,99	88,46	90,11	1,06,46			
August	94,39	83,48	83,09	83,67	81,45	79,72	81,11	77,53	88,93	85,14	1,15,97			
September	95,09	86,88	79,75	81,49	81,86	79,74	78,79	75,79	84,72	85,46	1,23,45			
October	96,02	85,87	86,57	86,97	88,40	87,26	84,76	88,20	95,47	1,04,74	1,49,55			
November	99,66	93,17	97,36	93,88	88,70	94,17	96,40	89,85	97,70	1,29,35	1,57,84			
December	87,53	86,36	89,63	83,29	87,02	90,94	84,15	92,12	89,35	1,28,95	1,53,16			
January	1,05,10	99,29	94,99	99,45	92,38	97,46	93,15	92,76	95,28	1,51,85	1,76,67			
February	88,39	89,95	91,86	81,46	90,87	86,17	89,55	89,07	93,60	1,51,05	1,71,51			
March	1,01,25	1,27,28*	88,43	88,35	96,58	1,05,44	84,96	91,43	96,40	2,13,68	1,75,00†			
Total	11,64,34	11,20,14*	10,72,54	10,69,72	10,61,83	10,69,08	10,49,77	10,40,44	11,10,67	14,40,46	17,52,38			
Net military expenditure in India recorded in the Finance and Revenue Accounts	11,76,83	11,60,56*	11,14,68	11,09,38	10,89,02	10,79,39	10,78,68	10,96,42	11,54,85	12,18,26	14,43,18	13,28,95		
Net expenditure compared with net disbursements	+12,49	+40,42	+42,14	+39,66	+27,19	+10,31	+28,91	+55,98	+44,18	-2,22,20	-3,09,20			
	TO THE END OF THE MONTH.													
April	1,04,40	96,51	93,70	1,02,15	94,58	92,59	92,13	89,35	96,87	1,10,78	1,70,18	1,71,99		
May	2,03,45	1,87,10	1,87,62	1,96,72	1,85,90	1,81,67	1,83,81	1,77,94	1,91,28	2,10,08	3,04,26			
June	2,98,38	2,76,94	2,75,79	2,83,60	2,72,48	2,71,53	2,70,62	2,62,70	2,80,76	3,00,13	4,22,77			
July	3,96,91	3,67,86	3,60,86	3,71,16	3,54,57	3,58,18	3,56,90	3,43,69	3,69,22	3,90,24	5,29,23			
August	4,91,30	4,51,34	4,43,95	4,54,83	4,36,02	4,37,90	4,38,01	4,21,22	4,58,15	4,75,38	6,45,20			
September	5,86,39	5,38,22	5,23,70	5,36,32	5,17,88	5,17,64	5,16,80	4,97,01	5,42,87	5,60,84	7,68,65			
October	6,82,41	6,24,09	6,10,27	6,23,29	6,06,28	6,04,90	6,01,56	5,85,21	6,38,34	6,65,58	9,18,20			
November	7,82,07	7,17,26	7,07,63	7,17,17	6,94,98	6,99,07	6,97,96	6,75,06	7,36,04	7,94,93	10,76,04			
December	8,69,60	8,03,62	7,97,26	8,00,46	7,82,00	7,90,01	7,82,11	7,67,18	8,25,39	9,23,88	12,29,20			
January	9,74,70	9,02,91	8,92,25	8,99,91	8,74,38	8,87,47	8,75,26	8,59,94	9,20,67	10,75,73	14,05,87			
February	10,63,09	9,92,86	9,84,11	9,81,37	9,65,25	9,73,64	9,64,81	9,49,01	10,14,27	12,26,78	15,77,38			
March	11,64,34	11,20,14	10,72,54	10,69,72	10,61,83	10,69,08	10,49,77	10,40,44	11,10,67	14,40,46	17,52,38			

a. Exclusive of a nominal credit of about 4,23,09 and a nominal debit of 63,03 in adjustment of certain charges and receipts on account of the Abyssinian Expedition.

b. Exclusive of a nominal debit of 58,97 in adjustment of certain charges on account of the Abyssinian Expedition.

* Includes a write back of 39½ lakhs on account of the overland troop transport service.

† Net disbursements reported at 2,08,25; transfer adjustments still to come.

Enclosure 2. in No. 48.

MINUTE by HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, dated 26th May 1880.

1. I circulate herewith a minute by the Honorable Sir John Strachey, on the failure of the military estimates for 1879-80 and 1880-81.

2. Beyond the acknowledgment due to the clearness with which he has stated it, I have but very few remarks to make on the case as it now stands. I must first, however, refer to the minute written upon this subject by Sir Edwin Johnson on the 1st instant, which reached my hands on the 4th instant, when it was forwarded to the Secretary of State with our Despatch of that date.

3. I could not with advantage make any comment on Sir Edwin Johnson's above-mentioned minute pending the completion, thus far, of inquiries which the Financial Department had then in hand, and of which the result has now been laid before us by Sir John Strachey. I fully appreciate the chivalrous impulse of our military colleague in taking to himself personally whatever responsibility might rest on his department. But it is now obvious that both the impressions which inspired, and the explanations which accompanied, that minute are inapplicable to the facts established by subsequent inquiry, and unknown to Sir Edwin Johnson when he wrote it.

4. In whatever manner, or degree, responsibility for the failure that has occurred may, hereafter, be apportioned between persons or departments, the immediate duty involved in the responsibility which rests collectively with the Government of India, is to search out the whole matter down to the root of it, by prosecuting energetically and impartially the investigations initiated by Sir John Strachey; and to lay before the Secretary of State, as soon as we can confidently do so, a complete statement of the final result of these investigations.

5. What we have now to ascertain, with the utmost possible precision, is how, and why, this failure has occurred; the extent to which the evil has reached; and the most effectual means of preventing its recurrence.

6. It is, clearly, not to be explained by reference only to the defects of a system, or to the errors of individual subordinate officers, whatever those errors or defects may have been. Inquiry must also be directed towards every other aspect of the subject, in connexion with which a more active exercise of intelligence could have prevented what has occurred.

7. The statements contained in Sir John Strachey's minute appear to me as complete as they can possibly be, pending the replies still awaited by this Government to the references already made, on the subject of them, to its officers of account and control.

8. The absence of those replies need not, meanwhile, delay the submission of our further report to Her Majesty's Government. Nor do I think that the failure in the war estimates, serious and extensive though it is, can materially affect that real and substantial improvement in the Government of India's general financial position, which Sir John Strachey described in his late financial statement.

9. Neither does this failure in any way affect the soundness of the general principles of our financial policy. It has, however, misled the Government of India, and it has caused us to mislead the Government of Her Majesty, as to the cost of the Afghan War. For this we owe to the Secretary of State the expression of an unqualified regret. But, in contemplating every other aspect of what has occurred, the Government should, I think, be upon its guard against premature assumptions, or exaggerated apprehensions.

10. Whether, apart from the seriously mistaken estimate of it, the actual expenditure incurred on account of the Afghan War has been as reasonable and economical as we have striven to render it, and believed it to be, is a question which cannot now be determined. It is one, however, which, in my opinion, will hereafter demand searching and independent investigation on the part of the Government of India.

11. Such an inquiry cannot be opened while military operations are still in active progress, and while our knowledge of the expenditure actually incurred, or to be incurred, is necessarily imperfect. But if, hereafter, conducted with wisdom and impartiality, it will not only give to the Government valuable information in regard to the past, but will also furnish means for utilising the lessons of the past, to the best advantage, for the guidance of the future.

LYTTON.

No. 49.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 1, 1880.

War estimate Despatch posted, with minute by Viceroy and Sir John Strachey, in continuation of Despatch 4th May. That Despatch avowedly incomplete, but opinion of Government now unanimous that principal causes of failure were defects in system of military accounts, indicated in para. 12. System revised by English Commissioners in 1864 worked satisfactorily in peace, but during war proved defective, and precautions ineffectual. Consequently we were misled entirely by military accounts.

Regarding actual war expenditure, which to end of 1879-80 greatly exceeded amounts shown by accounts, consequent misapprehension vitiated estimates for future. Inquiries still being prosecuted into questions of individual responsibility and otherwise. No reason to suppose that error in estimate has affected actual expenditure. Revised estimates as soon as possible, although postponing opinion regarding probable total cost of war. We fear doubts expressed at end of para. 8, Despatch 4th May, are justified, and must expect total cost largely to exceed sum therein mentioned.

So many technical and other matters involved, that telegraphic summary of Despatch and minute is impossible. We can only repeat former request that you will await papers now sent, which contain full information. We shall not publish here anything more.

No. 50.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 4, 1880.

It would much help me to understand the case if your Excellency could telegraph dates when first information reached Government, or orders were issued, on points mentioned by Sir Edwin Johnson, namely, purchase of transport, supplies for six months, great increase of prices, necessity for extra wages to followers, and for construction of protective works.

No. 51.

DESPATCH to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, June 7, 1880, No. 179
(Financial).

MY LORD MARQUIS,

1. I HAVE received and considered in Council the letter from the Government of India, dated the 4th of May, No. 143, reporting that they had grave reasons for apprehending that the cost of the military operations in Afghanistan would seriously exceed the amount entered in the financial statement for 1880-81.

2. I have also received a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th of May, stating that a further letter was about to be sent, containing minutes by his Excellency and the Financial Member of Council giving complete information on the subject, and requesting that orders by Her Majesty's Government may be deferred pending its receipt; and I have received a further telegram of the 1st of June announcing the despatch of that letter, and indicating the nature of its contents.

3. In accordance with the request of your predecessor's Government, I suspend my final judgment until the arrival of their further communication; but, in the meantime, I think it right to apprise your Excellency that I consider the explanations at present before me to be unsatisfactory and insufficient.

4. From a careful examination of the information which has been supplied, I am unable to gather that the estimates for 1880-81 will be even sufficient to meet the outstanding charges of 1879-80, so that there was in effect no provision whatever for the military operations of the current year.

5. I find that the estimate of the Military Accountant-General for the year 1880-81 was submitted by him on the 19th of January 1880, with a memorandum containing the following words:—"For the Kabul charges it has not been considered necessary to do more than repeat last year's provision, Rs. 2,00,00,000. But for the renewal of hostilities in September last, that sum would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year. With an early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier, the same amount may suffice to wind up the accounts of the campaign; should the operations be protracted, this figure will no doubt have to be increased, hereafter, in the revised estimate, as has been done this year."

6. Major Newmarch states that he had the following data for his estimate:—

1. He considered that something over 100 lacs of expenditure incurred in 1879–80 would be outstanding at the end of the year, and have to be provided for in 1880–81.

2. The estimates of the Controllers of Military Accounts for 1880–81 (of which the dates are not given) were as follows:—

Bengal, 200 lacs, without remark.

Madras, 6 lacs, with a remark that it was prepared with reference to the first four months of 1879–80, which appears to imply that it was an estimate for the cost from April to July inclusive, at the rate of expenditure of 1879–80.

Bombay, nothing, the Controller leaving it to Major Newmarch to supply the figures.

7. Thus the Controllers' estimates amounted to 206 lacs, without any provision for the expenses in 1880–81 of the Bombay army engaged on the Kandahar line, or for the arrears on that line for 1879–80, so far as regarded Bombay troops. Major Newmarch, however, submitted an estimate of 200 lacs upon the supposition that this amount would suffice if the operations were not protracted. Even upon this supposition, the estimate seems to have been insufficient; the 200 lacs provided in 1879–80 included arrears of only 60 lacs, whereas the 200 lacs provided for 1880–81 included an estimated arrear of 100 lacs; consequently, the provision for the current expenditure of the later year was less by 40 lacs than had been allowed for the past year.

8. But, putting aside this minor question, I cannot understand how an estimate based on the expenditure of 1879–80 could have been thought sufficient for 1880–81. I find, from statements transmitted in the Military Department, that the total force in the field and warned for service amounted to 40,260 on the 1st January 1879, and to 51,746 on the 1st January 1880, a large part of the latter force being employed at a much greater distance from its base, and on much more extended operations, than in 1879. During January and February last the military expenditure is stated to have greatly increased; yet, without any prospect of a speedy termination of the operations when the estimates were revised just before the financial statement was delivered, no alteration of the figures was made.

9. Sir Edwin Johnson does not state whether, in recommending the estimate for adoption on the 26th of January, he drew attention to the remark of Major Newmarch above quoted; but I presume that, according to what I understand to be the usual practice, the memorandum was forwarded to the Financial Department with the estimate. If this was done, it requires explanation how, when the time came for revision, no correction was considered necessary in the Financial Department.

10. It is stated in the 4th paragraph of the letter from the Government of India of the 4th of May, that a doubt was felt whether too large an amount had not been inserted by the Military Accountant-General in the Regular Estimate for 1879–80; but, as he maintained the accuracy of the estimate, it was not altered. The great increase of expenditure, however, which is said to have begun in January, and which would materially affect the estimates for 1880–81, seems to have been unknown to the Government of India, or overlooked by them, when the statement was made in the Legislative Council by Sir John Strachey on the 24th of February, and when the Viceroy concluded the debate on the 2nd of March.

11. Yet, assuming that Major Newmarch had made allowance in his original estimate for the great increase of the force shown in the orders given at the end of December 1879, it seems unaccountable that it should not have been foreseen that additional expense would be caused by the orders issued in January.

12. I further remark that this increase, actual or possible, in the force engaged in active operations is not one of the reasons assigned by Sir Edwin Johnson as having led to a disturbance of the calculations. In his minute of the 1st of May he assigns five causes for the disturbance, "which were not, and could hardly have been, foreseen at the time the estimates were prepared;" namely (1), the purchase of a very great proportion of the transport, instead of hiring it; (2), the necessity for purchasing and transporting six months' supplies, to be stowed at the front and on all the lines of communication before the hot weather set in; (3), the enormous increase in the price of grain and other supplies, and of stores, such as firewood and forage; (4), the necessity for paying increased wages, in addition to half-rations, to all followers north of Jhelum; and (5), the necessity for constructing works for the maintenance of the positions and protection of the troops.

13. The dates when orders were issued or information received regarding these

several measures are not stated by Sir Edwin Johnson; and I have applied for this information by a telegram to your Excellency on the 4th instant.*

14. But another question remains, on which none of the papers before me appear to throw any light. I have already referred to the passage in the memorandum of Major Newmarch (para. 12) enclosed in the letter of 4th May, in which it was distinctly stated that his estimate of Rs. 2,00,00,000 was a simple repetition of the sum which, but for the renewal of hostilities in September last, would probably have sufficed to meet the extra charges of the year 1879-80, when, as is known, the spring campaign terminated in the course of June, and the extra military expenditure was reduced within narrow limits.

15. I am unaware of any circumstances which could have enabled the Government of India, at any moment since the commencement of the present year, to anticipate the termination of the campaign of 1880 before the later months of the autumn; and all the information which I possess points to the opposite conclusion.

16. The state of affairs in January rendered it impossible for the Government of India to forecast, with any precision, the duration of their military operations in Northern Afghanistan. At that time the plan of the campaign involved not only the movement of troops on a considerable scale and the purchase and transport of large supplies for Kabul, but also the special enlistment of native soldiers under a system of bounties which were to be granted during nine months from February last. A display of force in the spring was also distinctly contemplated, while there was no indication of any approach to such arrangements for the future Government of the country as could have rendered probable the withdrawal of the troops before the winter.

17. It does not, therefore, appear that, when the estimate of Major Newmarch was finally accepted by the Government of India on the 18th February, any reasonable hope could have been entertained of an "early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier," on which assumption alone the estimate of Rs. 2,00,00,000 had been considered by that officer to be "probably" sufficient; and I am unable to understand how the Government of India, fully acquainted, as they must have been, with the political and military position of affairs in Afghanistan, could have arrived at the conclusion stated in the 4th paragraph of their letter of the 4th May, that there was "no apparent cause for distrusting" "the sufficiency of the Military Department's estimates."

18. Your Excellency will gather from the preceding observations that I regard the circumstances connected with the estimates of war expenditure published in the Budget of this year as of the utmost gravity; and I am only awaiting the explanations which your predecessor's Government have promised me, to communicate to your Excellency the conclusions at which her Majesty's Government may arrive upon these transactions.

I have, &c.

HARTINGTON.

No. 52.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 7, 1880.

Your telegram 4th. Orders for purchase (of) transport, mobilisation, reserves, storage, supplies, &c. all issued before closure of estimates, but local failure of crops and other causes augmented expense (of) measures thus sanctioned. Sir E. Johnson did not, in his minute, intend to imply that above-mentioned orders had not been considered in framing estimates, but that cost of carrying them out was not then sufficiently appreciated, and was increased by circumstances, some of which could not have been foreseen. Sir E. Johnson desires to explain that, in framing his estimates, he fully realised that in any circumstances it would most probably, for sanitary reasons, be impossible to completely withdraw troops to within our own frontier before October, but he considered that active military operations, and consequently war expenditure properly so called, were not likely to extend beyond July, after which date military expenditure would be confined to maintenance of positions, with consequent large reductions of cost. All such considerations as these, however, have become unimportant, as explanations of failure of estimate in light of full information subsequently obtained, which was not before Sir Edwin Johnson when he wrote, and which was sent by last mail. It is now shown that failure (of) estimates is due to Government having been misled as to actual past cost of war, not to any

* "It would much help me to understand the case, if your Excellency could telegraph dates when first information reached Government or orders were issued on points mentioned by Sir Edwin Johnson, namely, purchase of transports, supplies for six months, great increase of prices, necessity for extra wages to followers, and for construction of protective works."

unforeseen expansion of military operations. It has been explained in papers accompanying last Despatch that, for some time after first discovery of failure of estimates, we were looking for explanation in wrong direction; and some of our telegrams, as well as parts of Sir E. Johnson's minute, were consequently written under entire misapprehension of real causes. See specially telegrams of 23rd March and 20th April.

No. 53.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, dated June 8, 1880, No. 177 (Financial). (Received July 3, 1880.)

We have the honour to reply to Lord Cranbrook's Despatches, No. 119, dated the 15th April, and No. 133, dated the 22nd April 1880.

In his minute forwarded with our Despatch No. 176, dated the 1st June, Sir John Strachey has explained the origin and nature of the failure of the estimates of the cost of the war in Afghanistan included in the financial statement of the 24th February last, and has given such indications of its apprehended extent as are possible, in anticipation of the formal revised estimates.

That failure fully accounts for our disappointment in respect to the opening balances of the current year and for our present financial condition, and explains our inability to meet your Lordship's bills, as we expected to do.

2. We cannot be surprised at the dissatisfaction manifested in these Despatches at the contrast between the representations of the condition of our finances contained in the financial statement and subsequent communications. We have already expressed our regret that, having been misled ourselves, we have so misled Her Majesty's Government.

3. Under these circumstances, we think it unnecessary to notice all the details of the criticisms contained in Lord Cranbrook's Despatches. Some of them are based upon hypotheses (as for example estimates of our balances) which later events have disturbed, and others will appear unimportant in the light of later information.

4. We have only to add, upon this part of the subject, that the expectations of an abnormal production of opium under the Bengal agencies have not been realised. The unseasonably early heat appears to have seriously interfered with the amount of the produce, both in Bengal and Malwa, so that it is now doubtful whether we shall not have to indent upon our reserve stock of Bengal opium to complete the provision of 56,400 chests in 1881.

5. Apart from the cost of the war, the accounts of 1879-80 seem likely to show, on the whole, results at least as favourable as the regular estimates; and we are aware of no present reason for anticipating any failure of our estimates for the current year.

6. In the light of subsequent events, we entirely share Lord Cranbrook's regret that we did not arrange for a loan in India as part of the programme of the year; but, with reference to paragraph 14 of Despatch No. 119, we desire to explain that the course which we took was not based upon any intention to borrow a very large sum in 1881. On the contrary, the general prospects of our finances seemed so favourable, that we had some hope that we might avoid borrowing in 1881 also, and certainly did not anticipate that we should have to borrow more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores in that year, unless some unforeseen calamity such as war or famine should occur.

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We have, &c.

LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

J. STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

RIVERS THOMPSON.

J. GIBBS.

ALEX. FRASER.

No. 54.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 16, 1880.

Can you telegraph how far provision made in Budget for war in 1879-80 and 1880-81 respectively will be insufficient, and do you adhere to estimates for frontier railways?

No. 55.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 22, 1880.

Yours, 16th. Cannot yet send detailed revised estimates. Following based on actual treasury outgoings to May. No better estimate probable before statement (for) Parliament. Cannot safely reduce 15 millions (in) paragraph 17, financial member's minute (of) 20th May, but, assuming evacuation begins (in) October, that sum probably sufficient. Total deficiency (in) military estimates 9 millions,—almost wholly due depends on (? to defects in) war record (in) accounts. Financial member's suggested reform. If reform complete, war charges in 1879-80, $8\frac{3}{4}$ millions,—1880-81, $5\frac{1}{2}$ (millions); being excess over estimates (of) 1879-80 (of) $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions,—1880-81, $3\frac{1}{2}$ (millions). If system unchanged, total recorded charges (in) 1878-79, 676,000*l.*; 1879-80, $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions; 1880-81, 9 (millions); 1881-82, $1\frac{1}{2}$ (millions). Foregoing figures all gross. Sets off, increased railway (and) telegraph receipts, possibly one million. Suggested account reforms also involve record (in) 1879-80 (of) other unadjusted differences (in) military and civil accounts, about 450,000*l.* Thus total possible addition in 1879-80 6 millions. Charges (for) frontier railways, 1879-80, closely agree (with) regular (estimate). 260,000*l.* more granted (in) 1880-81 to prevent stoppage (of) work, especially Rawlpindee section.

No. 56.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 24, 1880.

Yours, 22nd. Am I right in believing excess $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions 1879-80 was disbursed during that year, and therefore, when March balance 1,301 lacs was ascertained, $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions excess, besides 260,000*l.* railways, was all that remained to be met beyond Budget provision, 2,090,000*l.* ?

No. 57.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, June 26, 1880.

Yours, 24th. Yes, present estimates only $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions excess (of) war payments this year besides 260,000*l.* railways; rest paid last year. To reconcile 4,214,000*l.*, paragraph 15 (of) minute, with $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions, add 850,000*l.* unspent balances, and 500,000*l.* (for) reasons given (in) paragraph 16.

No. 58.

TELEGRAM to the VICEROY, June 30, 1880.

Yours, 26th. Besides balance 13,010,000*l.*, was 850,000*l.* unspent balances available for war? If so, deducting that sum and budget provision from 5,500,000*l.*, is not excess to be met 2,560,000*l.* only? What is your revised estimated balance for 31st March 1881, assuming home drawings 15,000,000*l.* ?

No. 59.

TELEGRAM from the VICEROY, July 2, 1880.

No. Including balances, war payments this year 635 lakhs; closing balance 12 crores.

MEMORANDUM ON THE FOREGOING TELEGRAMS.

The total cost of the war in Afghanistan, excluding the expenditure on frontier railways, was given in the financial statement as 676,381*l.* expended in 1878-79, 3,216,000*l.* estimated for 1879-80, and 2,090,000*l.* estimated for 1880-81, making a total of 5,982,381*l.*, or say 6,000,000*l.*

In the telegram of the 22nd of June, the total gross cost (that is, without allowing for extra receipts from railways and telegraphs) is estimated at 15,000,000*l.* shewing an excess of 9,000,000*l.* over the former estimate. If a reform which has been suggested by the Financial Member of Council be carried out, by which the military expenditure would apparently be brought into the accounts at a much earlier date than before, the

portion of the excess so brought to account in 1879-80 would be 5,500,000*l.* By this alteration the sum of 71,164,000*l.* shewn (on page 47 of the correspondence laid before Parliament) as "Imperial expenditure" in that year, would be increased by 5,500,000*l.*, a corresponding reduction being made under the heads of "other deposits repaid and advances made" and "balances." Thus, the war expenditure brought to account to the 31st of March 1880 would be nearly 9,500,000*l.*

The cash balance in India was, on the 31st of March 1880, about 1,183,000*l.* below the estimate of February. It has since been strengthened by the loan in India, of which the proceeds will amount to about 3,229,770*l.* On the other hand, the war disbursements in 1880-81 would, under the suggested reform be 5,500,000*l.* instead of 2,090,000*l.* or an excess of 3,410,000*l.* over the provision in the budget. Adding this last 5,500,000*l.* to the former expenditure of 9,500,000*l.*, the total becomes 15,000,000*l.* in the three years.

To this excess of 3,410,000*l.* must be added 260,000*l.* granted for frontier railways; but an extra receipt of 300,000*l.* seems to be expected from railways and telegraphs. Thus there will be a total amount of 3,370,000*l.* to be provided in the current year. The present estimates of the Government of India regarding the war should be re-estimated, and if in other respects the anticipation of the budget estimate should prove correct.

It is uncertain what amount of bills will be drawn in 1880-81; but, on the assumption that the drawings will be reduced to 15,000,000*l.*, the cash balances in India on the 31st of March 1881 are now estimated at 12,000,000*l.*, or about 556,000*l.* higher than the estimate of February last.

India Office, July 2, 1880.

HENRY WATERFIELD,
Financial Secretary.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

P A P E R S

RELATING TO THE

ADVANCE OF AYOOB KHAN ON KANDAHAR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1880.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1880.

LIST OF PAPERS.

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2	" - -	"	"	1 July	Arrival of Ayooob Khan at Farrah. Consequent orders.	3
3	Letter; with 9 enclosures.	Govt. of India	"	6 " (No. 154)	Telegraphic news reports -	3
4	Diary of military events.	—	—	6 July	Advance of force under General Burrows.	5
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6	Letter; with 10 enclosures.	"	"	20 July (No. 162)	" " Mutiny of the Wali's troops.	7
7	Letter; with 9 enclosures.	"	"	27 July (No. 169)	Telegraphic news reports -	10
8	Telegram - -	Governor of Bombay.	"	28 July	<u>Defeat of General Burrows</u> -	12
9	" - -	Viceroy -	"	" "	" "	- 12
10	Letter; with 23 enclosures.	Govt. of India	"	3 Aug. (No. 175)	Summary of events preceding the defeat of General Burrows.	13

P A P E R S.

No. 1.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 27th June 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

TELEGRAM from Thomson at Teheran says, Ayub Khan marching against Kandahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Kandahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrak, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose.

No. 2.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 1st July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

AYUB's advance guard reported to have arrived at Furrak. Orders sent to Primrose and Phayre in accordance with my telegram of the 27th.

No. 3.

No. 154 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 6, 1880.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed)

RIPON.

F. P. HAINES.

JOHN STRACHEY.

E. B. JOHNSON.

WHITLEY STOKES.

JAMES GIBBS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTERS from Herat of 5th instant report that Ayub had some time before sent 1,200 letters to Kabul, addressed to different chiefs and officers, announcing his approach with a powerful army. Informant reports Ayub more than ever in the hands of the Kabulis, and personally unwilling to make any move; also expresses disbelief that any move will be made, and predicts that if it does, the Herati and Kabuli troops are sure to quarrel before they have gone far.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

SEVERAL caravans have arrived from Herat in last few days with news up to 5th. Some preparations were being made for the intended march, and six regiments were at Rozabad. The Governor of Meshed was preventing the exportation of gun caps to Afghanistan. The harvest at Herat has been very fine.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NINTH June is day on which regular troops known to have camped outside Herat. Actual start probably some days later. Nevertheless I recommend despatch of brigade to Maiwand as quickly as possible, if only to confirm fidelity of Wali's troops, overawe Zemindawar tribes, and establish confidence here. Am asking General Primrose to make preparatory arrangements in anticipation of orders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

LETTER from Wali's nephew in Washir, dated 26th, states intelligence reached him that Luinab with advance guard of horsemen had left Herat some days before Ayub, who was then probably at Subzawar. Luinab supposed to have reached Furrah.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th June 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI sends second letter from his nephew in Washir, giving intelligence that Luinab has arrived in Furrah with 800 Sowars, and is collecting Furrah levies. Travellers, who have arrived from Herat in 12 days, say that when they left, Ayub Khan was at Rozabagh with regulars.

In answer to letter of mine about report of desertions written some days ago, Wali writes that 50 or 60 men had returned to their homes when ordered to Washir, that a few of his men were mutinous, but the majority quite trustworthy.

His monthly disbursements for pay amount to one lakh six thousand rupees.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, No. 2122 E.P., dated 1st July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar.

YOUR telegrams, 27th and 30th. Orders are issuing for brigade to Maiwand. Your political instructions are that no hostile troops must cross Helmund, and Wali must be supported, if necessary, in maintaining order this side river. Beyond Helmund he must rely on his own resources.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WALI writes on afternoon of 29th, that messengers from Furrāh state Luinab with 1,000 horse arrived there about the 23rd, and was collecting supplies for army which was at Kushkaba, 16 miles north of Furrāh. Ayub was with army. Kabul troops had their families with them. Wali calculated Ayub arrived Furrāh six days ago, inquires anxiously whether force will move to his support, and asks orders regarding his advancing forces in Washir.

Second letter written night of 29th states messengers from Bakwa report Luinab at Khor Malik, 21 miles, and his advance guard at Chargaz 50 miles, this side Furrāh and four marches from Kandahar frontier.

I am writing to Wali not to risk collision with Ayub's regular troops in Washir, but in absence of (orders?) not giving him definite assurance of active support from here. But I strongly urge immediate advance of brigade.

It is possible that Ayub may delay on frontier; but he may be at Girishk in 10 days or less.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NOTHING of importance has occurred during the week in Kandahar territory; but the menaced invasion from Herat is causing much excitement in the city and neighbourhood.

Ayub Khan appears to have left the city finally about the 18th, and to have reached Furrāh, where he was at the date of the latest advice, about the 24th. He has with him 2,500 horse, including 900 regulars, 10 regiments of infantry, varying from 350 to 500 men each, and six batteries of artillery, including at least one mule battery. He is said to be well provided with ammunition, except caps, of which a supply expected from Meshed had been seized by the Persian authorities at the frontier. A party of 1,000 cavalry under the Luinab, Khushdil Khan, are four or five days' march in frontier, and at date of latest report were in Bakwa.

Before leaving Herat the Ulemas assembled in a mosque and invested Ayub with title of Amir. He has also had money coined in his name.

The Wali is at Girishk with main body of his forces, two regiments of infantry, four guns, and 1,500 horse being in Washir under his nephew, Roshdil Khan.

The weather is much cooler.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

TELEGRAM, dated 4th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

Two regiments cavalry and a battery Horse Artillery marched this morning for the Helmund. There is no news from the Herat direction.

No. 4.

MILITARY DIARY OF EVENTS FOR PERIOD FROM 3RD TO 6TH JULY 1880. (Extract.)

3rd July.—Instructions have been issued for the advance of a brigade from Kandahar to Girishk, but it is not to cross the Helmund. Also for a brigade of the Reserve Division to be pushed forward from Karachi to Kandahar.

5th July.—Lieutenant-General Primrose reports as follows from Kandahar on the 4th:—

“Five hundred sabres 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse, E-B Royal Horse Artillery

“ 40 Sappers and two companies infantry, left to-day for Helmund, under command of General Nuttall. Six companies 66th, and 1st and 30th Native Infantry, leave to-morrow under General Burrows' commanding column.”

6th July.—The following message has been received from Lieutenant-General Primrose from Kandahar, dated the 5th :—

“ Your telegram of 3rd July. My telegram of yesterday to you will have informed you of the departure of cavalry and artillery for Helmund near Girishk. The infantry, 66th Regiment (six companies), 1st Grenadiers, and 30th Native Infantry, left this morning, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Burrows. A month's supplies have been forwarded with the troops. Lieutenant-Colonel St. John accompanies the force.

No. 5.

No. 157 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 13, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 154, dated the 6th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 8th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KHUSK-I-NAKHUD, 43 miles from Kandahar, July 7th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Some difficulty about supplies at last halting place, but abundance here. General Burrows with infantry nine miles in rear.

Wali writes yesterday from Girishk that enemy's cavalry had reached bank of Khashrud, and that remainder were in Bakwa. Doubtful whether he means remainder of cavalry or regular troops, probably the former.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 9th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

9TH JULY 1880.—Mir Karez, 23 miles from Helmund, July 8th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning. All well. Have arranged to break march to-morrow at Oograkh, about 14 miles from here. Infantry brigade at Kushk-i-Nakhud to-day. All well.

Wali sends letter from Washir of 6th, giving intelligence that Ayub arrived at Farah on 30th, with entire force. The families of Kabul regiments reached Farah three days previously; and Muhammad Omar Khan, Nurzai, has undertaken to protect them. The Luinab has collected a depôt of provisions at Dilaram, and his cavalry patrol daily up to the Khash river.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 11th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Choghak, six miles from Helmund, July 9th :—Cavalry brigade arrived here this morning, after 18 miles march over rather heavy ground. Ample supplies sent by Wali from Girishk. Heat much increased. Nothing fresh from Herat direction.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th July 1880.

FROM AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received information from fairly reliable sources to the effect that Ayub's march on the Helmund is not so much with the object of fighting with Sher Ali as to keep the country in a state of anarchy, and make its administration and collection of revenue as difficult as possible. Ayub will, if he can, avoid fighting with the British troops. Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Nassar, is with Ayub Khan, and is said to have been mainly instrumental in adjusting the differences existing between the Herat and Kabuli troops, which formerly prevented the march of Ayub's army. Dissensions still exist. One of Wali Sher Ali's regiments is said to have deserted.

Enclosure 5 in No. 5.

TELEGRAM, dated 10th July 1880.

FROM AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

THE march of the Herat army under Ayub Khan towards the Helmund has caused much excitement in country, but the impression seems to be that Ayub Khan does not intend to oppose the British, but merely Wali Sher Ali. Four railway coolies were killed near Hari gorge by, it is supposed, the relations of the six Marri reported last week as having been killed by the Sind Horse near Thall. The Marri Chiefs have promised Mr. Duke, Political Officer, to surrender the murderers.

No. 6.

No. 162 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 20, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 157, dated 13th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 12th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN UNDER, Simla.

NEWS confirmed that Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan and Habibulla, son of Sirdar Khairulla Khan, have deserted from Wali's force and gone to Naozad. They had accompanied advanced force to Washir. Nothing further is known of their intentions. They had no following. Wali has written to his son here to confiscate their property.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP, bank of Helmund, opposite Girishk, July 10th.—Arrived here this morning. All well. No news from Farah. Three days ago Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, cousin of the Wali, attempted to excite the Wali's troops in Washir to mutiny and join Ayub. On their refusal he quitted the camp with some 80 horsemen, and has gone to Naszad, 40 miles to north-west of this. Wali has sent Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan after him.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 13th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP near Girishk, 11th July.—General Burrows with infantry brigade arrived this morning. All well. The Helmund is fordable everywhere, and presents no obstacle to passage of an army. Forage and wood in any quantity about the river. Other supplies are being furnished in abundance by Wali. Sirdar Gul Muhammad Khan marched for Naozad yesterday evening with a strong body of cavalry. Trustworthy news has arrived that Ayub's main body was at Saki in Bakwa on 6th, and that Luinab was to turn off from that place with the cavalry into Zamindawar. A spy, however, states that Luinab's main body was two days ago at Dilaram, and that his advance guard of 100 men had arrived in Washir. The advanced column of Wali's troops is about 20 miles north-east of this.

Enclosure 4 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 14th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 12th.—An intercepted letter from Luinab shows that he was at Washir on the 10th, and that Ayub was not far in rear. Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan, failing to persuade the Naozad people to rise, has gone to Washir. A son of Sirdar Ghulam Mubiuddin Khan deserted the Wali's advanced guard yesterday with 20 men to join the Sartip.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th, 9.30 a.m.—All arrangements having been made by Wali for crossing to our side river and his baggage packed, Kabul regiment, mutinied, seized guns and Wali's baggage, and drove his cavalry across river. Rest of infantry joined them, and they are now moving along west bank. Cavalry are going in pursuit.

Enclosure 6 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, July 14th.—Cavalry, horse artillery, and eight companies infantry pursued mutineers, who were marching along west bank of river for several miles, and captured all their six guns which came into action to cover retreat, but after a few rounds from horse artillery were abandoned. Majority of infantry had previously dispersed, but a few desperate men held some enclosures and had to be dislodged by infantry. Mutineers' loss not great; may have amounted to 40 or 50; our loss one man, 66th, killed, and two wounded, with some horses. Captured guns and waggons brought in to our camp.

Ayub's army is to-day at Bibanak, three marches distant. Seven deserters from Ayub's regular cavalry arrived here. They left army at Washir, and state Sartip Nur Muhammad has replaced Luinab in command of advanced cavalry, having declared to Ayub that Luinab was in correspondence with Wali. They also declare that Nur Muhammad has advised Ayub to remain in Zamindawar with regulars, while he raised the country with the tribal cavalry.

Enclosure 7 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 16th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GIRISHK, 14th, 9.30 a.m.—Ayub Khan is probably at Lar, two marches distant.

Enclosure 8 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 17th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP MIRKAREZ, July 16th.—Loss and discomfiture of mutineers greater than at first reported. Forty-six bodies were found and buried by villagers, among them colonel of artillery and a captain of Kabul regiment, in which most casualties took place. Part of this regiment marched westward yesterday, but all the others dispersed to their homes on evening of 14th. I found that all the flour and ghee collected by Wali for our use in his camp and the fort had been plundered and carried off. This left force entirely dependent on foraging, from which little was to be expected in neighbourhood of Girishk. The river offering in its present condition no obstacle in any place to the passage of troops, the Wali's army having ceased to exist, and reports reaching me from different quarters that Ayub's intention was to cross river further north, if at all, General Burrows determined rightly, in my opinion, to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, where several roads from Helmund to Kandahar meet, where supplies are abundant and communication with Kandahar easy. Accordingly entire force marched last night 23 miles to this place, and goes on to Kushk-i-Nakhud, eight miles further, to-morrow. The Wali is with us, part of his cavalry has dispersed; part is at Kushk-i-Nakhud with his nephews and other Sirdars.

Post from Kandahar interrupted for one day and bags lost, but is now coming in regularly. Captured guns brought with us, but three waggons with their ammunition destroyed for want of carriage.

Enclosure 9 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 17th.—Force arrived here this morning. All well. Principal Sirdars and Chiefs are here, with about 500 horses. The Alizais of Zamindawar accompanied them, but asked and obtained leave to return to their homes to protect their families and property.

Many of the mutineers have been seized and disarmed, while passing through this on the way to their homes.

As far as can be ascertained the country about here is quiet.
No news of Ayub's force.

Enclosure 10 in No. 6.

TELEGRAM, dated 19th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP, Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 18th.—All quiet in this vicinity *en route* to Kandahar, whence post and single messengers pass constantly without trouble. All accounts tend to show that mutineers, with few exceptions, have returned to their homes, many without arms. Two hundred of Ayub's cavalry reached Girishk yesterday and sent back word of its evacuation to main body then at Mahmudabad, some 16 or 20 miles distant. A servant of Wali's taken off by mutineers to camp of advanced cavalry, states that story of Luinab having been disgraced is untrue, and that he was apparently preparing to cross the river above Girishk. The camp here moves two miles nearer Girishk to-morrow. Supplies are plentiful; immense quantities of grain lying unthrashed in fields round camp, but wood is scarce.

No. 7.

No. 169 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

To the RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, July 27, 1880.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 162, dated 20th July 1880, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegrams relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-i-Nakhud, July 19th.—This morning General Burrows shifted his camp three miles back towards Girishk. Fifteen hundred or two thousand of Ayub's sowars arrived at Girishk yesterday. Main body still at Mahmudabad. Considerable numbers of ghazis have passed along by roads to join Ayub, Abubekr, Alizai, who murdered Colonel Moore's Munshi last year, and headed the force at Colonel Malcolmson's engagement here, is said to have brought a number of men from Zamindawar. In our neighbourhood all quiet. Cavalry patrols regularly for ten miles in every direction.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL BROOKE and Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, escorted by four sowars, were fired at by two men this morning in the Kotal-i-murch, a steep pass

leading into the Arghandab valley, about five miles distant from cantonments. One of the sowar's horses was killed. Parties of cavalry and infantry were immediately sent out to surround the hills, and it is hoped that the men may be caught.

Shortly afterwards a report, probably caused by our troops being seen leaving cantonments, spread among the town people that the enemy were approaching, and a panic ensued. Order was quickly restored, and all is quiet and as usual.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushki-Nakhud, July 20th.—No symptoms of advance by Ayub, whose cavalry have not yet crossed the river. The country in this vicinity quiet, except about the Arghandeh, where Achakzai nomads are committing depredation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 21st July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 21st, 9 a.m.—Enemy's main body reached Helmund about 12 miles above Girishk yesterday, and sent back camels to bring up baggage and stores left behind at last stage for want of carriage. A considerable number of tribal sowars, mutineers, and ghazis had joined them. It is stated to be Ayub's intention to attack us here, moving by Sangbar road. Luinab with a large number of cavalry is reported to have moved down the Helmund with intention of crossing to Arghandab and attacking our camp; but this requires confirmation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

CAMP Kushk-i-Nakhud, July 22nd.—Spies report that Ayub's troops have crossed the Helmund at Haidarabad. A party of his cavalry came yesterday to Sangbar, 14 miles from here, but returned again. A small party of ghazis, who have collected there, state that they expected 4,000 horsemen to arrive to-day, and the main body to-morrow. Few supplies being available at Sangbar, Ayub cannot halt there beyond a day. Being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy's numerous cavalry, General Burrows has shifted his camp to a new position, in which the stores, sick, and baggage animals are in an enclosure. Report raises number of ghazis and men, who have joined Ayub, to 4,000.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 23rd, 9 a.m.—Intelligence brought last night that Luinab with 400 sowars was moving on Maiwand to collect provisions. Main body of enemy was yesterday still at Haidarabad on this side river. Cavalry reconnaissance going towards Sangbar met about 400 enemy's sowars moving towards Maiwand. A demonstration of cavalry and artillery made them retreat by the road they had come. They state that regular troops will remain in reserve pushing forward cavalry and ghazis. Neither will attempt to move by main road, but keep along foot of hills. Herati regiments reported to be very uneasy at being taken so far from home.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

IN and around the city all is quiet. A few shots were fired from outside last night at the Shikarpur Gate, where a guard of our troops is stationed. No one was hurt. The Arghastan, Kadanai, and Derawat districts are slightly disturbed. The rest quiet. No more reports of gatherings. Most of the malcontents having probably left to join Ayub, no further news of Abu Said's sons, who were reported trying to raise a gathering in Kadanai.

On the 14th, Muhammad Aslam with a body of sowars attacked a fort near Kelat-i-Ghilzai, occupied by Sirdar's men collecting revenue. He was repulsed. By latest accounts he was near Shahjui, with a following of about 40 men. District otherwise quiet.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, 24th.—Retirement of enemy's cavalry this morning complete. None have passed us.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 24th.—Reconnoitring parties sent out to Sangbar and Maiwand this morning saw no signs of the enemy. The cavalry driven back yesterday was commanded by the Luinab and fell back from Sangbar to the Helmund. Last night a body of 450 cavalry crossed the hills to the north three days ago, and came down to the Arghandab valley in our rear. It is believed to have been sent by the Sartip to bring away his family hidden in the villages there. A Populzai Khan of Khakrez has brought in letter from Ayub, calling on him to join his army, and reports that Habibulla Khan, Barakzai, has passed up the valley trying to make the people rise. He has as yet had little success, though there is much excitement throughout the country. Much mischief is caused by false reports that the Wali is a prisoner in our camp. Fifty sowars of the Sind Horse arrived here from Kandahar on the 21st, and found road quiet.

No. 8.

TELEGRAM from GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRIMROSE telegraphs to-day from Kandahar:—Terrible disaster. General Burrows' force annihilated. We are going into citadel. General Phayre telegraphed to collect what forces he can, and march on Kandahar. Posts are being concentrated at Chaman. Message ends. I have telegraphed Simla. We can send another brigade if necessary.

No. 9.

TELEGRAM from VICEROY, 28th July 1880, to SECRETARY OF STATE.

GENERAL BURROWS has been seriously defeated by Ayub Khan. Primrose has vacated cantonments at Kandahar and retired to citadel. We are pushing forward reinforcements already on their way, as quickly as possible, and sending large additional reinforcements from India. It may be necessary to anticipate despatch of troops from England intended for this season's reliefs.

No. 10.

No. 175 of 1880.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

TO THE RIGHT HON. THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Simla, August 3, 1880.

IN forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further telegrams regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan, in continuation of those forwarded with our Despatch, No. 169, dated 27th July 1880, we have the honour to summarize, as follows, the information which they contain regarding the reverse sustained by the force under command of Brigadier-General Burrows.

2. On the 12th July news reached Colonel St. John, the Political Officer with General Burrows' force, that the advanced portion of Ayub Khan's army was at Washir, and that Ayub Khan himself was not far in rear. The British brigade was then encamped on the Helmund opposite Girishk, the troops of the Wali of Kandahar being on the further bank of the river. On the 13th, it appeared that the infantry in the service of the Wali was in such an unsatisfactory state and so untrustworthy, that General Burrows and Colonel St. John deliberated on the question of disarming them. But the next morning, before any steps could be taken, the Wali's infantry deserted in a body, taking with them a battery of artillery. The mutineers were pursued by a portion of General Burrows' brigade and dispersed, the guns and baggage being recovered. At this time [14th July], Sirdar Ayub Khan's army was reported to be three marches distant from Girishk.

3. As the mutinous troops had plundered the stores of supplies collected at Girishk by Sher Ali Khan, and as reports had reached Colonel St. John that it was Ayub Khan's intention, if he crossed the river Helmund at all, to do so at a point to the north of Girishk, General Burrows determined on the 15th July to retire to Kushk-i-Nakhud, a distance of 30 miles from Girishk and 45 miles from Kandahar, where several roads from the Helmund to Kandahar converge, and where supplies were plentiful. This retirement was effected on the 17th. On the 18th all was reported quiet in the vicinity of Kushk-i-Nakhud, and it was believed that the majority of the mutinous troops had dispersed to their homes. The advanced portion of Ayub's cavalry had reached Girishk the day before. On the 19th, General Burrows shifted his camp three miles nearer Girishk, and on the 22nd he again moved it to a new position, in which he was able to place his sick, stores, and baggage, in an enclosure, being apprehensive of a night attack by the enemy.

4. On the 21st it had been reported that Ayub Khan's force had reached Haidarabad on the Helmund, 12 miles above Girishk, and that the intention was to advance by way of Sangbar. On the 22nd, our cavalry appear to have come in sight of that of the enemy, who retired without coming into action, a demonstration with cavalry and artillery having sufficed to cause them to fall back. On the 25th Ayub Khan with his entire force was known to be at Haidarabad, while his cavalry occasionally occupied Sangbar, and it was reported to be his intention to advance on the 25th by Sangbar and Maiwand, and to endeavour to pass by General Burrows' force into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar. This news was received by us on the 27th July.

5. On the morning of the 28th we received a telegram from Lieutenant Muir, Assistant Political Officer at Kandahar, announcing the total defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force, with heavy loss in officers and men, and reporting that, in consequence, General Primrose had vacated the cantonment at Kandahar, moving all his troops into the citadel. This intelligence was gradually supplemented, during the 28th and 29th, by telegrams from Sir R. Sandeman at Quetta, who reported that telegraphic communication was broken down before noon on the 28th, between the Chaman Post, west of the Khojak Pass, and Kandahar; the last message received in Quetta intimating that the disaster, though severe, was not so complete as General Primrose had at first believed. The report that the whole of General Burrows' force had been annihilated, which was transmitted to England, and which is inconsistent even with the few details contained in the first account of the affair received at Kandahar, seems to have been founded upon a telegram sent direct by General Primrose to the Bombay Government. Nevertheless, the account of the action

received this morning from Colonel St. John by a telegram, dated Kandahar 29th, leaves no doubt that the British force encountered an enemy greatly superior in numbers, well posted, and of formidable strength in artillery and cavalry, that our force was defeated, and that it fell back in great disorder on Kandahar, suffering heavy loss during the retreat, mainly through the exhaustion of the troops. At Kandahar General Primrose was reported to be making preparations against an attack by fortifying himself in the citadel, where provisions and ammunition are said to be plentiful.

6. We are taking all possible measures for speedily pushing forward reinforcements to the relief of the troops now in Kandahar. As the first step towards the attainment of this object, all the troops at Quetta, in Pishin, and on the railway line between Sibi and Quetta are being concentrated in Pishin, the railway works being temporarily abandoned, until the advance of reinforcements from India make it again possible to arrange suitably for their protection. Troops are also being forwarded from India as rapidly as possible, and a strong division, now under formation at Kabul, will be ready in a few days to march for Kandahar *via* Ghazni.

7. In Kabul and its neighbourhood all is reported quiet, and the necessary arrangements are now being made with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, the newly-recognised Amir of Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

RIPON.
F. P. HAINES.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
WHITLEY STOKES.
JAMES GIBBS.
C. U. AITCHISON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

No. 394, dated Camp Kushk-i-Nakhud, 17th July 1880. (Extract.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. C. ST. JOHN, C.S.I., Resident, Southern Afghanistan, to
A. C. LYALL, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of Government a detailed account of the events of the last few days, with the leading incidents of which my daily telegrams will have kept you informed.

2. The advanced column under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with which I marched, reached Girishk on Saturday morning the 10th, and the main body under Brigadier-General Burrows the following day. The total force then consisted of one battery Royal Horse Artillery, two regiments of Cavalry, one company of Sappers, six companies of British Infantry, and two regiments of Native Infantry.

3. Our camp was pitched in comparatively low ground on the left bank of the Helmund almost immediately opposite the fort of Girishk, from which it was separated, first by the river itself, fordable at the present time at intervals of half a mile at most, and secondly by a belt of grass and jungle over a mile in width. A bridged road leads from the ford to the fort. The camp of his Highness the Wali was pitched about a mile below the fort, partly on the high sloping banks of the river's bed, and partly in the low land below. His force then consisted of three regiments of infantry, numbering about 1,300 men, two six-pounder smooth-bore guns, and about 1,000 tribal cavalry. The remainder of his force was in advance under his nephew Sirdar Roshndil Khan at Karezat, 20 to 25 miles distant, and consisted of 800 infantry, the remaining four guns of his battery, and about 1,500 tribal cavalry.

4. In the evening of the day of our arrival the Wali visited me, and gave me details of what I had heard by message from him in the morning, that his cousin Sartip Nur Muhammad Khan had deserted the advanced camp at Karezat with his own sowars, 50 in number, after an ineffectual attempt to induce the rest of the troops to accompany him to Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan's camp, then in Washir. The Wali then told me that in spite of this evidence of fidelity on the part of the troops, he felt by no means confident in their loyalty. He was anxious for us to cross and camp on the west bank of the river, but I did not then think right to tell him definitely that the General in command had most stringent orders not to do so, hoping that Brigadier-General

Burrows, who would arrive the next morning, would bring permission to act on his own discretion.

5. No such permission having been received, I told the Wali the next evening that under no circumstances should we cross the river. He was much depressed, and said that in that case it would be impossible for him to do anything to oppose Ayub's advance, and that he would concentrate all his troops at Girishk. To this I agreed, considering that if their fidelity was doubtful, it would be better to have the whole of them within reach than to leave a large proportion in a place where there would be no obstacle to their going over to the enemy.

6. The next day (Monday the 12th), I did not see the Wali, but finding from various sources that the disaffection among his troops was far more serious than he had led me to believe, and seeing that he was unwilling that I should go to his camp, I sent for his confidential Secretary, who confirmed the information. By him I sent a message to the Wali asking him whether it would not be better to disarm the whole or part of his regular troops, or, if he was unable to do so himself, to authorise us to take measures for the purpose. To this he eagerly assented, and he appointed the next morning to meet and talk the matter over.

7. At sunrise the next morning I met his Highness on the west bank of the river, and rode with him to the fort and across again to our camp, where he spent a considerable time in discussing the situation with General Burrows and myself. He freely admitted the untrustworthiness of his men, placing the blame mainly on the Sartip and on a certain Sardaru Khan, the principal officer of his army, who was known to have received many communications from Ayub Khan, some of which he had made over to the Wali. "But the only really disaffected corps," he declared, "was the Kabir regiment, about 450 strong, which had been sent to him last September from Kabul, where it had been stationed for 10 years." If this regiment was disarmed there would be no cause to fear the others, but he himself could not disarm it without our assistance. This the very stringent orders received by General Burrows prevented his doing as long as the Wali's force remained on the right bank, and his Highness therefore offered, on receipt of a written request from me, which he could show his officers, to bring the whole of his force to the left bank the next morning. Later on, General Burrows, as reported by telegram, determined to cross the river to disarm the Wali's troops should the step appear necessary. The next morning, while our own camp was being shifted to a better position a mile and a half up stream, I watched the Wali's encampment from the opposite heights. The tents were struck about six, and half-an-hour later the Wali's cousin, Sirdar Dilawar Khan, came across to fix a site for the new camp. Everything was, he said, proceeding satisfactorily, but a quarter of an hour later news was brought me that the troops had mutinied, seized the guns and baggage and driven the Wali and the whole of his cavalry and principal officers across the river. Riding back to the ford I met the Wali with a large number of horsemen; he said that after striking the tents and packing the baggage, the Kabir regiment had marched up to the high bank where the guns were, had seized them, forced the gunners to join them, and driven him and all but a few sowars who joined the mutineers out of the camp. The Wali added that many of the sowars who had accompanied him were untrustworthy, and begged me to fall back in the Kandahar direction at once. I told him that this would be quite unnecessary with our strong force, and that we would first punish the mutineers, and recover the guns. After some delay, mainly caused by uncertainty whether the mutineers intended to hold a position about the fort or move off

Battery, Horse Artillery.
2nd Regiment of Cavalry.
Company Sappers.
Four companies, 66th Regiment.
Four companies, Jacob's Rifles.

towards Herat, and of the attitude of the Wali's sowars, the troops, as per margin, moved across the river by a ford directly in front of our new camp, two miles above Girishk, at 9.30 a.m., the mutineers being then seen streaming along the opposite bank two miles distant. After the troops had crossed the ford I rode on to the advanced guard, which brought the mutineers to bay a few minutes before 11 a.m. at a distance of four miles from the camp. Half-an-hour later they moved to a second position a mile further on, and opened fire with the 6-pounder guns on the cavalry. This they kept up at intervals till the Horse Artillery, whose passage was much delayed by irrigation channels and rough ground, came into action at half-past 12.

8. On the brief engagement that ensued it is not my province to enlarge: suffice to say that at 2 p.m. all firing had ceased and I returned to camp five miles off by a different road and ford to that by which I had come. I mention this to show the feebleness of the obstacle which the Helmund in a season like the present offers to military operations. During my stay of five days I crossed it in nine different places with a guide, in a distance of five miles.

9. On my return I found the Wali with a few servants in our camp; he informed me that the majority of his sowars were still with him, though a few had, he found, joined the mutineers, and a few more fled to Kandahar. Most of those that had remained had sent their baggage in the same direction. Before leaving camp, I had asked that a party with camels should be sent to bring across the *atta*, grain, and ghee stored for us by the Wali in the fort; this had been done, but the *atta* and ghee had disappeared, though large quantities of raw grain remained.

10. The next morning after consultation with the Wali as to the possibility of feeding the troops at Girishk, I reluctantly came to the conclusion to recommend General Burrows to fall back on Kushk-i-Nakhud, whither the Wali had sent the whole of his sowars the night before.

11. The position of Kushk-i-Nakhud offers many advantages. Should the enemy cross at Girishk and follow the road we came, he would have to meet us either in an entrenched position here, or on ground of our own choosing, covering the first water-course on this side of the desert which separates us from Girishk. Should he take the northern road, he would have to meet us at Maiwand, 10 miles off, or, if he keeps to the river line, the Arghandab is less than that distance to the south. In fact, we are half way between the mountains to the north and the sandy desert to the south, at the point where these approach each other most nearly.

12. Should Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, however, carry out what is, according to some reports, his intention of moving to Tirin and Darawut, and stirring up the country from there, the situation would be entirely changed, and the presence of so large a force here useless.

13. In conclusion, I have the honour to make a few remarks with reference to the effect on the country of this so far successful invasion. It is well known to you, that for many months Ayub Khan and his partisans have used every effort to inflame the religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us and our *protégé*, Sher Ali Khan. These had apparently little or no effect at the time and as long as the possibility of an invasion from Herat seemed more than remote, particularly after the failure of the first attempt. But the actual presence on the frontier of an army of their own fellow tribesmen, under a prince of their recent ruling family, the memory of whose oppression a year and a half of prosperity has sufficed to obliterate from the minds of this fickle people, has, I have reason to suspect, created a more powerful and general feeling in Ayub's favour than one who had only known Kandahar a year ago would believe possible; and it is far from improbable that, unless Ayub Khan's army be defeated and dispersed at once, something very like a general rising may take place. That this could attain the formidable dimensions which have been reached in Kabul, the unwarlike character of the modern Durani and the physical features of the country forbid, but it may cause considerable trouble and annoyance and involve somewhat extended operations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th July 1880.

FROM RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 24th.—If enemy moves up Helmund, General Burrows proposes sending back superfluous baggage and sick to Kandahar and moving up Khakrez valley, opening up fresh line of communications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th July 1880.

FROM AGENT, GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

GENERAL Phayre has received information from the Kandahar Road commandant corroborating what I previously told him that Ayub's cavalry meditate an attack in the Gulistan direction on our communication. The general is sending there to-morrow from Quetta a small column consisting of 450 infantry, 2 guns, and a few cavalry.

The 24th Native Regiment is at Darwaza, and hopes to reach Quetta to-morrow or next day.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th July 1880.

From RESIDENT, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

KUSHK-I-NAKHUD, July 25th.—Ayub, with his entire force, is still about Haidarabad. His cavalry outposts occasionally occupying Sangbar, near which two men of Sind Horse on outpost duty were surprised and killed. This morning spies report that he intends moving on the 28th by both roads through Sangbar and through Maiwand. His object being to get past us into the Arghandab valley above Kandahar.

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From Lieutenant MUIR, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

TOTAL defeat and dispersion of General Burrows' force. Heavy loss in both officers and men. General Primrose has vacated cantonments and brought all his troops into citadel. Officers and men returning in small parties. Wali has arrived. Colonel St. John safe.

Enclosure 6 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, GOVERNOR-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

NEWS of this morning from Kandahar. General Phayre and I have consulted together, and these are our views: That our line of communication with India for troops must be the Bolan Pass. The question we beg to refer to Government is what is to be done under present circumstances with the railway line under construction. We consider that the force from Thal-Chotiali to Quetta should be concentrated in Pishin with the least possible delay, and we recommend that the protection of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali should, if possible, be taken by Punjab troops. The Bombay troops, in which we include the whole of General Phayre's division, ought to be concentrated here at once.

General Primrose has telegraphed that he is abandoning Kandahar cantonments and will defend himself in citadel. He has directed General Phayre to march on Kandahar as soon as he can collect army. Primrose says Ayub's army is strong in artillery, which numbers 35 guns well served. We trust as much artillery as can be spared will be sent from India, also Europeans and horses to equip the guns at Quetta. We are quite aware of the very bad political effect the abandonment of the railway line and Thal-Chotiali by the present garrison must have upon the country, unless troops from the Punjab can be sent to relieve them, but state of country and strength of tribes, in our opinion, leave no alternative.

Primrose telegraphed two of our guns had been taken by enemy, who pursued our retreating troops for three miles.

Enclosure 7 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2511 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, GOVERNOR-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves the measures proposed by yourself and General Phayre, and decides that the forces employed for protection of railway line must be at once withdrawn as proposed. We are sending reinforcements from Bengal, and will re-occupy railway line when possible, but present exigencies necessitate pushing forward all available forces toward Kandahar. Viceroy relies on you to use all exertions to co-operate with Phayre in relieving posts and pushing forward reinforcements.

Enclosure 8 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram to-day just received. General Phayre has issued the necessary orders for the troops now protecting railway line to concentrate on Pishin. Movement commences from Thul-Chotiali, and I hope the order for the march will reach Thul-Chotiali on the third day from this. I have directed political officers to heartily co-operate with commanding officers in carrying out General's orders, and to arrange as best they can with the head men of villages to take care of all stores, telegraph line, &c. left behind, until reoccupation of country by our troops. I am in constant communication with General Phayre, who is strenuously exerting himself to push forward all available forces towards Kandahar. His Excellency the Viceroy may rely on myself and officers using our best exertions to aid General Phayre.

Enclosure 9 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th June 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

BEFORE telegraphic communication ceased at 11 o'clock this morning, the following news was received from General Primrose:—Following officers belonging to General Burrows' force had safely reached Kandahar:—Doctor Burrows, Eaton, Harvey, Mainwaring, Geoghegan, Oliver, Griffiths, Whitecot, Dane. Small parties of Burrows' force constantly arriving. Enemy appear only to have pursued for three or four miles. Extent of our losses not yet ascertained, but feared to be very severe. Two guns lost. Jacob's Rifles lost, Smith, Justice, and Coles killed; in Bombay Grenadiers, Anderson severely wounded, Haslet killed. Of R.H.A., Osborne killed, Blackwood wounded. In 3rd Cavalry, Mayne and Reid wounded. In 66th, Roberts killed, Lynch wounded. Enemy very strong in guns; believed to have 35, which they work well. General Primrose mentions that he has sent out General Brooke to bring in stragglers.

Enclosure 10 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 28th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

COMMUNICATION with Kandahar stopped at 11 this morning. I will inform General Phayre of your instructions.

Enclosure 11 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2521 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

WE hear wire cut towards Kandahar. Please use every endeavour to collect and send me early intelligence of passing events there.

Enclosure 12 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2,524 E.P., dated 28th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

Do you know what day and time and where action was fought; also whether Burrows attacked or enemy attacked him.

Enclosure 13 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

His Highness the Khan has sent me the following message in reply to telegrams informing him of substance of what had happened, and asking him to assist us with camels:—*Begins*. Thanks for your three telegrams. I am certain that the enemy will get their due reward soon. I am glad to afford help. My head and my all belongs to the British. I shall never draw back. One hundred and fifty camels, and one hundred horses are ready at Mustung just now; inform me and I shall happily send them to you immediately.

Musa Khan left this three days ago for Quetta with 100 camels. Whatever grain or money is required by the British I am ready to supply. I am certain you will always keep me informed of what is going on for the future. *Ends*.

Enclosure 14 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE this morning again visited General Phayre, and have recorded a memorandum of our deliberations which will be posted to-day. After carefully reviewing the situation we are again forced to the conclusion that, unless other troops can at once occupy the railway line of works, it must be abandoned. I telegraph this to show Government that the abandonment of the line and valuable plant is imperatively necessary, though we have come to this decision most unwillingly.

Enclosure 15 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 29th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram, dated this morning, asks where and when Burrows' action was fought, and whether he attacked. I regret I cannot give any information in addition to what I telegraphed yesterday. Primrose at the time wire was cut did not know the extent of the defeat. The last words that I understood he sent were to the effect that disaster was not so great as at first believed, but very severe; enemy only pursued for three or four miles; two of our guns taken, the others expected in; Brooke sent out to bring in stragglers; intended to abandon cantonments and occupy citadel; his only fear was scarcity of water.

Enclosure 16 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2531 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

VICEROY entirely approves your decision to abandon railway line temporarily. Two strong brigades are being sent up and reinforcements coming from England at once. Send all particulars of Burrows' action as early as possible.

Enclosure 17 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2534 E.P., dated 29th July 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

YOUR telegram 29th. Please convey at once to his Highness the Khan of Kelat, Viceroy's cordial acknowledgments of the friendship and loyalty toward the British Government attested by his prompt and valuable offer of co-operation.

Enclosure 18 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

YOUR telegram of last evening expressing anxiety for news from Kandahar. Within a few hours of the receipt of the news about Burrows, I had sent off reliable men to Kandahar for information last night. The news from Chaman fort was that the Mel Abdul Rahman and Dubrai post, retreating from the line of communication on Chaman, had arrived at Gatai. Fighting was going on, but they were holding their own. Assistance is to be sent this morning from Chaman to help them in. They number 180 infantry and 70 cavalry. The country between Kandahar and Khojak Pass. is in a state of insurrection, the difficulty therefore of communicating with Kandahar is very great. I have sent six letters to St. John and Major Westmacott yesterday at Chaman, despatched to him by messenger, with telegram from me. The country people say that the fight between the British and Ayub's army was severe and both sides lost heavily. I will again despatch letters; but even if my messengers succeed in reaching St. John, an answer to my first letters on account of distance must take, counting from date of despatch, 10 days.

The Kakars and Aitchakzais are reported collecting; but in a few days, I trust, we will be strong enough to hold the country from Quetta to Chaman post.

Enclosure 19 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

FROM Chaman I hear that Major Westmacott went out this morning with 50 sabres, Poona Horse, to assist Major Jacob retreating with road outpost detachments on Chaman. A skirmish took place near Gatai, but I understand there were no casualties on our side. Major Westmacott and Jacob are bringing their men safely into Chaman.

Enclosure 20 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

My telegram this morning. The detachments named therein have arrived at Chaman. No casualties.

Enclosure 21 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 31st July 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

WE have received no direct news from our army at Kandahar. Native sources do not describe Burrows' defeat as crushing. They say that British cavalry and guns were induced to follow the enemies' cavalry, who pretended to fly and led them into a complete ambushade. Ayub's army then delivered its attack, and our troops suffered very severely in officers and men. A battle was then fought, resulting in our retirement on Kandahar, but Ayub's army suffered much. This news, I am sorry to say, requires confirmation. I send it because received from several sources.

Enclosure 22 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 1st August 1880.

From AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta, to FOREIGN, Simla.

I HAVE received the following news from a fairly reliable source :—Ayub Khan's army did not follow up British retreat to Kandahar. Burrows' force has arrived at Kandahar, and our whole army is now in the citadel. When messenger left Ayub was encamped where action was fought. This intelligence seems to corroborate news sent you yesterday that Burrows' defeat was not so crushing as at first believed by Primrose, and that Ayub Khan's army had suffered so much that they were vacillating regarding their further course of action.

Enclosure 23 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, No. 2571 E.P., dated 1st August 1880.

From FOREIGN, Simla, to AGENT, Governor-General, Quetta.

HER Majesty the Queen has expressed her satisfaction at the news of the Khan of Kelat's loyal offers of assistance. Please inform Khan.

Enclosure 24 in No. 10.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd August 1880.

From Colonel ST. JOHN, Kandahar, to FOREIGN, Simla.

29th. Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning, 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 A.M., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared and formed line of battle—, seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being best posted. Till one P.M., action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and, in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 P.M., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Kandahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no efforts would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Kandahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, 40 miles from scene of action, at 7 A.M.; many not having tasted water since previous morning.

Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed and missing,—66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; Artillery, 40; Sappers, 21; Cavalry, 60. Officers killed, or missing,—Major Blackwood, Osborne, Maclaine, Artillery; Henn, Engineers. Galbraith, McMath, Garratt, Cullen, Roberts, Rayner, Honeywood, Barr, Chute, 66th; Owen, 3rd Cavalry; Hinde, Whitby, Grenadiers; Smith, Justice, Cole, Jacob's Rifles. Wounded,—Fowell, Artillery; Lynch, Preston 66th; Anderson, Grant, Grenadiers; Iredell, Jacob's Rifles.

Preparations being now made for siege. Durani inhabitants expelled. Provisions and ammunition plentiful. Wali was present during action, and is now with us, assisting actively. Of course, whole country will rise.

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